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The Topic
This dissertation explores and analyzes James Rachels’s efforts to prove that
Darwin’s theory of evolution has catastrophic implications for traditional Christian ethics.

The Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and evaluate the question of
whether or not protology affects ethics. In particular, I propose to distill the implications
of evolutionary views of origins for ethics, mainly in reference to the issue of human
preference over nature in ethics. I propose to disclose Rachels’s understanding of the
implications of evolution on human preference (greater protections for human beings over

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

non-humans) in ethics (such as biblical-Christian ethics), and to evaluate his views on the
basis of his internal consistency, and the accuracy of his use of Christian history and
biblical data.

The Sources
In order to accomplish this purpose, many sources were consulted, starting with
the works of Rachels himself. Some of the additional authors consulted include: J. V.
Langmead Casserly, Richard Dawkins, Stephen J. Gould, John F. Haught, Cornelius
Hunter, Jerry Korsmeyer, Andrew Linzey, John Rawls, Tom Regan, Lewis Regenstein,
Michael Ruse, Richard Ryder, Peter Singer, Gerhard von Rad, Stephen Webb, Lynn
White, Jr., and Benjamin Wiker.

Conclusions
First, James Rachels is essentially correct in his analysis of the impact of Darwinian
evolution on Christian Ethics. Second, possibly Rachels’s greatest contribution is
identifying Darwin’s rejection o f teleology as the philosophical nerve o f Darwinism.
Third, Rachels correctly identifies two key pillars of human preference in Christian ethics
and shows how evolution undermines each pillar. Fourth, the work o f evolutionary
theologians corroborate Rachels’s assertion that any kind o f theism incorporating
Darwin’s theory cannot sustain a traditional Christian view of morality. Fifth, the
dependence of evolutionary theologians on Process Theology undermines the grounding
of God’s moral authority by limiting His foreknowledge. Sixth, W iker is correct in his
assertion that cosmology affects morality, and that changing from a biblical cosmology to
a materialist one will eventually undermine Christian ethics. Seventh, I conclude that in
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Problem
Ever since Charles Darwin published his ideas on the theory of evolution,
individuals have been passionately pursuing the questions regarding the relationship of
Darwinian theory to ethics and morality. Churchmen, philosophers, and scientists alike
have made claims for and against the viability of such an endeavor.1 A recent attempt to
construct a theory of ethics based on evolution has been made by James Rachels,
professor of philosophy at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, from 1977 to 2003.2
‘James Rachels, Createdfrom Animals: The Moral Implications o f Darwinism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1-4. Hereafter cited as CfA. Rachels’s book
has a well-done presentation on the history of the debate between Christians and
evolutionists regarding the moral implications of Darwinian evolution. See also, C. Leon
Harris, Evolution: Genesis and Revelations (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1981), 17-18, who also presents a series of fundamentalist assertions regarding the
moral implications of evolution. A more general history is found in Duane McCampbell,
“The Development and Failure of the Nineteenth-Century Evolutionary Theory of
Ethics,” Restoration Quarterly 26 (1983): 161-71. For a conservative Christian overview
of evolutionary ethics see, Ian T. Taylor, In the Minds o f Men: Darwin and the New
World Order (Toronto, Ontario: TFE Publishing, 1984), 340-430. Taylor credits
Darwinism for being the root of today's teaching of situation ethics. He likewise cites a
humanist author as declaring that Darwin's discovery sounded the death knell of religious
and moral values (421-22).
2James Rachels (1941-2003) first served as chair of the philosophy department,
then as dean of arts and humanities. He returned to regular professorship in 1983 and
continued in that capacity until death from cancer in 2003. According to the University
1
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This dissertation will endeavor to analyze and evaluate his views. Before presenting the
problem, purpose, and method, I shall briefly sketch the historical background of this
topic.

Historical Summary of Evolutionary Ethics
“Evolutionary ethics,” says Michael Ruse, “is a subject with a bad reputation, not
entirely undeserved.”1 Indeed, as Paul Lawrence Farber observes, previous attempts to
construct a model of ideal behavior based in evolutionary theory have produced some
notable disasters including the British, German, and American practice o f eugenics, and
the Nazi racial hygiene policies.2 In addition to these notorious attempts to create an
evolutionary ethics, we find there has been a small but steady stream o f thinkers who
have pursued this task.
Farber divides the history of evolutionary ethics into three stages. Stage one
extends from the latter portion of Darwin’s life to about World War I. The second stage

Radio Station, WBHM, his textbook, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy, is about to
become the most sold ethics textbook in history, currently used as required reading in
about one-third o f all university ethics courses in U. S. colleges and universities. See,
WBHM, “In Memoriam: James Rachels 1941-2003,” Undated, http://www.wbhm.org/
News/2003/rachels.html (18 May 2004). For an obituary of James Rachels copied from
the Birmingham News, see, “James Rachels, Ph.D. 1941-2003,” 6 September 2003,
http://www.bradpriddy.com/rachels/obituary.htm (18 May 2004).
'M ichael Ruse, “The Significance o f Evolution,” in A C om panion to Ethics,

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, ed. Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Publishers, 1991; 1993 paperback with corrections), 500. Ruse is one o f the most
prominent evolutionary ethicists during the last decade.
2Paul Lawrence Farber, The Temptations o f Evolutionary Ethics (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1994), 3-4. See also I. Taylor, 406-11.
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covers the era from World War I to the 1960s. The third stage originated in the 1970s and
continues to the present.1 Farber asserts that the third stage is simply a revival of the
previous, discredited attempts to construct an evolutionary ethics. Thus Farber and likeminded thinkers assert the third stage was defeated before it even started.2
It is my contention that the third stage must still be taken seriously. While the third
stage o f evolutionary ethics tends to be more an explanation of the moral nature of man
in evolutionary terms than a system of ethics, it is of greater significance than the prior
two stages for at least three reasons.
First, a leading advocate for the third stage, Robert Wright, openly declares that the
new Darwinian synthesis3 is more than just a scientific theory. He asserts that it is, in
reality, a new worldview,4 thus ascribing a metaphysical dimension to evolution.5
'Farber, 6. Farber outlines the representative proponents of evolutionary ethics for
each of these three stages as well as their opponents. See pp. 6-8. See also, Robert
Wright, The Moral Animal: The New Science o f Evolutionary Psychology (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1994), 4-5, 39-42, where he outlines the key players in the development
of what Farber describes as stage three.
2Farber, 2. Timothy Anders, Anthony Flew, and Elliot Sober likewise reject
current attempts to create an evolutionary explanation of morality or an evolutionary
ethics. See, Timothy Anders, The Evolution o f Evil (Lasalle, IL: Open Court, 1994),
329-330; Anthony G. N. Flew, Evolutionary Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1967), 5; Elliot
Sober, From a Biological Point o f View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 111.
3Wright repeatedly uses the technical terminology the new synthesis to describe this
new stage of ethical thinking informed and guided by evolutionary theory.
4Wright, 4-5.
5Wright may be the first evolutionist to make such a blunt confession, but Julian
Huxley comes very close to asserting the same viewpoint. See Julian Huxley, Essays o f a
Humanist (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 73.
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Second, the third stage is unique in its ubiquity, spilling out of the ivory towers into
everyday publications,1particularly since about 1990. Third, this stage of evolutionary
theory and ethics revives teleology and design. The new paradigm seems bent on a quest
to find, in Antony Flew's words, “some immanent substitute for Divine Providence.”2
These three characteristics of the third stage seem to make it significantly different
from the first two stages of evolutionary ethics. Thus we should not dismiss it with glib
comments.

‘See Farber, where he laments that, “We read daily in journals and magazines that
biology holds the key to human nature” (2). Examples include two cover features in
Time: First, Paul Gray, “What Is Love?” Time, February 15, 1993, 47-49; Anastasia
Toufexis, “The Right Chemistry,” Time, February 15, 1993,49-51; the cover title being
“The Chemistry of Love”; second, Robert Wright, “Our Cheating Hearts,” Time, August
15, 1994,44-52; the cover title being, “Infidelity: It May Be in Our Genes.” Other
articles include: Paul Galloway, “Darwin II,” Chicago Tribune, October 5, 1994, Tempo
1-2; Daniel Goleman, “Science: Flirtatious Come-ons Are Linked to Our Survival,”
South Bend Tribune, February 16,1995, A12; Natalie Angier, “Sexual Harassment: An
Activity Throughout the Animal Kingdom,” South Bend Tribune, October 12,1995, A13;
Robert Wright, “Science and Original Sin,” Time, October 28,1996, 76-77; idem, “Styles
of Polygamy,” 30 August 1996, http://www.slate.com/id/2013/ (7 November 2005).
Another vein related to the biological roots of human nature is the attempt to blur the
distinction between humans and other animals by showing evolutionary roots of human
characteristics in lower animals. Examples include: Nathan Myrhvold, “So You're a
Human Being: Isn't that Special?” Time, August 26, 1996, 64, condensed from idem,
“Mars to Humanity: Get Over Yourself,” 15 August 1996, http://www.slate.com/id/2361/
(7 November 2005); Paul Davies, “The Harmony of the Spheres,” Time, February 15,
1996, 58; Turning Point [Television Broadcast], October 10, 1996 (New York: ABC
Television)[hosted by Diane Sawyer]; Kenneth Miller and Anne Hollister, “What Does It
Mean to Be One o f Us?” Life, November 1996, 50.
2Flew, 4. See also McCampbell, who describes Flew's concern as “surrogate divine
providence” (171). For a more recent assertion of an immanent, self-ordering principle,
see Davies, “The Harmony of the Spheres,” Time, 58.
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Christian Moral Foundations Challenged by
the Third Stage of Evolutionary Ethics
Christian concepts o f morality are implicitly and openly challenged in the new
synthesis. For example, Ruse asserts that there are no philosophically objective
foundations for ethics. Morality “is just an illusion, fobbed off on us to promote
biological ‘altruism.’” Thus, morality and ethics become simply another example of an
evolutionary adaptation aiding the prowess of the species, and limiting the explanation of
ethics to causal argumentation.1 More specific challenges to Christian ethics are found in
regard to man's relationship to (or position in) nature.

Christian Morals and Man's Relationship to Nature
The General Issue
H. James Birx addresses the contrast of evolutionary thinking with Christian
thought, writing: “The theory o f evolution is indispensable for both believers and non
believers if they are to achieve a sound understanding of and proper appreciation for the
true place of humankind in nature.”2 Birx asserts that the proper understanding of man's
place in nature requires man to overcome geocentrism and cosmocentrism.3
Nathan Myrhvold similarly asserts that the recent assertion of finding bacterial life
’Michael Ruse, “Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen,” Zygon 21 (1986): 102.
See also idem, “The Significance of Evolution,” m A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter
Singer (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 43-44.
2H. James Birx, Interpreting Evolution (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991),
104.
3Ibid., 101.
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from Mars opens the next frontier of hubris: “Humans are still the only intelligent
life—right? The wagons will circle to defend this last bastion of human conceit.”1
Similar claims are also originating in the areas of genetics and embryology.2

The Imago Dei and Man's Relationship to Nature
Several authors have directly addressed the issue of man as the image of God.
Philip Hefner briefly explores how evolution undermines Western religious tradition
which separates man from nature and gives him moral preference over nature.3 Paul
Davies asserts that if extra-terrestrial life is discovered, evolution would be affirmed
while traditional Christian belief in the special relation of mankind with God would be
undermined.4 Ruse concludes, “We believe that it simply has to matter that we are
modified monkeys rather than a special creation of a good God, in his image, on the sixth
day.”5 J. H. Randall likewise declares: “Man's relation to nature was basically altered.
He was no longer a fallen angel, but a great ape trying to make good, the last and best'Myrhvold, 64.
2See Miller and Hollister, 50. Significantly, the magazine cover reads “The Dawn
of Life,” then in another part o f the cover, “Revolutionary prenatal photographs of
humans and animals challenge our view of our origins—and of ourselves.”
3Philip Hefner, “Nature, God's Great Project,” Zygon 27 (1992): 327, 334-339.
"Davies, 58.
5Ruse, “Significance,” 502. See also idem, “Phoenix,” 95, where Ruse restates his
view as follows: “We humans are modified monkeys, not the favored creation of a
benevolent God, on the sixth day.”
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bom of nature's children.”1 If these statements are true, then humans must be viewed as
merely moral monkeys and angelic apes for they are, as Wright implies, the only animal
to evolve a moral dimension.2

The Work of James Rachels
Of even greater significance, however, is the work of James Rachels. Rachels
expressly recognizes the importance to ethics of the place and role of man in nature. He
convincingly argues that traditional morality depends on human beings being placed in a
special moral category.3
Rachels, an avowed Darwinist, clearly seeks to show how Darwinian evolution
undermines two classic justifications of the special status of man: That man is different
from animals because he is the image of God, and that man is different from animals
because he possesses reason. By destroying these two distinctions, man no longer can be
special and treated on a different standard from animals. Humans are different only in
degree, not in kind.4
’J. H. Randall, “The Changing Impact of Darwin on Philosophy,” in Darwin, ed.
Philip Appleman (New York: Norton, 1970), 415. Also quoted in McCampbell, 163.
2See Wright, Moral Animal, 3-4, where morality is treated as being a unique trait of
the human animal. Also note his book title, The Moral Animal.
3Rachels, CfA, 4-5. The full development of Rachels’s arguments is delineated
especially in chapters 4 and 5 o f his book. Chapters 1-3 are the foundational and
background material that prepares the way for his exposition of man's place in nature (his
non-uniqueness) in chapter 4. His exposition of his ethical system, “Moral
Individualism,” is in chapter 5.
4Ibid., 171-172. This is Rachels’s own summary o f the first four chapters of his
book. It gives the essential points without the detailed arguments.
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Rachels offers a new morality called “Moral Individualism.” He asserts that ethics
are determined by the individual's characteristics and the situation, not by the “species”
of the creature. One's view of human life thus will no longer be a form of superstitious
awe, and non-human life will be treated with greater dignity.1
While Rachels is quite convincing in his depiction of the impact o f evolution on
human preference ethics, there appear to be at least two key areas o f possible weakness.
First, Rachels is clearly an ardent animal rights supporter (and also seems to support
euthanasia).2 He seems almost polemically driven in his attempts to equalize animal and
human rights.
Second, Rachels also seems to create a straw-man by generally limiting himself to
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century (i.e., industrial revolution era) viewpoints in depicting
the model of human preference ethics, which he then challenges. The model he rejects
seems to take a rather extreme view of human preference and may actually turn out to be
a mix of Enlightenment-Humanism and Christian thinking.

Problem
Since Rachels uses evolution to challenge the concept of human preference over
nature and ethics rooted in a preferential view of humans, Christians (and those of similar
belief such as Jews) are faced with the problem of the veracity o f his conclusions and
their implications for Christian ethics. In what ways will ethics be affected by how
'Ibid., 4-5, 171-172.
2Ibid., 173-223.
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protology defines man's relationship to nature? In particular, how will ethics be changed
by abandoning human preference as Rachels does by accepting Darwinian protology?
More specifically, this study must evaluate the accuracy of his depiction of
Christian ethics and ethical foundations. How he treats Christian ethics may undermine
the veracity of his depiction of the implications that evolution would have on ethics based
on human preference. Additionally, this study must examine if Rachels has adequately
established the possibility of doing evolutionary ethics.

Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and evaluate the question of whether
or not protology affects ethics. In particular, I propose to distill the implications of
evolutionary views of origins for ethics, mainly in reference to the issue of human
preference over nature in ethics, particularly in reference to the views of James Rachels.
I propose to disclose Rachels’s understanding of the implications of evolution on
human preference ethics (such as biblical-Christian ethics), and to evaluate his views on
the basis of his internal consistency, and the accuracy of his use of Christian history and
biblical data. Likewise, I shall assess and evaluate Rachels’s assertion of the
foundational role of human preference in Christian ethics. My analysis will presume a
biblically oriented Christian perspective, as represented by Seventh-day Adventism. I
shall, of course, not study Rachels in isolation from evolutionary ethicists contemporary
to him (such as Michael Ruse and Robert Wright).
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Significance of This Study
This study o f Rachels is significant for several reasons. First, Rachels offers a new
approach to ethics yet one finds no scholarly responses to Rachels’s position. Peter
Singer receives much attention. By contrast Rachels remains essentially untouched, even
in Christian literature.
Second, the fact that Rachels builds his ethics by going head to head against
Christian ethics begs for further investigation. His attacks on the view of man as the
image of God and his evaluation of the moral implications of that doctrine provide a
direct comparison o f the ethical implications of two views of human origins.
Additionally, his rebuttals raise serious questions regarding what it means to be a human
being.
Third, some branches of Christianity have accepted evolutionary theories of
origins. Mainline Protestants, and now the Pope, have taken a territorial approach to the
issue of origins: Science gives us the physical mechanisms of origins through the theory
of evolution while Religion explains the metaphysical soul dimension of man.1 The
Presbyterians made some social statements in the mid-1980’s that clearly propound an
evolutionary-based social ethics similar to Julian Huxley’s. However, there seems to be
no organized, Evangelical-Conservative Christian response. I find a strong impetus for
Barnes Collins, “Vatican Thinking Evolves,” Time, November 4, 1996, 85. Many
newspapers reported the Pope's declaration o f acceptance of the theory of evolution in
reference to the physical evolution of man (October 24-26, 1996, depending on the
newspaper), but only Time notes the territorial issue.
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this research in the silence of most Christian scholarship regarding positions such as
Rachels’s.
Finally, Rachels appears to be compatible with a Postmodern emphasis on
debunking human preference in morality, and in advocating animal rights.1 In addition,
his connection to the larger, animal rights movement is of some significance due to its
use of evolution to minimize human specialness, though in a less thorough manner than
Rachels.

Limitations and Delimitations
In this dissertation, I shall focus primarily on the work o f Rachels. Since most of
the work in evolutionary ethics has been done by American or British thinkers, I shall
primarily focus on these thinkers when going beyond Rachels himself.
This dissertation is not designed to address directly the relative merits of creationist
or evolutionary theories of origins.2 It rather will focus on the ethical/meta-ethical

‘See Gene Edward Veith, Jr., Postmodern Times (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books,
1994), 72-79; Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1996), 92-93; Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things: An Archaeology o f the
Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 342-43. See also, J. Richard
Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Truth Is Stranger Than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a
Postmodern Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 57, where some metaethical implications o f the human identity issue are mentioned.
2It is also not necessary to argue directly over the merits of Darwinism versus other
naturalistic theories o f origins. In regard to human preference, it seems likely that
Rachels could have chosen any theory of origins which eliminates divine providence,
depicts man as just a highly developed animal, and still have produced the same or
similar results as his analysis o f the implications of Darwinism on ethics. Man still
would lose his special status with God and over nature. Also, the veracity of a given
theory o f origins does not change the implications of that view on human preference
ethics. Rather, veracity affects how widely the implications will be distributed. Finally,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
implications of evolution on ethics, with a special emphasis on the issue of human
preference in ethics. Additionally, I do not address the dualistic view that the physical
nature o f man evolved while the soul is created or generated by God.

Methodology
To accomplish this purpose, I describe and delineate Rachels’s evolutionary ethics
and his portrayal of Christian-based ethics. I compare these two approaches as explicated
by Rachels, particularly how the issue of human preference is influenced by evolutionary
and Creationist protologies, and how the resulting views of human preference affect the
respective ethics. I analyze Rachels’s presentation of Christian ethics and his proposed
evolutionary ethics, testing the consistency and strength of his arguments. I evaluate
Rachels’s methods and conclusions, and identify implications of Rachels’s assertions
regarding evolution and human preference for Biblically based ethics.
Finally, I attempt to introduce some biblical concepts of the relationship of man to
nature that Rachels does not seem to consider. I particularly focus on the basis of human
preference in the biblical data, with a special emphasis on the Image of God (.Imago Dei)
and human dominion over nature. With these points in mind, let us turn to a more
detailed look at historical views on man’s relationship to nature.
the significance and influence o f Darwinism on the intellectual world cannot be
minimized in spite of the criticisms against it.
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CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution brought to full fruition a tension between two
views of the world. This tension first appeared in the pre-Socratic philosophers but has
been especially acute since the advent of modem science. Morris Goldman describes
these viewpoints, and in so doing, introduces the key issue to understanding the ethics
proposed by James Rachels. This issue is the relationship of man to nature. In
Goldman’s words:
The religious outlook is characterized by a view of man as a transcendental
creature who has, inherently, duties and privileges that extend beyond what is
applicable to the rest of nature. Furthermore . . . is the concept that there exists a
God who . . . controls and directs the natural w orld.. ..
The secular view denies both these propositions.. . . It sees man as one
animal species among millions of others, with no inherently special privileges
beyond what it makes for itself by virtue of its unique mental capabilities. There is
no supernatural God.1
The Theocentric half of this opposing pair o f ideas has been a key principle in not only
Christianity, but also in the Jewish and Moslem faiths. Thus Cragg notes that the
underlying belief in Christian, Jewish, and the Moslem faiths is the “concept of man as

‘Morris Goldman, “Man’s Place in Nature,” Tradition: A Journal o f Orthodox
Thought 10 (1968): 100.
13
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the proper imperialist, the dominion-holder in the earth.” Man is seen “as the vicegerent
set over the things under God.”1
It is this so-called imperialist view that led to Lynn White’s landmark article in
1967,2 charging that the current ecological crisis is a result of the influence of
Christianity. Wesley Granberg-Michaelson distills these accusations against Christianity
into four specific charges: First, that Gen 1:28 “sets humanity apart from nature and
directs humanity to conquer and exploit it.” Thus humans are viewed as “divinely
appointed . . . to place nature firmly under its subjugation.” Second, “Christian values in
the Middle Ages encouraged the development of modem technology, which flourished
under a doctrine o f humanity’s transcendence over nature. These two new
forces— science and technology—then merged together with the blessing of Christianity,
giving humanity unprecedented and uncontrolled power over nature.” Third, the
Christian dualism between the spiritual and the material, the heavenly and earthly, made
the things of this earth of little importance, or even regarding the material world as
inherently evil. Thus man is distinct from nature because he is “spiritual” while nature is
“material.” Finally, “the belief in the Second Coming . .. negates any reason to improve
or
‘Kenneth Cragg, The Privilege o f Man: A Theme in Judaism, Islam, and
Christianity (London: University of London/Athlone Press, 1968), 3.
2Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” Science 155
(1967): 1203-1207. This article was reprinted as a chapter in, Western Man and
Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1973), 18-30. Hereafter, page citations are
to Barbour’s edited book.
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even preserve the world until then.” Granberg-Michaelson specifically cites Hal
Lindsay’s dispensationalist eschatology as an example of this attitude.1
Ever since White’s article, Christian scholars have been debating whether Christian
beliefs have caused or contributed to the current strains on the earth’s environment.
Central to this discussion is the issue of how Christianity views man’s relation and role to
nature. Part of the challenge is that, up to the present time, no systematic theologies have
dedicated a specific section to nature and man’s relationship to it. As John Jefferson
Davis has observed, twenty major Systematic theologies have been produced in
Evangelical circles since White’s article but very few have addressed the issue of our
ethical obligations to the rest of nature. In fact, for these twenty systematic theologies,
the median percentage of material dedicated to environmental stewardship is 1 percent,
with a range from 0-12.5 percent.2
Andrew Linzey picks up and intensifies the charge, noting that
Mainstream Christianity still propagates a range o f ideas about animals which are
hugely detrimental to their status and welfare. Animals are “here for our use,”
indeed, “made for us.” Animals have no immortal soul, no rationality, no intrinsic
worth. Animals are subordinate to humankind, who have be given ‘dominion’
(commonly understood as despotism) over them. How far these ideas are distinctly
and authentically Christian is beside the point; the fact is that the Christian tradition
has propagated them—and still defends them.
Indeed, those who wish to justify the exploitation of animals regard the
Christian tradition as the last bastion of the anti-progressive sentim ent.. . . Ethical
‘Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, A Worldly Spirituality: The Call to Redeem Life
(New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 30-32.
2John Jefferson Davis, “Ecological ‘Blind Spots’ in the Structure and Content of
Recent Evangelical Systematic Theologies,” Journal o f the Evangelical Theological
Society 43, no. 2 (2000): 274, 284.
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sensitivity, it was supposed, constitutes nothing less than a rejection of Christian
Values: It seems increasingly part of a post-Christian ethic, however to nourish the
belief that animals possess dignity, personality and spirit that entitle their interests
to be considered in the same fashion as the rest of us.1
It is precisely argumentation along this line that appears to have influenced Rachels
in rejecting Christian ethics as insufficient and thus the need to move beyond Christianity
and attempt to create an ethics based in neo-Darwinism. It therefore seems prudent to
delve a little more deeply into the dominant strains to Christian thought to see if these
charges are substantiated and to provide the theological context for understanding
Rachels’s ethics.

Man and Nature in Patristic Thought
Introduction: Greek Philosophical Influence
The relationship o f man to nature in the Patristic literature is a sketchy matter since
their viewpoint can only be derived by incidental comments and discussions. However,
it does appear that the early fathers were significantly influenced by Greek philosophy.2

'Andrew Linzey, “Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?” in
Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals fo r Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew
Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press [Illini Books],
1998), xi-xii.
2There appears to be some historical significance to the pre-Socratic philosophers
which fits better in the context of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, than with the Early
Church Fathers. Richard Tam as asserts that w hile some Greeks like the Pythagoreans

sought to maintain the ancient myths and mystery religions, while simultaneously
pursuing philosophical development, by contrast, “the general tenor of Greek intellectual
evolution was otherwise, as from Thales and Anaximander to Leucippus and Democritus
a naturalistic science matured in step with an increasingly skeptical rationalism.. . . With
the exception of the . . . Pythagoreans, the Hellenic mind before Socrates followed a
definite, if at times ambiguous, direction away from the supernatural and toward the
natural: from the divine to the mundane.” Richard Tamas, The Passion o f the Western
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One example o f this influence can be found in the work of Aristotle.
In his discussion on acquiring wealth, Aristotle makes an argument that would be
often repeated in Classic Christian interpretations of the Genesis statement on human
dominion over nature. In his Politics (1:3), he asserts that it is nature’s order,
that the plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of
man, the domestic species both for his service and for his food, a n d . . . most of the
wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that
they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. If therefore
nature makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all
the animals for the sake of men.1
Robert Reneham observes that classic Greek philosophers argued that man was
superior to animals because man alone, has reason and rational speech and can
experience an emotional sense of anticipation to future events. Man alone has unique
abilities with his hands. Man alone stands erect on two legs as a primary posture.
Laughter is unique to humans. Because of these unique attributes, man alone is seen as
being, in a sense, divine.2
Mind: Understanding the Ideas that Have Shaped Our World View (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1991), 23-24. Benjamin Wiker sets forth the position that Epicurean
materialism was revived in the Renascence and came to its culmination in Charles
Darwin’s theory o f evolution. Thus the pre-Socratic and Epicurean draining of divinity
from nature may have helped transform nature into an object of scientific study, but
seems to have had little bearing on early Christian theology. See also, Julian Marias,
History o f Philosophy, trans. Stanley Appelbaum and Clarence C. Snowbridge
(NewYork: Dover Publications, 1967), 95; and Benjamin Wiker, Moral Darwinism: How
We B ecam e H edon ists (D ow ners Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 34.

'Aristotle, Aristotle in Twenty Three Volumes, vol. 21, Politics, trans. H. Rackham,
Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Gould (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1977), 37.
2Robert Reneham, “The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man,” Harvard Studies
in Classical Philology 85 (1981): 248-51.
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In addition to Aristotle, Robin Attfield observes that the Stoics believed that the
irrational existed for the sake of the rational, and thus man can do to non-human nature
whatever he pleases.1
D. S. Wallace-Hadril declares that for most of the early church fathers, man’s erect
posture and rational ability allows him to transcend the material world and look to
heaven. Rationality was viewed as a reflection or image of divinity.2 Three well-known
church fathers illustrate this orientation reported by Wallace-Hadril: Gregory of Nyssa,
Basil, and Ambrose.

Gregory o f Nyssa (A.D. 330-395)
Gregory of Nyssa has one o f the best developed expositions on man’s relationship
to nature found in Patristic literature. In his treatise, On the Making o f Man, Gregory
asserts that man’s great significance is found in the fact that “no other existing thing, save
the human creation, has been made like to God,” especially noting that the “soul was
fashioned in the image o f Him Who created him.”3 Gregory outlines to the reader, thirty
points of discussion he will pursue on the topic of man’s creation, several of which
impinge on man’s relationship to nature.
In Point 2, Gregory uses royal language to describe man’s relation to nature. Man
lRobin Attfield, “Christian Attitudes to Nature,” Journal o f the History o f Ideas
44, no. 3 (1983): 371.
2D. S. Wallace-Hadril, The Greek Patristic View o f Nature (New York: Barnes
and Noble, 1968), 75.
3St. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making o f Man, trans. Henry Austin Wilson
(Manassas, VA: Eternal Word Television Network, 1996), 1.
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was created last because it is not fitting “that the ruler should appear before the subjects
of his rule; but when his dominion was prepared, the next step was that the king should
be manifested.” The earth was thus “a royal lodging for the future king” in which “all
kinds of wealth had been stored in this palace [i.e., the earth]” for his use. He further
states that man’s position as ruler over nature was “assigned to him” by God.1
Gregory further proposes in Point 3 “that the nature of man is more precious than
all the visible creation.” His explanation is that the “the elemental foundation for the
formation of the universe, the creation is, so to say, made offhand by the Divine power,
existing at once on His command, while counsel precedes the making of
man.” He reiterates this argument a second time: “O marvellous! a sun is made, and no
counsel precedes; a heaven likewise;. . . All are brought into being with a word, while
only to the making of man does the Maker of all draw near with circumspection, so as to
prepare beforehand for him material for his formation.”2 The conclusion, then, is that
man must be more precious than the rest of creation due to the more intricate divine
involvement in his creation.
Point 4 continues the regal argumentation introduced in Part 2. Gregory asserts
that man’s nature was made “as it were a formation fit for the exercise of royalty.”
Again, “our nature was created to be royal from the first.” He ties this rulership to the
concept of the image of God by making an analogy to the artisan who makes an image of
Tbid., 5.
2Ibid., 5-6.
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a royal personage. The artist indicates its “royal rank by the vesture of purple.” In the
same way, “the human nature also, as it was made to rule the rest, was, by its likeness to
the King o f all, made as it were a living image, partaking of the archetype both in rank
and in name, not vested in purple,. . . but instead of the purple robe, clothed in virtue,
which in truth is the most royal of all raiment.”1 Here (more clearly than in Part 2)
Gregory more clearly ties the royal rank of humanity to its being created in the image of
God.
These comments constitute the major corpus of Gregory’s argument on human
superiority over nature, and indeed shows a highly developed theology of human
primacy. Thus, for Gregory, Man is superior to nature because he was made like God
(i.e., in God’s image), he was made to be a sovereign ruler over the things of nature, he
was given the virtues for rulership, and therefore, the riches of nature are for man’s use.

Saint Basil (329-379)
Basil does not make a formal exposition on man’s relationship to nature as did
Gregory of Nyssa. His views must be distilled from incidental comments scattered in his
Exegetic Homilies. In Homily 6, he describes fallen man as “the work of the divine
hands, falling far short of the animals in strength, but an appointed ruler o f the creatures
without reason, inferior in physical constitution, but able by the benefit of reason to be
‘Ibid., 6.
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lifted up to the very heavens.”1 Basil here seems to echo Gregory’s emphasis on man’s
being an “appointed ruler,” as well as touching on the theme of reason as being the
faculty separating man from animals. We also see a hint at the idea that humans are
immortal while animals are not, for the possession of reason made man capable of being
“lifted up to the very heavens.” Apparently, the creatures who lack reason are not
capable of such “lifting up.”
Basil continues, in Homily 8, to catagorize the creation into three divisions: aquatic
animals, terrestrial animals, and the highest level of created being, man, because his soul
is different from the soul of animals. The animals are “irrational,” and “the soul of
beasts is earth.” Thus animals are mortal, without capacity for eternal life. Concerning
the animal soul, Basil states, “Do not think that it is antecedent to the essence of their
bodies or that it remains after the dissolution of the flesh.”2
By contrast, in Homily 9, Man’s soul is contrasted with the animals. “The herds
are earthly and are bent towards the earth, but man is a heavenly creature who excels
them as much by the excellence of his soul as by the character of his bodily structure.. . .
Your head stands erect towards the heavens.” He further argues that in the Scriptures, if
you as a human “dishonor yourself, serving your belly and your lowest parts, ‘you are

‘St. Basil, Exegetic Homilies, trans. Sister Agnes Claire Way, The Fathers of the
Church, vol. 46 (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1963), 84.
2Ibid., 118-119. See also Homily 9, p. 138, where again animals are inferior to
man because they lack reason. Basil also exhorts the reader in Homily 8, p. 119, not to
be like an animal, for example, not to hold anger for retribution as Camels do.
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compared to senseless beasts, and are become like to them.’”1 Thus man is clearly seen
as elevated above the beasts, which, in turn, explains why in Homily 8, Basil condemns
“the proud philosophers, who are not ashamed to regard their own soul and that of dog’s
as similar.”2 It seems evident, then, that Basil held a very similar view of man to
Gregory. Their contemporary, Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, likewise will show agreement
with the view that man is superior to nature.

Saint Ambrose: Bishop of Milan (339-374)
A comment by Ambrose concerning the benefit of death to man gives us a brief
hint at his view of man and nature. In his Seven Exegetical Works, Ambrose teaches that
in death the body “lies still and is shut in the hollow tomb like a wild beast. Its savagery
is bereft o f life.” Meanwhile, the soul flies away “on high.”3 Ambrose thus equates the
body with a wild, savage beast that must be trapped in a tomb and subdued, while the
soul has a natural affinity to virtue and God. It seems quite clear that Ambrose sees the
locus of man in the immortal soul, and even more apparent that man is superior to
“savage” animals.
The Patristics, therefore, project a very high view of man, and a low view of nature.
That which is not a human soul is irrational, deserving to be shut up in the tomb and
Tbid., 138.
2Ibid., 119.
3St. Ambrose, Seven Exegetical Works, trans. Michael P. McHugh, The Fathers
of the Church, vol. 65 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1971), 97.
Emphasis mine.
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otherwise put into oblivion. Man is appointed the ruler of creation by God, is superior to
animals by virtue o f having reason, and the Creator stored riches in the earth for the
kingly man to use for his own interests. This is the general picture of man and nature that
Augustine would inherit and develop a generation later.

Saint Augustine (354-430)
Much like the Patristic authors before him, as Gillian Clark notes, Augustine did
not dedicate a particular portion of his work to the issue of man’s relationship to the
animals, and nature in general. However, a sense of his theology can be derived from
incidental remarks about man and nature scattered throughout his works.1
Augustine appears to make three key points about the relationship of man to nature.
First, humans are spiritual, having an immortal soul, while animals are corporeal, with
no soul. The spiritual is said to be superior to the corporeal.2
Second, he refers to the statement in Gen 1 that gives man dominion over the
animals. Augustine insists that this dominion is not over the heavenly luminaries, etc.,
but rather over the various animals.3
Third, man is different from, and gains his preeminence over, the animals because
'Gillian Clark, “The Fathers and the Animals: The Rule of Reason?” in Animals
on the Agenda: Questions about Animals fo r Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey
and Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press [Illini Books], 1998),
67.
2Augustine, St. Augustine’s Confessions, vol. 2, trans. William Watts
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1912; reprint, 1988), 377-79.
3Ibid., 435, 437.
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he was made in God’s image while the animals were made according to their kind. The
image o f God is interpreted primarily in terms of having reason and intellect which
elevates man over the beasts.1 Thus, the sixth commandment does not apply to animals
because they “are not partakers with us in the faculty of reason, the privilege not being
given them to share it in common with us— and therefore by the altogether righteous
ordinance o f the Creator both their life and their death are a matter subordinate to our
needs.”2 Animals thus seem viewed primarily in reference to their utility to man.
This final proposition is especially cited as a foundational statement demonstrating
the alleged despotic view of human dominion within Christianity. While it is true that
Augustine states that the animals’ lives and deaths are subject to our use, Santmire
correctly points out that, for Augustine, human dominion is a “minor m otif’ and that
“there is no suggestion that God places humanity over a lesser or valueless thing in order
to dominate it.”3 He rightly concludes, “Although Augustine believes that all things . . .
are created as a blessing for humanity, this by no means exhausts their reason d ’etre.
'Augustine, St. Augustine: The Literal Meaning o f Genesis (De Genesi ad
Litteram), trans. John Hammond Taylor, S.J., Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of
the Fathers in Translation, vol. 41, ed. Johannes Quasten, Walter J. Burghardt, and
Thomas Comerford Lawler (New York: Newman Press, 1982), 192-93 (Section 6.12.);
Confessions, 431; idem, “On Free Will,” in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans.
John H. S. Burleigh, Library o f Christian Classics, vol. 6 (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster
Press, 1953), 138,143. See also the editor’s introduction and analysis on p. 109.
2Augustine, The City o f God Against the Pagans, trans. George E.
McCracken, The Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Gould, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1957), 93. This statement is part of the explanation for why the
sixth commandment does not forbid killing animals.
3H. Paul Santmire, “St. Augustine’s Theology of the Biophysical World,” Dialog
19 (1980): 181.
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Human utility is not the sole reason for the existence of all visible things in the hierarchy.
Rather, for Augustine, the most fundamental telos o f the whole creation is beauty, and the
glorification of God.” 1
Overall, however, it does appear that Augustine definitively favors man over the
rest of nature. It is easy to see how those of a later, more technologically advanced era
could use Augustinian theology, as well as the Patristic writers, to justify a despotic
dominion of man over nature. However, Augustine never authorizes an unbridled,
exploitative human dominion over nature, but rather seems to advocate a limited
authority. So while we can see seeds of future despotism lying in Augustine, we shall
see that those seeds did not germinate and bear fruit till much later in history. With this
in mind, let us turn our attention to developments in the Medieval era.

Medieval Theology Concerning Man and Nature
The Medieval Christian theologians appear to pick up the views of Augustine and
possibly sharpen them a bit further towards a despotic view of human dominion. Linzey
asserts there was a “hardening of scholastic theology against animals” after the twelfth
century, blaming this hardening on the influence of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas.2
Ian McHarg observes that Medieval Christianity, in general, saw nature as rotten and
rotting. But man was seen as having a divine mandate giving him dominion over all
earthly life and non-life, and a commission to subdue the earth. Furthermore, the
'Ibid., 177.
2Linzey, xii-xiii.
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cosmos was thought of as a pyramid with man at the pinnacle and all below him are
placed there to support man at the peak.1 Two Medieval theologians will suffice to
illustrate the extension and refining of Augustine’s animal theology: John Duns Scotus,
and the prince of Medieval theology, Thomas Aquinas.

John Duns Scotus (1266-1308)
John Duns Scotus appears not to have systematically dealt with the relationship of
man to nature in general, or animals in particular. However, some o f his incidental
comments, and his citations of Augustine point to a fundamental agreement with
Augustine’s thinking concerning man’s relation to animals and nature.
Quoting Augustine, he states that “a man is not called the image of God according
to everything that pertains to his nature, but according to the mind alone.” He then
comments on this, saying that “from this and other passages [referring to what was just
quoted from Augustine], one would conclude that every image is in the intellective part,
understanding by this the part that transcends the sensitive [i.e., physical sensory
abilities].”2 A little later, Duns Scotus again uses a statement by Augustine that
“intellection” requires memory which man has but which animals don’t have, while
emphasizing the independence of the intellect from the senses. He then adds further
‘Ian McHarg, “The Place of Nature in the City of Man,” in Western Man and
Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1973), 174-175.
2John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions 15:15-16
(trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1975], 348-49).
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commentary, saying, “The memory, which animals lack, viz., that which is properly
intellectual, has a likeness to the Father. . . A few pages later he once more broaches
the same issue saying, “Now the ‘image’ [of God in us] consists of what is best in our
nature.”2
While not fully addressing the relationship between man and nature, these
comments clearly seem to indicate a harmony with Augustine’s sharp distinction between
man and nature, and especially between man and the animals. The primary focus is the
intellect and reason as the definitive separator of man from animals. Such a theme is
developed much more clearly in his more famous contemporary, Thomas Aquinas.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
Dorothy Yamomoto asserts that the Thomistic view of animals and their role “has
exerted an enormous influence on Christian tradition.”3 She further notes that Aquinas’s
view of the animals is based on a philosophical hierarchy of being ranked according to
the degree of participation in the divine nature. Thus, humans, who have reason, are
placed above all other animals, with, the elements intended to serve the higher.4

‘Ibid., 15:17-18.
2Ibid., 15:44.
3Dorothy Yam am oto, “Aquinas and Animals: Patrolling the Boundary?” in

Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals fo r Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew
Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press (Illini Books),
1998), 80.
“Ibid. See also, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.65.2 (trans. The Fathers
of the English Dominical Province [New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947], 1:327).
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Yamomoto frames the issue in a way that will play a significant role in Rachels’s
reaction: “It is a cornerstone of Aquinas’ scheme that there is an absolute difference
between animals and humans. Humans have reason, ‘intellectual nature’; animals have
none, and are guided purely by instinct.”1 Aquinas asserts this absolute difference in
several ways, often citing Aristotle.
First, he reiterates the patristic refrain that man is superior to animals because of his
reason, and by virtue of possessing an “intellectual soul,” which is immortal. On the
other hand, animals have a “sensitive soul,” which is corruptible.2
St. Thomas also argues that prior to the fall, man had total dominion over the
animals, but that part o f God’s punishment for the fall is that animals now disobey us.
He concludes that all animals are naturally subject to man as part of the natural order of
the use o f things. “Thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make
use o f the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes
use o f both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature that
man should be master over the animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Politic i. 5) that
the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural
right.”3 Such arguments really make Aquinas sound like he advocates despotic
dominion. Certainly he seems to state the issue in stronger terms than Augustine.
'Yamamoto, 85.
2Aquinas, 1.76.3. This argument is later expanded in 1.91.4 and 1.93.2.
3Ibid., 1.96.1; see also, 2-2.64.1 for an almost identical argument.
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However, Aquinas has tried to constrain man’s exercise of dominion, even as Augustine
did.
William French notes that, “for Thomas, animals are a path to God, for God created
them and sustains them in being.”1 He further asserts that for Aquinas, animals are
created in the likeness o f God and bear the marks of their creator. Furthermore, French
declares that for Thomas, “Humans are of the same genus as other animals, but differ in
species.”2
Attfield notes that Aquinas argued that cruelty to animals is wrong only because of
the effects on the agent’s character and on the owner’s property (the animal).3 This
clearly puts some moral limits on man regarding animals.

But this means that animals,

and by extrapolation, the rest o f nature, have little or no moral standing except in
reference to their impact on humans. Such an ethical position could very easily develop
into a potent moral cocktail of despotic human dominion over nature. The Thomistic
view of nature has dominated much of Christian thought ever since. Even the Reformers
who favored Augustine were influenced by Aquinas’s thinking.

'William French, “Beast Machines and the Technocratic Reduction of Life: A
Creation-Centered Perspective,” in Good News fo r Animals? Christian Approaches fo r
Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 1993), 38.
2Ibid., 38. The portions o f Aquinas cited by French can be found in Aquinas,
1.13.1.2; 1.65.1.3; 1.75.3.1; 1.76.1.
3Attfield, 379.
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Selected Reformation Views of Man and Nature
Martin Luther (1483-1546)
It should come as no surprise that Luther, the former Augustinian monk, had strong
affinities to Augustine’s thinking in the area of man’s relationship to nature. Scott Ickert
notes, that Luther did not treat animals separately as a theological subject, and that “for
Luther the non-human creation is a function of anthropology as anthropology is a
function o f the doctrine of G od.. . . Animals are subordinate to human beings as the
latter exist to glorify—and exemplify—God. Therefore, the dominion that human beings
exercise over the non-human creation, is a part of the divine ordering of creation.. . .
Human dominion is not merely advised but is expressly commanded by God.”1 Luther
primarily addresses human-animal issues in his expositions on Genesis.

Luther on Man and Animals
Luther expounds on the creation of man by asserting “an outstanding difference”
between man and the animals.2 He justifies this assertion on the grounds that man was
made by a special command and plan of God as opposed to the animals, and that man
was made in the image of God, while the animals were not. God created man to be ruler
of the earth, sea, and air, but “No beast is told to exercise dominion.”3 By contrast, “the
‘Scott Ickert, “Luther and Animals: Subject to Adam’s Fall?” in Animals on the
Agenda: Questions about Animals fo r Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and
Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press [Illini Books], 1998), 90.
2Martin Luther, Luther’s Works: Lectures on Genesis-Chapters 1-5, 54 vols., ed.
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmust T. Lehman (Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 1955), 1:56-57.
3Ibid., 1:66-67.
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beasts of the field and the birds of the heaven were created for mankind; these are the
wealth and possessions of men.”1 However, Luther himself laments that the original
dominion was lost,2 and that what dominion we still have “is extremely small and far
inferior to that first dominion.. . . Therefore, we retain the name and word, ‘dominion,’
as a bare title.”3
Yet after the Flood, Luther sees God as increasing human dominion in a way that
required putting the fear of man into the animals. This is because Luther believed that
before the Flood, animals were not slaughtered for food. Instead, man was a gentle
master of the beasts. After the Flood, however, the animals could now be killed and their
flesh eaten, thus putting them under a “more oppressive form of bondage,” being
“subjected to man as to a tyrant.” Therefore, concludes Luther, at the present time, “It is
a great liberty that with impunity man may kill and eat animals of every edible kind.”4

Luther and Compassion to Animals
In spite of his despotic-sounding viewpoint, Luther did believe in being kind to
animals. The purpose of the Mosaic command not to muzzle the ox when it is treading
out the grain, says Luther, “is that by practicing kindness toward beasts, they may

■ibid., 2:58-59.
2Ibid., 1:66-67.
3Ibid., 1:67.
“Ibid., 2:132-133.
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become more benevolent toward people.”1 Like Augustine, Luther here exhorts
kindness to beasts, not so much for their benefit but for ours.
In his comments on Eccl 3:1, Luther declares, “Therefore God wants us to make
use of creatures, but freely, as He has provided them, without prescribing the time, the
manner, and the hour. . . . so that we should not think that it is in our hands to use things
as we wish if He does not give them.”2 Luther here clearly advocates that there are
divine limits on man’s use of nature. Ickert further observes that the arbitrary killing of
animals for sport and pleasure was not sanctioned by Luther, who asserted that we must
not act like wild beasts.3

John Calvin (1509-64)
John Calvin, a contemporary of Luther, and being a devoted student of Augustine,
holds a very similar view to both of these men. As Robin Attfield states it, “Peter
Lombard, and later John Calvin, held that everything was made for man.” However, as
Attfield also observes, Calvin’s great emphasis on the sovereignty o f God led him to
balance this view of dominion with a thoroughgoing stewardship model of man’s
relationship to nature.4

'Ibid., 9:248.

2Ibid., 15:50.
3Ickert, 97-99. Emphasis mine.
4Attfield, 379-80.
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Calvin on Man versus Animals
In his Institutes, Calvin asserts that the immortal soul distinguishes man from the
“brutes” and that this soul constitutes the image of God. He further teaches “that where
the image of God is said to be in man, there is implied a tacit antithesis, which exalts man
above all the other creatures, and as it were separates him from the vulgar herd.”1
In his commentaries on Gen 1 and Ps 8, Calvin argues that man was divinely
appointed, as the image of God, to be lord of the world to rule in God’s stead. This
authority was given both to Adam and to his posterity. Furthermore, the rest of creation
was made for man’s welfare so that “man was rich before he was bom.”2 Thus, “it is by
the wonderful providence o f God that horses and oxen yield their service to men; that
sheep bear wool to clothe them with; and that all kind of cattle yield even their flesh to
feed them.”3

Calvin and Limits to Human Dominion
Like Luther, Calvin sees limits to man’s dominion, especially in light of the Fall.
Thus, the current exercises o f dominion over cattle, horses, sheep, etc., that we now enjoy
'John Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, 2 vols., trans. John Allen
(Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1936), 1:206,208.
Emphasis mine.
2Jean [John] Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book o f Moses Called Genesis,
trans. John King, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 96.
3Ibid. See also, Jean [John] Calvin, A Commentary on the Psalms o f David, vol. 1,
trans. unnamed (Oxford: Printed by D. A. Talboys for Thomas Tegg, 1860), 71-74.
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are “the remnants of the good things whereof they were despoiled in Adam.”1
Furthermore, in his exposition of Gen 2:15, Calvin asserts a thoroughgoing stewardship
model with man giving strict accountability to God for how he cares for the world.2
Thus Calvin supplies a strong check and balance to arrest a despotic view of dominion.
Nevertheless, Calvin’s language regarding horses, oxen, and sheep would reappear
in a new social context, the Industrial Revolution, and be used to justify an exploitative
despotism o f man over nature. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, man could not afford to
use the animals in an abusive fashion as he was too dependent on them for his own
prosperity. But the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution allowed man to
perform his tasks without animals, thus opening the door for the development of a more
domineering orientation.

The Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries
It was shortly after the deaths of Luther and Calvin that three forces began to assert
a powerful influence on Christian interpretations of man’s dominion of nature: The new
technological prowess of the Industrial Revolution, the mechanistic-secularized view of
nature emerging from the Renaissance, and the rise of a capitalist economic system.3
Protestantism was a suitable religious milieu for capitalistic thinking to grow and
‘Calvin, Psalms, 72-75.
2Calvin, Genesis, 125.
3David Livingstone, “The Historical Roots of Our Eschatological Crisis: A
Reassessment,” Fides Historia 26 (1994): 43-45; Jeremy Cohen, “The Bible, Man, and
Nature in the History o f Western Thought: A Call for Reassessment,” Journal o f Religion
65 (1985): 156.
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develop, as Cohen observes, because of its “worldly asceticism” which secularized the
world.1 Ronald J. Sider expresses a similar sentiment when he states that “the eighteenth
century, however, abandoned the biblical worldview. The isolated, autonomous
individual replaced God at the center of reality.. . . The destructive, unbridled
consumerism o f modem society is rooted in this narcissistic individualism and
materialistic naturalism that flows from the Enlightenment.”2
The roots o f the shift to a more mechanistic view of nature originated a couple of
centuries earlier. Brother Aiden notes that starting in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries there “was the massive influx of Aristotelian literature and Arabic philosophy
into thirteenth century Europe which effected a shift from a truly Christian cosmology to
a more pagan and mechanistic one.” Thus, “Man and not God was declared to be the
measure o f all things.”3 In other words, Aiden implies that we cannot lay all blame for an
exploitative view o f nature solely at the feet of Christianity, for other philosophical
influences were uniting with Christian thinking in producing this result.

Aiden further

argues that Nominalism played a key role in developing this mechanistic view of nature.4
'Cohen, 156.
2Ronald J. Sider, “Message from an Evangelical: The Place of Humans in the
Garden of God,” The Amicus Journal 17 (1995): 14.
3Brother A iden, “M an and H is R ole in the Environm ent,” E piphany Journal 12

(1992): 30.
4Ibid., 29. Aiden describes Nominalism as teaching that ultimate reality resides in
particulars, which means that Nominalism does not see a larger, universal reality from
which all is derived (such as God), but rather these principles are only in particular
things. This logically leads to the belief that higher levels emerge from lower levels
based on ultimate realities contained in the lower levels. Aiden credits William of
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The key reason is that Nominalism follows Greek thinking in dismantling and studying
individual parts. This dismantling, asserts Aiden, leads to a reductionist, mechanistic
view of reality which tends to secularize nature.1 This approach to nature was most
influentially promoted by Francis Bacon.

Sixteenth Century
Francis Bacon’s Influence (1551-1626)
Francis Bacon associated his new, scientific approach to nature, not to Scripture,
but to the Greeks just as Aiden has asserted. In Bacon’s own words, “The sciences we
possess have been principally derived from the Greeks; for the additions of the Roman,
Arabic, or modem writers, are but few and of small importance, and such as they are, are
founded on the basis of Greek invention.”2 Thus Bacon himself discredits the charge that
Christianity is the primary culprit in developing the exploitative view of human
dominion.
Bacon’s significance is that he is the first one to systematically promote the
legitimate goal of the sciences as “the endowment of human life with new inventions and
riches.”3 He asserted that Science should extend “to a greater distance the boundaries of
Ockham as being one o f the best promoters of Nominalist philosophy.
•ibid., 29-31.

2Sir Francis Bacon, Advancement o f Learning; Novum Organum; New Atlantis, ed.
Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 30 (Chicago, IL:
William Benton, 1952), 117. This is from Novum, Aphorism 71.
3Bacon, 120 {Novum, Aphorism 81). See also Bacon, 34 {Advancement).
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human power and dignity,”1and was to be used to “to renew and enlarge the power of the
empire of mankind in general over the universe.”2 Science was to be used to mine the
secrets of nature so the craftsmen could produce new things for use in serving man.3
Significantly, Bacon welded the biblical concept of the dominion of man to his
imperative to harness and control nature through science. Science was to be the means
for man to recapture the powers over nature lost in the Fall. Bacon argued that the
potential misuse and abuse of this scientific power was worth the risk to gain the benefits,
and then concludes his exhortation, “Only let mankind regain their rights over nature,
assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be
governed by right reason and true religion.”4
Bacon here clearly indicates science as a means to “regain their rights over nature,”
and truly gives theological justification to a despotic view o f dominion over nature. Yet
Bacon himself tried to set some governing limits to this enterprise of conquering nature
through science. Geisler astutely observes that Bacon’s closing phrase in the previous
quote states, “The exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion.”5
Thus Bacon does not seem to have intended the unbridled exploitation o f nature by man.
'Ibid., 131 {Novum, Aphorism 116).
2Ibid., 135 {Novum, Aphorism 129). Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 41-42 {Advancement).
4Ibid., 135 {Novum, Aphorism 129). Emphasis mine.
5Norman L. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Book House, 1989), 308.
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However, the exploitative vein is precisely what the succeeding generations popularized
and secularized.

The Theological Impact of Bacon
Bacon’s work is recognized by many as the pivotal point where the secularized
view of nature reached its critical mass in terms of becoming the dominant viewpoint.
Merchant insightfully captures the significance of Bacon’s theological proposition, when
she declares: “While some, accepting God’s punishment, had obeyed the medieval
strictures against searching too deeply into God’s secrets, Bacon turned the constraints
into sanctions. Only by ‘digging further and further into the mine o f natural knowledge’
could mankind recover that lost dominion. In this way, ‘the narrow limits of man’s
dominion over the universe’ could be stretched ‘to their promised bounds.’”1 Merchant
polemically announces that Bacon’s “science legitimized the domination of
nature . . . [and] fashioned a new ethic sanctioning the exploitation of nature.’”2
William Leiss likewise comes to the conclusion that
‘Carolyn Merchant, The Death o f Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific
Revolution (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1980), 170. See also, Livingstone, 43,
44.
2Merchant, 169-170. Merchant creatively strings phrases together from Bacon’s
Advancement o f Learning, 33, to assert that Bacon “treats nature as a female to be
tortured through mechanical inventions, [which] strongly suggests the interrogations o f
the witch trials and mechanical devices torture witches” (Merchant, 168). However,
when read in context, Bacon is doing no such thing. Rather, his mention of witchcraft is
in the context of not rejecting paranormal phenomena such as “sorceries, witchcrafts,
dreams, divinations, and the like,” as possibly producing valid, verifiable scientific
evidence. Outside of this gender-biased twisting of Bacon, Merchant appears to have
correctly interpreted the significance of Bacon in shaping modem, exploitative attitudes
towards nature.
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Bacon’s great achievement was to formulate the concept of human mastery
over nature much more clearly than had been done previously and to assign it a
prominent place among men’s concerns. Its dangerous connection with the
megalomaniacal delusions of the alchemists were severed; and, still infused with
Renaissance energies, it was wedded to the predominant cultural force of the time,
namely, Christianity.
In Bacon’s view religion and science were engaged in a mutual effort to
compensate for the damage incurred as a result of the expulsion from Paradise.1
Leiss thus shows us that, for Bacon, recovery of lost dominion over nature was the task
o f science and religion. But in so doing, Leiss concludes that Bacon “unwittingly charted
a course for later generations which led to the gradual secularization of the idea.”2
Granberg-Michaelson likewise points to Bacon as the root of the despotic
viewpoint, but adds Rene Descartes (1596-1650)3 and Isaac Newton (1642-1727) as
accomplices. Descartes, he says, detached the human mind from nature. Bacon supplied
the rationale, the goal o f using science to regain dominion over nature, and Newton’s
view of the universe as a cosmic machine combined to lead to a mechanical paradigm
'William Leiss, The Domination o f Nature (New York: George Braziller, 1972),
48-49. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 52-53.
3Descartes does not seem to develop the man-nature relationship the way Bacon
does. However, he does repeat the familiar refrain that reason “is the only thing that
makes us men (and distinguishes us from animals).” He also, like Bacon, promotes the
potential use o f science to improve the lot o f man, advocating that instead o f teaching
“speculative philosophy,” schools should teach “a practical one, by which, knowing the
nature and behavior o f fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all other bodies which
surround us, as well as we now understand the different skills of our workers, we can
employ these entities for all the purposes for which they are suited, and so make
ourselves masters and possessors of nature.” Thus Descartes echoes the Baconian mind
set and shows how it was becoming mainstream thinking barely a generation later. See,
Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays: Discourse on Method; Meditations; Rules fo r the
Direction o f the Mind, trans. Laurence J. LaFleur (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merril
Company, 1964), 4,45. Both quotes are from Discourse on Method, parts 1 and 6.
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which excluded God from the explanation of the world. “Once Bacon, Descartes,
Newton, and others liberated God from running the world, John Locke set God free from
the task of upholding government and society. Natural reason and self-interest would
suffice.”1
It should be no surprise that as technological prowess increased, there would be
those who would try to express a theology of dominion compatible with Bacon’s bold
vision. Thus the new understanding of dominion spawned by Bacon appears to have
been infiltrating Christian thinking. This can be seen in several, influential works of
natural theology and natural science produced in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.

Seventeenth-Century Works
Robert Boyle (1627-91)
Robert Boyle states that people were studying nature for two reasons. Some
merely wanted only to know nature. Others were studying nature in order to command
her. This second group, says Boyle, would “bring nature to be serviceable to their
particular ends, whether of health, or riches, or sensual delight.”2 Boyle thus affirms
that Bacon’s vision was indeed becoming mainstream science. Apart from this statement,
Boyle has little else to say concerning the relationship of man to nature. Much more
1Granberg-Michaelson, 42.
2Robert Boyle, The Works o f the Honourable Robert Boyle in Six Volumes, vol. 1
(London: J. and F. Rivingdon, L. Davis, W. Johnston, S. Crowder, T. Payne, et al., 1772),
310.
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prominent, however, is Boyle’s contemporary, Sir Matthew Hale.

Sir Matthew Hale (1609-76)
In The Primitive Origination o f Mankind, Hale appears to weld Calvin’s language
of oxen and sheep, with Bacon’s imperative to subvert nature to man’s use. Early in his
discussion o f the relationship between man and nature, Hale asserts, “If we consider of
Animals [sic], we shall find admirable accommodations in them one to another, and
especially to Man: the Horse, high-spirited, yet very docible [sic], fitted for swiftness,
carriage, and agility,. . . the Ox patient, painful, strong, fitted for draught; the Camel
fitted for Strength, and a natural Saddle for Burthen; the Cow for yielding Milk; the
Sheep for Cloathing; the Beasts and Birds of greatest use being most commonly made
tame, and affecting a spontaneous subjection to Man: among the Vegetables some are for
Food, some for Medicines.”1 It is no surprise, then, when Hale declares, “Yet the chief
and ultimate accommodation of things seems principally to terminate in Man.”2
Hale does put some limitation on human dominion by stating that the subjection of
nature to man is not so much in terms of subservience and service, but rather is more
related to their place in the divine regiment and order. Thus, in keeping with the divine
'Sir Matthew Hale, The Primitive Origination o f Mankind, Considered and
Examined According to the Light o f Nature (London: William Godbid, 1677), 359.
2Ibid., 360, 362. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, John Ray would
likewise argue that the animals and resources in this world were made for man’s use and
benefit. Ray postulates that there are still many, unknown uses yet to be discovered.
See, John Ray, The Wisdom o f God Manifested in the Works o f the Creation, 12th ed.,
corrected (London: n.p., 1754), 367-370. Originally published in 1691.
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order, “Lions, Tigers, Wolves, Foxes, Dragons, Serpents; and that these stand in need of
some coercive power over them, that they destroy not the Species of more profitable, and
yet weaker Animals.. . . Man was invested with power, authority, right, dominion, trust,
and care, to correct and abridge the excesses and cruelties of the fiercer Animals, to give
protection and defence [sic] to the Mansuete [sic]1and useful.”2 Hale further declares
that God made man to be “Vice-Roy of the great God of Heaven and Earth . . . ; his
Steward, Villicus, Bayliff or Farmer o f this goodly Farm of the lower Worl d. . . Gen 9. 3.
Psal. 8. 6.”3
Hale’s beliefs in human supremacy over nature would carry over into the
eighteenth century. In England, William Derham would assume the prophetic mantle of
Hale, and in America, Cotton Mather would rely on the work of both Hale and Derham.

Eighteenth Century
William Derham (1657-1735)
Besides Matthew Hale, William Derham is most often cited as a leading influence
in championing a high-handed view o f man’s dominion over nature. In a series of
sixteen lectures given in 1711-12, Derham periodically expounds on the dominion of man
and that the things o f nature are here primarily for the benefit of man.
Derham declared that God gave man the power of reason to make effective use of
'I.e., tame, or gentle, now spelled, “mansuetude.”
2Ibid., 369-370.
3Ibid., 371.
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the materials and resources of this world. This provision of materials was made for man
by the creator. Animal skins, trees, plants, even stones, are all from God for us to use in
making our habitations, clothing ourselves, and providing for our needs.1 He more
explicitly incorporates the Baconian ideal than does Hale, when he states that “M an’s
invention should reach to such a great variety of matters, that it should hit upon every
thing that may be of any use, either to himself, or to human society, or that may any ways
promote (what in him lies) the benefit of this lower part of the creation.”2 Thus Derham
furthers the merger of the new, Greek-based science, with the Genesis concept of human
dominion.
Like those before him, Derham claims a biblical mandate supporting the
advantageous use of nature by artisans and tradesmen, declaring that man was made “to
bear the great Creator’s vicegerency in this lower world, to employ the several creatures,
to make use of the various materials, to manage the grand business.”3 Thus, “a duty
ariseth thence on every man, to pursue the ends, and answer all the designs of the Divine
'Wfilliam] Derham, Physico-Theology: or, A Demonstration o f the Being and
Attributes o f God, from His Works o f Creation, vol. 2, From Sixteen Discourses given in
1711-12 (London: Printed for A. Strahan; T. Cadell, Jun. and W. Davies, 1798), 61-62.
2Ibid., 145. Emphasis in original. See also, where he also declares: “And for
this lower world, what material is there to be found; what kind of earth, or stone, or
metal; what animal, tree, or plant, yea even the very shrubs of the field; in a word, what
of all the excellent variety the Creator has furnished the world with, for all its uses and
occasions, in all ages; what, I say, that man’s contrivance doth not extend unto, and make
some way or other advantageous to himself, and useful for building, cloathing, food,
physic, or for tools or utensils, or for even only pleasure or diversion?” (146). The
answer is, “All of it.”
Tbid., 153ff.
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Providence.” Derham here turns the bending nature to human ends (which is the divine
design for nature) into a moral duty.
However, Derham does try to limit human dominion, arguing, like Calvin, that
human dominion operates on a stewardship model where man is held accountable by God
and must not abuse his privileges.1 He also gives us a hint that the secularization of
Bacon’s vision was well underway when he laments the fact that “men are ready to
imagine their wit, learning, genius, riches, authority . . . to be works of nature [as
opposed to being gifts of God]. . . ; that they are the masters o f them, and at liberty to use
them as they please, to gratify their lust or humour and satisfy their depraved appetites.”2
Thus Derham points us to the secularization of man’s view o f nature as causing the
unconditional, exploitative view of man’s dominion over nature, in which he is at liberty
to do whatever he pleases with the natural world.

Cotton Mather (1663-1728)
That Derham’s and Boyle’s influence reached the settlements on the American
continent is evident in the work of Cotton Mather, an American Puritan, for Mather
explicitly mentions both men in his natural theology.3 Mather essentially takes up their
refrain, though in a more indirect and abbreviated form.

‘Ibid., 164.

2Ibid., 163-164.
3Cotton Mather, “The Christian Philosopher,” in Selections from Cotton Mather,
ed. Kenneth B. Murdock (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926), 293-294.
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For example, Mather opens his essay entitled, “Of the Earth,” by quoting Prov
3:19, “The Lord by Wisdom has founded the Earth.” He then proceeds to assemble
natural data reported by men such as Boyle and Derham to show how nature is a system
of harmonious design. One example of this divine wisdom being manifest in creation is
said to be “that the Ridges o f the Mountains being placed thro the midst of their
Continents, do serve as Alembicks,1to distil fresh Waters in vast Quantities for the Use
of the World.”2 Another illustration is that “minerals are dug out of the Mountains;
which if they were sought only in level countries, the Delfs would be so flown with
Waters, that it would be impossible to make Addits and Soughs to drein them.”3 Thus
God in his wisdom put the minerals in the mountains so that we can be above the water
line to dig and retrieve them. Mather gives mountains yet another divine function for
human benefit. “Mountains also are the most convenient Boundaries to Territories, and
afford a Defence unto them. One calls them the Bulwarks of Nature, cast up at the
Charges of the Almighty.” These and other marvels should, declares Mather, cause us to
say, “Great God, the Earth is full of thy Goodness!”4 In a later essay, he goes on to assert
that a host of useful things in nature are clearly there for the happiness of mankind. They
*An alembic was a device for purifying water akin to distilling.
2Ibid., 294.
3Ibid., 295. The editor notes in footnote 2 on this page that “Delf = a ditch; addits
and soughs = drains, gutters.”
4Ibid., 297.
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“answer the chief End of man.”1 Thus in Mather, we see a continuation of dominionist
theology.

The Puritans’ View of Nature
Mather reflects not only the influence of Boyle and Derham, but to a degree, a
culmination o f his own Puritan heritage. This heritage was most developed in the
struggle to plant new colonies and settlements in the newly discovered American
continent. In the American context, Santmire notes that Puritanism contributed to this
exploitative mentality by strongly emphasizing the text in Genesis where God commands
man to subdue the earth. Furthermore, the Puritans put heavy emphasis on proving their
election with good works that bring glory to God. “Generations of Americans,” says
Santmire, “were instructed in their Churches that nature is properly man’s sphere of
lordship, given to him by God, and now at his disposal to use, by the sweat of his brow,
in order to bring honor to the name of God.”2
From the very onset of British settlement in New England, and Puritan authors
advocated a strong assertion of dominion over nature.3 The wilderness was an evil entity

•Ibid., 352.
2Paul Santmire, “Historical Dimensions of the American Crisis,” in Western Man
and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature, and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour
(Reading, MA: A ddison-W esley Publishing C o., 1973), 71.

3This is best traced by studying the Puritan theology of the wilderness, which goes
far beyond mere replenishment of the earth. For a fuller exposition on the Puritan
theology of the wilderness, see Peter N. Carroll’s landmark work, Puritanism and the
Wilderness: The Intellectual Significance o f the New England Frontier 1629-1700 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1969). This work is an excellent resource for finding
original Puritan documents.
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which had to be tamed. This can be seen in the work of Puritan poet Michael
Wigglesworth, who described the uninhabited New England country as, “a waste and
howling wilderness, Where none inhabited But hellish fiends, and brutish men That
Devils w orshiped.. . . in darkness . . . Far off from Heaven’s light, Amidst the shaddows
[57c]

of grim deat h. .

.

Such a disordered and evil land must be inhabited and subdued.

This led to the problem of justifying the occupation of Indian tribal lands. Their
justification reveals much about their understanding of man’s relationship to nature.
The Puritans argued that the Indians had no valid claim to vacant lands, and thus
the Colonies had free right to move in. Winthrop, White, and Cotton, among others,
argue that God establishes nations and peoples to “replenish the earth,” in fulfillment of
the command o f Gen 1:28, and its restatement to Noah in Gen 9: l.2 This command,

'Michael Wigglesworth, “God’s Controversy with New England,” in The Poems o f
Michael Wigglesworth, ed. Ronald A. Bosco (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1989), 90. According to Carroll, two other major aspects of the wilderness
theology were the apocalyptic interpretation in which the wilderness provides protection
(i.e., Rev 12:14) to set up a model, theocratic-biblical society (a “city upon a hill”), and a
strong missiology in reference to seeking to convert the native Indians. See Carroll, 6163. William Bradford, Mayflower passenger and first Governor of the Plymouth
plantation and a Pilgim (not a Puritan), describing the first views of the new land, wrote,
“What could they see but a hidious and desolate wilderness, full of wild beasts and wild
men? . . . the whole countrie, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage
heiw [hue, appearance].” William Bradford, Bradford’s History o f Plymouth Plantation,
ed. William T. Davis, Original Narratives of Early American History (New York: Barnes
and Noble, 1964), 96.
2John Winthrop, Winthrop Papers, 5 vols. ([Boston, MA]: The Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1929, 2:123 [This portion was written in 1629]; John White, The
Planters Plea or the Grounds o f Plantations Examined and Usuall Objections Answered
(London: William Iones, 1630), in Proceedings o f the Massachusetts Historical Society,
vol. 62 ([Boston, MA]: n.p., 1930), pages 371-75; John Cotton, God’s Promise to His
Plantations, as it was Delivered in a Sermon (London: William Jones for John Bellamy,
1634; reprint, Boston in New England [MA]: Samuel Green, 1686), 4-6.
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argues White, is universal and is still binding “as long as the earth yeelds [sic] empty
places to be replenished.”1 Thus, in Cotton’s words, when a land is “void of Inhabitants,”
and “is a vacant place, there is liberty for the Son of Adam or Noah to come and inhabit,
though they neither buy it, nor ask their leaves.. . . If therefore any Son of Adam come,
and find a place empty, he hath liberty to come, and to fill, and subdue the Earth there.”2
White argues that the New England Colonies had “sufficient warrant from the mouth of
God” to replenish the “wast and voyd Countries,” and that the “Colonies . . . have their
warrant from God’s direction and command [cites Gen 1:28-29].”3 Both Winthrop and
White attach the idea of fulfilling the Genesis command to the concept of giving God His
“due honor,” and advancing God’s glory. Thus it is our moral duty to replenish the
earth.4 Both Winthrop and White thus invoked the principle that men are only entitled to
as much land as they can improve, concluding that the vacant lands were free for the
colonies to possess and subdue.5
The Puritans also invoked the argument that the rest of the creation was made for
man’s use and benefit. Thus, the Colonies had received God’s blessing on their
industrious subjection of the land. Whatever they needed was said to be “treasured vp in
’John White, 372.
2Cotton, 4-5.
3John White, 376, 371.
4Winthrop, 2:123; John White, 372-73.
5Winthrop, 4:101-102; John White, 385.
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the earthe by the Creator, and is to be fetched thence by the sweatt of our browes.”1 In
this way, the American culture developed a clear tendency towards a strong, aggressive
view of human dominion over nature, believed to have divine sanction and approval.
This interpretation received some criticism and opposition in the nineteenth century.

Nineteenth-Century Reaction to American Dominionist Theology
Francis Wayland (1796-1865)
According to Peter Singer, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy by Francis Wayland
was “perhaps the most widely used work on moral philosophy in nineteenth-century
America.”2 In this work, Wayland has a short section entitled “Our Duty to Brutes,” in
which he asserts of that animal “brutes are sensitive beings, capable of, probably, as great
degrees of physical pleasure and pain as ourselves.. . . They differ from us chiefly in
being destitute of any moral facility.”3
While Wayland explicitly rejects viewing animals as being our moral equals, and
further asserting that human rights are paramount, nonetheless, he argues that human
treatment of animals must be consistent with what God permits, as animals are under His
protection. Thus, “we are forbidden to treat them unkindly on any pretense, or for any
reason.”4 Wayland cites most forms of hunting, as well as horse racing, as examples of
'Winthrop, 2:136.
2Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1977), 222.
3Francis Wayland, The Elements o f Moral Science (Boston, MA: Gould, Kendall,
and Lincoln, 1848), 395.
4Ibid.
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cruelty to animals that is “wrong.”1 If Singer has correctly depicted the popularity of
Wayland, then it may be that his influence is seen in two great activists who opposed
human despotism over nature, John Muir and Henry Thoreau.

John Muir (1838-1914)
Muir, in the language of Calvin and Hale, repeats and criticizes the despotic view
of human dominion inherited from the Puritans and touted in the mid-1800s,2 saying:
The world, we are told was made especially for man —a presumption not
supported by all the facts. A numerous class of men are painfully astonished
whenever they find anything, living or dead, in all God's universe, which they
cannot eat or render in some way what they call useful to them selves.. . . To such
properly trimmed people, the sheep, for example, is an easy problem—food and
clothing “for us.” . . .
In the same pleasant plan, whales are storehouses of oil for us . . . until the
discovery of the Pennsylvania oil wells. Among plants, hemp, to say nothing of the
cereals, is a case of evident destination for ship's rigging, wrapping packages, and
hanging the wicked. Cotton is just another plain case of clothing. Iron was made
for hammers and ploughs, and lead for bullets; all intended for us. And so of other
small handfuls of insignificant things.. . .
. . . Why does water drown its lord? Why do so many minerals poison him?
Why are so many plants and fishes deadly enemies? Why is the lord of creation
subjected to the same laws of life as his subjects?3

•ibid.
2See, for example, George Bush, Questions and Notes Critical and Practical upon
the Book o f Genesis (New York: John P. Haven, 1831), 45, where he says, “How exalted
the original dignity o f man! M ade in the im age o f his Creator, not on ly in moral

similitude but in official supremacy, he beheld himself head of the terrestrial creation,
with every department of nature, animate and inanimate, subservient to his use!”
3John Muir, The Wilderness World o f John Muir, ed. Edwin Way Teal (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954), 316-318. Second emphasis mine.
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Muir’s reaction to dominion theology suggests it was alive, well, and commonly
advocated during his lifetime. Thus we have evidence through his reaction that the
Puritan influence was alive and well in nineteenth-century America. Furthermore, Muir
is significant in the fact that he represents one of first critics to directly connect
Christianity with a despotic view of human dominion, and, as seen above, one of the first
to put forth evidence to disprove such claims.

Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862)
Thoreau likewise objected to the total subjugation of nature, and likewise tied it to
Christianity. “I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute freedom and wildness, as
contrasted with a freedom merely civil.” He wished to promote wild nature because
“there are enough champions of civilization: the minister and school committee and
everyone will take care of that.”1 Thus, in Thoreau and Muir, we see the beginnings,
both of environmental activism, and of seeing the Christian understanding as anti-nature.
A century later, Lynn White, Jr., would develop the latter thought into a full blown
charge against Christianity.

‘Henry David Thoreau, Walking (n.p.: The Riverside Press, 1914;
[Originally published posthumously by his wife in 1863], 3. Excerpts of Walking are
found in his journals from 1850-52; See also Huckleberries, ed. Leo Stoller (New York:
New York Public Library, 1970; Originally published in 1861), 30-31, where Thoreau
announces, “I am not overflowing with respect and gratitude to the fathers who thus laid
out our New England villages,” because they built churches, but “did not preserve from
desecration and destruction, far grander temples not made with hands.”
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Twentieth-Century Developments
Lynn White, Jr.
While Lynn White, Jr., does not explicitly mention John Muir, it is precisely the
exploitative mentality towards nature to which Muir reacted that also seems to be the
basis of White’s controversial article in 1967.1 This article has become the flagship work
o f those who wish to blame the current ecological stress on Christianity.
White asserts that Christianity has inherited from Judaism “a striking story of
creation.. . . Man named all the animals, thus establishing dominance over them. God
planned all this explicitly for man’s benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had
any purpose save to serve man’s purposes.. . . He is not simply part of nature: he is made
in God’s image.”2 This led him to charge that Christianity is the most anthropocentric
religion the world has ever seen for, “Man shares, in great measure, God’s transcendence
o f nature.” He insists that from the creation perspective, “it is God’s will that man
exploit nature for his proper ends.”3
Not only does White see the creation theology as shaping Christian thought into
support for despotic dominion, but he also sees Christianity as having achieved a
stunning intellectual victory over other perspectives that has sealed the victory of the
'Lynn White, Jr., 18-30.
2Ibid., 25.
3Ibid.
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exploitative viewpoint. He specifically cites the demise of paganism and its tendency to
animism, as the “greatest psychic revolution in the history of our culture.”1
When White’s understanding of the creation story is examined, one begins to
question if he has actually read it on its own terms. In other words, is it possible that
White has built up a straw man by reading industrial revolution thinking into the original
text instead o f exegeting it on its own terms?

Challenges to Lynn White, Jr.
Lynn White’s article has aroused much discussion and criticism.2 Some, like J.
Baird Callicot, do not choose to quarrel with White’s premise that science and
technology grew primarily in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Instead, he asserts that
White’s analysis is incomplete. “What he fails to note is that the cognitive stock-in-trade
of modem science . . . is o f Greek philosophical [roots], not biblical or religious

‘Ibid., 24-25.
2Some representative examples include: J. Baird Callicot, “Genesis and John
Muir,” ReVision 12, no. 3 (1990): 2 (paging is from an electronic version in
EBSCOhost, an electronic library source); Granberg-Michaelson, 40-41; Geisler, 308309; Henry Morris, “The Bible, Creation, and Ecology,” 1 November 1991,
http://www.icr.org/index.php?module=articles&action=view&ID=350 (7 November
2005); Steve Bishop, “Green Theology and Deep Ecology: New Age or New Creation?”
Themelios 16 (1991): 8-14; and John B. Bennet, “On Responding to Lynn White:
Ecology and Christianity,” Ohio Journal o f Religious Studies 5 (1977): 71-77. In this
list, Bennet is unique in arguing from a Process T heology perspective. Bishop is rich in

other sources for Christian Eco-theology. A final article with, perhaps, a withering
criticism of White is by John Richardson, “The Spiritual Roots of Our Ecological
Crisis—Was Lynn White Right?” November 1998,
http://www.btintemet.eom/~j.p.richardson /lynnwhite.html (6 July 2003).
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provenance.”1 He declares that Newton’s imperative to “think God’s thoughts after
Him,” was “inspired by Pythagoras and Democritus, not Moses and Paul.” He concludes,
“In my opinion, the more culpable conceptual roots of our ecological crisis, are traceable
to the intellectual legacy o f Greek natural philosophy, reworked by the early modems,
rather than to the intellectual legacy of the Old and New Testaments.”2
Granberg-Michaelson likewise rejects the charge that Christianity is the cause of
our ecological woes, clearly asserting the impact of the Enlightenment in opening the
way for an exploitative viewpoint. He further argues that a number of non-Christian
cultures have been scientifically advanced and have had major impacts on the
environment. Egypt’s technology was highly developed, while the Hebrew’s technology
was quite inferior.3
Norman Geisler takes White to task on his conclusions, rightly asserting that, “it is
not the Christian world view that encourages the abuse of nature, but the materialistic
view. Those who see nature’s resources as unlimited and man as the ultimate authority in
the use o f them are the exploitative ones.”4 That is, Christianity corrupted by
Enlightement, materialistic thinking has inappropriately interpreted human dominion in
terms of exploitation to match the psyche of the intellectual revolution surrounding them.

'Callicot, 2.
2Ibid.
3Granberg-Michaelson, 40-41.
4Geisler, 308-309.
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Finally, Callicot notes that, by and large, most Christian responses to views such as
held by White promote a stewardship model of man’s relation to nature instead of a
despotic model.1 Steve Bishop also argues that human dominion is in the context of
God’s ownership of the earth. Thus, “Creation is not anthropocentric, it is theocentric.”
Furthermore, Bishop argues that human dominion “is not rulership without limits.” He
cites various limits on man’s use of nature, prescribed in the Pentateuch, as evidence that
man was not seen as empowered to do whatever he pleases with nature.2 This implies, as
I have suggested earlier, that White has not accurately portrayed the creation theology of
Genesis. But having noted some criticism of White’s position, it is important to
remember White’s challenge to Christians that we cannot get out of our ecological crisis
until we rethink our religion.3 Andrew Linzey has set out to do precisely this—to
reformulate Christian theology in terms of Animal Ethics.

Andrew Linzey
Andrew Linzey, the first professor of animal theology in the world, has set out to
rethink Christian theology in terms of animals and their rights in their relationship with
‘Callicot, 2.
2Bishop, 8-9. Bishop catalogs Mosaic regulations of man’s use of nature as
evidence that man did not have unbridled freedom to exploit nature in the name of
dominion. A partial list o f B ishop’s evid en ce includes divine lim its on human diet (Gen

1:29-30; Lev 17:10-14), the prohibition of using fruit trees to build siege works (Deut
20:19), the prohibition o f taking a mother bird with her young (Deut 22:6); the
prohibition of muzzling the ox when it is threshing grain (Deut 25:4); and the
requirement to rest the land every seventh year (Lev 25:1-12).
3Lynn White, Jr., 28.
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man.1 Linzey, like Rachels, flat out rejects “speciesism” which he defines as “an
arbitrary favoring of one species’ interests over another.”2 Linzey sees Christian
theology as generally focusing on the difference between animals and humans. Besides
the creation theology and philosophical arguments on man having reason, Linzey adds
one more reason animals are second class in Christian theology. Citing Barth’s
soteriology, he shows that in Christian thinking, man is special because Christ incarnated
as a human, and died to save humans. “The incarnation is the trump card to vanquish all
other creaturely rights to specialness, intrinsic worth, and respectful treatment.”3
Linzey’s significance lies in the fact that he appears to be the first Christian
theologian to seriously attempt to reinterpret the “Christian” exploitative view of nature
and animals, and thus to establish a Christian theology of animal rights. Linzey thus is
breaking new ground in Christian theological circles.
Ironically, Linzey claims that his work is not inspired by the ongoing debate
encapsulated in Lynn White’s article. In his words, “Confronting speciesism, then, is not
about Christian theology’s latest concession to secular fashion, it is an imperative derived
from the heart of theology’s mission: to render a truthful, non-partial account of the
creation God has made.” While this is ostensibly so, it seems odd that Linzey has
undertaken this task at the peak explosion of the animal rights movement which, like
‘Linzey claims this title for himself. See, Andrew Linzey, “Notes on Contributors,”
in Animals on the Agenda: Questions About Animals fo r Theology and Ethics, ed.
Andrew Linzey (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, Illini Books, 1998), 251.
2Linzey, “Introduction,” xii.
3Ibid., xii-xv.
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Rachels, is usually based in evolutionary and not Christian thinking. Yamamoto hints at
this in one of her chapters in Linzey’s book, arguing that we can find no indisputable
factor distinguishing us from animals.1 This distinction has been precisely where this
historical survey interfaces with Rachels's work.
It is in this historical context that I launch my investigation of James Rachels and
his view o f the moral implications of Darwinian evolution. Rachels will criticize
Christianity for holding a despotic view of dominion which is neither philosophically
nor scientifically tenable in the light of Darwin’s theory of evolution. He will also offer
an alternative approach to ethics based on the principles of Darwinian evolution.
‘Yamamoto, 88.
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CHAPTER THREE

SPECIESISM AND THE ROLE OF HUMAN
PREFERENCE IN ETHICS

Introduction
James Rachels has two dimensions to his Darwinist ethics that impinge on the issue
o f human specialness. In the first dimension, he shares common ground with other
current thinkers, most easily seen through the eyes of the animal rights movement. In
short, Rachels joins many in the cry against “speciesism.” This chapter will focus on this
dimension of Rachels’s ethics. It will place Rachels in the context of fellow animal
rights advocates. Chapter 4 will focus on Rachels’s unique contributions among modem
thinkers concerning evolution and ethics. These two chapters will have but little critique
o f Rachels and his peers. My purpose is to set forth their side of the arguments as
accurately and unbiasedly as possible. I shall respond to the arguments in this chapter in
chapter 5 and likewise for chapter 4 in chapter 6. With this in mind, let us explore the
issue of speciesism to see where Rachels fits into the contemporary landscape, and to
discover how Darwinian evolution is used in a manner that generates significant moral

implications.

58
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The Oxford Group and Speciesism
According to Tom Regan,
In 1971, three young Oxford Philosophers— Roslind and Stanley Godlovich,
and John Harris—published Animals, Men and Morals.1 The volume marked the
first time philosophers had collaborated to craft a book that had to do with the
moral status of nonhuman animals.
In the past twenty-five years, these philosophers have written more on “the
animal question” than philosophers of whatever stripe had written in the previous
two thousand.2
Richard Ryder notes the significance of this landmark event, observing that the
philosophical enterprise of addressing the moral significance of animals has been
primarily within British circles, especially in connection with Oxford University. Key
participants in the “Oxford Group,” as he christens these scholars, include the
Godlovitches, John Harris, Richard Ryder, Peter Singer, Stephen Clark, and Andrew
Linzey. The movement reached its critical mass in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Ryder further declares that while the British philosophers (i.e., the Oxford Group)
pioneered the issue, American philosophers have joined the British bandwagon in further
exploring and developing the issues surrounding the moral status of animals.3
'Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris, eds., Animals, Men
and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment o f Non-humans (New York: Taplinger
Publishing Company, 1972).
2Tom Regan, foreward to Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life,
ed. H. Peter Steeves, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. Dennis
J. Schmidt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), xi.
3Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 1-4.
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Ryder believes that the counter-cultural social movements of the 1960s like hippies
and flower children were a key factor in opening the door for considering moral issues as
related to animals.1 Indeed, a number of authors in this animal rights movement use
strong revolutionary and ideological rhetoric to promote their cause. Peter Singer says,
“Only by making a radical break with more than two thousand years of Western thought
about animals can we build on a solid foundation.”2 Similarly, Ryder asserts, “The
struggle against speciesism is not a sideshow; it is one of the main arenas of moral and
psychological change in the world today. It is part of a new and enlarged vision for peace

'Ibid., 3. He additionally asserts that the animal rights movement is a result of an
eclectic collection of ideas such as the counterculture of the hippie movement,
individualist rejection of social institutions, science demystifying man into an animal,
higher education, and television which combined to produce the anti-speciesist
movement. See pp. 3-5. On pp. 309-311, Ryder expands his explanation of origins of
speciesism, giving four factors: (1) Punishing non-humans for our sexual weakness [he
ties viewing man as an animal, contrary to Puritan theology, as one factor in looser
attitudes to sexuality]; (2) Social classes—The Middle and Upper classes are asserted to
look down on animals in a similar way to looking down on the lower social classes of
humans; (3) Repressing “perennial guilt surrounding humankind’s speciesism,” by over
arguing the case in favor o f speciesism; (4) The lower classes tyrannize animals to get a
sense of power for themselves. He also roots speciesism in Puritan theology where what
is “natural” for animals is “unnatural” for humans (again focused greatly on sex drives),
but credits Freud for educating us to accept our “animal natures.”
Finally, Ryder believes that “the gradual decline in the overt importance attached to
Christian values has left an amoral vacuum,” opening the way for an alternative ethical
approach (329). Peter Carruthers also points to a weakness in Christianity as opening the
way for an alternative ethical approach when he asserts that Christian values carry little
conviction in an increasingly secular era. See Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue:
M o ra l Theory in P ra ctice (N ew York: Cam bridge University Press, 1992), 13-14.
Both Ryder and Carruthers cite urbanization of Western culture for aiding the shift
towards anti-speciesism. Urbanization has disconnected most from direct use of animals,
and significant numbers of pets have increased our sentimentality towards animals in
general. Animals to a great degree are not seen as a threat to our safety. See, Ryder,
Animal Revolution, 318, and Carruthers, xii.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 224.
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and happiness.. . . The time has come for a revolution in our attitudes.”1 These changing
attitudes towards animals are indicative, in Ryder’s words, “of the gradual triumph of
reason and compassion over habit, vested interest, and convenience.”2 Regan argues that
human preference over animals is unjust to the core and this means that advocates of
animal rights are not reformists but abolitionists!3 This moral preference for humans is
now called “speciesism,” a word Regan claims to have coined for this purpose in 1970.4
Since this word was created in the context of a counter-cultural movement, we need to
briefly explore its nuances.

The Nature of Speciesism
General Concepts
In their article on Speciesism in the Dictionary o f Ethics, Theology and Society,
Andrew Linzey and Paul Waldau give the following definition of speciesism:
“Speciesism is the arbitrary favoring of one species’ interests over the interests of
others.”5 Two years later, Andrew Linzey used almost identical language in declaring
'Ryder, Animal Revolution, 1.
2Ibid., 2. On p. 4, he pejoratively labels what he calls discrimination on the basis of
species as “illogicaF and “unjust.” Emphasis in original.
3Tom Regan, “Animal Rights: W hat’s in a Name?” in Animal Welfare and the
Environment: An RSPCA Book, ed. Richard D . Ryder (London: Gerald Duckworth &

Co., 1992), 55.
4Ibid„ 328.
5Andrew Linzey and Paul Waldau, “Speciesism,” Dictionary o f Ethics, Theology
and Society, ed. Paul Barry Clarke and Andrew Linzey (New York: Routledge, 1996),
788.
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speciesism to be “an arbitrary favoring of one species’ interests over another.”1 Kevin
Dolan begins to narrow the definitional focus by asserting that “the essence of speciesism
can be summed up in the phrase: ‘the boundary of my group is the boundary of my
concern’.”2 Paul Waldau makes it clear that the implied focus of the term is human
speciesism3—the preference of humans over other animals simply because they are
human. Richard Ryder believes human speciesism is rooted in appearance, like racism.4
Evelyn Pluhar echos Ryder’s focus on appearance by noting that “not coincidentally, we
humans tend to assume that we are the paradigms of moral significance. As other beings
depart in greater and greater degree from our model, most of us find progressively more
difficult to accord than our moral concern.” Pluhar later concludes, “Not surprisingly,
the further we depart from our own characteristics, the less likely we are to extend our
moral concern.”5 Roslind Godlovitch makes a similar observation in her statement that,
“This view about animals runs alongside another generally accepted view concerning
human beings. Whereas we think that a few animals may be sacrificed for the benefit of
many humans. . . we do not accept this utilitarian reasoning with regard to humans and

’Linzey, “Introduction,” xii. Emphasis in original.
2Kevin Dolan, Ethics, Animals, and Science (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Science,
1999), 127.
3Paul Waldau, The Specter o f Speciesism : B u ddh ist a n d C hristian Views ofA n im als

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27.
4Richard Ryder, Victims o f Science: The Use o f Animals in Research (London:
Davis-Poynter, 1975), 16.
5Evelyn Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance o f Human and
Nonhuman Animals (London: Duke University Press, 1995), 1, 8.
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allow experiments which cause suffering and death to be carried out on a minority of our
fellows in order to ‘maximize the happiness’ of the scope of the remainder. Thus seems
that our moral principles differ substantially when we apply them to human beings in
animals.”1 Singer explicitly likens speciesism to racism, sexism, and slavery.2 Thus to
be accused of speciesism is highly pejorative, similar to being accused of being racist. It
is also interesting to note that the term is not used for preferential value o f a non-human
species. It is used only in reference to preference of humans over the animal kingdom.
Singer asserts that speciesism violates the “fundamental moral principle of equality
and consideration of interests that ought to govern our relations with all beings.” This, he
asserts, causes us to inflict suffering on non-humans for “trivial purposes,” but that
“generation after generation of Western thinkers have sought to defend the right of
humans to do this.”3 Singer here reveals the cultural target of the indictment as
“speciesism”: It is primarily Western culture and thinking that comes under attack for
being “speciesist.” Also, even human preference for “trivial purposes” is clearly
condemned. Waldau criticizes the inclusion of the adjective “trivial” as a weakness.
Some trivial issues, he argues, favor humans without being objectionable. Therefore, he
maintains that the definition would be much stronger and more useful if speciesism is
‘Roslind Godlovitch, “Animals and Morals,” in Animals, Men and Morals: An
Enquiry into the Maltreatment o f Non-humans, ed. Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind
Godlovitch, and John Harris (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), 156.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 55-56. Much of the “pop literature” on Animal Rights
makes this same comparison.
3Ibid., 223.
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restricted to undue human preference in a “critical issue.”1 However, he offers no
suggestion on determining the difference between trivial and critical, leaving the reader
with no clear means of making the distinction.
James Rachels reiterates the concept of speciesism found in such authors as Singer,
and repeats those sentiments in his own writings. He argues that “the traditional doctrine
o f human dignity is speciesist to the core, for it implies that the interests of humans have
priority over those of all other creatures.”2
Rachels believes this speciesism exists largely because of what he calls “traditional
morality.”3 But what does Rachels mean by traditional morality? Another statement
clarifies his intent: “Darwin’s earliest readers realized that an evolutionary outlook might
undermine the traditional doctrine of human dignity, a doctrine which is at the core o f
Western m orals”* Rachels observes that this means that as we probe the relationship of
morality to religion, the religious focus is likely to be on Christianity because it is the
dominant religion of Western society.5 Specifically he mentions the doctrine of man

’Waldau, 37.
2James Rachels, CfA, 181.
3Ibid., 1-5.
4Ibid., 79. Emphasis mine.
5James Rachels, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy, 3d ed. (Boston, MA:
McGraw-Hill College, 1999), 55; idem, CfA, 102. See also CfA, 182, where Rachels
states that “many defenders of traditional morality have embraced the radical form of
speciesism. Aquinas and Kant . . . both held that the interests of non-humans count for
nothing.” Thus Aquinas, a major Christian theologian, is identified with “traditional”
morality. Although unstated, Rachels’s writings seem to imply that other religions are
not seen as posing the kind of speciesist threat that he claims to find in Christianity. In
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being the “image o f God” as a major culprit in causing speciesism.1 Rachels sees
Aquinas’s incorporation of the Aristotelian hierarchy of being as a corollary cause of
Western speciesism.2 Thus, for Rachels, ethical systems rooted in “human hubris” are
focused on protecting HUMAN rights and interests.3
Elements (1999), 61, it seems clear that by “Christianity,” Rachels is essentially referring
to Roman Catholic moral theology and Catholic based natural law theory.
'Rachels, CfA, 4,171; idem, Elements (1999), 102.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 60-61, 102. Rachels’s mention of the Aristotelian view
of reality points to a fundamental issue undergirding the speciesism debate. Stephen
Toulmin asserts that there has been a fundamental shift from an “ahistorical” view of
nature and reality to a historical one. In the ahistorical view, there was an “‘immutable’
order of nature and human knowledge.” The cosmos was “a fixed and ‘well-ordered’
body o f eternal entities and their relationships.” Toulmin argues this concept of an
underlying, immutable reality which shapes and structures our history, is rooted in Greek
philosophy, citing especially Plato. Concerning the shift to a historical, more relativist
paradigm, Toulmin observes: “Only from 1750 on did the new historical point of view
begin to put down serious roots. At first, it made inroads only into the human sciences;
but it soon spread into natural sciences: first, into the history of the earth, by way of
paleontology and historical geology, and next into biology, with the discovery of organic
evolution, which led to Darwin’s theory of variation and natural selection.” Stephen
Toulmin, “The Historization o f Natural Science: Its Implications for Theology,” in
Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium fo r the Future, ed. Hans Kiing and David
Tracy (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1989), 233-241, esp. 233-235. Thus,
Darwinism cannot see any fixity of species for this would reflect the immutable order of
the ahistorical approaches to nature. If fixity of species is thus rejected, then this would
imply that the concept o f species is an artificial and arbitrary categorization that can have
no moral significance. We shall see Rachels develop this argument in chapter 4.
3Rachels, Elements (1999), 195. Rachels here attributes human tendencies to
speciesism as being part of our evolutionary development, and in this context asserts that
humanocentric eth ics restricts morality to the protection o f human interests. H owever,

since Rachels accuses traditional ethics as being founded on foundations of human
preference, and thus inherently speciesist, the clear implication of Rachels’s assertion is
that any ethics recognizing human preference is ultimately an ethics which protects only
human interests, whether explained by evolution, or justified by theological and
philosophical concepts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66

Four Forms of Speciesism
Radical versus Mild Speciesism
Unlike the previous authors, Rachels classifies speciesism into different forms,
consisting of two sets of paired categories. In the first pair, radical speciesism and mild
speciesism, his contrast “has to do with the extent of the view.”1 In radical speciesism,
“even the relatively trivial interests of humans take priority over vital interests of
nonhumans. Thus, if we have to choose between causing mild discomfort to a human,
and causing excruciating pain to a non-human, we should prefer to cause pain to the non
human and spare the human.”2
In mild speciesism, “when the choice is between a relatively trivial human interest
and a more substantial interest of a non-human, we may choose for the
non-human.. . . However, if the interests are comparable . . . we should give preference
to the human’s welfare.”3 Thus, only when human interests are either greater than or
approximately equal to animal interests is human preference given. But for Rachels, this
is not the only way to categorize speciesism.

Qualified versus Unqualified Speciesism
Rachels shifts the discussion to another way of distinguishing types of speciesism,
'Rachels, CfA, 183.
2Ibid., 182.
3Ibid.
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saying, “In addition to distinguishing between radical and mild speciesism, we may
distinguish between qualified and unqualified versions of the doctrine.”1 Rachels asserts
that this method of comparing forms of speciesism differs from the former in that it “has
to do with its logical basis.”2 Rachels defines unqualified speciesism as “the view that
mere species alone is morally important. On this view, the fact that an individual is a
member of a certain species, unsupplemented by any other consideration, is enough to
make a difference in how the individual should be treated.”3 In other words, unqualified
speciesism asserts that species membership alone is the basis of having moral
significance and protection. Applied to humans, any human would automatically have
superior rights over an animal merely because of membership in the human race. Thus, it
seems closely related to the view of radical speciesism discussed earlier. Unqualified
speciesism is essentially an entitlement model of morality regardless of personal function
and ability. It is this concept of speciesism that Rachels likens to racism, a comparison
that he notes is also made by Singer.4 The one without rights is “equally as intelligent,
'Ibid.
Tbid., 183.
Tbid.

4Ibid., 181, 183. On p. 181, Rachels uses a quote from Singer, cited below to
establish the racism analogy. Then on p. 183, he uses the example of a “martian” who
differs from humans only in bodily appearance, yet is discriminated against on the basis
of not being human. This clearly builds on the racism model borrowed from Singer two
pages earlier. Comparing speciesism with racism and sexism is commonplace in animal
rights literature. For example, see Ryder, Animal Revolution, 3-4; Singer, Animal
Liberation, 1, 7-9, 234. Rachels’s quotation of Singer is from p. 9.
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and equally as sensitive, with just the same cares and interests as anyone else. The only
difference is that he has a different kind of body.”1
By contrast, Rachels proposes qualified speciesism, introducing it as “a more
sophisticated view of the relation between morality and species.. . . On this view,
species alone is not regarded as morally significant. However, species-membership is
correlated with other differences that are significant. The interests of humans are said to
be more important, not simply because they are human, but because humans have
morally relevant characteristics that other animals lack.” In other words, this form of
speciesism is based on the functional abilities of the typical member of the species, not
on the membership itself. Rachels gives several examples of typical human traits used to
justify human preference in morality. He notes that characteristics such as ability to
reason, language, being the image of God, the ability to enter into morally binding
agreements, and greater sensitivity to pain and suffering (due to our superior intelligence)
have all been suggested as justifications of human preference.2 It appears that, for
Rachels, once the human function is verified, this form of speciesism will still have more
affinity to radical speciesism than to mild speciesism.

'Rachels, CfA, 182, 183.
2Ibid., 184.
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Animal Rights as a Foil for Exploring Evolution and Ethics
A classic argument in the animal rights literature is to blame human preference
ethics on Christianity.1 Thus, we find in the literature of the animal rights advocates,
discussion and argumentation of moral standing based on an Darwinian-evolutionary
world-view opposing perspective of traditional, theocentric morality which they label as
being speciesist.
If we wish to discover some of the ethical implications of Darwinism, then, it
seems likely that we can find fruitful insights by examining the work of animal rights
authors. It should be noted, however, that we are not interacting with animal rights
literature to debate animal rights, but rather to identify possible implications of
Darwinian evolution for ethics, and especially for Christian ethics. All the arguments
examined in this chapter are to be understood as occurring in the context of a moral
revolution intended to replace traditional Western ethics with a morality based in the
“facts” of Darwinian evolution. Thus how do animal rights advocates use Darwinian
Evolution to address the issue of speciesism?
One key proposal comes from Richard Dawkins. A second, complementary
approach is found in James Rachels. Because Rachels’s contribution is closely linked to
'See for example, Peter Singer, “Heavy Petting,” undated from 2001,
http://www.nerve.com/Opinions/Singer/heavyPetting/main.asp (22 May 2003), also
located at http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001— .htm. This article is a response to
a book on bestiality by Midas Dekkers, Dearest Pet: On Bestiality, trans. Paul Vincent
(n.p.: Verso, 2000). See also, Singer, Animal Liberation, chapter 5; Ryder, Animal
Revolution, 309-312; Pluhar, 11-12. See also chapter 2 of this dissertation for more on
the history of human preference in Western culture.
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his unique arguments for a Darwinist ethics, I shall save most of his work in this area for
chapter 4. I shall start, then, by exploring Dawkins’s proposal of an approach to morality
based on belief in the evolutionary kinship of man and animals. Then we shall explore
kinship-based criteria for granting moral status to humans and animals.

Morality Based on Evolutionary Kinship
Zoologist Richard Dawkins, from Oxford, expresses his opposition to human
preference speciesism by attacking the speciesist structure of thought which he calls,
“discontinuous thinking.” For Dawkins, discontinuous thinking is a mind-set which has a
great need to categorize everything into separate, unrelated entities. He illustrates it with
South African courts (during the Apartheid era) adjudicating whether particular
individuals of mixed parentage (racially) are legally Black, White, or Colored. In a
similar fashion, the discontinuous mind chooses to divide the animals (including the
human animal) into discontinuous species having no relation to each other. Thus, for the
speciesist, “humans are humans while gorillas are animals. There is an unquestioned
yawning gulf between them such that the life of a single human child is worth much more
than the lives of all the gorillas in the world.”1 Dawkins restates the issue this way: “But
‘Richard Dawkins, “Gaps in the Mind,” in The Great Ape Project: Equality
Beyond Humanity, ed. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1993), 81. Dawkins’s juxtaposition of a human child with gorillas is in reference to the
following hypothetical letter used to open the article: “Sir, You appeal for money to save
the gorillas. Very laudable, no doubt. But doesn’t it seem to have occurred to you that
there are thousands of human children suffering on the very same continent of Africa.
There’ll be time enough to worry about gorillas when we’ve taken care of every last one
of the kiddies. Let’s get our priorities right, please" (emphases in original). He then
suggests (pp. 80-81) that we can illustrate the speciesist double-standard by substituting
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tie the label Homo sapiens even to a tiny piece of insensible, embryonic tissue, and its
life suddenly leaps to infinite, incomputable value.”1 Dawkins concedes that while a
good case may be made for saving human children over gorillas, he also adds that “a
good case could be made the other way.”2

From Discontinuous Thinking to the Concept of Kinship
Dawkins seeks to undermine the discontinuous mind-set with his concept of the
“ring species.” He illustrates the concept of a ring species with two species of seagulls
found in England, the herring and lesser black-backed gulls. If you start with herring
gulls in England and move westward from Europe around the world, the herring gulls
slowly change in characteristics. By the time you get back to England, the ring of species
change you have followed will have changed from herring gulls, through small
incremental steps, into the lesser black-backed gull, a distinctly separate species. The
neighboring members in the ring can interbreed while the two species at the ends of the
ring cannot.3 These incremental steps Dawkins likens to the extinct evolutionary links
the word “aardvarks” for “humans” and see if you still agree with the concept of the
letter.
‘Ibid. The implications o f this statement for issues like abortion, stem cell
research, cloning, and genetic manipulation should not be underestimated. Most
Christian opponents o f these invoke the human status of the cells and organisms involved
as the grounds for moral and legal protection. D aw kins’s removal o f such status opens

the door for severely undermining the traditional foundations for exercising extreme
caution in some of these issues, or even prohibiting others. These implications do not fall
within the scope o f this work. Nevertheless, they beg for further investigation.
2Ibid„ 80.
3From a purely geometric perspective, a ring does not have ends. The only
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between humans and apes, and thus he argues that humans are a ring species as well. As
a ring species, Dawkins asserts that humans have a kinship with the apes (and maybe
other animals) which is not discontinuous, but rather, continuous. He reasons that “there
is no natural category that includes chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans but excludes
humans.” Dawkins concludes that to distinguish between man and apes as separate
categories is to make an artificial distinction not found in reality.1 In a similar vein,
Dolan asserts that our early evolutionary ancestors had no theological basis for separating
humans from animals and thus tended to view animals as creatures who were fellow kin.2
Such arguments clearly challenge speciesism and any humanocentric ethics associated
with it.
Ryder also argues for a moral kinship between man and animals. Ryder opines,
“Surely if animals are related through evolution, then we should all be related morally,”
and then declares his belief that Darwinism provides “grounds for asserting the moral
kinship of all animals.” He further asserts that while Darwinism has almost universally
demonstrated the “physical kinship” of men and animals, it has not yet caused most
people to take “the logical next step of admitting moral kinship.”3 Ryder argues that
exception is when drawing a picture of a ring. Dawkins uses a conceptual trip around the
globe with the same starting and ending point, to draw such a ring. The significance of
the ring species illustration is its depiction of a continuum of being. Dawkins then
transfers the concept o f a geographic continuum of being going around the world to a
continuum o f being going through time, which is called evolution.
‘Ibid., 82-84.
2Dolan, 123.
3Ryder, Animal Revolution, 3, 330-31. Emphasis in original.
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when we establish the kinship of humans and animals, we must go beyond the basic
concept of animal welfare to the stronger concept of animal rights. 1 So what moral
implications come when the “logical next step” is taken?

Moral Implications of Evolutionary Kinship
“Continuously Distributed Morality”
Dawkins’s ring-species argument raises the question of the nature of ethics in the
context of evolutionary kinship. He declares that “as long as our social mores are
governed by discontinuously minded lawyers and theologians, it is premature to advocate
a quantitative, continuously distributed morality.”2 In the context of the larger debate
over speciesism, when Dawkins proposes an ethics that is “quantitative,” he is using this
term in juxtaposition to the term, “qualitative.” This means that, for Dawkins, being
entitled to rights and privileges is not to be based on possession of a special quality or
qualities (such a being human, and thus a qualitative criterion). Instead of looking for
ontological qualities to gain moral status, one would look at how many functional factors
there are to entitle the subject to rights.3 The phrase, “continuously distributed,” refers to
the ring-species concept. The scope of ethics and morality is to be continuously
distributed across the species ring instead of being discontinuously restricted to a
'Ibid., 3.

2R. Dawkins, “Gaps,” 87.
3In the next chapter, we shall see that this quantitative versus quality argument is a
major foundation for James Rachels’s proposed ethical system.
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privileged species or group of species in the ring. Thus ethical privilege would be based
in functional attributes, and not on a qualitative status such as being human. Once
morality is based on functional attributes, it cannot avoid becoming relativist. A number
of authors assert that ethical relativism is precisely what one would expect from a
Darwinist world-view.

Inherent Relativism
Dawkins asserts that “ethical principles that are based upon accidental caprice
should not be respected as if cast in stone.”1 In other words, for Dawkins, humans are an
accidental product of a designless evolution. Thus, human preference ethics are based on
a meaningless act of chance. Dawkins not only challenges the validity of human
preference in ethics due to these principles of evolution, but he also undermines any
concept of ethical absolutes because “ethical principles . . . should not be respected as if
cast in stone.” From an evolutionary perspective, then, ethical principles, standards, and
norms, must now be viewed as relative, evolving with man, ever adaptable, never
absolute. Dawkins is not the only one to come to such a conclusion.
Julian Huxley, the great evolutionary ethicist of the mid-twentieth century (A.D.),
likewise points out the relativist bent in ethics rooted in evolutionary thinking, noting that
“any standards of right and wrong must in some way be related to the movement of that
process [evolution] through time.”2 Thus, ethics is the product of evolution and is itself
‘Ibid., 87.
2Julian Huxley, Touchstone fo r Ethics: 1893-1943 (New York: Harper and
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evolving.1 Huxley is echoed by Antony Flew in his discussion of Darwin’s position that
man is totally part of nature, having evolved from it. Flew states: “As applied to ethics in
particular this involves that all moral ideas and ideals have originated in the world; and
that, having thus in the past been subject to change, they will presumably in the future
too, for better or worse, continue to evolve.”2 Due to Darwin’s influence, Huxley
declares that prior ethical systems have been “replaced with a thoroughgoing ethical
relativism.”3 Huxley even observed that the concept of “Absolute,” as result of Darwin’s
theory, seems destined to disappear in all fields—truth, beauty, goodness or any other
value.4 Huxley asserted that evolutionary thought “will have nothing to do with
Absolutes, including absolute truth, absolute morality, absolute perfection, and absolute
authority.”5
Michael Ruse joins Huxley in asserting that human morality is an evolutionary
adaptation built into us by natural selection. In particular, Ruse defines morality in terms
of altruistic behavior. “We all know what morality is about. It is about helping other
Brothers, 1947), 131.
‘Ibid., 114.
2Flew, 55.
3Huxley, Touchstone, 114.
4Julian Huxley, New Bottle fo r New Wine (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957),
59.
5Julian Huxley, Essays o f a Humanist (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 73-74.
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folk.”1 Again, he states that “if morality means anything, it means being prepared to hold
out a helping hand to others.”2 By defining morality in terms of helping others, Ruse sets
his reader up for the assertion that morality (i.e., helpfulness) evolved in humans through
the “good biological strategy” of “cooperation,” which gave humans an advantage in the
“struggle for existence.”3 Altruism, then, is seen as the root of human morality.4
Because altruistic cooperation is seen as so crucial to human survival and
evolution, Ruse argues that natural selection had to produce a sense of binding obligation
to make humans act altruistically. Otherwise, there would be no universal cooperation
necessary to produce the advantages humans have enjoyed. Ruse calls these genetically
generated moral impulses “epigenetic rules.”5 Ruse observes that this explanation of
moral origins in humans reduces morality, to a great degree, to feelings and sentiments of

‘Michael Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 208. For Ruse’s full discussion of the evolution of
morality in man see chapter 6, esp. 217-222, and 250-252.
2Ibid., 217.
3Michael Ruse, “The New Evolutionary Ethics,” in Evolutionary Ethics, ed.
Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1993), 144. This chapter is a condensed refinement of the arguments in Taking
Darwin Seriously, chapter 6.
4Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, 218-219.
5Ibid., 222, 251-252. Interestingly, Ruse places epigenetic rules in comparison to
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, arguing that the latter is “embedded” in the former [p.
244]. Ruse discusses Kant twice in this chapter [pp. 210-211; 244-247], without directly
referring to Kant’s epistemological theory and categories. In my opinion, having a set of
epigenetic moral rules programmed into our very nature sounds suspiciously close to
Kant’s preprogrammed epistemological categories found in his view of human nature.
While not directly related to the topic of this work, pursuing this potential
interrelationship of Ruse’s and Kantian thought would be an interesting study.
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obligation.1 Thus, Ruse declares, “Morality has neither meaning nor justification, outside
the human context. Morality is subjective.”2 In a later work he goes further in declaring
the evolutionary advantages of a genetically generated sense of duty to others, stating,
“Often we perform better if we are deceived by our biology.. . . We think we ought to
help, that we have obligations to others, because it is in our biological interests to have
these thoughts.”3
Because of his belief that morality is essentially genetically generated trickery, this
leads Ruse to some key conclusions concerning the nature of morality and ethics. Ruse
opines that, “there is no foundation for ethics at a ll!. . . The supposed underpinning is
chimerical in some sense or another.”4 Ruse boldly concludes that, “morality is no more
than a collective illusion fobbed off on us by our genes for reproductive ends.”5 Thus, for
Ruse, morality is not based on any objective standard of right or wrong but, rather, is
rooted in a fictitious fable that our “genes make us believe.”5 If morality is merely an
illusion, a hereditary deception, then its principles certainly cannot be absolute, but must
of necessity be relative.
‘Ibid., 252.
2Ibid.
3Ruse, “The New Evolutionary Ethics,” 147. Emphasis mine.
4Ibid., 150-151.
Tbid., 151.
Tbid., 152. Ruse’s seminal form of this argument can be found in his book,
Darwinism Defended: A Guide to the Evolution Controversies (Reading, MA: AddisonWesley Publishing Company, 1982), 272-273.
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Others have also noted the relativistic bent introduced by evolutionary thinking.
Robert Morrison explicitly asserts that evolution “tends to lead to a relativistic
philosophy. Goodness can be only judged in relation to prevailing circumstances. There
is no absolute scale of righteousness against which the individual can measure himself
for all time.”1 Ian Taylor, an opponent o f evolution, describes humanists as declaring
Darwinian evolution to be the “death knell of religious and moral values” as part of his
own assertions to this effect.2 The evolutionist, H. James Birx, likewise hints at a moral
revolution when he asserts that “the empirical truth of organic evolution still challenges
those entrenched beliefs of traditional theology concerning a god, freewill, immortality,
and a divine destiny.”3 Dawkins more deeply develops these implications through his
kinship model of morality.

Evolutionary Kinship Said to Undermine Religiously Rooted Ethics
What if Missing Links Were Not Extinct?
Dawkins unpacks some key moral implications of Darwinian evolution, when, in
reference to kinship, he declares, “The point I want to make is that, as fa r as morality is
concerned, it should be incidental that the intermediates are dead. What if they were
not? What if a clutch o f intermediate types had survived, enough to link us to modem
‘Robert S. Morrison, “Darwinism: Foundation for an Ethical System?”
Christianity and Crisis 20 (1960): 120.
2Ian Taylor, 422.
3Birx, 102.
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chimpanzees by a chain . . . of interbreeders?”1 In other words, from an evolutionary
perspective, if enough of the missing links between chimpanzees and man had survived,
so that interbreeding was possible between all the neighboring forms in the ring between
chimps and humans (like the gulls), how could we claim humans were special and
distinct? Where could the discontinuous mind draw the line of moral favoritism?
It is precisely the concept that we can have intermediates who might be, in
discontinuous terminology, 80 percent human, 93 percent human, or 61 percent human,
that suddenly makes it hard to draw the moral boundary of inclusion. The almost infinite
number of variables makes a concrete answer seem ludicrous. In a similar way, Dawkins
is arguing that the many intermediates implied in the evolutionary model makes it
ridiculous to try to establish a definition of essential humanness entitling us to special
moral consideration over the animals.2 Dawkins boldly asserts that “we need only to
discover a single survivor [of an intermediate species], say a relict [sz'c] Australopithecus
in the Budongo Forest, and our precious system of norms and ethics would come
crashing about our ears. The boundaries with which we segregate our world would be all
shot to pieces. Racism would blur with speciesism in obdurate and vicious confusion.”3

'R. Dawkins, “Gaps,” 85. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid. On p. 82, Dawkins illustrates the difficulty of defining the boundary of
humanness in discontinuous terms by noting the fight of pro-life opponents of abortion
who view the concept of “human” as absolute, the opposite of Dawkins’s concept of ringspecies continuity. These people cannot be argued with, he says, because their
discontinuous minds cannot accommodate the concept that “the fetus could be half
human or a hundredth human.” Their way of thinking is an all-or-nothing mentality with
no capacity for half-measures.
3Ibid., 85.
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The ring-species argument has much in common with Rachels’s argument that for
Darwin there could be no set species, but rather, there is a continuum of being in which
individuals share some characteristics in common while differing in others. However, it
is different from Rachels in scope, because its focus is primarily on establishing kinship
through an organic union of man to animals through evolution, while Rachels is more
focused on the alleged arbitrariness of defining species. The organic nature of Dawkins’s
view is seen in two ways: first in his word picture in which an imaginary line of
individuals is envisioned representing the stages of evolutionary development up to man.
Each individual stands about a yard apart across the continent of Africa. Near mid-line,
there is a common ancestor from which two lines of primates descended, ours being one
of the lines. Starting at the Indian Ocean in Somalia, we would reach this common
ancestor, depicted as a female midway through the species ring. “The ancestor is
standing well to the east of Mount Kenya, and holding in her hand the entire chain o f her
lineal descendants, culminating in you standing on the Somali beach.”1 The other hand
holds the second line of descendants, the apes. Thus, through this ancestor, there is an
organic tie between the two lines of descendants.
The second way in which we see an organic connection between man and animals
in Dawkins’s position is in the appeals made to the ability o f one species in the ring of
species to interbreed with the neighboring species in the ring sequence. Only when
separated by multiple steps does interbreeding become impossible, as is illustrated by the
Tbid. Emphasis mine.
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two species of sea gulls at opposite ends of the same ring. This ability to interbreed with
neighboring species in the ring is asserted to mean that if the closest evolutionary
ancestors of humans were still alive, then we would be able to interbreed with them. The
kinship argument, then, claims in part that this organic connection to animals makes them
our evolutionary relatives, which, in turn, makes them entitled to equal consideration
with humans. Ergo, it is morally wrong to discriminate against one’s evolutionary family
on the basis that there is no interconnection between you as a human and them as
animals. The theoretical possibility of finding a surviving member o f our ring of species,
especially one we could interbreed with, begs a corresponding question: What if science
were to create a transgenic hybrid of human and non-human beings?

Implications of Human-Animal Transgenic Hybrids
Dawkins raises this very issue when he continues:
But I can assert, without fear of contradiction, that if somebody succeeded in
breeding a chimpanzee/human hybrid the news would be earth-shattering. Bishops
would bleat, lawyers would gloat in anticipation, conservative politicians would
thunder, Socialists wouldn’t know where to put their barricades.. . . Politics would
never be the same again, nor would theology, sociology, psychology or most
branches o f philosophy. The world that would be so shaken, by such an incidental
event as a hybridisation [s/c], is a speciesist world indeed, dominated by the
discontinuous mind.1
Ryder stretches the issue further by asking, “One day, if human apes are interbred
with other apes, will it be justifiable to hunt, or eat, or experiment upon the hybrid child,
'Ibid., 86-87.
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or should he or she be sent to school?”1 This is an excellent question for it stretches the
issue of what it means to be human. Would such a hybrid be entitled to equal rights with
“pure” humans?
Ryder raises a second question in reference to the transgenic issue which clarifies
this moral identity issue:
In order to produce cheaper meat, pigs have already been bom who contain human
genes. Yet surely this makes a nonsense of our speciesist morality?[sic] Is it not
partial cannibalism to eat such a Humanopig? How many human genes are
required to make a creature human in the eyes o f the lawl2
By asking how many genes are required to make a creature legally (or morally) human,
Ryder effectively brings us back to Dawkins’s proposed ring-species continuum of
creatures, meaning we can have beings who are only X or Y percent human. How is
their moral status to be determined? Ryder’s purpose seems to be to try to elevate the
animals to human-style preference, instead of lowering human status. But is it possible
that his argument may make it possible to devaluate humans instead of increasing the
moral value of animals?

Elevation of Animals or Demotion of Humans?
Ryder raises the possibility that kinship could demote human moral value instead
o f elevating the moral status of animals when he states:
The real and awful prospect of interbreeding human and nonhuman in the 1990's

‘Ryder, Animal Revolution, 7.
2Ibid.
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becomes daily more probable.. . . Within years, the ancient conceptual gulf
between man and beast will be closed by the scientists. Will this lead to increased
callousness to humans, or to a sudden dawning that we owe duties toward all
sentient life?1
Ryder consistently pursues the track of seeking to increase our sense of duties to all
sentient life, human or animal. Says Ryder, “One is left with the startlingly simple
position, already stated, that whatever is morally wrong in the human case, is probably
wrong in the nonhuman case as w ell.. . . What holds for humans, especially for such
categories as mentally handicapped and infants, should apply to in the case of
nonhumans.”2 Ryder pushes this new ethics to the conclusion that “where it is wrong to
inflict pain upon a human animal, it is probably wrong to do so to a non-human sentient.
The actual killing o f a non-human animal may be wrong i f it causes suffering or, more
contentiously, i f it deprives the non-human offuture pleasures'* Thus Ryder seeks to
shut out the degradation of our attitude towards human live and increase our protection of
non-human sentient life. But on what grounds does Ryder come to these conclusions
about morality? Why not lower our view of human life instead? This last statement by
Ryder seems to beg the question of moral foundations, for it reveals an assumed criteria
by which inclusion in moral protection is granted. He appears to assume a utilitarian
hedonism as the fundamental criterion of moral good and evil. But why should one
‘Ibid., 318.
2Ibid., 6. By asserting that the rights of less than fully functional humans are
grounds for extending the same rights to at least some animals, Ryder is using a
technique that is known as the argument from marginal cases. This category of argument
will be examined later in the chapter.
3Ibid., 6-7. Emphasis mine.
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accept this foundation for launching moral imperatives? What criteria for moral
protection are proposed by anti-speciesist thinkers?

Proposed Characteristics That Entitle One to Moral Standing
Waldau notes that animal rights advocates are not uniformly agreed on this matter.1
If the boundary o f moral preference is not to be defined by membership in the human
race, then where are we to draw the new line? Ryder argues that it is not differences
between the species but differences within a species that are morally relevant.2 This
would seem to imply that shared characteristics could also have moral relevancy.
Roslind Godlovitch asserts, however, that it is not just any shared characteristics between
men and animals, but that it is only “relevant similarities” that matter.3 But what are
relevant similarities? What kinship characteristics really matter in reference to moral
standing?
Waldau asserts that there are several key standards proposed for redrawing the
moral preference boundary line. Beyond invoking the status of being a “fellow
creatures”with us, the proposed boundaries of moral inclusion include, sentience, mental
life of a certain complexity, and traits common to humans and some animals.4

•Waldau, 28.
2Ryder, Victims, 14-15.
3Godlovitch, 157.
4Waldau, 28.
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The Sentiency Criterion
The Basic G rounds of the Sentiency Position
Peter Singer asserts that Jeremy Bentham is significant in that he appears to be the
first to denounce human dominion over nature as tyranny rather than legitimate
government.1 In addition Bentham is significant for forging the fundamental argument
for sentiency as the ultimate criterion for determining moral status. Said Bentham,
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights
which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny.
The French have already discovered that the blackness o f the skin is no reason why
a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.
It may one day come to be recognized that the number o f the legs, the villosity of
the skin, or the termination o f the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for
abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse?
But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a
more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old.
But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can
they reason? nor Can they talkl but, Can they suffer! Why should the law refuse
its protection to any sensitive being? The time will come when humanity will
extend its mantle over everything which breathes.2
In particular, the phrase, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk] but,
Can they suffer?” has become the chief slogan of the animal rights movement. Richard
Ryder aptly has coined the term “Painism” as a label for defining the boundary of moral
protection for an individual on the ability to suffer, where suffering is defined in terms of
pain. The moral aspect of this approach applies to the pain of others. Thus, “we should do
1Singer, Animal Liberation, 211.
2Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation
(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1876), 311. All emphases are original except the
final two.
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to others what we believe will give them pleasure and not do to them what we believe will
cause them pain.”1
Singer points out that Bentham rejects any kind of contractualist foundation for
ethics, proposing instead a hedonist basis of morality: Pain and suffering are inherently
morally evil while pleasure and happiness are the essence of the morally good. In
Ryder’s words, “Pain, can be said, is the quintessence of evil. All painful events are bad
and all bad events are painful. It is on this premise that Singer declares that the only
grounds for having interests, and thus rights, is the capacity to be able to suffer (i.e.
experience pain).”2 The ability to experience pain, then, becomes the criterion of
defining sentience or consciousness. Says Ryder,
Whatever are the causes of consciousness, its moral importance is clearly
paramount. It matters not if an animal, whether human or nonhuman, is intelligent
or communicative, or has an immortal soul. All that matters is that it is conscious:
in particular that it can be conscious o f pain and pleasure. This should be the
bedrock of our morality. Pain is pain regardless o f the species suffering it.3
Thus, says Ryder, all major theories of behavior (including Freud and Skinner) are based
on the principle that pleasure is desired and pain is avoided.4 Since animals can seek to
gain pleasure and avoid pain, Ryder declares that our laws must recognize that
“nonhumans have claims to life, freedom, and the pursuit o f happiness just as we do; and

'Richard Ryder, “Painism: The Ethics of Animal Rights and the Environment,” in
Animal Welfare and the Environment: An RSPCA Book, ed. Richard Ryder (New York:
Avon Books, 1977), 196, 198-199.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 7-9.
3Ryder, Animal Revolution, 325.
4Ryder, “Painism,” 198.
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among the liberties that individual non-humans should be able to enjoy is the freedom
from exploitation by humankind.”1 Why individual nonhumans?
Ryder declares, that since pain is non-transferrable—that is, one can never
consciously and directly feel another’s pain—ethics based on the ability to suffer pain
must be individualistic since species cannot feel pain. For Ryder there can be no sum or
averaging of pains because what is morally significant is the pain of one, not the
combined pain of a group.2 Rachels likewise argues that the capacity to suffer belongs to
individuals, not groups, and thus moral status is based on individual characteristics, not
on species membership.3 This painist criterion, and specifically the use o f Bentham,
belies, then, a tendency of these ethicists to favor a utilitarian approach to morality.4
‘Ibid.
2Ibid., 202. It should be noted that Ryder seems to contradict this argument to some
degree in Victims, 15. On pp. 14-15, he gives a brief, but classic sentience argument
based on individual abilities to suffer. He then argues in the context o f challenging
politicians with the significance of the sentience criterion, that “those politicians who still
believe that politics have some remote connection with morality or who vaguely believe
that their job has to do with increasing the total sum of happiness, should question why
non-human animals should not be also represented by them?” Here Ryder focuses on the
classic utilitarian formula of the greatest sum of happiness for the greatest number of
sentient beings, explicitly citing Bentham. However, it is to be the sum o f individual
experiences of happiness, and not a conglomerate sum that essentially turns into an
averaging of happiness. Thus Ryder would probably not feel that there is any
contradiction between his two books.
3Rachels, CfA, 173,192.
4In CfA, pp. 190-192, Rachels is seeking to rebut the idea that moral protection
depends on the capacity to create and maintain social contracts with reciprocal
obligations. He asserts that the proponents of the contractual foundation fail “to
distinguish the conditions necessary for having a moral obligation from the conditions
necessary for being the beneficiary of a moral obligation.” For example, Rachels notes
that adult humans are considered morally obligated not to torture one another. If a
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Current Assertions of Utilitarianism
Richard Ryder demonstrates the bent to utilitarianism when he declares that
“animal liberation” has “its foundation partly in utilitarian philosophy.”1 The key to
Ryder’s declaration is that the sentiency/painism argument is rooted in a statement of
Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, where animals are to be included in the
calculation o f pain and suffering. Since the foundational principle underlying these
assertions is the evolutionary kinship of man with the animals, it becomes relatively easy
to shift the concept of rights from a humanocentric focus to a sentiency-based view of
suffering that includes the animals.
Singer likewise confesses his utilitarian leanings,2 and Carruthers confirms the
utilitarian bent of the animal rights advocates by noting that from a utilitarian standpoint,
there is no reason for “an impartial, benevolent observer,” who is equally sympathetic to
the interests of all affected, to count animal interests as of lower importance than our
mentally retarded person violates this norm, we tend not hold them responsible because
of their diminished capacity to responsibly know what they are doing. But in the reverse,
we still hold the rational adult responsible for torturing a mentally handicapped person
who is unable to recognize the moral issue, but is still capable of experiencing pain.
Thus we have a person who lacks the ability to enter into a reciprocal social contract, yet
who can benefit from a moral standard. But it is the capacity to experience pain, not the
human species membership, that is morally significant for Rachels. Emphases in
original.
‘Ryder, Animal Revolution, 329.
2Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uninversity Press,
1993), 14.
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own.1 It would seem, though, that as soon as anti-speciesist ethics is admittedly a form
o f utilitarianism, that it becomes subject to the classic criticisms leveled against
utilitarianism, an issue that seems to be avoided in animal rights literature. On the other
hand, utilitarian hedonism may play a role in using the concept of marginal cases to try to
help define the circle of moral inclusion.

The Argument from Marginal Cases and Human Preference in Ethics
Basic Forms of the Argument
The argument from marginal cases is a classic tactic for exploring the extended
implications o f a particular position. The animal rights advocates regularly resort to the
marginal-cases argument in attempting to discredit support for human preference over
animals in ethics. According to Waldau, the “marginal cases argument” essentially holds
that certain “higher” non-human animals cannot fairly be denied basic moral rights
because there are “marginal” humans who have fewer abilities than the animals, but are
still granted full moral status.2 Thus, the argument concludes, the animal should receive
rights similar to those granted to the human. Singer frames the issue in a slightly
different manner:
If equality is related to any actual characteristics of humans, these characteristics

‘Carruthers, 55-56.
2Waldau, 26.
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must be some lowest common denominator, and pitched so low that no human
lacks them—but then the philosopher comes up against the catch that any such set
of characteristics which covers all animals will not be possessed only by humans.1
These articulations illustrate a type of the marginal-cases argument that Evelyn
Pluhar asserts is the favorite form of this argument in current usage, which she labels as
the “categorical version.”2 It should be noted that the categorical version essentially
assumes that marginal humans have rights and thus argues that animals of similar
characteristics (i.e., functionally) to marginal humans deserve the same rights.
Pluhar labels the second genre of the argument from marginal cases as the
“bioconditional version.” The bioconditional version does not assume rights are granted
to marginal humans, but rather asserts that marginal humans and animals of similar
characteristics (functionally) either share the same rights, or are equally deprived of
rights. The argument, then, is conditioned on marginal humans having rights. This
results in the conclusion that, in Pluhar’s words, “either both marginal humans and any
nonhumans who are similar to them in all morally relevant respects are maximally
morally significant, are highly morally significant, or neither are.”3 The key difference
‘Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal,”in Applied Ethics, ed. Peter Singer
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 226. See also, idem, Unsanctijying Human
Life: Essays on Ethics, ed. Helga Kuhse (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 89.
In Applied Ethics, Singer informs the reader in the first footnote of the chapter containing
this quote, that the chapter is “an abridged version of an essay which was first published
in P hilosohpic E xchange vol. 1, no. 5, (Summer 1974).” It is the 1974 version which was

republished in Unsanctijying Human Life, 79-93. This is indicated in the footnote on p.
79.
2Pluhar, 63.
3Ibid., 66. The abbreviated form appears on p. 120: “Either both are highly morally
significant or neither are.”
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between bioconditional and categorical versions is that the bioconditional version poses a
direct threat to the rights of marginal humans. Thus, Pluhar asserts that full-personhood
arguments are toppled by marginal cases because, “according to their view, those who
are not full persons, be they humans or non-humans, are in the same moral (or to be more
exact, nonmoral) boat.”1

Intended Purpose
It is critical to understand why this argument is used. Frey provides a key insight
into the core motives o f the marginal-cases argument. He diagrams the argument
structure as follows:
1. Criterion X, while excluding animals, also excludes babies and the severely
mentally-enfeebled from the class of right holders;
2. Babies and the severely mentally-enfeebled, however, do have rights and so fall
within this class;2
3. Therefore, criterion X must be rejected as a criterion for the possession of rights.
He continues, “Obviously, this argument is essentially negative and indirect, in that it
does not seek to establish that animals have rights but rather to undermine criteria the
application of which yield [s/c] the result that they do not have rights.”3 Pluhar concurs
with Frey in stating that “the entire point of the bioconditional version of the argument is
'Ibid., 120.
2The key assum ption is prem ise #2. The m arginal-cases argument thus is

essentially trying to argue, “Since babies and mentally handicapped humans still have
rights, the sentient animals ought to have similar rights.”
3R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals (Oxford, England:
Oxford University Press, 1980), 28-29.
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to show us exactly where the fiill-personhood view leads. It is a challenge to that view.”1
Nevertheless, the context in which the argument is presented is always in reference to
advocating the elevation of certain animals to equal moral status with people, and not to
devaluate the moral status of marginal humans. As Waldau points out, one must accept
the argument of marginal cases and protect other animals, or deny protection to both.2
One sees the intent is not to undermine human rights, but rather to expand animal
rights in many statements by many authors. For example, Christoph Anstotz argues that
the modem, enlightened “opposition to discrimination against intellectually disabled
people is based on principles that lead to opposition to discrimination against other
sentient beings who are also unable to defend their own interests.”3 In a similar vein
Singer opines that since we have now established universal human rights, the same
criteria should now be extended to animals.4 He also argues that the elimination of
human preference will not only bring better treatment of animals, but more compassion
to humans!5 Rachels remarks, “I fancy that human beings may be more humane when
they realize that, as their dependent associates live a life in which man has a share, so
’Pluhar, 73.
2Waldau, 37.
3Christoph Anstotz, “Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great
A pes,” in The G reat A pe P roject: E qu ality B e y o n d H um anity, ed. Paola Cavalieri and

Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 158.
4Singer, Practical Ethics, 55.
5Singer, Animal Liberation, 234-235.
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they have rights which man is bound to respect.”1 Ryder supports the same sentiment but
from a negative statement, that if humans persist in the total subordination of nonhumans,
we are paving the way for a more callous attitude towards the weak, elderly, and
handicapped of our own species.2
Pluhar, in fact, reveals her distaste for this very implication raised by Ryder. She
declares that attempts to restrict “maximum moral significance” to humans, either lapse
into unfounded prejudice (i.e., speciesism) or imply that many humans are not really
morally significant at all. She then concludes that “neither form of this dilemma is
particularly enticing.”3 For an ethics based in individual functionality, however, the
marginal-cases argument is very significant. Pluhar has aptly shown that if preference
and prejudice are set aside, the marginal-cases argument intended to elevate the moral
status of non-humans can just as easily demote them. There is no guarantee that
marginally functional humans will find protection. The marginal-cases argument
becomes empowered because an evolutionary understanding of origins and life leads to a
model of moral entitlement based on an individual’s functional capabilities. It is this
Barnes Rachels, “Why Darwinians Should Support Equal Treatment for Other
Great Apes,” in The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity, ed. Paola Cavalieri
and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 153.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 11.
3Pluhar, 120-121. It is significant to note the emotional response of Pluhar to the
bioconditional version’s implication that many marginally functional humans could lose
rights. Pluhar thus reflects the general preference for the categorical version seen in most
uses of this tactic. Their desire is not to undermine human rights but to elevate the moral
status of animals.
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individualism that will become the foundation of Rachels’s unique system of ethics based
on Darwinian evolution. Let us now turn to examining Rachels’s singular contribution.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE DARWINIST MORAL THEORY OF JAMES RACHELS

Introduction
What might a system of ethics based on Darwinian evolution look like? We have
already observed some general implications of Darwinism for ethics including a tendency
to favor Utilitarian ethics, and a propensity to relativism in ethics. But so far we have not
looked at how a moral theory or system based on the principles of Darwinian evolution
might be structured. No doubt there could be some variations based on differing
individual interpretations of the moral significance of Darwinism. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that most connections of ethics to Darwin have remained disjointed and isolated
from systematic ethical theory. One exception, however, is James Rachels.
In terms of recognition, Rachels stands in sharp contrast with the more renown
Peter Singer. In The New Yorker, Michael Specter characterizes Singer as follows:
“Peter Singer may be the most controversial philosopher alive; he is certainly among the
most influential.”1 By contrast, Rachels is comparatively unknown, yet he appears to
have made a m ore significant contribution in unpacking the moral im plications of

‘Michael Specter, “The Dangerous Philosopher,” The New Yorker, September 6,
1999, 46.
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Darwinian evolution. This is because Rachels goes where no one else has gone.
Rachels’s significance is twofold: First, he explicitly sets out to build an ethics based in
the “facts” o f Darwinism, and second, he seeks to undermine the pillars of traditional
Judeo-Christian ethics in order to create a need for a revised ethics. In so doing he
engages Christian ethics and theology much more directly and fully than Singer.1 Thus
Rachels, in explicitly seeking to establish a Darwinst ethics at the expense of Christian
ethics, stands alone.
Rachels has expounded his moral theory in two key books, as well as in a few
articles. The first book he published was a college textbook on ethics, The Elements o f
'A brief comment on the differences between Rachels and Singer is in order. In
some ways, they are virtually indistinguishable in their overall thrust, especially in
reference to animal rights. Their differences seem mostly to be more in emphases, than
in content. However, there are some key divergences that we shall summarize here.
Singer is more explicitly and more purely Utilitarian than Rachels. He builds his
ethics first on Utilitarian reasoning, with gleanings from Evolution. By contrast, Rachels
directly seeks to build his ethics on Darwinism and ends up with a type of Utilitarianism
as the result. Other differences include the fact that Rachels focuses on the principles of
equal consideration o f interests, and the concept of being subjects of a life, much more
than Singer does. Also, Singer regularly invokes and discusses the principle of
universifiability, whereas Rachels never mentions it. While both advocate abortion and
euthanasia, Singer seems more prone to push the discussion to the extreme possibilities,
including the issue o f infanticide.
The single biggest difference between them is that Singer will take the principle of
utility to the point o f rejecting any preferentialism or parochialism so that he sees no
difference between one’s moral obligations to one’s family and to poor starving people in
India or Africa. By contrast, we shall see Rachels explicitly build such preferentialism
into his ethics because it results in a Utilitarian type o f good for the community, though

the primary motivation is not Utilitarian.
What they share in common is a rejection of any theistic influence in ethics, and a
penchant to blame Christian ethics for producing anti-animal morality. Both thus do
ethics in a completely secular fashion rooted in human reason. Since Rachels is more
explicitly built from Darwinism, and more directly interacts with Christian ethics and
theology, he seems more significant for the purposes of this study.
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Moral Philosophy,1 which has passed through four editions, as of this writing. The
second book, Createdfrom Animals, sets the philosophical foundations for his ethics,
explicitly basing them on Darwinism. Thus, this book provides the centerpiece of this
study, while his other works play a supplemental role.

Rachels’s Use of Darwin to Inform and Ground Ethics
How Darwinism Interfaces with Traditional Ethics
In his introduction to Created from Animals, Rachels explicitly declares his intent
to discuss and explore the moral implications of Darwin’s theory of evolution and
intimates that Darwinism undermines the foundations of Christian ethics, especially in
reference to the issue of human preference in ethics.2 This does not mean that he takes
Christian ethics as insignificant. To the contrary, in another work, he makes it clear that
the “traditional theory” must be taken seriously, both due to its enormous influence, and
due to its being the only fully worked-out, systematically elaborated theory of morality
we have.3 It is important to note that Rachels does not claim to have falsified the
’James Rachels, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy, 1st ed. (Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 1986); 3d ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill College, 1999); 4th
ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill College, 2002). Hereafter will be footnoted respectively
as Rachels, Elements (1986), Elements (1999), and Elements (2002). If there is a second
edition, it appears to exist only in theory as I have been unable to find a library holding it.
However, since there is a third edition, it seems there must have been a second.
2Rachels, CfA, 1-5.
3James Rachels, The End o f Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 4. Rachels’s comment seems to have the unspoken implication
that with Christian ethics having a nearly 2000-year head start, Rachels's proposed ethics
will not be as complete or as systematic since his theory is still in its formative stages.
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Christian position. In his own words, “I would not argue that Darwinism entails the
falsity of the doctrine of human dignity; rather, I would contend that Darwinism
undermines human dignity by taking away its support.”1
The focal point o f this confrontation between Rachels’s Darwinian ethics and
traditional Christian ethics, then, is the issue of human preference in moral theory and
thinking. He asserts that “after Darwin, we can no longer think o f ourselves as
occupying a special place in creation.” This, in turn, leads Rachels to state that
“traditional morality is based, in part on the idea that human life has a special value and
worth. If we must give up on our inflated conception of ourselves, and our picture of the
world as made exclusively for our habitation, will we not have to give up, at the same
time, those elements of our morality which depend on such conceptions?”2 Thus Rachels
proposes the possibility that “Darwinism is incompatible with traditional morality, and so
provides reason for rejecting that morality and replacing it with something better.”3
Rachels notes that there has been a history of reactions to Darwin, in which the
general pattern has been to assert that the theory of evolution devalues man, and threatens
to undermine traditional Western morals. Says Rachels, “There is an idea about how
‘Rachels, CfA, 171.
2Ibid., 2-4.
3Ibid. See also Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse o f Our
Traditional Ethics (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1994), 1, 187-89. Peter Singer
likewise sees a need and reason to replace traditional (i.e., Christian) morality with a new
and improved theory o f morals. He likens the ethical movement to which he and Rachels
belong as the moral equivalent to the Copemican Revolution in astronomy—imperfect
but a great improvement over the previous theory. He depicts Christian ethics as all but
dead but still lingering in influence due to the populist masses.
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Darwinism might be related to ethics that is older and deeper than either ‘evolutionary
ethics’ or sociobiology. Darwin’s earliest readers realized that an evolutionary outlook
might undermine the traditional doctrine of human dignity, a doctrine which is at the core
of Western morals. Darwin himself seems to suggest this when he says that the
conception of man as ‘created from animals’ contradicts the arrogant notion that we are a
‘great work’.”1 Rachels suggests, however, that the significance of this point has been
underestimated. “I shall argue, however, that discrediting ‘human dignity ’ is one of the
most important implications of Darwinism, and that it has consequences that people have
hardly begun to appreciate.”2
However, Rachels is careful not to assert that the traditional ethical view of human
preference is patently false. Rachels asserts that “Darwin’s theory does not entail that the
idea of human dignity is false.. . . Darwinism does, however, undermine the traditional
doctrine [of human dignity]. . . by taking away its support.” He then informs us that “ to
replace the doctrine of human dignity, I offer a different conception, moral individualism,
which I argue is more in keeping with the evolutionary outlook.”3 Rachels here reveals
his significance by directly pitting Christian morality against Darwinian evolution and
‘Rachels, CfA, 79. Rachels appears to be alluding to a quotation by Darwin found
in the introduction of CfA, 1. “Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work worthy
of the interposition of a deity. More humble and I think truer to consider him created
from animals.” See, Charles Darwin, C harles D a r w in ’s N otebooks, 1836-1844,
transcribed and ed. Paul H. Barrett (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 300.
2Rachels, CfA, 79-80. Emphases mine.
3Ibid., 5. “Moral individualism” will turn out to become the label by which
Rachels identifies his proposed ethical system in chapter 5.
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joins the authors cited in the previous chapter in calling for a revolution in ethics.
But how does Rachels see Darwinian evolution as subverting human dignity and
thus undermining traditional morality? What is the “support” that is undermined?

Two Pillars Grounding Traditional Ethics
Rachels asks, “What exactly is the traditional idea of human dignity?” He goes on
to clarify that his question is focused, not in past historical squabbles, but “in the basic
idea that forms the core of Western morals, and that is expressed, not only in
philosophical writing, but in literature, religion, and in the common moral
consciousness.”1 Why, then, does Rachels see the doctrine of human dignity such a
critical component of traditional ethics?
In a nutshell, he sees the human dignity doctrine as resting on two premises:
“Traditional morality depends on the idea that human beings are in a special moral
category.. . . Traditionally it has been supported in two ways: first, by the notion that
man is made in the image of God, and secondly, by the notion that man is a uniquely
rational being.”2 Rachels eventually labels these pillars of traditional morality the “image
of God thesis” and the “rationality thesis.”3
Rachels sees two implications of placing a significant distinction between human
Tbid., 86.

2Ibid., 3-4. Emphasis in original. Rachels later gives a self-summary of his book
that recapitulates these very points. Seep. 171.
3Some examples of this labeling can be found in, ibid., 91, 97, 171.
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and non-human life, especially in reference to the image-of-God thesis. First, human life
is sacred and, thus, the central concern for morality is the protection and care of human
beings. Second, non-human life is thus less valuable than human life and is therefore not
entitled to the same degree of moral protection as a human being. Rachels notes that
some take this distinction to mean that “non-human animals” have no moral standing at
all. “Therefore, we may use them as we see fit.”1 How, then, does Rachels perceive the
image o f God and the rationality theses to support such a distinction between man and
animal? Since the image-of-God thesis is where most of his engagement with the
theological foundations of traditional ethics occurs, let us start there.

Pillar One: The Image-of-God Thesis
For Rachels, the image-of-God thesis may be the most significant underpinning of
traditional ethics. He clearly sees this view as rooted in Judeo-Christian tradition,
starting with the Genesis account of creation in which man is said to be created in the
image of God. Thus, Christian morality, for Rachels, is the prime proponent of the
doctrine of human dignity in Western society. Says Rachels:
The Western religious tradition, a blend of Judaism and Christianity, is a case
in point. Man, it is said, was made in the image of God, with the world intended to
be his habitation, and everything else in it given for his enjoyment and use. This
makes man, apart from God himself, the leading character in the whole cosmic
drama. But that is only the beginning of the story. Other details reinforce the
initial thought. Throughout human history, God has continued to watch over and
interact with man, communicating with him through the saints and prophets. One
of the things communicated is a set of instructions telling us how we are to live;

'Ibid., 86.
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and almost all those instructions concern how we must treat other humans. Our
fellow humans are not to be killed, lied to, or otherwise mistreated. Their lives are
sacred. Their needs are always taken into account, their rights always respected.
The concern we are to show one another is, however, only a dim reflection of the
love that God himself has for mankind: so great is God’s love that he even became
a man, and died sacrificially to redeem sinful mankind. And finally, we are told
that after we die, we may be united with God to live forever. What is said about the
animals is strikingly different. They were given by God for man’s use, to be
worked, killed, and eaten at man’s pleasure. Like the rest of creation, they exist for
man’s benefit.1
Rachels here identifies four key theological themes from the Judeo-Christian tradition
that he believes undergird the doctrine of human specialness. However, Rachels will
ultimately focus only on one of these four, leaving the other three untouched in further
discussion.
The first theological theme, which is the one upon which Rachels trains his focus,
is the doctrine that man was created in the image of God, and that all in this world was
made for his use and enjoyment—the image-of-God thesis. We shall soon see that for
Rachels, the concept of the image of God is the most crucial undergirding principle for
establishing the doctrine o f human dignity. Thus if the image-of-God thesis can be called
into question, a major pillar of Western ethics is thought to have been crumbled. We
have seen, however, that Rachels identifies three other theological themes that he
believes undergird the traditional view o f human dignity.
In the second theme, we saw Rachels make the claim that the human preference
found in the Genesis creation story is further bolstered by the biblical account of God’s
continued watch-care and interaction with man, including communicating with man
•ibid., 86-87.
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through prophets, and giving them a set of instructions on how to live (i.e., the 10
Commandments). Thus he alleged that the morality thus attributed to divine prescription
is focused on protecting humans from mistreatment, while the animals were relegated to
human exploitation and use. These provisions are said to be understood by the JudeoChristian tradition as an evidence of God’s great love for mankind, presumably above the
animals.
The third theological foundation for human preference presented by Rachels is the
doctrine of salvation. In his depiction of Christian thinking, God so loves mankind that
He became a man and died sacrificially to redeem mankind. It is implied in the context
of the previous quotation that God did not offer to do anything for animal redemption.
Thus Rachels asserts that the incarnation is interpreted to mean that animals are less
valuable than humans. The use of salvation to bolster human preference has also been
depicted by the animal theologian from Oxford, Andrew Linzey. He asserts that the
tendency of Christian theology to juxtapose humans over against the animals “is
encapsulated in Karl Barth’s view that ‘God’s eternal Son and Logos did not will to be an
angel or animal but man’ and that ‘this and this alone was the content of the eternal
election of grace’ [sz'c]. Given this overarching divine election of divine humanity, it
must follow that human kind is special, unique, distinct, superior, and so o n .. . . The
incarnation is used as the trump card to vanquish all other creaturely rights to specialness,
intrinsic worth, and respectful treatment.”1
'Linzey, “Introduction,” xv. Linzey’s citation of Barth is, “Karl Barth, Church
Dogmatics, III/l, The Doctrine o f Creation, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, T &
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In addition to the doctrine of salvation, the fourth and final theological concept that
Rachels believes supports the doctrine of human preference over animals is the doctrine
of final destiny. Humans are promised the hope o f life with God after death. While the
exact depiction of the relationship of death and eschatology can be debated,1the more
important point to this discussion is that traditional Christian theology promises some
kind of afterlife in paradise with God, while animals seem to miss out because salvation
is presented as human-centered.
Rachels concludes that “the central idea of our [i.e., Western] moral tradition
springs directly from this remarkable story. The story embodies a doctrine of the
specialness of man and a matching ethical precept.” He reiterates the elements found in
this story—that man alone is made in the image o f God and that creation was made for
his use and benefit, and that man is the center of God’s love and attention— and then calls
this theological package the “image of God thesis.” He then articulates the moral
meaning of the image-of-God thesis as having two dimensions: “The matching moral
id ea. . . is that human life is sacred, and the central concern of our morality must be
protection and care of human beings, whereas we may use other creatures as we see fit.”2
T Clark 1960, pp. 1 6 ,1 8 ;...” Emphases in original.
'Not all Christians agree on the exact nature of death, nor of eschatological events.
Debates between Dispensationalists and non-D ispensationalists could be cited as one

example of disagreement over eschatology within Christendom. Likewise, there is
division over whether a soul remains conscious after death. But for Rachels these are
moot issues. The issue is that in whatever theological form presented, individual humans
are promised the possibility of some kind afterlife while individual animals seem not to
be given this privilege.
2Rachels, CfA, 87. Emphasis mine.
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Rachels repeats and enlarges these two points by suggesting “some practical
implications of the idea of human dignity.” First is the doctrine of the sanctity of human
life— innocent human life to be more precise. Rachels observes that traditional ethics
usually recognizes that “guilty persons— criminals, aggressors, and soldiers fighting
unjust wars—are not given this protection, and in some circumstances they may be justly
killed.” However, traditional ethics is said to erect an inviolable wall of protection
around the innocent. The practical outworking of this doctrine, notes Rachels, is that
traditional morality does not permit practices such as suicide, infanticide, and
euthanasia.1 Thus, innocent human life becomes untouchable.
Rachels further explores the second implication of the human dignity doctrine by
appealing to Aquinas and Kant to show the “traditional” view of the moral status of
animals. The usual statements of everything in nature being made for man’s usage are
repeated, and Aquinas is cited as saying that “charity does not extend to irrational
creatures.” Kant is cited as claiming that animals have no ends in themselves but are
merely means to an end and that end is man.2
Succinctly stated, then, for Rachels the overall basis of human dignity is rooted in
the theological premise that if man is the central object of God’s love and watch-care,
then man’s protection should be the central object and focus of morality. Thus the
image-of-God thesis becomes the first central pillar for upholding the sanctify of human
‘Ibid., 88.
2Ibid., CfA, 90-91.
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life over animal life in Rachels’s argument. But the appeal to Kant brings us to the
second pillar o f the human dignity position, the rationality thesis.

Pillar Two: The Rationality Thesis
In Rachels’s words, “Few Western moralists have been satisfied to leave the idea of
man’s specialness stated in an overtly theological way.” Thus he notes that they
reasoned that they should be able to identify the essential nature of this divine image that
is possessed by man. “The favored answer, throughout Western history, has been that
man alone is rational.” He notes that “the doctors of the Church” adopted Aristotle’s
argument that man alone is rational, this being the single characteristic distinguishing
him from animals. Rachels calls this the “rationality thesis: man is special because he
alone is rational. Non-human animals are not rational, and so are not to be compared, in
this regard, with humans.”1
Rachels asserts that the importance of the rationality thesis is that it “secularized”
the doctrine of man’s specialness. Thus, “even if the image of God thesis is rejected, the
matching moral idea need not be abandoned.”2 Rachels casts this “rejection” in the
context of Christian apologetics, where secular arguments are used to defend the same
conclusion that was reached by theological debate. But without saying it directly,
Rachels demonstrates that he sees a second possibility: If the image-of-God thesis
‘Ibid., 87-88.
2Ibid., 88.
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becomes weakened or is eliminated from theology, then only one pillar would remain for
supporting human dignity.
Here we find the significance of Darwinian evolution for Rachels. The image-ofGod thesis, according to Rachels, is ultimately rooted in the doctrine of biblical creation.
But Darwin’s theory of evolution, in many circles, has brought the Genesis account into
disrepute. Thus we earlier saw Rachels label it a “remarkable story.” Darwinist
evolution is the alternative that allows creation to fall and thus undermine the image-ofGod thesis. Then Rachels only has to undermine the rationality thesis, and, in his mind,
human dignity will be a dead issue.
We have seen why Rachels believes the image of God and rationality theses are
foundational to traditional ethics. But how does Rachels understand Darwinism to
undermine these theses?

“How Darwinism Might Undermine the Idea of Human Dignity”1
Before showing how Darwinism may undermine the traditional pillars of Christian
ethics, Rachels first sees it necessary to show us that it is possible to discuss ethics in the
context o f Darwin’s theory. To make his case, Rachels addresses the problem of the isought fallacy, or “Hume’s Guillotine,” as he likes to call it. Simply stated, the argument
is made that it is logically improper to derive a moral imperative (an “ought”) from a
basic matter of fact (an “is”). To derive an “ought” from an “is” is to fall into the
'ibid., 91. This is an actual section heading used by Rachels.
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is-ought fallacy. In Rachels's words, “Factual statements can never by themselves
logically entail evaluations.”1

Overcoming Hume’s Guillotine
Rachels observes that, in traditional morality, the elements in the image of God and
rationality theses (i.e., God exists, He created man in His image, etc.) “are, speaking
loosely, matters o f (purported) fact.” Once these “facts” are established (the “is”), they
are said to entail (the “ought”) that the purpose of morality is the protection of human
life. Rachels asserts that this logic commits the is-ought fallacy. Rachels, however,
notes that Hume’s Guillotine is just as merciless with those who wish to argue that
Darwinism undermines the doctrine of human dignity, “For the facts of evolution do not,
by themselves, entail any moral conclusions.”2 Thus, for Rachels, Hume’s Guillotine
cuts both ways, giving neither Creationist nor evolutionist an advantage. So what is
Rachels’s solution to this apparent dilemma?
Rachels notes that philosophical reassurances that we cannot derive “ought” from
“is” are “too quick and easy,” and thus, “the nagging thought remains that Darwinism
does have unsettling consequences.” He continues, “I believe this feeling of discomfort
is justified. Matters are more complicated than a simple reliance on Hume’s Guillotine
would suggest.” The key reason matters are more complicated is that “our beliefs are
often tied together by connections other than strict logical entailment.” Rachels uses the
'Ibid., 91-92.
2Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109
anti-abortion movement to illustrate how a position can be maintained when new
evidence removes the original grounds for the viewpoint. He asserts new grounds are
found and substituted but the position is not forsaken. Strict logical entailment would say
the position should have been given up. But we are not strictly logical beings.1 And this,
in turn, opens the way for Rachels’s solution to the is-ought issue. And his solution
provides his logic for how Darwinism “might” undermine traditional ethics.
Rachels is arguing that, in a similar fashion, believers in the human dignity doctrine
have essentially proven that traditional ethics does not deduce the doctrine of human
sanctity from the image of God by strict logic. This is because, asserts Rachels, that as
old reasons are overthrown by new evidence, they keep shifting their argument to
continue to provide support for the established belief. Thus, traditional morality “never
depended on taking the matching moral idea as a strict logical deduction from the imageof-God thesis or the rationality thesis.” Rather, these theses provided moralists with what
they felt were “good reasons” (i.e., good justifications) for accepting the moral
conclusion of a human centered ethics.2 The difference between merely providing “good
reasons” and strict logical entailment is the key that Rachels believes delivers both
traditional ethics and his own work from the impact of Hume’s Guillotine. In other
words, for Rachels, by never claiming to supply absolute proof, but rather merely
providing “good reasons,” we escape the is-ought fallacy. Notice how he now argues on
•ibid., 92-97.
2Ibid., 97.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
what grounds Darwinism undermines traditional ethics.
First, Rachels observes that claiming that Darwinism undermines traditional
morality “is not the claim that it entails that the doctrine of human dignity is false.”
Rather, “it is, instead, the claim that Darwinism provides reason for doubting the truth of
the considerations that support the doctrine. From a Darwinian perspective, both the
image-of-God thesis and the rationality thesis are suspect.” Second, Rachels asserts that
there are “good Darwinian reasons, for thinking it unlikely that any other support for
human dignity can be found. Thus Darwinism is believed to furnish the ‘new
information’ that undermines human dignity by taking away its support.”1 So what is this
“new information”?

How Darwin’s Theory Undermines the
Image-of-God thesis
Rachels’s primary tactic to undermine the image-of-God thesis will be to try to
show that Darwinian evolution cannot support the kind of theism necessary to produce
such a conclusion.2 But what in Darwinism does Rachels see as undermining the grounds
of the image-of-God thesis? Rachels offers two aspects of Darwinism that he believes
'Ibid., 97-98.
2Rachels summarizes his work at the end o f chapter 4 in CfA, by stating that
chapter 3 is dedicated to showing how Darwinism undermines the image-of-God thesis,
while chapter 4 is focused on undermining the rationality thesis. See Rachels, CfA, 171.
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undermine classical theism, and in undermining classical theism, undermine the imageof-God thesis.

The problem of evil
The first aspect is the issue of evil and suffering in the world. As Rachels notes,
“The existence of evil has always been a chief obstacle to belief in an all-good, allpowerful God. How can God and evil co-exist? If God is perfectly good, he would not
want evil to exist; and if he is all-powerful, he is able to eliminate it. Yet evil exists.
Therefore, the argument goes, God must not exist.”1 Rachels then gives a short list of
traditional answers offered by theologians “through the centuries.”
1. Perhaps evil is necessary so that we may appreciate the goo d .. . .
2. Perhaps evil is a punishment for man’s sin. Before the fall people lived in
Paradise. It was their own fault sin that resulted in their expulsion. Therefore,
people suffer because they have brought it on themselves.
3. Perhaps evil is placed in the world so that, by struggling with it, human beings
can develop moral character.. . .
4. Perhaps evil is the unavoidable consequence of man’s free will. In order to
make us moral agents, rather than mere robots, it was necessary for God to endow
us with free will. But in making us free agents, God enabled us to cause evil, even
though he would not cause it himself.
5. Or, if all else fails, the theist can always fall back on the idea that our limited
human intelligence is insufficient to comprehend God’s great design. There is a
reason for evil; we just aren’t smart enough to figure out what it is.
All these arguments are available to reconcile God’s existence with evil. Certainly,

'Ibid., 103.
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then, the simple version of the argument from evil does not force the theist to
abandon belief.1
Rachels does not further analyze these particular arguments for he has already concluded
they are not overly effective in changing the theist’s mind. Rather he gives two common
rejoinders to these arguments before proceeding to his conclusion.
The first rejoinder, which may come in varying forms, focuses on the fact that there
is an excessive amount of evil in the world for the first three arguments to be valid. The
second rejoinder argues against number 4 by appealing to the distinction between moral
and natural evil. Free will is only responsible for the former and is inadequate for the
latter.2 But, as we have seen, these do not force the believer to forsake their belief in
God.
Rachels thus argues that Darwin contributes “two distinctive twists” that strengthen
the argument from evil. First, theological arguments justifying the existence of God and
the presence of evil in this world center on human suffering, belying the human centered
focus of traditional morality. But for Darwin, says Rachels, these arguments assume,
based on the creation story, that man has always been a co-occupant with animal and
plant life forms on the earth, whereas in the evolutionary view evil and suffering existed
for millions o f years before man arrived on the scene. Thus, “the traditional theistic
rejoinders do not even come close to justifying that ev il.. . . The evolutionary
'Ibid., 104. Emphasis in original.
2Ibid., 104-105.
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perspective puts the problem in a new and more difficult form.”1 Rachels does not
further develop this point.
Second, Rachels asserts that Darwin’s theory would expect natural evil, suffering
and unhappiness to be widespread as it is, while the divine hypothesis view would not.
“Thus, Darwin believed, natural selection accounts for the facts regarding happiness and
unhappiness in the world, whereas the rival hypothesis of divine creation did not.”2
This second point is especially crucial for Rachels. He notes that Darwin sought an
account o f origins and life that most easily fits the facts of suffering with the least amount
o f explanatory contortions. On this account, Rachels claims that “Divine creation is a
poor hypothesis because it fits the facts badly.”3 He asserts that in the creation
hypothesis, we would expect evil not to exist at all, and that it requires too many
explanations, ultimately claiming that the coexistence of God and evil is beyond our
ability to understand. In the mean time, the current patterns of suffering are said to be
just what Darwin and his theory would expect with natural selection in process. “Thus,
Darwin believed, natural selection accounts for the facts regarding happiness and
unhappiness in the world, whereas the rival hypothesis of divine creation does not.”4
To put it another way, Rachels’s fundamental argument against the image-of-God
thesis, which he claims to have derived from Darwin himself, is that the doctrine of
Tbid., 105-106. Emphasis in original.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 106.
4Ibid.
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creation upon which the image-of-God thesis depends is less parsimonious than
Darwinian evolution.1 Darwin’s theory is said to require less explanation to satisfy the
facts on the extent of evil and suffering. Since Darwin has, in Rachels’s view, presented
an alternative to divine creation that is viable and exhibits greater parsimony, the divine
creation hypothesis is now undermined by good reasons. And of course, to spell out the
implication o f Rachels’s argument, if there is no divine creation, and possibly no God,
how can man be created in the image of God? If man can no longer be the image of God,
then that pillar o f traditional ethics is toppled by Darwin’s theory, and traditional ethics
begins to crumble. In raising the specter of denying the existence of God altogether,
Rachels brings us to his second major set of arguments for why Darwin undermines
traditional ethics.

Teleology: The central issue
Rachels credits Marx for pinpointing the “philosophical nerve” of Darwin’s theory
in declaring the theory of evolution to be “the death b lo w . . . to ‘Teleology’ in the
natural sciences.”2 Thus, it may be that the most significant aspect of Darwin’s theory is
his overall rejection of teleology in nature. Rachels reminds us that “a teleological
explanation is an explanation of something in terms of its function and purpose: the heart
‘Tom Regan places much emphasis on the principle of parsimony or simplicity in
his argumentation, including some discussion and description of the principle. See The
Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 21-24.
2Rachels, CfA, 110-111.
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is for pumping blood, the lungs are for breathing, and so on.”1 Teleology thus implies a
purpose or design, which must have been determined by the intentions of a maker.2 But
there can be no designer in Darwinian evolution, and as Rachels notes, “If there is no
maker—if the object in question is not an artifact—does it make sense to speak of a
‘purpose’?” The answer is, “No,” says Rachels. Any purposes attributed are merely
those we assign. Thus, “the connection between function and conscious intention is, in
Darwin’s theory, completely severed.3
Rachels has thus highlighted the debate over the design argument (offered by
Paley) which is considered by many to be definitively refuted by Hume.4 The problem is,
notes Rachels, that Hume, and other critics of the design argument, only pointed out
logical deficiencies in the design argument, but “they could not supply a better way of
understanding the apparent design of nature.. . . Darwin did what Hume could not do: he

‘Ibid. Rachels admits, “It is an exaggeration to say that Darwin dealt teleology a
death blow; even after Darwin we still find biologists offering teleological explanations.
But now they are offered in a different spirit. Biological function is no longer compared
to the function of consciously designed artifacts” (112).
2The term "Teleology" is used in two fundamentally different, but related ways. In
the philosophical realm, teleology asserts there is some kind of ordering design or
purpose in nature that produces the predictable formulas and laws used in the sciences
today. The discipline of Ethics also uses the term, "teleology, to designate systems of
morality in which good and evil are determined by consequences. Teleological ethics are
thus goal oriented instead of duty oriented. For example, the woman hiding the Jew from
the N azis w ould not worry about duties to tell the truth regardless o f consequences, but in

teleological ethics, would lie when questioned by the Gestapo with the goal of saving the
Jew's life (not to mention avoiding significant trouble for herself).
3Ibid., 111-112.
4Ibid., 118.
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provided an alternative, giving people something else they could believe. Only then was
the design hypothesis dead.”1 For Rachels, then, the significance of Darwin is that he
provided the “good reasons” that Hume was unable to provide, which made the rejection
of teleology plausible because there was a viable alternative for interpreting data. It is
the fact that Darwin’s theory provided rational reasons for rejecting teleology that makes
Darwin’s theory so capable of undermining the image-of-God thesis.

Removing teleology undermines a divinely
designed ethics
The rejection of teleology is a major weapon in the war to divorce morality from
religious and theological grounding. In his textbook, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy,
Rachels notes that, “in popular thinking, morality and religion are inseparable. People
commonly believe that morality can be understood only in the context of religion.”2
Rachels asserts this is partly due to the fact that, “when viewed from a non-religious
perspective, the universe seemed to be a cold, meaningless place, devoid o f value or
purpose.”3 By contrast, for Judaism and Christianity,
the world is not devoid of meaning and purpose. It is the arena in which God’s
plans and purposes are realized. What could be more natural, then, than to think
that “morality” is a part o f the religious view of the world, whereas the atheist’s
view of the world has no place for values?
. . . In both the Jewish and Christian traditions, God is conceived as a
'Ibid., 120. Emphasis in original.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 54. The title of this chapter, “Does Morality Depend on
Religion?” also hints at the vernacular view that indeed the one does depend on the other.
3Ibid., 54.
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lawgiver who has created us, and the world we live in, for a purpose.. . . God has
promulgated rules that we are to obey.. . . But if live as we should live, we must
follow God’s laws. This, it is said, is the essence of morality.1
Rachels further intimates that this populist opinion is merely seeking order and design
where there are none, for evolution shows us that there is no teleology, no divine
purpose, but only blind laws of nature. Thus Rachels clearly tries to show that traditional
ethics can only be grounded in the concept of being part of a grand design created by an
almighty Creator-God. He clearly asserts that Darwinism undermines this foundation.
Peter Singer echoes the same sentiment. “Once we admit that Darwin was right when he
argued that human ethics evolved from social instincts that we inherited from our non
human ancestors, we can put aside the hypothesis of the divine origin for ethics.”2
The issue here, however, is not the efficacy of the design versus materialism
argument. It is, rather, that to accept Darwin’s theory is to accept that there is no purpose
or design in nature at all. This completely opposes classic Judeo-Christian theism, in
which there is a cosmic design and purpose in which the image-of-God concept plays a
specific role. Rachels asks the clinching question: “Can theism be separated from belief
in design? It would be a heroic step, because the design hypothesis is not an insignificant
component of traditional religious belief. But it can be done, and in fact it has been done,
by eighteenth-century deists.”3
'Ibid., 55.
2Peter Singer, “Introduction,” in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 6.
3Rachels, CfA, 125.
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The retreat to deism
Deism, he notes, rejects any personal-relational view of God, replacing that with a
God who created natural laws, made the world, and now lets it run itself by those natural
laws. The God of deism is hands-off and not concerned with details. Thus there is
theism without teleological design.1 What is the significance o f this for Rachels?
Rachels declares, “Since deism is a consistent theistic view, it is tempting simply to
conclude that theism and Darwinism must be compatible, and to say no more. But the
temptation should be resisted, at least until we have made clear what has been given up
in the retreat to deism.”2 And just what is it that must be given up in the “retreat to
deism”? Rachels asserts that “when the world is interpreted non-teleologically—when
God is no longer necessary to explain things—then theology is diminished.”3 And how is
theology diminished? “The image of God thesis does not go along with just any theistic
view. It requires a theism that sees God as actively designing man and the world as a
home for man. If, by abolishing the view of nature as designed in substantial detail,
Darwinism forces a retreat to something like deism, then we are deprived o f the idea that
man has a special place in the divine order. Even if we can still view nature in some

■ibid.
2Ibid. Em phasis mine.

3Singer also uses these arguments but in reverse order: “When we reject belief in a
god we must give up the idea that life on this planet has any preordained meaning. Life
as a whole has no meaning.” Thus Singer connects rejection of teleology with atheism.
Singer, Practical Ethics, 331.
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sense as God’s creation, we will no longer have a theism that supports the doctrine of
human dignity.”1
In the words of Sigmund Freud, the God of the deists is “nothing but an
insubstantial shadow and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine.”2 All
that is left is the concept of God as the original cause. But, says Rachels, Darwin has
asserted that to say the original cause is God is merest speculation. It can be asserted but
no good reasons can be given to substantiate it. And, in fact, Rachels asserts that if we
can accept that God is uncaused, then there is no good reason to reject the assertion that
the universe is uncaused.3 Thus what is left is a theism so worthless as to make religious
belief essentially nonsense.
Two statements of Rachels bring us to his crowning conclusion: “I have already
argued in this chapter that Darwinism undermines theism.” How severe is this
undermining of theism in Rachels’s view? Says Rachels, “In summary then, the
'Rachels, CfA, 127-128.
2Sigmund Freud, The Future o f an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York:
Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1928), 57. O f further interest is that between pp. 25
and 35, Freud argues that deities are human inventions to personalize the forces of nature
so that man can feel he has a relationship with these forces that will enable man to
manipulate nature or at least be protected from it. Thus Freud casts human culture as a
tool to aid the dynamic o f man versus nature. This clearly depicts a culture where man is
viewed as special apart from nature and juxtaposed against it. In relation to Rachels’s
use o f the quotation in the text above, it is significant that Freud asserts, “And the m ore

autonomous nature becomes and the more the gods withdraw from her, the more
earnestly are all expectations concentrated on the third task assigned to them” (p. 31,
emphasis mine). Freud astutely connects autonomy of nature to a withdrawal from
divine dominance, thus underscoring Rachels’s assertion that deism is too anemic a
theism to support traditional morality.
3Rachels, CfA, 108,126.
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atheistical conclusion can be resisted, but only at great cost.”1 Indeed the theological cost
is great enough to leave traditional ethics reeling. But just how irresistible is the
“atheistic conclusion?” For Rachels, it is irresistible enough to assert, in another work,
that theism is incompatible with morality!

Is the existence o f god antithetical to morality?
In an essay entitled “God and Moral Autonomy,”2 Rachels directly asserts that the
existence o f God is antithetical to morality. He quickly comes to his overall theological
proposition: “The argument is that God cannot exist, because there could not be a being
toward whom we should adopt such an attitude.”3 But Rachels does sum up his argument
with the following syllogism:
1. If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship.
2. No being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the
abandonment o f one's role as an autonomous moral agent.
3. Therefore, there cannot be any being who is God.4
This overall logic causes him to make the following moral conclusion:
In saying that a being is worthy of worship, we would be recognizing him as
having an unqualified claim on our obedience. The question, then, is whether there
could be such an unqualified claim .. . .
‘Ibid., 127, 126.
2James Rachels, “God and Moral Autonomy,” in Can Ethics Provide Answers? And
Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers,
1997), 109-123.
3Ibid„ 109.
4Ibid., 119.
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. . . There is a long tradition in moral philosophy, from Plato to Kant,
according to which such a recognition could never be made
by a moral agent. According to this tradition, to be a moral agent is to be
autonomous, or self-directed.. . .
On this view, to deliver oneself over to a moral authority for directions about
what to do is simply incompatible with being a moral agent. To say “I will
follow so-and-so’s directions no matter what they are and no matter what my own
conscience would otherwise direct me to do” is to opt out of moral thinking
altogether; it is to abandon one's role as a moral agent. And it does not matter
whether “so-and-so” is the law, the customs of one's society, or Jehovah.. . .
We have, then, a conflict between the role of worshiper, which by its very
nature commits one to total subservience to God, and the role of moral agent,
which necessarily involves autonomous decision making.1
So, then, what seems to lie behind Rachels’s dismissals of theistic ethics is a
philosophical argument that an absolutely supreme being to whom we ought to fully
submit is incompatible with our being free moral agents. For Rachels, we cannot both
think for ourselves and submit to a divine moral authority. As a result, in The Elements o f
Moral Philosophy, Rachels promotes reason over religion, the latter being depicted as
being morally useless. In his own words, “Right and wrong are not to be defined in terms
of God’s will; morality is a matter of reason and conscience, not religious faith; and in
any case, religious considerations do not provide definitive solutions to the specific moral
problems that confront us.”2
Rachels here seems to imply that Judeo-Christian morality is essentially rote
obedience to divine commands and rules which are seen as being related to God’s master
‘Ibid., 118-119.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 69.
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purposes.1 A second possible implication intended by Rachels is that obedience to
divinely prescribed norms is incompatible with human reason.

Rachels’s disconnection o f morality and religion
In his college textbook, Rachels explicitly develops the position that submission to
divinely prescribed moral standards is essentially an unreasoned belief that is maintained
by popular opinion.2 He further charges then that those who adhere to a religious
viewpoint actually first make up their minds concerning a moral issue, and then interpret
the Bible or Tradition to justify their pre-fabricated conclusion.3 In fact, he charges that

'Singer makes a similar argument, though from a slightly different angle, in the
context of asserting and implying that Christian ethics is often irrelevant and impractical
to today’s society. He then argues that “ethics is practical, or it not really ethical. If it is
no good in practice, it is no good in theory either. Getting rid o f the idea that an ethical
life must consist o f absolute obedience to some short and simple set o f moral rules makes
it easier to avoid the trap o f an unworkable ethic.” And just what is the simple set of
moral rules Singer has in mind? “Some don’t think of an ethical approach to life as one
in which every time we are about to enjoy ourselves, an image of a stone table drops
from some section of our mind, engraved with a commandment saying,4Thou shalt
not\’” (all emphases mine). The language in the last sentence clearly evokes biblical
language referring to the ten commandments. Thus Singer rejects any definition of
morality rooted in the idea of an unchanging, moral code that is to be always obeyed, and
like Rachels, divorces ethics from religion. See Peter Singer, How Are We to Live?
Ethics in an Age o f Self-Interest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 203-204.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 54.
3See ibid., 66-68, where Rachels tries to illustrate such mis-uses of Scripture and
Tradition in reference to abortion. His basic premise is that the interpreter is first against
abortion and then searches for apparent justification in the text or tradition. He
essentially argues that texts are pulled out of context and used in an illicit way. Rachels
is to be commended for sensitivity to context but he himself may fall victim to his own
criticism. In discussing the use of Jer 1.5, he quotes vss. 4-6 to supply context. Rachels
argues that the context is o f Jeremiah asserting the divine source of his prophetic call and
authority. “He is saying, ‘God authorized me to speak for him; even though I resisted, he
commanded me to speak.’” But then Rachels asserts that Jeremiah was merely being
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this often happens.1 Thus, believers in religion are depicted as unthinking, unreasonable
folk who have the conclusion prior to looking at the evidence. Essentially, this also
means that Rachels is charging Jews and Christians with being emotivist (or subjectivist)
in their ethics since they supposedly arrive at their moral conclusions apart from any
meaningful evidence. Nevertheless, he feels he has sufficiently undermined the efficacy
of Scripture as a moral authority to not have to address the issue in further detail.2
Rachels illustrates the charge that any ethics rooted in divinely prescribed norms or
poetic when he says God intended him to be prophet before he was bom. The question,
of course, is what evidence is there in the context that Jeremiah intended this poetically?
Rachels offers none. In so doing, he seems to fall into the same kind o f eisogesis of
which he accuses others. While it is not possible to do a full exegesis here, it seems that
Rachels has undermined his own argument. If the divine call to Jeremiah is poetic
regarding the unborn stage of Jeremiah’s life, why not explain the prophetic office to
which he is called as merely poetical language as well. Rachels never considers how
Jeremiah understood his own statement. Instead of addressing the moral argument that
God’s call to the unborn has moral implications for abortion, Rachels tritely dismisses it
as poetic. He seems to forget others in the Scriptures who had divine purposes prescribed
for them prior to conception or while in-utero, such as Sampson, Cyrus, and John the
Baptist. Are these all poetic as well? Rachels has not interpreted the text in a fair and
impartial manner, but rather a shallow manner suited to his purposes and thus falls to his
own criticisms of twisting the Scriptures to fit a preconceived belief.
'ibid., 55. See also James Park, “From Rule-Morality to Rational Ethics: Debating
the Ten Commandments,” Undated, http://www.tc.umn.edu/~parkx032/O-ETHICS.html
(20 May 2000), where he even more clearly expresses the same sentiment as Rachels
concerning Christian morality: “In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Ten Commandments
are often thought to be the basic moral code. But most people raised as Jews or Christians
cannot name all 10 commandments. Rather, they affirm their own morality based on
these commandments. As a matter of historical fact, the various denominations of
Judaism and Christianity do have systems of morality, which have developed over the
centuries within each religious community—sometimes loosely based on the Bible.''’
Emphasis mine.
2Tom Regan also argues that the multiplicity o f interpretations of Scripture make it
invalid for use as a moral authority. See, The Case fo r Animal Rights, 125-126.
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commandments is really a prefabricated morality by appealing to Plato’s famous
argument in Euthyphro. The central challenge by Euthyphro to theism concerns whether
there is a standard of good apart from God. In succinct form Plato’s dialogue asks if
one’s conduct is good because God commanded it, or did God command the conduct
because it was good?1 For Rachels, this is a poison-pill for theism. On the one hand, if
“conduct is right because God commands it,” then, “this leads to trouble, for it represents
God’s commands as arbitrary.”2 For example, argues Rachels, honesty could not be said
to be morally right before God commanded it. Thus, if God commanded lying instead,
lying would be morally good, and thus, “the doctrine of God’s goodness is reduced to
‘Rachels gives no specific reference data, but the argument referred to can be found
in Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans. Harold North Fowler,
Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1966), 35-39. Michel Ruse also makes use of the Euthyphro argument. See, Ruse, Can a
Darwinian Be a Christian? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 167-169.
Interestingly, it is not “good” (ayaGog or Kcdo<;) that Socrates debates with Euthyphro but
“holiness” (ooioq). The word, ooiog, has to do with what the gods command, that is, with
pious duty. Thus Rachels extrapolates the more narrow definition of “good” out of this
dialog. O f further note is that the argument invoked by Rachels draws some o f its power
from Socrates’ earlier argument that “holiness” cannot be defined as being what the gods
love since the gods argue over what is holy and is not. If the gods cannot agree on what
is holy, then holiness must be defined independently from the gods, who are now then
subjected to this higher standard. (We cannot help but see here a major moral
disadvantage of polytheism in contrast to monotheism). Thus the argument invoked by
Rachels and Ruse is the second major argument by Socrates against holiness being
determined by the gods. It is also interesting to note that Socrates complains he is being
prosecuted for denying the stories of the gods to be true (p. 21). In a similar fashion,
R achels’s denial o f the existence o f G od is a fundamental foundation o f his argument.

The possibility is rased that both Rachels and Socrates have argued, in part, on the basis
of personal ideology and not merely from pure principles of reason.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 56. Emphasis in original.
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nonsense.” 1 The reciprocal problem would be this. If “GoJ commands right because it is
right,” then we face a “different problem, which is equally troublesome for the
theological conception of right and wrong,” for it means there is an independent standard
of right and wrong apart from God.2 This would seem to imply that we would not need
God to know what is good, an equally unpalatable option for the classical theist. This is
why, says Rachels, that a “theological conception” of the good has been “virtually
abandoned.”3 Thus Rachels sees theistic ethical theories as rooted in beliefs that are selfdefeating, eliminating their relevance for moral guidance.4
Rachels’s arguments against the role of religion clearly advocate the conclusion
that God and ethics have no valid relationship. While his arguments in this realm are not
all explicitly grounded in Darwinian thought, Rachels’s conclusion makes sense in light
of his commitment to Darwinism. Since Rachels has accepted the anti-design views of
Darwin, it would seem natural, even logical, to reject the existence of a designing,
almighty God and thus His moral authority. So while Rachels does not seem to fully
ground this ethical conclusion directly in Darwinism, it certainly fits into his moral
‘Ibid., 57.
2Ibid., 57-58. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid. In the context of the chapter, the “theological conception of right and
w rong” is another term for the D ivine Command theory o f morality, in w hich good is

good because God commanded it.
4Rachels makes this argument in criticizing the Divine Command Theory of ethics.
What he seems not to recognize is that the Divine Command Theory is not the only
theological moral theory that Christians can espouse. Not all Christian views of ethics
contain the voluntarism found in some versions of the Divine Command Theory.
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package based on evolutionary theory. Thus for Rachels, the doctrine of human dignity
requires a certain doctrine of creation, which requires a particular doctrine of God, who
can prescribe a humano-centric ethics. Rachels believes that Darwin’s theory clearly and
successfully undermines these foundations of traditional, Judeo-Christian morality. For
Rachels, the image-of-God thesis is dead. But what of Rachels’s second pillar of
traditional ethics—the rationality thesis?

How Evolution Undermines the Rationality Thesis
Rachels’s attempt to rebut the rationality thesis does not engage Christianity to any
significant degree, and so is less significant to this study. Therefore, I shall only give a
cursory summary.1 The simple core of his argument is based on the conclusion that
“Darwin did not deny that human rational abilities far exceeded those of other animals.
But, he insisted that the difference is only one o f degree, not o f kind."2 Thus,
“intelligence is not, for Darwin, an all-or-nothing thing that one either has fully or lacks
completely.. . . Man is not the only rational animal; he is merely more rational than other
animals.”3 Thus humans cannot be viewed as the unique possessors of reason, and, by
‘Rachels himself states that the entire fourth chapter of CfA is dedicated to
rebutting the rationality thesis; see CfA, 171. The core of his rebuttal is contained in pp.
132-147.
2Ibid., 133. Em phasis mine.

3Ibid., 136. Emphasis in original. In the succeeding pages Rachels sets forth
various evidences to support the concept that rationality evolved in small stages in pre
human ancestors, and thus, reason is not a uniquely human ability. In particular, from
149-158, he discusses the evolution of altruism in a manner not unlike Ruse and others as
seen in chapter 3, except that Rachels uses altruism as evidence of pre-human rationality,
instead o f drawing conclusions about the nature of morality as Ruse does.
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implication, they cannot be said to be uniquely different from animals in a way that
entails preferential treatment.
By showing that evolutionary theory removes reason from being a uniquely human
attribute, Rachels believes Darwinism undermines the second pillar upholding traditional
ethics. With both the image-of-God thesis and rationality thesis believed to be removed,
Rachels concludes his chapter by asserting, “I have argued that Darwinism must also lead
to the rejection of the idea that man is the only rational animal. We may now draw the
conclusion that the traditional supports for the idea of human dignity are gone. They
have not survived the colossal shift of perspective brought about by Darwin’s theory.”1
Thus Rachels feels he has toppled the second and final pillar holding up the edifice of
traditional, Christian ethics. What does he propose for replacing traditional ethics?

Morality without Human Specialness
With the pillars o f traditional ethics believed to be toppled, Rachels now asks, “If
the idea of human dignity is abandoned, what sort of moral view should be adopted in its
place?” Rachels answers his own question by proposing a new view o f ethics, based on
Darwin’s theory o f evolution which he labels “moral individualism.”2 In addition,
Rachels pursues the question o f how morality will work without human preference in his

‘Ibid., 171.

2Ibid., 173.
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textbook. He asks, “What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory Be Like?”1 His approach
in the textbook is built in a way different enough from Created from Animals that one
cannot really synthesize them into one presentation, yet the conclusions are
complementary. They are two different roads to the same destination.
Because of this difference, I shall first finish his work in Created From Animals,
and then move on to his work in his textbook. In using the textbook, I follow a more
chronological order, focusing first on the first edition, then noting refinements made in
the third and fourth editions. With this in mind, let us move to Rachels’s proposed ethics
of moral individualism.

Rachels’s Ethics of Moral Individualism
According to Rachels, in moral individualism, “the basic idea is that how an
individual may be treated is to be determined, not by considering his group memberships,
but by considering his own particular characteristics.”2 For Rachels, all moral decisions
are to be made based on the individual’s own personal characteristics and not on the basis
of species or other group membership. Thus, “If A is to be treated differently from B, the
justification must be in terms of A ’s individual characteristics and B ’s individual
characteristics. Treating them differently cannot be justified by pointing out that one or
‘Rachels, Elements (1986), 139. This is the chapter title for the 12th and final
chapter of the book.
2Rachels, CfA, 173.
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the other is a member of some preferred group, not even the ‘group’ of human beings.”1
Rachels further drives his point home by arguing that in making a moral decision
involving chimps and humans, “it is not good enough simply to observe that chimps are
not members of the preferred group.. . . Instead, we would have to look at specific
chimpanzees and specific humans.”2 In other words, we would have to ask why this
specific chimp or specific human was entitled to moral consideration. The consideration
is decided strictly on the individual’s characteristics and capacities. In a nutshell, then,
for Rachels, moral status is merited on an individual basis. It is not granted by a higher
moral authority, nor is it granted on the basis of any kind of connection to group.
Rachels asserts that these conclusions are grounded in Darwinian evolution when
he states:
This kind of thinking goes naturally with an evolutionary perspective because
an evolutionary perspective denies that humans are different in kind from other
animals; and one cannot reasonably make distinctions in morals where none exist
in fact. If Darwin is correct, there are no absolute differences between humans and
the members of all other species— in fact there are no absolute differences between
the members of any species and all others.. . . As Darwin puts it, there are only
differences of degree.. . . Therefore, the fundamental reality is best represented by
saying that the earth is populated by individuals who resemble one another, and
who differ from on another, in myriad ways, rather than saying that the earth is
populated by different kinds of beings.3
We here see that the crux of Rachels’s argument is that differences of kind do not exist in
evolutionary fact, but rather, all creatures share sameness and difference. Therefore
'Ibid., 173-4.
2Ibid., 174. Emphases mine.
3Ibid. First emphasis mine; all other emphases in original.
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Rachels interprets this to imply that species boundaries are arbitrary and meaningless for
morals. Furthermore, moral status cannot thus be based on that which is not “factual,”
namely the concept of species boundaries. Based on these arguments, Rachels asserts
that “moral individualism is a view that looks at individual similarities and differences
for moral justification, whereas human dignity emphasized the now-discredited idea that
humans are of a special kind.”1

Moral Individualism and Aristotle
Rachels expands on this foundation by appealing to a maxim he asserts was
recognized by Aristotle: The principle that “like cases should be treated alike, and
different cases should be treated differently.”2 Since Rachels believes species
membership has been excluded from being a factual reality, he cannot advocate it as
being part of the criteria for determining what constitutes “like cases.” Thus, Rachels
argues that moral individualism implies that, “if he [Darwin] was rig h t,. . . it would
follow that, often, when we object to treating humans in a certain way, we would have
similar grounds for objecting to the similar treatment for a non-human animal.” He
asserts that such a conclusion is demanded by consistency.3
Rachels here seems to assume the moral standing of humans, and thus tries to
'Ibid., 174-175.

2Ibid., 196.
3Ibid., 175. Rachels here is on the edge of using the marginal-cases argument, but
he does not develop it fully, nor does he use the term “marginal cases” in this work.
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elevate animals to a human level of moral protection in the name of logical consistency.
However, he does not explore the issue of whether animals should be promoted to equal
status with humans, or whether some “defective” humans should be demoted in status to
the level o f animals. Rachels seems to take human rights for granted and thus appears to
assume the elevation o f the moral status of animals as a natural consequence. The
bottom line, though, is that for Rachels, moral status is only to be granted based on a
being’s individual characteristics.

Equality of Treatment versus Equal Status
Rachels seeks to illustrate the individualistic nature of granting moral status by
noting that Western thinkers for the last three centuries have argued the principle that all
humans are equal. But, asks Rachels, what does this really mean? The fact is that not all
men are equal.1 Rachels interprets this principle as being a statement about human
treatment and not about human status. The principle of equality, for Rachels, is thus to
grant rights to equal consideration and treatment, with the emphasis on treatment. But,
Rachels notes, not all people are treated equally, sometimes for good reasons. Here is
where Rachels may stumble, for his illustrations of good reasons are not drawn from
analogous cases.
For example, he argues that all can apply to law school but not all are accepted.
All get the opportunity, but some are rejected for good reasons. A second example is the
fact that doctors do not prescribe the same treatment to every patient. Thus equal people
•ibid., 175-76.
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are treated differently for “relevant reasons.”1 The problem, of course, is that most
moralists would not consider entrance to law school a “right” that the applicant is entitled
to, nor would one be considered to have a “right” to a given medical treatment. Both are
privileges that can be sought if one can meet certain conditions such as being able to pay
for the service sought. Thus Rachels is trying to make an analogy between privileges and
rights, which thus seems fundamentally flawed. Rights fundamentally do not have the
contingencies that privileges have. Freedom of Speech and having a job are not morally
analogous. The first is guaranteed to Americans as a fundamental right, while the other
is obtained through merit. Of course, Rachels is precisely treating rights as something
merited by individuals, which reduces rights to privileges.
Rachels has well illustrated his fundamental moral principle that each individual
deserves equal consideration, though not necessarily equal treatment. Few would argue
against his position that some criteria are more relevant than others. Law school, for
example, requires a certain level of educational training, which is why a high-school drop
out could never qualify. Likewise, a doctor should base treatment on medical symptoms
and not on irrelevant characteristics such as place of birth, race, or gender. But a possible
weakness in his analogies is that the services provided by the law school and physician
are fundamentally privileges, not rights. Both the doctor and law school can be moral
while refusing to give their services if one has no resources to pay for the services
requested, even if that individual is qualified in all other ways. If one is entitled by right
’Ibid., 176.
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to those services, then such refusal is wrong and no payment would be necessary.
Despite the possible weakness of analogy, what Rachels is trying to do is to
establish Aristotle’s maxim as a basic moral principle of moral individualism.
Furthermore, he is taking advantage of the fact that Aristotle’s language is not humanocentric. “Like cases should be treated alike.” For Rachels, these “cases” cannot be
restricted by species membership. Thus, whatever the species, “individuals are to be
treated the same way unless there is a relevant difference between them that justifies a
difference in treatment.”1 This, of course, begs the question of what constitutes a
relevant difference?

The Principle of Equality /Equal Consideration
ofInterests
In pursuing the question of what constitutes a morally relevant characteristic to
justify differentiation o f treatment between individuals, two things will become clear in
regard to Rachels’s viewpoint. First, as we have already seen, for Rachels, species
membership is not a morally relevant characteristic and thus, any system of ethics giving
moral relevance to species (i.e., to being human) is speciesist, which of course is seen as
undesirable.2
Second, what constitutes a morally relevant difference between individuals
'Ibid.
2We have already examined Rachels on speciesism so will not pursue this issue
further here. His fundamental argument is found in CfA, 181-194.
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“depends on the treatment we have in mind.”1 Here a situational element is introduced
into Rachels’s moral theory. But what criteria should be used to determine the situational
relevance of a given characteristic? Is this to be determined by common sense or
intuition? Common sense seems easily used in some cases—blindness would likely not
be a relevant factor in seeking to become a musician, but would be most definitely a
problem for someone wanting to become an airline pilot—but in other cases could be less
than clear from a common-sense perspective. So the question remains: What criteria do
we use to determine a morally relevant characteristic from an incidental characteristic?
Rachels responds to this challenge by admitting that, “I cannot develop a complete
theory of relevant differences here—that would take us too far from the subject at hand,
and would involve controversies whose resolutions do not really matter for present
purposes. But I do indeed need to say something about what such a theory would look
like.”2 Therefore, Rachels seeks to address this problem by offering a “general
principle” for defining morally relevant differences: “Whether a difference between
individuals justifies a difference in treatment depends on the kind of treatment that is in
question. A difference that justifies one kind of difference in treatment need not justify
'Ibid., 177.
2Ibid. Rachels here is stuck in a dilemma. To not address the issue of establishing
the criteria for determining what constitutes a relevant difference for moral purposes is to

torpedo the theory of moral individualism which he is advocating. But to develop such a
criteria is said to be so complicated as to be seemingly impossible to accomplish in a
portion of one chapter. Rachels seems to seek the advantage of expounding his ideas
while hiding from rigorous criticism in the name of not being able to adequately pursue
the issue.
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another.”1 Rachels, continues that the corollary conclusion is “that there is no one big
difference between individuals that is relevant to justifying all differences in treatment.”
Thus any differences of treatment cannot be based on species membership. But as
eloquent as this sounds, we are still left with the problem of how to know what a relevant
difference is.
Rachels offers no surefire way to determine a morally significant difference, but
rather gives various examples that attempt to illustrate the concept of relevant
differences. In the final analysis, Rachels gives only this one criterion: If it is permissible
to treat one individual one way, and a second individual in a differing way, “surely there
must be some difference between them that explains why. This is what the principle of
equality requires.”2 Such an assertion, however, does not tell us how to determine if that
“reason” is a good reason or not. The closest he comes is to adopt the painist
perspective and argue that beings able to experience pain should not be caused such pain
without a good reason, and species membership is not a good reason. So Rachels talks
much, but in the end offers no clear criteria on how to determine morally relevant
differences for justifying differing treatments. Instead he focuses on what are not
relevant differences, finally concluding that “humans and non-humans are, in a sense,
moral equals.”3
•ibid., 178.
2Ibid., 180.
3Ibid., 182.
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To illustrate how this moral equality between humans and animals might work, and
riding the evolutionary argument that humans are different from animals only in degree,
and not in kind, Rachels argues that the grounds of ethical importance are not found in
the individual itself, but “that it is the richness and complexity of the individual life that
is morally significant.” 1 And here Rachels confesses a major implication: “Some
humans, unfortunately, are not capable of having the kind of rich life that we are
discussing. An infant with severe brain damage . . . may never learn to speak, and its
mental powers may never rise above a primitive level. In fact, its psychological
capabilities may be markedly inferior to those of a rhesus monkey. In that case, moral
individualism would see no reason to prefer its life over the monkey’s.”2 The most
controversial portion is the obvious favoring of the monkey over the baby and the clear
application of the doctrine of no human dignity. As Rachels notes in his textbook, this
means that not every life is precious. It is only lives with certain qualities that become
precious.3 But underlying this argument is a more foundational concept: That moral
standing is granted on the basis of currently active attributes and capabilities.
In short, Rachels is taking a functional model of determining moral significance,
treating rights as being more like privileges, and thus, regardless of species membership,
those individuals who meet a specified level of minimum function deserve to be
'Ibid., 189. Emphasis in original.
2Ibid.
3Rachels, Elements (1999), 9.
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considered while those falling short of the required functions deserve to be excluded.
Therefore, for Rachels, when the principles of Darwinian evolution are applied to ethics,
rights are earned and not granted. There can be no God-granted rights that are
inalienable. Nor are rights granted by any other authority. They are earned by the
“richness” of our individual life, and forfeited with ease. The individual is just one
accident away from losing the functions on which rights are said to be given.
We see here, of course, teleological ethics in the form of Utilitarianism.
Individuals are merely containers holding experiences, and the container is of no value.
The container is disposable. The richer the experiences of the individual life, the greater
the moral status. This “richness” of the individual life eventually is refined by Rachels
into the concept, apparently borrowed from Regan, of an individual being the “subject of
a life.”1

Subjects of a Life
For Rachels, being the subject of a life gives one moral standing. Again, tying
himself to Darwinism, he asserts that after Darwin’s theory, “the value of a life is, first
and foremost, the value it has fo r the person who is the subject o f a life. Our lives are
'Rachels, CfA, 198. It appears that Rachels is indebted to Regan for this concept,
yet he never cites Regan as a source in this chapter. However, Regan had discussed the
concept of being a “subject of a life” in 1983, seven years prior to Rachels’s use of the
term here. See Regan, Case fo r Animal Rights, 243-248; 392. (See Pluhar, 231, where
she hints that Regan introduced this concept.) This concept is also discussed by Tom
Regan, The Thee Generation: Reflections on the Coming Revolution (Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 1991), 57-58, 77-78.
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valuable, not to God or to nature or to the universe, but to us.”1 This concept is then
developed into the concept of having biographical life, not just a biological life.
Biological life is merely being biologically alive. The irreversibly comatose person is
biologically alive but has no biographical experiences. Rachels declares that for such a
person, “being alive, sadly, does such a person no good at all. The value of being alive
may therefore be understood as instrumental.” This is because biological life is
necessary to have a biographical life.2 Therefore, biographical life is the only kind of life
worth having. To take a biological life, when no biographical life is possible, is not
morally evil. Termination of a biological life is only morally wrong when it destroys a
biographical life. In such a case, the animal or person has an interest in staying alive.3
The primary evil then consists in the loss to the victim, who can recognize the magnitude
of the impending loss.4
At this point, we should note here the total self-centeredness of this viewpoint.
Ultimately our lives have meaning only to us, individually. Unlike Singer,5 Rachels does
'Rachels, CfA, 198. Emphasis in original. Most of this discussion is duplicated in
Rachels, End o f Life, 5,22-28, 65.
2Rachels, CfA, 199.
3Rachels, End o f Life, 28.
4Rachels, CfA, 198.
5See Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, 216-217, where Singer discusses the nonpersonhood o f infants and, in some cases, the need to euthanize an infant before familial
attachments are made. See also Singer, Practical Ethics, 182-183, where Singer argues
that even a healthy newborn infant has no claim to life through its own characteristics,
but only through being desired by biological or adoptive parents.
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not explicitly make any room here for the value of our life to others. (We would note
however, that his concept of multiple strategies Utilitarianism, which he published later
and which we shall soon examine, would seem capable of recognizing the moral
significance of the value o f our lives to others.) The bottom line is that some animals and
some, but not all, humans are considered to be subjects of a life and thus qualify to
receive moral protection. We again see a functional model of rights— only those
intelligent enough to be subjects of a life, who can prefer to stay alive should be
protected.
Rachels, however, does insert a loophole that can elevate humans over animals. He
recognizes that humans are capable of a biographically more complex life than most
other animals. Thus if one had to sacrifice an animal or a human, being unable to save
both, the greater complexity o f the average human’s biographical life over that of the
animal would suggest the loss o f the human’s life is the greater loss. However, this also
leaves the door open for a sub-average human to be judged to have a biographically
inferior life to the animal, in which case the animal would be argued to take preference.1
But why should greater biographical complexity be the determining criterion of
moral protection or exclusion? This is not made clear by Rachels. He appears to depend
solely on the appearance o f having a self-evident maxim to commend this argument.
However, it seems suspiciously akin to Utilitarianism. The creature with a more complex
biographical life can have far more pleasures, and thus has higher utility. While Rachels
'Rachels, CfA, 209.
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has derived a type of Utilitarian ethics from Darwin, he seems to have moved from the
primary foundation of Darwinian evolution to the secondary foundation of Utilitarianism.
He makes no argument to directly tie his subjects of a life view to Darwinism as such.
Rather it becomes a second generation, logical, extrapolation from his more foundational
principle of denying human specialness due to Darwin.
Rachels’s vision of morality without human specialness, then, has led us a long
ways. We have seen him argue that Darwinism undermines the foundations of traditional
Western or Judeo-Christian ethics by making it impossible for man to be the image of
God, and by undermining the rationality thesis. Further, Rachels has attempted to give
some criteria on how to establish which individuals have moral status and which do not.
While deriving much from Darwinism, his primary criterion of being the “subject of a
life” seems more rooted in Utilitarian thinking than in Darwinism itself. A form of
Utilitarianism has been used to fill the vacuum left by the perceived fall of the pillars
supporting traditional ethics.

And this is where moral individualism ties into Rachels’s

work in his textbook. A survey of three editions o f his textbook will help us expand our
understanding of his vision of ethics without human preference.

Ethics without Human Preference as Depicted in
The Elements ofM oral Philosophy
Published first in 1986, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy lays out the basic
rationale of Rachels’s ethical structure to a target audience of college students. The core
elements of his theory remain essentially the same in each edition. The later editions
update illustrations with more recent stories while making minor changes to sharpen the
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argumentation. The fourth edition carries somewhat greater significance as it makes an
important expansion to Rachels’s moral theory. In each edition, Rachels surveys most of
the key, classical theories of the past 2,500 years, and argues why he believes each is
insufficient. He then proceeds to propose his own system o f ethics. It is his own ethical
proposals that we shall examine. For the sake of clarity, I will outline his theory as given
in the first edition, and then survey later editions for new developments and refinements.

The First Edition
In the first edition of his textbook, Rachels introduces his system of ethics with this
question: “What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory Be Like?”1 To answer this
question, Rachels will ultimately work through arguments to produce three key axioms
describing such a system: (1) We should not prefer humans over non-humans, (2) we
should act to promote the interests of everyone alike, and (3) we should treat people as
they deserve to be treated, considering how they themselves have chosen to behave. Let
us see how he gets to each one, especially noting the role of Darwinian evolution in the
process, and also noting other moral implications as well.

“Morality without Human Hubris”
Rachels proposes the first characteristic of a satisfactory moral system in the first
heading of the chapter text, “Morality Without Human Hubris,” before any discussion is
waged. Rachels then argues that “a satisfactory theory would, first o f all, be sensitive to
•Rachels, Elements (1986), 139. This is the chapter title for the 12th and final
chapter of the book.
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the facts about human nature, and it would be appropriately modest about the place of
human beings in the scheme of things.”1 What “facts about human nature” does Rachels
have in mind and why do they diminish human importance?
Rachels, as we would expect, turns to Darwinian evolution to supply those facts.
His first evolutionary “fact” is that humans are relative newcomers on the evolutionary
scene. “The first humans appeared quite recently. The extinction of the great dinosaurs
65 million years ago . . . left ecological room for the evolution of the few little animals
that were about, and after 63 or 64 million more years, one line of that evolution finally
produced us. In geological time, we arrived only yesterday.”2 This is interpreted to
mean that we do not have the right to oust other animals from positions of moral
significance. Thus his first evolutionary argument is quite different from the line of
reasoning in Createdfrom Animals, for here he uses Evolution to make a simple
argument from seniority. We are too new, in evolutionary terms, to have the seniority to
oust other animals from the sphere of moral status. Therefore, we get the first of
Rachels’s proposed three moral axioms of a satisfactory moral system: The proposition
that we should not prefer humans over non-humans.
Rachels further develops this conclusion from evolution by arguing that our early
ancestors evolved a warped and erroneous view of ethics. Rachels asserts:
But no sooner did our ancestors arrive than they began to think of themselves as the

'Ibid., 139. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 140. Emphasis in original.
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most important things in all creation. Some of them even imagined that the whole
universe had been made for their benefit. Thus, when they began to develop
theories of right and wrong, they held that the protection o f their own interests had
a kind o f ultimate in objective value. The rest of creation, they reasoned, was
intended for their use. We now know better. We now know that we exist by
evolutionary accident, as one species among many, on a small insignificant world
in one little quarter of the cosmos.1
By this line of argumentation, the student is taught that early humans wrongly reduced
morality to the protection of human interests alone, and that an ethics that focuses on
protecting human interests is inherently opposed to the “facts” of evolution. In addition,
Rachels adds to his argument against human importance by citing the philosopher David
Hume. ‘“ The life of man,’ he wrote, ‘is of no greater importance to the universe than an
oyster.’”2 Thus the student is led to believe that there is no cosmic design or importance
to our lives, and thus no special importance in moral consideration.
Before moving to the second axiom of a satisfactory moral system, we must note
some further moral implications of Rachels’s evolutionary argument thus far. In
claiming that ethics evolved as part of human evolution, Rachels opens the door for the
conclusion, as we have seen earlier with Dawkins and Ruse, that ethics must therefore be
inherently relativistic, capable of evolving and adapting with new data. Although
‘Ibid. Emphasis mine. The astute reader can see the subtle but direct attack on
classic Christian anthropology regarding man’s relationship to nature (which we
discussed earlier in this work), although Christianity is not explicitly named here.
2Ibid. Rachels gives no reference data for the citation. Rachels further asserts that
Hume recognized “that our lives are important to us.” Emphasis in original. This is
highly reminiscent of his “subjects of a life” argument found in CfA earlier, but Rachels
does not develop that angle in the textbook. Additionally, beliefs used to characterize
Christian ethics in CfA are now attributed to an evolutionary development and thus are
cast with much less significance than was done in CfA.
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Rachels does not explicitly develop this aspect of the argument, the relativist bent
nevertheless lurks in the shadows influencing the ethical process. Rachels’s evolutionary
explanation of how morals evolved leads to further implications and will generate his
second axiom.

Consequentialism: The means of determining
good reasons
Rachels observes that while human hubris is “largely unjustified,” it is not “entirely
unjustified,” for “we have evolved as rational beings.”1 In a separate article, Rachels
quotes the claim from Darwin’s The Descent o f Man that “as man gradually advanced in
intellectual power and was enabled to trace the more remote consequences of our actions;
. . . so would the standard of his morality rise higher and higher.”2 Thus, for Rachels, our
powers o f reason evolved to give us abilities not found in the animal kingdom—abilities
to reason based on cause and effect. Hence, Rachels develops a teleological approach to
ethics, in part, as a logical product of Darwinian evolution.3
Once the consequentialist approach to ethics is established, Rachels then sees
another implication for morality. Consequentialism introduces the ability to have
personal interests—X consequence is in my interests while Y consequences is not. For
'Ibid., 140-141.
2Charles Darwin, The Descent o f Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London:
John Murray, 1871), 101, quoted in Rachels, “Why Darwinians Should Support,” 153.
3This is not to say that consequentialism is ethically bad or good. I am merely
showing that Rachels builds his case for consequentialism as a natural outgrowth of
Darwinian evolution.
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Rachels, our superior powers of reason are what “makes us capable of having a
m orality.. . . Thus we take the fact that an action would help satisfy our desires, needs,
and so on— in short, the fact that an action would promote our interests—as a reason in
favor o f doing that action.”1 Rachels then concludes that, “the origin of our concept of
‘ought’ may be found in these facts [regarding the development of recognizing personal
interests].” Thus, for Rachels, human intelligence evolved to where we can conclude that
we ought to perform said action, not because of impulse or emotions, but because we
have good, substantive reasons. “We use the world ‘ought’ to mark this new
development o f the situation: we ought to do the act supported by the weightiest
reasons.”2 Through the influence of Darwinian evolution, morality thus becomes defined
as acting according to reason as opposed to irrational impulse.
But reason alone is not enough for Rachels. He argues it must be supplemented
with the concept o f consistency—we must be consistent in applying our reasons.
Therefore, he concludes that consistency of reasoning should produce similar actions for
similar situations, which means reason must act with impartiality. This leads Rachels to
give his second moral axiom: “Reason requires impartiality: we ought to act so as to
promote the interests o f everyone alike.”3

'Rachels, Elements (1986), 140-141.
2Ibid., 141. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid.
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Resembles Utilitarianism
So far, then, Rachels has argued that a sufficient moral theory should (1) not prefer
humans over non-humans, and (2) be based on reason, applied impartially with
consistency. This moral theory would prescribe that we should act to promote the
interests of everyone alike. While not yet developed by Rachels in this volume, we
would note that “everyone” is to be controlled by the proposition that “everyone” cannot
be restricted to human beings. Again evolution plays a factor.
Evolution, for Rachels, shows man is a social creature, who lives in communities
where cooperation and caring for one another’s welfare are crucial to human survival and
existence. Thus, “There is pleasing theoretical ‘fit’ between (a) what reason requires,
namely impartiality; (b) the requirements of social living, mainly the adherence to a set
of rules that, if fairly applied, would serve everyone’s interests; and (c) our natural
inclination to care about others, at least to a modest degree.”1 Rachels’s use of language
such as to “serve everyone’s interests” and “fairly applied” cannot help but cause a reader
familiar with classic ethical theories to conclude that there is an element of Utilitarianism
creeping into Rachels’s ethical reasoning.

Moral status earned, not granted
Rachels admits the Utilitarian bent of his conclusion, stating, “So far, M[orality]
W[ithout] H[ubris] sounds very much like Utilitarianism. However there is another fact
’Ibid., 141-142.
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about human beings that must be taken into account, and doing this will give the theory a
decidedly non-Utilitarian twist.”1 What is this new “fact” that will deliver Rachels from
the implications of Utilitarianism? It is that humans are not only rational agents capable
of choice, but such agents can be held accountable for their actions. In short, humans can
be held “responsible for their freely chosen actions.”2
Rachels develops the ability to be held responsible in social reciprocity as a means
of holding people accountable. Thus, for Rachels, since we evolved as social beings,
being held responsible through reciprocal relationships ensures we will get treated as we
deserve. Thus, Rachels’s final axiom of a satisfactory moral theory is stated: “We should
treat people as they deserve to be treated, considering how they themselves have chosen
to behave.”3

The grounds for exceptions
Thus far in his textbook, Rachels’s moral theory has given three major axioms for
morals: (1) We should not prefer humans over non-humans, (2) we should act to promote
the interests of everyone alike, and (3) we should treat people as they deserve to be
treated, considering how they themselves have chosen to behave. He now moves on to
question how the second and third axioms are connected. Rachels answers this question
'Rachels, Elements (1986), 142. Rachels in this edition calls his theory “Morality
Without Hubris” which he abbreviates MWH. In Created from Animals, we saw it
named “Moral Individualism,” which is the title most recognized by other authors.
2Ibid., 142. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid., 143.
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by arguing that the second moral axiom “establishes a general presumption in favor of
promoting everyone’s interests, impartially.” Axiom three “specifies the grounds upon
which the presumption may be overridden.” 1 In short, axiom three provides the grounds
for determining what is a “good reason” for justifying exceptions in treatment. Rachels
now synthesizes the whole axiomatic package with this simple statement: “We ought to
act so as to promote impartially the interests of everyone alike, except when individuals
deserve particular responses as a result of their own past behavior.”2
With this synthesis, Rachels claims that “this principle combines the best elements
of both Utilitarianism and Kantian ‘respect for persons,’ but is not produced simply by
stitching those two philosophies together.”3 Furthermore, he argues that he is not merely
eclectically combining elements from two contradicting schools of ethics, but rather these
elements have been synthesized together based on the “facts of the human condition.”4 It
is this effort to start with evolution, instead of with a particular school of ethics (such as
Singer who is unabashedly Utilitarian) that sets Rachels apart from his peers.
Rachels admits, however, that his present presentation could be more
comprehensive. “Although more needs to be said about the theoretical basis of this view,
I will say no more about it here.”5 Some may criticize this development, but in all
'Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 144.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
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fairness it should be noted that his book was designed as a college text for those
uninitiated in the realm of ethics, and thus we would expect the theoretical portion to be
understated.1 But having laid the foundations as he has, Rachels now turns to the issue of
who is to be included the moral community in which everyone’s interests are impartially
protected and advanced?

Who is part of the newly defined moral community?
In this new, Darwinist morality, who, then, should be given moral status and
protection? Rachels’s Utilitarian tendencies reveal themselves in his answer: “We ought
to give equal consideration to the interests of everyone who will be affected by our
conduct.”2 But who is affected by our conduct? “In principle, the community with
which we should be concerned is limited only by the number of individuals who have
interests, and that, as we shall see, is a very large number indeed.”3 Rachels is forced by
logic to conclude that those impacted by our choices cannot be limited by time or place.
For Rachels we are obliged to consider all their interests equally, including future
generations or someone on a distant continent. Thus, in what Rachels admits is a
“radical” example, “when a person is faced with the choice of spending ten dollars on a
trip to the movies or contributing to famine relief, he should ask himself which action
‘It should also be noted that Rachels has not avoided this duty, but has more
thoroughly examined those foundations in Created from Animals.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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would most effectively promote human welfare, with each person’s interests counted as
equally important. Would we benefit more from seeing the movie than a starving person
would from getting food? Clearly he would not. So he should contribute the money to
famine relief.”1 Likewise, he seeks to expand the moral community to future generations
who have interests in inheriting a world not polluted by nuclear waste, etc. These two
expansions of the moral community (to include those on the other side of the globe and
not just those near me; and future generations) lead Rachels to conclude that “the
Utilitarians were right to insist that the interests of nonhuman animals must be given
weight in our moral calculations. As Bentham pointed out, excluding creatures from
moral consideration because of their species is no more justified than excluding them
because o f race, nationality, or sex.”2 The animals are affected by what we do, and have
interests in not having to suffer unnecessarily. Rachels finally appeals to impartiality as
the reason that our circle of moral protection should be expanded both through space and
time into the future, and across species boundaries.3
Rachels again admits that his Morality Without Hubris “has much in common with
Utilitarianism,”4 but notes that in an earlier chapter, the reader was shown that

‘Ibid., 145-145.
2Ibid., 146. I have not been able to find such a statement in the writings of
Bentham . H ow ever, in our earlier discussions, w e have seen Singer make such a

statement. I suspect Rachels may have crossed over the concept accidentally, in part due
to the foundational work by Bentham in including all sentient beings in the Utilitarian
moral calculus.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
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Utilitarianism failed to account for the values of justice and fairness. He asks, “Can
MWH do any better in this regard? It does, because it makes a person’s past behavior
relevant to how he or she should be treated. This introduces into the theory an
acknowledgment of personal [i.e., individual] merit that is lacking in unqualified
Utilitarianism.” 1 In other words, Rachels claims to have introduced a theory of
individual punishment missing in classic Utilitarian theory. Punishment by definition
means differential treatment of one person over another, he argues, but “this is justified,
on our account, by the person’s own past deeds.. . . The account of punishment
suggested by MWH is very close to Kant’s.”2 By including this theory of punishment,
Rachels believes he has essentially fixed the justice problem in Utilitarianism, so that
with Kant, one can punish an offender, not as a means to an end, but in reference to
holding the offender responsible for his deeds. What is important for this study is not the
fine points o f Kant and Utilitarianism, but rather that this Kantian-Utilitarian hybrid was
synthesized in attempting to create an ethics that harmonized with a Darwinian
anthropology. Rachels has avowedly come to these conclusions seeking to keep in
harmony with evolutionary theory and its principles. Now that we have seen Rachels’s
outline of his undergraduate version of Darwinist ethics, let us briefly look at the third
and fourth editions to see how Rachels further refines and argues his theory.

Tbid.
2Ibid., 147.
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Third Edition: Mild Refinements
What about love and loyalty?
In his introduction to the third addition, Rachels states that the only chapter to have
been substantially altered was the final chapter, ‘“ What Would a Satisfactory Moral
Theory Be Like?’ My opinion about the proper answer to that question has changed
since the second edition, and the revised chapter reflects that.”1 However, a careful
reading of the final chapter in comparison to the first edition shows, in my opinion, little
if any real difference. The same fundamental skeletal structure and argumentation are
found, albeit some arguments are shortened and others lengthened. He still promotes the
same three core components for his moral system: Morality without human hubris,
promoting everyone’s interests alike, and treating people as they deserve to be treated
based on their past behavior. However, he does add a short section apparently addressing
a potential criticism not considered in the first edition.
Focusing on the second axiom of promoting everyone’s interests alike, Rachels
observes that it “apparently fails to capture the whole of moral life.”2 He does allow that
he thinks this failure is only apparent and not real, however. Rachels works his way out
of his apparent dilemma by noting that promoting everyone’s interests alike “is not the
‘Rachels, Elements (1999), xii. This quote shows there must have been a second
edition, but my university’s library was unable to find another institution with the second
edition in its holdings. Thus there is no coverage of that edition in this analysis.
2Ibid., 198.
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only morally praiseworthy motive.”1 He notes that a mother has different attitudes for a
child not her own and her own child. She is not as concerned with the other child’s
interests. Loyalty among friends can likewise cause differential treatment. Yet we value
both a mother’s love for her child, and the loyalty o f friends. Rachels responds to this
tension by concluding that “only a philosophical idiot would propose to eliminate love
and loyalty, and the like from our understanding of moral life. If such motives were
eliminated, and instead people simply calculated what was best, we would be much
worse off.”2 Rachels is fundamentally correct to make this observation, which seems to
overturn his previous argument in the book’s first edition (but not found in the third
edition), that all interests must be considered regardless of space and time. Possibly this
is the substantial change he referred to in his introduction.

Consequential reasons for including love and loyalty
It is significant that Rachels focuses on the lack of welfare generated by a purely
Utilitarian moral calculus devoid of such motives as love and loyalty. Rachels, as a
consequentialist, is arguing to keep love, loyalty, and the like in our system of morality
because he believes the benefits outweigh the consequences of an emotionless moral
calculus. In so doing, Rachels has here introduced a seminal form of an argument that
we shall see him further develop in the fourth edition of his textbook. He names this
seminal form, “Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism. The ultimate end is the general
'Ibid., 199.
2Ibid.
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welfare, but diverse strategies may be endorsed as a means of achieving that end.”1
However, this innovative use of consequentialism to include certain emotional factors in
morality does not mean that Rachels is subverting the role of reason in defining and
determining morality.
Quite to the contrary, Rachels continues to equate morality with rationally based
action as he did in Created from Animals. In this same opening chapter, Rachels argues
that moral judgments must be backed by good reasons, by logic, and not merely by citing
moral authorities.2 He further states that,
the minimum conception [of morality] may now be stated very briefly: morality is,
at the very least, the effort to guide one’s conduct by reason— that is, to do what
there are the best reasons for doing—while giving equal weight to the interests of
each individual will be affected by warns conduct.. . .
The conscientious moral agent is someone who is concerned impartially with
the interests of everyone affected by what he or she does; who carefully sifts facts
and examines the implications; who accepts principles of conduct only after
scrutinizing them to make sure they are sound; who is willing to listen to reason
even when it means that his or her earlier convictions may have to be revised; and
who finally, is willing to act on the results of this deliberation.3
Certainly there is much appeal in Rachels’s assertions. We all like to believe we are
objective, rational agents willing to face the evidence, whatever it its. Rachels has used
some very rational arguments to include attitudes of love and loyalty in the Utilitarian
calculations, giving his position great emotional appeal. Let us now examine his
expansion of this argument in the fourth edition of his textbook.
‘Ibid., 201.
2Ibid., 15.
3Ibid., 19.
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Fourth Edition: Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism
Expanding the arguments for Multiple-Strategies
Utilitarianism
Rachels informs us that the fourth edition of The Elements o f Moral Philosophy is
essentially unchanged in content from the third edition, with changes mostly focused on
updating illustrations. However, Rachels does tell us that a new section has been added
to the final chapter which “further elaborates what a satisfactory moral theory would be
like.” 1 This new section, in conjunction with modifications in the previous section,
further develops the argument for love and loyalty as part of renaming his satisfactory
moral system. In the first and third editions, his moral theory was called Morality
Without Hubris. In the third edition he introduced the term Multiple-Strategies
Utilitarianism (MSU). Now, in the fourth edition he more fully develops MSU.
Rachels returns to his benefits argument, introduced in the third edition, and
repeats the essential foundational arguments, again showing concern for the lack of
attention to motives and virtues in classical Utilitarianism. Unlike the previous edition,
in this one, Rachels credits the Utilitarian, Henry Sidgewick, as the source of his idea
that non-Utilitarian actions can have an overall Utilitarian benefit.2 The essential concept
Rachels seeks to perfect is that some actions, having no direct Utilitarian motive, still
produce good overall, Utilitarian results. Rachels notes, for example, that loving your
'Rachels, Elements (2002), xi. The “further elaboration” is found on pp. 198-199.
2Ibid., 197.
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child preferentially over non-relatives violates classical Utilitarian calls for equal
consideration o f interests, yet human society is better off because of such love. Likewise
for loyalty, honesty, and other virtues— even if not perfectly Utilitarian, they bring
positive benefits to the whole community. The upshot, then, is that Rachels argues that
non-Utilitarian actions having Utilitarian results are therefore morally desirable. We thus
are able to achieve utility by multiple strategies instead of just consequential moral
calculus. Thus Rachels coined the name: Multiple Strategies Utilitarianism.1

How MSU works
In some ways this twist on Utilitarianism is a stroke of genius. Until now, Rachels
has struggled with the usual limits of Utilitarianism in accommodating motives and
virtues (i.e., character) into the moral system. The MSU argument allows him to remain
a Utilitarian while incorporating these desirable traits into his moral system. Rachels
now tries to give us a glimpse o f how this new morality would work in practice.
Rachels proposes that every person whose life is both satisfying to himself or
herself and contributes positively to the welfare of others will be characterized by an
“optimum list” o f virtues, motives, and methods of decision making.2 This optimum list
is also labeled, from an individual’s personal perspective, “my best plan.”3 In Rachels’s
words,
‘Ibid., 195-198.
2Ibid., 198.
3Ibid., 199.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

157
This
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

list would include at least the following:
The virtues that are needed to make one’s life go well;
The motives on which one will act;
The commitments and personal relationships that one will have to friends,
family, and others;
The social roles that one will occupy, with the responsibilities and demands
that go with them;
The duties and concerns associated with projects one will
undertake . . . ;
The everyday rules that one will follow most of the time without even
thinking; and
A strategy, or group of strategies, about when to consider making exceptions
to the rules, and the grounds on which exceptions can be made.

The list would also include specification of the relations between the other items on
the list—what takes priority over what.1
It is of utmost importance to emphasize that the focus is placed on the individual—no one
shares the same optimal list with another, though they could share components in the list.
No other combination o f virtues, motives, and methods of decision making could better
equip that specific moral agent. This seems to reflect Rachels’s adherence to the Kantian
principle that moral precepts are self-imposed by a rational, autonomous, free moral
agent. The penalty for violating these self-imposed moral precepts, notes Rachels, is, “in
Kant’s words, ‘self-contempt and inner abhorrence.’”2 It also dovetails with the
individualist moral focus in Rachels’s moral individualism as seen in Created from
Animals. Thus in MSU, there can be no universal code of moral precepts. Each best plan
is to be custom designed by the individual and imposed on himself. The key in
constructing that optimum list is that it must be made to optimize the agent’s chances of

'Ibid., 198-199.
2Rachels, “God and Moral Autonomy,” 118.
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the individual’s “having a good life, while at the same time optimizing the chances of
other people having good lives.” 1 Thus this should still promote everyone’s interests
alike.
Rachels admits that the individual’s optimal list “might be extremely hard to
construct.. . . As a practical matter, it might even be impossible.”2 Also, the relativist
bent is clearly seen in this statement about one’s optimal list: “It would help us keep our
promises, but not always, and to refrain from hurting people, but not always; and so on.”3
MSU, therefore, includes a number of elements we have seen Rachels and others propose
on the basis o f Darwin’s theory of evolution. MSU ends up assuming a resemblance to
Rule Utilitarianism when Rachels concludes that, for MSU, “the [morally] right thing for
‘Rachels, Elements (2002), 199. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 198-199. See also, Rachels, End o f Life, 2-3, where Rachels shows his
relativistic bent by stating that “moral philosophy may be revisionary, and not merely
descriptive.. . . I shall assume that we may reject received opinion [i.e., Christian
teaching] if it goes against reason.” Also, Rachels makes an analogy between breaking
the rules of the road to avoid and accident, and making exceptions to moral rules. “It is
the same with moral rules. It is important to understand their point because otherwise we
will not be able to judge intelligently when to make exceptions to them” (27). One
possible flaw in Rachels’s analogy is that the laws for driving often have provisions
written into the law whereby one is entitled to break a rule to avoid an accident (often
because the other driver is breaking the rules). In other words, such provisions are made
because it is realized that the law cannot handle all situations encountered on the road.
Rachels seems to assume that morality has the same kind of limits, thus needing the
provision for making exceptions. However, it seems that all Rachels has done is to open
a free-for-all argument on when to make exceptions, which leaves us with little to no
moral guidance for making decisions.
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me to do is to act in accordance with my best plan.”1

Rachels’s conception of a satisfactory moral system
Now that we have used The Elements o f Moral Philosophy to look at Rachels’s
conception of the major elements of a satisfactory moral system, I will summarize the
essential points before critiquing them. First, Rachels believes that a satisfactory system
of ethics must take into account the “facts” of human nature as revealed by Darwinian
evolution. These “facts” led Rachels to conclude that since humans are relatively recent
in the evolutionary timetable, they should not be so quick to claim special moral
privileges and protections for humans. Thus he proposes Morality Without Human
Hubris. This first major premise means that the circle of moral inclusion must include
some or many of the animals.
Since Rachels believes man evolved, the next move is to note that humans have
evolved capacities of reason far superior to other animals. These capacities of reason
allow man to perceive the workings of cause and effect in freely chosen actions. This
evolutionary capability opens the way to define good and evil in terms of consequences,
and to argue an obligation to make choices most likely to produce good consequences.
Thus, for Rachels, it seems that consequentialism is a key implication o f Darwinism.
’Ibid., 199. This concept of grading moral imperatives is surprisingly similar to
Norman Geisler’s concept of Graded Absolutism, in which Geisler argues that divinely
commanded absolutes sometimes conflict, and so must be graded or ranked to see which
absolute takes precedence in the conflict. Thus, for Geisler, in Nazi Germany, when
confronted by the Gestapo and you are hiding Jews, the moral imperative to save life is
argued to take priority over the imperative to tell the truth, and you would be exempted
from the requirement against lying. See Geisler, 116-117.
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This leads to Rachels’s second major premise, that everyone’s interests should be
promoted alike. Rachels asserts that we must consider the interests of everyone who may
be affected by our actions, and that our considerations must not be limited by space or
time. Thus strangers on the other side of the world deserve equal consideration along
with, say, your child. Likewise, future generations must have their interests considered.
Rachels admits the strong Utilitarian flavor in his ethical system to this point.
But Utilitarian consequentialism is flawed for Rachels because it can justify
injustice. Therefore, Rachels borrows from Kant to develop the concept of deserts,
which becomes his third major premise: People deserve to be treated according to their
previously and freely chosen behaviors. This third principle regulates when to make
exceptions to promoting everyone’s interests alike.
Rachels then notes one other issue that permits some exceptions based on
geographical proximity. We love and care for those closest to us. He concludes that
moral systems must incorporate virtues such as love and loyalty even though they are not
directly Utilitarian in promoting everyone’s interests alike. This argument is eventually
developed into Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism, where virtues such as love and loyalty,
although not directly Utilitarian because they prefer some people’s interests over others,
ultimately produce more benefits to society than a pure Utilitarianism could. Thus, nonUtilitarian means can still accomplish Utilitarian ends, hence the designation of MultipleStrategies Utilitarianism.
MSU in turn is revealed to be an individualistic ethics, where each individual
develops his optimum list/best plan of moral virtues, values, rules, principles, criterion
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for exceptions, and a prioritization of the items on the list in a moral hierarchy, to name
some elements in the list. No two lists are alike as Rachels believes there can be no
universal, one-size-fits-all morality. In this way, MSU dovetails nicely with his concept
of moral individualism.
Rachels appears to believe that MSU is worked out and chosen on the basis of a
Darwinian world-view.1 Combined with his work in Createdfrom Animals, Rachels has
shown that Darwinism undermines traditional, Western, Christian ethics. He has
proposed in its place a radically different form of ethics in which rights are earned, not
granted, to individuals who are subjects of a life, and based on their individual,
functioning characteristics. What are we to make of Rachels’s ethics from a biblical
Christian perspective? How efficacious is Rachels’s argument? Let us analyze his
assertions.
‘Not all recognize Darwinism as a “world-view.” O f significance, however, is the
observation by the evolutionist Robert Wright concerning the impact of E. O. Wilson’s
Sociobiology, published in 1975. Says Wright, “A small but growing group o f scholars
has taken what Wilson called ‘the new synthesis,’ and carried it into the social sciences
with the aim of overhauling them .. . . Slowly but unmistakably, a new worldview is
emerging.. . . Here ‘worldview’ is meant quite literally. The new Darwinian synthesis is,
like quantum physics or molecular biology, a body of scientific theory and fact; but
unlike them is also a way o f seeing everyday life” (emphasis mine). Wright, The Moral
Animal, 4-5.
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CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATION OF ANTI-SPECIESIST USES OF EVOLUTION
TO INFORM AND SHAPE ETHICS

Introduction
It is time now to turn to the task of analyzing the moral implications of Darwin’s
theory of evolution. To stay within the limits of this study I shall focus on evaluating the
connections between evolution and ethics, especially the impact on Christian ethics.
First, I shall analyze the three arguments against speciesism, their veracity and their
implications for traditional ethics. This chapter will cover the work presented earlier by
several notable authors, including Rachels. The next chapter will evaluate the unique
contributions of Rachels in showing how Darwinism undermines Christian theology and
ethics. Finally, in both chapters, I will use an exploration of implications as the primary
means of conducting my analysis.

Analysis of Arguments Against Speciesism
We have seen several ways of arguing against human speciesism on the grounds of
evolution. However, my purpose is to analyze these arguments, not in reference to the
veracity of animal rights, but rather as a means of distilling moral implications from
Darwinism. In this analysis, then, I shall analyze three issues where anti-speciesist views
162
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impinge on ethics, often in reference to principles based in Darwinism. Then I shall offer
some alternative suggestions.

Analysis of the Kinship Argument
Dawkins’s concept of evolutionary kinship seems to be one of the more substantive
arguments in justifying the rejection of human preference speciesism.1 The centerpiece
of establishing an evolutionary kinship between humans and the animal kingdom was the
concept o f the ring-species. This argument inherently challenges the concept of species
fixity that is asserted as being necessary to justify human preference. Dawkins’s ringspecies argument, then, carries significance in that it specifically engages in the more

‘While not as directly tied to belief in evolution, a foundational argument against
speciesism is exemplified by Ryder’s assertion, which is also echoed by others including
Rachels, that speciesism is merely based in external appearance as is racism and sexism
and is thus morally equivalent to both. It is of interest to note that virtually none of these
leading authors offer substantive reasons for justifying this analogy. Rather, they
virtually seem to assume that the analogy is self-evident.
The analogy to racism and sexism seems convincing only if certain presuppositions
are held, some o f which may be rooted in Darwinian evolution. Thus, to those not
holding those beliefs, the analogy to racism and sexism is less than convincing. One key
reason is that those who practice racism and sexism are making distinctions in rights and
privileges between fellow members of the human race who possess an extremely high
degree of similarity. By contrast, speciesism makes its moral differentiation between
human and non-human beings, where the contrast is much greater, and there is thus more
room to argue in favor of differential treatment based in those dissimilarities. The
differences between a male and female human, or two races of humans regardless of
gender, are much less distinct than those between humans and, for example, a dog,
chimpanzee, or donkey. B ecause o f this lack o f full analogy, the racism -sexism

argument seems to be more emotive or psychological than moral, resonating with basic
civil rights themes, and appealing to a generation with strong tendencies to interpret
issues in terms o f power and oppression.
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specific task of discrediting human dignity, and does so on the basis of evolution.1

'A less related, but interesting parallel to this argument is the attempt to
undermine human dignity through the issue of extraterrestrial life. Paul Davies asserts,
“The existence of extra-terrestrial intelligences would have a profound impact on
religion, shattering completely the traditional perspective of God’s special relationship
with man. The difficulties are particularly acute for Christianity, which postulates that
Jesus Christ was God incarnate whose mission was to provide salvation for man on
Earth.” He further claims that multiple worlds would necessitate a host of alien Christs
to save the aliens, which he deems as absurd. See, Paul Davies, God and the New
Physics (New York: Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1983), 71.
Wiker seems to assert a similar conclusion in arguing that there was a revival of
Epicureanism, culminating in the Renaissance and Reformation. In discussing what he
believes to be the morally relativistic influence of William of Occam, Wiker asserts that
part of this relativism is rooted in the affirmation by radical Augustinians that there is a
“plurality of worlds” beyond earth. Wiker juxtaposes this with the Aristotelian view that
“the first cause cannot make more than one world.” Thus, for Wiker, this radical
Augustinian view and the ensuing attacks on Aristotelianism “affected the moderate
users of Aristotle, the Thomists, as well.” Thus, if human dignity is partly rooted in the
earth’s being the only inhabited planet created by God, Davies’s assertion carries heavier
weight in the human dignity debate. See, Wiker, 106-107.
However, it seems that belief in multiple worlds does not have to undermine human
dignity or the absoluteness of Christian ethics. In fact, the multiple worlds argument can
be used in favor of human dignity. One of the founders of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church, Ellen White, asserted the existence of other inhabited worlds in many statements.
For example, “Man was created a free moral agent. Like the inhabitants o f all other
worlds, he must be subjected to the test of obedience.” Ellen G. White, Patriarchs and
Prophets (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1958), 331-332. In another statement
she uses the idea of multiple worlds to assert the specialness of this one: “How grateful
we should be that, notwithstanding this earth is so small amid the created worlds, God
notices even us. The nations are before him as the drop in the bucket, and as the small
dust in the balance; and yet the great, the stupendous work that has been done fo r us
shows how much he loves us.” Idem, “The Government of God,” Review and Herald,
March 9,1886, 145-146. It seems, then, that human dignity is not solely dependent on
Aristotelian philosophical foundations as Wiker seems to assert. Likewise, neither
Augustine nor Ellen White is known for their moral relativism, so it seems that belief in
multiple worlds does not entail moral relativism as Wiker seems to conclude.
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Kinship as Organic Union
The kinship argument at first seems compelling enough to be self-evident. But one
wonders if certain key elements of evolutionary theory are being excluded from the
argument, which, if included, might change the entire picture of ethics based in kinship.
Dawkins does not appear to take into account the theory espoused by Ruse and others
that our moral capacity evolved through manifestations of altruism, as part of our
evolution, and thus making morality to be primarily understood as helping others,
especially one’s immediate kin. If morality did evolve this manner, then at best, only the
higher primates can be claimed as evolutionary kin entitled to equal consideration. One
look at the evolutionary tree raises serious questions concerning who in the animal
kingdom are truly our evolutionary kin. Are those not in our branch o f the evolutionary
tree disqualified as kin worthy o f altruism? It seems likely that dogs, donkeys, dolphins,
and ducks, for example, would not be in ring-species relationship with humans, and thus
would not qualify as kin entitled to moral inclusion with man since their organic
connection to us is less complete. On this ground, then, the extension of moral protection
to non-kin branches of the evolutionary tree becomes a less compelling, if not downright
contradictory, basis for the broad inclusion argued by Dawkins.
A partial rebuttal to this objection may be offered through Dawkins’s use of the
organic inclusion tactic by raising the specter o f creating human-animal transgenic
hybrids. If a human-nonhuman transgenic creature can be developed through our genetic
technology, Dawkins sees this as again blurring the boundary between human and
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animal, thus demonstrating an organic interconnection which discredits human
preference. More importantly, it permits interbreeding between species who are not
neighbors in the sequence of the ring-species. However, this is less than compelling
support for the organic kinship argument because this form of transgenic breeding is
accomplished, not through the natural selection processes of evolution, but through
artificial intervention by humans. Therefore, transgenic creations by human
technological prowess cannot provide support to ring-species organic union argument.
However, the potential for artificial transgenic breeding mentioned by Dawkins is
of significance to the human preference issue in a different way. We have seen Ryder
question, in reference to pigs with human genes spliced into their genome, how many
human genes are needed in the pig to qualify it for human status. In other words,
transgenic breeding raises the specter o f so blurring the boundaries between human and
animal that human preference in ethics becomes impossible to practice at the practical
level. This is a valid and unavoidable consequence of creating transgenic hybrids of
humans with non-human beings. The intent seems to be to elevate the animals to
human-like moral status. Thus R. G. Frey asserts that “the more we can pile up the
human traits we are prepared to endow animals with, the more likely we will regard them
as honorary persons and so to put them into a position to possess rights.”1 However, the
implications may not open vistas of greater moral inclusion as Dawkins and Ryder
envision.
•Frey, 86. Frey calls this humanizing of animals, “rampant anthropomorphism.”
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Dawkins and Ryder clearly believe that the kinship argument should elevate the
moral status of animals rather than undermine the moral status of humans. However, this
conclusion is by no means guaranteed and the kinship principle might just as readily
produce a universalist ethics in which humans are diminished significantly while animals
are elevated moderately if at all.' We shall see this more clearly in my examination of
marginal cases.

An Arbitrary Criterion
Another potential problem in the kinship argument is that it can be criticized as
being both arbitrary and a new form of exclusivism. The ring-species relationship
'It is interesting to note, that in Seventh-day Adventism, where Ellen White is
regarded as having exercised the ministry of a prophet, a hotly disputed statement may
add some insight into Ryder’s issue of how interbreeding human and animal might
change ethics. In 1864 Ellen White wrote of the antediluvial world: “But if there was
one sin above another which called for the destruction of the race by the flood, it was the
base crime of amalgamation of man and beast which defaced the image of God, and
caused confusion everywhere.” The infamous phrase, “amalgamation of man and beast,”
has been much debated and I wish not to pursue that debate here. My point in raising the
issue is that it may be possible that she really intended to assert that in the days of Noah,
his contemporaries created human-animal hybrids. Whether or not she intended
hybridization of human with animal, she clearly associates this “amalgamation” with a
defacement of the “image of God.” This assertion correlates with Rachels’s argument
that evolution blurs the moral boundary between human and animal by undermining the
image-of-God thesis. See, Ellen G. White, Spiritual Gifts, vol. 3 (Ann Arbor, MI:
Edwards Brothers, 1864; facsimile reprint: Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1945),
64.
I f w e take som e hom iletical license with Christ’s statement that the days before H is

second advent will be like the days of Noah (Matt 24:37; Luke 17:26), the technological
possibility of such hybridization now discussed would suggest that Ellen White would
likely see Ryder’s interbreeding of humans and animals precisely as producing a
callousness towards human life more than an elevation of animal life in moral status. For
more history of the discussion on Ellen White’s statements on amalgamation, see F. D.
Nichol, Ellen G. White and Her Critics: An Answer to the Major Charges that Critics
Have Brought Against Mrs. Ellen G. White (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1951).
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becomes merely a new type of exclusionary boundary. But why should one ring of
species be included while another is excluded? Has Dawkins merely expanded
speciesism into genus-ism or phyla-ism? In other words, it seems that the kinship
argument violates the fundamental dictum of anti-speciesism authors that moral rights
and privileges do not come by membership in a group but on individual capabilities and
merits. Kinship ethics, however, is still based first on group membership, though it can
also be based on a minimum functionality criteria. But, as the anti-speciesists including
Rachels have charged, human preference in ethics is also based on group membership
and can likewise be based on defining the minimum functional attributes to qualify for
human status. How then is kinship ethics not essentially speciesist, when it simply is
expanding the boundary of the group?
Dawkins’s moral model still seems to base moral privilege in a new kind o f group
membership— evolutionary kinship to man. But this begs the question of why kinship
with the animals should be a criterion for moral status? I have already raised the problem
of how to define who is included in the kinship criterion. But on what grounds do we
conclude that kinship between man and members of other branches of the evolutionary
tree is morally significant? Why should these other branches be included or excluded?
Dawkins does not address such issues. He merely assumes that if the species barrier is
broken by the organic connections, then human preference is gone. This is a valid
inference, but when he redraws the line of moral inclusion around organic kinship, the
new boundary seems just as arbitrary, if not more so, than the old boundary is accused of.
William Saletan illustrates the arbitrary nature of such argumentation in looking at
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the Korean practice of eating dog meat. He cites Brigitte Bardot as arguing that eating
dogs is wrong because they are “friends, not animals.” He continues by quoting her as
saying, “Cows are grown to be eaten, dogs are not.” Saletan observes that “if you refuse
to eat only the meat of ‘companion’ animals . . . you’re saying that the morality of killing
depends on habit or even whim.”1
To illustrate this argument, Saletan notes that the companionship standard is
completely subjective. For Koreans, dogs are livestock, not companions, so eating them
is not a problem, whereas for Bardot, dogs are only companions. But, he notes, a change
is underway in Korea, especially the cities, where citizens are now starting to keep dogs
as pets. Korea now has two classes of dogs: “pet dogs,” and “meat dogs”—also called
“junk dogs” or “lower grade” dogs. From the perspective of the dogs, Saletan notes,
“But you don’t become a Tower-grade’ dog by flunking an IQ test. You’re just bom in
the wrong place.”2 One could also note a potentially similar twist on this argument,
where the division is by breed instead o f by birth place. Both seem quite arbitrary and
whimsical.
In a similar fashion, the kinship argument has not shed the alleged arbitrary nature
of the speciesism it seeks to refute. Thus, it leaves us with the choice of who is kin with
'William Saletan, “Wok the Dog,” Slate, 16 January 2002,
www.slate.com/?id=2060840 (20 May 2003). Saletan gives no citations for the quotes
by Brigitte Bardot. The significance of his argument, however, is not dependent on
Bardot actually having said these things.
2Ibid. Saletan also notes that in parts of Spain, cat stew is eaten, while the French
eat horses, both o f which could be argued as companion animals by many people.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170
moral status, and who is not, being at least partially grounded in human whim. A high
degree of moral relativism is thus manifested in ethical arguments based in evolution.
This lack of firm foundations undermines the felicity of evolutionary kinship as being a
significant criterion for defining moral status. And there is yet another reason to doubt
the efficacy of evolutionary kinship as a standard for determining the boundary of moral
status.

Does the Kinship Argument Commit the
Naturalistic Fallacy?
Robert Griffiths argues that proponents of the animal rights movement commit the
naturalistic fallacy. In simple terms, Griffith states the fallacy as applied to animal rights:
‘“ Man is evolved from lower forms of life, therefore lower forms of life ought to be
treated in certain ways;’ or ‘Some animals are intelligent, therefore they ought to possess
rights;’ or ‘Animals are capable o f suffering, therefore they ought to be spared it.’”1
Griffiths argues that all naturalistic philosophies including Utilitarianism commit the
naturalistic fallacy. He concedes that this fallacy “does not negate naturalistic ethics
entirely, but it does show that ethics cannot be grounded exclusively in the facts of
human (or animal) experience.”2 Griffiths states that the fallacy is a logical one in that
there may be excellent moral reasons why I should not do what another dislikes (such as
cause pain). But, he concludes, the imperative to not cause pain cannot be logically
'Robert Griffiths, The Human Use o f Animals, Grove Booklets on Ethics, no. 46
(N.p.: Grove Books, 1982), 17.
2Ibid.
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derived from the fact that the potential victim does not like pain.1
Griffiths illustrates the problem in a different way. He distills the kinship argument
into a syllogism: “All men have rights; all men are animals; therefore animals have
rights.” While sounding very logical, Griffiths charges it contains a lapse of logic. The
subject of the second phrase is not the subject of the final phrase, thus invalidating the
syllogism. He uses the following syllogism: “All cats have fur; all Tigers are cats;
therefore all Tigers have fur,” to show how “tigers” is the subject of the last two-thirds of
the syllogism. Taken that way, the animal rights syllogism should read, “All men have
rights; all animals are men, therefore animals have rights,” but this is clearly problematic.
For animals to get rights, “animals,” not “men,” should be the subject of the final twothirds of the syllogism.2 In other words, just because men have rights does not
automatically entitle animals to rights even if we are “kin.”
Based on the arbitrary nature of the kinship criterion demonstrated by Saletan, and
the questionable logic of the argument shown by Griffiths, it seems safe to conclude that
kinship can only undermine human preference. It is incapable of providing a criterion of
moral inclusion that requires the uplifting of animals. Ultimately, Dawkins’s argument
seems almost spiritual rather than scientific in nature. As Christians argue for equal
human rights on the basis that we are all children of God, brothers and sisters in Christ,
so Dawkins seems to ultimately argue that we are all children of evolution—humans and

'Ibid.
2Ibid., 4-5.
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animals— and thus are all brothers and sisters in Darwin! It seems likely that the kinship
argument provides a less than compelling foundation for determining moral inclusion,
and this may be why it is not often used to provide those definitions. Instead, two major
veins o f criteria were proposed to help determine the boundary of moral status. They are
the sentiency criterion and the argument from marginal cases.

Analysis of The Sentiency Criterion (Painism) for Moral Inclusion
We have seen the sentiency criterion proposed as the means of determining who is
entitled to moral protection. It is rooted in Bentham’s argument that the real question for
determining moral status is not whether the individual in question can reason or speak,
but whether they can suffer. Thus, we saw Ryder christen this view with the term
“Painism.” We will recall that this criterion is expressed succinctly in the statment: “We
should do to others what we believe will give them pleasure and not do to them what we
believe will cause them pain.” 1 But is it really that simple?

Regan’s Qualification of Painism
Regan opines that we cannot merely assert that causing pain is bad. He qualifies
the concept of pain with the word, “unnecessary.” It is unnecessary, unjustifiable pain
that is morally wrong.2 But this begs two questions: How are we to define
“unnecessary,” and who determines that definition? We generally consider causing
‘Ryder, Painism, 196, 198-199.
2Regan, Case fo r Animal Rights, 50-51.
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unnecessary pain to children as child abuse. But what the child may consider abusive
and what adults consider abusive may drastically differ. For example, neither the parent
who takes their child to the doctor for immunization shots, or for surgery to correct a
congenital defect, nor the medical personnel who perform the procedures are considered
to be abusing the child, even though the child may feel the pain is neither justifiable nor
necessary. Likewise, Regan’s argument opens the door to undermine the very ethics he
is trying to build, for humans historically have shown great ability to justify immoral
treatment of marginal groups or individuals in the name of a greater or common good.
How easily might we justify the necessity of animal suffering for a greater good. Thus,
not ALL pain is bad, as we saw Ryder claim. And this now raises the question of who
has the right to decide what pain is justifiable, especially for agents like animals and
small children who are incapable of making such judgments? Who becomes the moral
authority?
This is a vexing matter, for the need of a paternalistic moral authority goes against
the very nature of the painists’ argumentation which is trying to appeal to a universal
code of reason that will compel all human debaters into agreement with the sentience
criterion. Indeed, Ryder has observed that “unless one adopts a religious view, right and
wrong are intrinsically about what is desired and what is avoided.”1 This is a telling
comment. For it is precisely apart from religious influence, in harmony with Darwin and
‘Ryder, Painism, 198. This also raises the specter that the hedonist base o f the
speciesist model of morality, and its affinities for Utilitarianism, is antithetical to
religion, presumably here referring to the Judeo-Christian religion that has dominated
Western culture and its associated approach to morality.
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Bentham, that these thinkers use suffering and pain as the grounds for morality. Yet, the
very issue that some pain, even involuntary pain, is justifiable, leads to the need of
establishing a paternalistic authority to decide such matters. But this need, in turn, opens
the door for an outside value system such as religion to control the definition of morally
versus immorally inflicted pain, and thus, Bentham’s hedonistic principle is no longer the
true grounding point of the moral system. Also, without the possible re-introduction of
theological or other clarifying influences,1there are several other weaknesses to pain or
suffering as the grounding criterion of moral status.

The Problem of Assessing Pain
A key problem for the sentiency-painism position is the issue of how to define the
boundaries of sentiency. What is the difference in sentiency between a chimpanzee, dog,
and snail? This is not an easy question, particularly if we take the continuous mind-set of
Dawkins where creatures can be 37 percent or 99 percent sentient. What is 100 percent
sentiency? A key admission of Ryder is that the premise that sentience fades with
descent on the phylogenic scale is unproven.2 In his discussion of vivisection, C. S.
Lewis highlights this problem by asserting that we have no real way of knowing how
‘This is the route Andrew Linzey takes, seeking to re-interpret what he sees as
traditional, speciesist Christian theology, into a more animal-friendly system. See
Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995),
chapters 1-4; idem, Animal Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster-John Knox Press,
2000), chapters 1-6.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 332.
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conscious an animal is, and that arguments here are essentially opinions.1 In similar
fashion, Singer questions the ability to compare the sufferings of men with other animals,
in order to undermine the argument that beasts suffer less than humans.2 Singer,
however, has caused himself a problem: If we cannot say for certain that animals suffer
less than humans (especially in response to a standardized stimulus), then it is equally
impossible to claim any similarity between human and animal suffering, and Singer’s
attempt to equate the two falls flat.
A corollary problem is raised by Marian Stamp Dawkins. She observes that a key
area of division between the animal rights activists and animal use advocates “is a failure
to agree on how to recognize and define suffering.”3 Not only is there a failure to agree
on how to measure animal suffering, but an even more fundamental issue which
undermines the use of suffering to determine the moral boundaries of inclusion.
Ultimately, we are faced with the even more basic question, How can we know how
much an animal is suffering? Says Dawkins, “We do not know infallibly what the mental
experiences o f other animals are like, particularly those animals that are structurally very
different from us.”4 We thus end up with two key problems for ethical rights being based
in the capacity to suffer.
*C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter
Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 225.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 232-33.
3Marian Stamp Dawkins, Animal Suffering: The Science o f Animal Welfare (New
York: Chapman and Hall, 1980), 1.
4Ibid., 2.
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First, suffering is subjective. Two creatures experiencing the same pains can suffer
differently. How then can such variable perceptions provide a stable foundation for
building our concepts o f ethical preferences and rights? And who defines suffering?
How often have oppressors caused suffering while denying that their victims were indeed
suffering? It would seem that such a malleable criterion leaves us with no real ethics at
all.
Second, if we cannot enter into the mental experiences of animals, and thereby
enter into their suffering, how can we possibly objectively evaluate their suffering or
potential suffering sufficiently enough to build the moral boundaries o f exclusion and
inclusion on such limited evidence? Again we are given a foundation for ethics that
becomes highly subjective and unstable. Should ethics, especially Christian ethics, be
based on and built from such an unstable foundation of speculation and opinion?

Is pain the same as suffering?
R. G. Frey observes that suffering is not merely unpleasant or painful sensations,
but that it requires the organism having the sensations to possess a mental capacity
capable of suffering.1 And yet we have seen it argued that our ability to assess whether
such mental capacity exists in animals, and to evaluate how equivalent their suffering is
to ours, is impossible, or at best very limited. As C. S. Lewis cogently asserts in regard
to vivisection, “Unless we know on other grounds, that vivisection is right we must not
'Frey, 39-41.
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take the moral risk of tormenting them [animals] on a mere opinion.”1 In restated form,
willingness to risk inflicting unjustified pain is, defacto, a willingness to knowingly
inflict unjustified pain.
When Frey asserts that suffering is more than merely painful sensations, and that a
certain mental capacity is required to be capable of suffering, he implies that pain and
suffering are not one and the same thing. Thus it becomes hypothetically possible for
two sentient creatures to experience identical pains, but different levels of suffering.
Ryder notes that the ability to anticipate pain can increase the total suffering, while
the ability to project a positive future consequence can reduce the total suffering.2 This is
because, as Leahy notes, many scholars, including some of the key animal rights
advocates, concede that humans can suffer more than animals because of the superiority
'Lewis, God in the Dock, 225. Note however, how Lewis reverses the logic
from the sentience school. Lewis, instead of arguing how much pain animals feel,
instead takes the higher moral road by asserting that the lack of objective data on
animals’ ability to experience pain is precisely why we should not risk inflicting
suffering by procedures such as vivisection. Thus Lewis takes a restrictive approach to
ambiguity instead of a permissive approach and in so doing side-steps the animal rights
advocates who are programmed only to confront the permissive mind-set.
Griffiths uses a similar tactic to argue that basing animal rights in evolution is not a
prudent methodology. “To base an ethics of animal welfare on what is still widely
regarded as only a hypothesis is to skate on thin ice. It is bad ethics to make one’s morals
depend so heavily on the vagaries of the results of scientific research” (17). Both men
underscore the problem of basing ethics on the moving targets of opinion and science.
However, both men clearly have an absolutist view of ethics, which the evolutionist
would see as a weakness. N evertheless, it does seem that an ethics based on a m oving

target could hardly be normative in the practical world.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 326.
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of human intelligence.1Ryder’s point is well taken but opens a new problem. If suffering
does not have to include pain, then we should become less supportive of defining the
limits o f morality in terms of pain. Rather we must now define the moral boundaries in
terms o f the broader criterion of suffering. Furthermore, suffering now becomes a
function of “mental capacity,” which becomes a euphemism for rational intelligence. If
suffering implies and requires a minimum level of intelligence, then Bentham’s
foundation for including the animals has artificially separated reason from the capacity to
suffer. Reason and thinking do play a role after all. Thus the very concept that is
supposed to deliver the animal rights proponent from the use of intelligence and reason as
criteria for defining the boundaries of moral preference ends up being grounded in the
very intelligence it was invented to replace.

Why Choose Pain for a Criterion?
Both Frey and Griffith attack what they perceive to be a subjective or arbitrary
designation of pain as the primary grounds of establishing moral rights. They both assert
that it is not clear that the experience of pain automatically has intrinsic moral value to
ground rights. Frey charges essentially that the adequacy of the criterion of sentience (or
pain) is an unargued, unproved assumption. Second, both argue that even if experiences
of pain do have intrinsic moral value, this is no guarantee that pain is the only experience
'Michael Leahy, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective (New York:
Routledge, 1991), 29.
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to have intrinsic moral value.1 On what basis is pain to be chosen over these other
options as the grounding value of morality? What justification is offered by the animal
rights advocates for choosing pain over these other experiences? Frey declares he is
aware o f no answer to this last question.2
There appears to be no direct attempt to answer to Frey’s objection. The closest
thing to an answer may be the general, Bentham-based hedonist argument that human
and animal behaviors are grounded in avoiding pain and in seeking pleasure. Thus,
morality ought to be grounded in avoiding pain and promoting pleasure (or happiness).
But why should behaviorism be the grounding principle for ethics? Just because an act
appears to produce pleasure or happiness does not entail the conclusion it is moral.
Adultery is mutually pleasurable but few would assert that it is morally good.
Frey argues that pain is an ineffective means for establishing rights if it is the sole
ground, as it is with Bentham and the animal rights advocates. He illustrates his point by
presenting the case of a war veteran who is quite conscious and cogent, but his war injury
made him incapable of feeling pain. Has he lost his rights since he can no longer feel
pain? This argument can be extended to the comatose human as well. Have they lost
their rights and interests because they are comatose? Could a photographer enter the
room of a comatose person and take immodest photos because they cannot feel pain nor
'Frey, 46-50, 145; Griffiths, 15. Chapter 11 of Frey has a major section arguing
this issue in detail.
2Frey, 46-50; Griffiths, 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180
can they suffer?1 Does a person bom with a congenital condition making them unable to
feel pain have no rights?2
Frey also observes that if pain is the sole basis of moral rights and interests, then
future generations can have no moral rights or interests as they do not yet have a nervous
system enabling them to feel pain (or suffer).3 Such an argument would undermine key
moral positions on caring for the earth and the environment because the future
generations are entitled to receive a habitable earth from us. Could it not be convincingly
argued that preventing real, present pain, trumps actions to prevent potential, future pain
that may not occur? Frey concludes that the painists offer no objective test criteria to be
met in order to demonstrate pain and suffering, and thus it becomes a version of
speciesism that simply has expanded the circle to include more than just humans. It is
still discrimination in the speciesist sense, just on a broader scale.4
One other point about pain should be made here. Casserley, writing well before
'Frey, 34-36; 145-147.
2An actual case history of such a person can be found in Robert Marion, The Boy
Who Felt No Pain (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1990). Marion’s book is a personal
memoir of his early career in medicine. In this volume he tells the story of treating an
infant who felt no pain at all. Several years later he encountered the boy again, and the
patient was a physical and medical mess due to not feeling any injuries. Would the
painists say he was not suffering and thus had no rights? Could we do experiments on
him that we could not do on others since he feels no pain?
This exam ple highlights the fact that every criterion based in functionality is bound

to face a situation where one faces a marginal case where granting moral status is an
exception to the criterion and yet seems to be in order. I shall examine the issue of
arguing from marginal cases shortly.
3Frey, 34-36.
4Ibid., 44.
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painism was in vogue, declares, “Pain is not the worst of evils.”1 He contends that there
is “widespread modem superstition that all pain is stark and unredeemable evil, and that
indeed, evil and pain necessarily amount to the same thing.. . . Pain is indeed a species
o f evil, but pain is not, so to speak the most evil form o f evil. Both moral evil, sin, and
social evil, injustice, are worse than pain. The fight against pain may never be carried on
by immoral or unjust means. It is never worth while [sic] to corrupt men or societies in
order to avoid pain.” 2 Casserley’s point is well taken. Bentham’s foundation for
painism presupposes hedonist consequentialism in judging good and evil by the pleasure
or pain produced by choices and actions. Few would argue that pain is evil. The
frequent instances of individuals willingly placing themselves in a position to suffer pain
for various higher purposes would seem to indicated that many do not see pain as the
ultimate evil. Thus Pinches rightly argues that “sentience, therefore, turns out to be one
o f a number o f features of a given animal that humans must consider when seeking to
treat it well. It has no special, privileged status.”3 There is one other problem for the
sentiency criterion.
1J. V. Langmead Casserley, M an’s Pain and God’s Goodness (London: A. R.
Mowbray & Co., 1951), 63. See also Peter Anthony Bertocci, Introduction to the
Philosophy o f Religion (New York: Prentice Hall, 1951), 394: “Hardship is not
necessarily evil.”
2C asserley, M a n ’s P ain, 60-61.

3Charles Pinches, “Each According to Its Kind,” in Good News fo r Animals?
Christian Approaches fo r Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 201.
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The Problem of Predation
Another challenge for the sentiency view is the problem of predation. Those
advocating the sentiency criterion for moral protection do not appear to address this
issue adequately. The issue o f predation begs the question of why it should be
considered morally wrong for a man to kill and eat a zebra, while for a lion to kill and eat
a zebra is not immoral. Peter Alward clarifies the argument, saying, “In particular, what
is in need o f explanation is exactly why non-human carnivores, but not humans, may
permissibly eat meat. That is, the (relevant) properties differentiating humans from non
human carnivores need to be delineated and an explanation needs to be given as to why
possession of such properties, or the lack thereof, ground the moral distinction at issue.”1
This issue is particularly problematic in these modem times when it is likely that the lion
will inflict more pain and suffering on the zebra than the man.2 Why is the pain inflicted
by the lion not morally evil (or at least not as evil) as that given by a man?
Singer tries to show why a predator can kill other animals to eat with no moral
culpability, while humans cannot. He appeals to William Paley’s argument that
the reasons alleged in vindication of this practice [humans killing animals to
‘Peter Alward, Naive! Who Me? 2000, http://people.uleth.ca/~peter.alward/papers/
Naive-who-me.htm (6 July 2003).
2With a scoped rifle, a hunter can easily kill a game animal up to 800 yards away.
The bullet will reach the animal before the sound of the rifle shot, and with an accurate
shot, the animal will be dead before it can be fully aware that anything happened.
However, if the shot is off, then the animal may well suffer but this can be quickly
remedied with a second shot. Any way you look at it, the modem hunter is likely to
inflict far less pain and suffering than the lion.
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eat], are the following: that the several species of brutes being created to prey upon
one another, affords a kind of analogy to prove that the human species were
intended to feed upon them; that, if let alone, they would overrun the earth, and
exclude mankind from the occupation of it; that they are requited for what they
suffer at our hands by our care and protection.
Upon which reasons I would observe, that the analogy contended for is
extremely lame; since brutes have no power to support life by any other means,
and since we have; for the whole human species might subsist entirely
upon fruit, pulse, herbs, and roots, as many tribes of the Hindoos actually do.1
Singer is arguing that the lion or wolf has no other options for food, whereas we do.
Thus killing prey animals is necessary for lion and wolf. Furthermore, Singer argues that
predators do not kill for pleasure, in contrast to humans who do kill for sport. He
therefore joins Paley in arguing that just because some animals kill others for food, it is
not a moral ground to justify our killing for food.2
All of this wrangling over necessity leaves the prime question unanswered: Why is
it wrong for a man to kill a zebra and eat it while it is morally acceptable for the lion to
kill and eat it? Pain is still pain whether inflicted by a lion or a human. Singer offers one
other answer to this conundrum: “The most decisive point, however, is that nonhuman
animals are not capable of considering the alternatives open to them or o f reflecting on
the ethics o f their diet. Hence it is impossible to hold the animals responsible for what
they do.”3 Thus, he argues that the difference between animal and human predation is
‘William Paley, The Principles o f Moral and Political Philosophy (Boston, MA:
West and Richardson, 1818), 70. Second emphasis is mine. Singer merely summarizes
Paley’s point. He makes no direct quotation. See Singer, Animal Liberation, 237.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 235, 237.
3Singer, Practical Ethics, 71. Emphasis mine.
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that the animals have no moral ability and thus cannot be held accountable, while humans
can make such reflections and be held culpable. But this is begging the question for the
argument assumes that there is a moral problem with humans eating animals. Why
should my sense of morality defacto prohibit eating animal flesh? There needs to be a
separate reason for having such a moral requirement.1 Neither Singer, nor any of his
cohorts adequately addresses the problem of distinguishing between animal suffering
caused by predacious animals, and similar forms of suffering caused by humans.
Thus Bentham’s hedonism is challenged in two key ways. First, because for
Bentham, all pain is evil whether intended or unintended. The zebra suffers either way,
and for the painists, the issue is suffering, not motive or intent. Second, the major feature
distinguishing the morality of the lion from that of man is not pain but the ability to
reason creatively.2 The very criteria of human preference ethics that is discarded in favor
lIt is interesting that Singer then asserts that “it must be admitted that the
existence of carnivorous animals poses one more problem for the ethics of Animal
Liberation, and that is whether or not we should do anything about i t . . . . The short and
simple answer is that once we give up our claim to ‘dominion’ over the other species we
have no right to interfere with them at all. . . . We should not try to play Big Brother
either.” A little later he asserts that “we cannot and should not try to police nature.” See
Singer, Animal Liberation, 238-239. By contrast, Steve Sapontzis argues the opposite, in
an apparently Utilitarian argument. “Where we can prevent predation without
occasioning as much or more suffering than we would prevent, we are obligated to do so
by the principle that we are obligated to alleviate avoidable animal suffering.” Steve
Sapontzis, “Predation,” Ethics and Animals 5 (1984): 36.
2The attempt to make a moral difference between predatory animals and humans
is based on the argument that humans have powers of judgment and reason that animals
do not have. Sapontzis tries to refute this type of argument by using the illustration of an
human toddler tormenting a cat, and then concluding: “Tormenting cats remains wrong,
whether it is done by someone who ‘ought to know better’ or by someone who ‘can’t tell
right from wrong” (27-28). But Sapontzis seems to deliberately ignore the fact that the
moral judgement in this case is neither made by the cat, nor by the toddler, but by a
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of sentiency, returns as the defining criteria that gives humans moral obligations not
binding on the animals. But why should our superior intelligence diminish the right for a
human to be a predator while not impacting the lion? No one seems to address these
problems.
The presence of predators has proved to be a major challenge for morality based on
the capacity to suffer or experience pain. It has proven itself to be situationally relative
and is thus unstable. The sentiency criterion has been shown to be subservient to survival,
and is thus a form of moral relativism. No substantial explanation has been found to
explain why pain caused by predatory animals is morally acceptable while pain caused
by human predators is not ethically justifiable.

Potentially Grounded in Emotivism
Not only are the advocates of sentiency accused of providing no solid grounds for
using pain as the master criterion for extending rights, but it is asserted that there is an
emotivist basis involved in selecting the hedonist concept of good and evil. Griffiths
argues that the use of pain and pleasure to determine moral status is very appealing to the
modem man because most modems use this standard for their own behaviors,1while

human sufficiently developed to have judgmental powers sufficient to morally evaluate
the situation. So, the immorality of the situation cannot be known except by superior
human powers. While cat and toddler can express their preference against suffering, they
can make no moral judgment on it. The morality is dependent on someone outside the
dynamics between them.
•Griffiths, 15.
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Ryder explicitly links this moral mind-set to the work of Freud and Skinner.1 It seems
reasonable to suspect that painism is rooted in the modem psyche with its focus on self
esteem and avoiding suffering. Thus, the animal rights position seems partly, if not
mainly, rooted in emotional preference.
A significant problem, then, as C. S. Lewis observes in regard to vivisection, is that
opposing views can both end up grounding their appeals primarily in emotive arguments.
“And neither appeal proves anything. If the thing is right—and if right at all, it is a
duty—then pity for the animal is one of the temptations we must resist in order to
perform that duty. If the thing is wrong, then pity for human suffering is precisely the
temptation which will most probably lure us into doing the wrong thing. But the real
question—whether it is right or wrong—remains meanwhile just where it was.”2 This
being the case, it makes sense that another means of elevating animals to moral status has
been proposed in the form of the marginal-cases argument.

Analysis of the Marginal-Cases Argument
Introduction
The marginal-cases argument is another weapon in the arsenal of the animal rights
advocates to try to elevate animals to inclusion in the moral community with humans. By
way of review, we saw that there were two versions: The categorical version and the
bioconditional version. The categorical form, simply stated, claims that marginal
'Ryder, Painism, 198.
2Lewis, God in the Dock, 224.
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humans, such as the mentally handicapped, often have less capabilities than many
animals, especially higher mammals. Thus, it is argued that since marginal humans are
included in the protected moral community, then there is no good reason to exclude the
higher mammals. This view essentially assumes that marginal humans have rights and
thus argues that animals of similar characteristics to marginal humans deserve the same
rights.
We also saw Pluhar assert the existence of a “bioconditional” version of the
marginal-cases argument. This version assumed no rights and merely asserts that
marginal humans and animals of similar functionality deserve the same consideration.
However, both marginal humans and animals can be excluded from the moral community
as easily as being included. Thus, this view, does not guarantee the elevation of animals
to protected moral status.

Evaluation of the Argument from Marginal Cases
Unintended implications
The potential for the marginal-cases argument to undermine basic human rights is
illustrated by Kevin Dolan. He questions why we ascribe human dignity to “mentally
defective” infants, and psychopaths like Hitler, a dignity which an elephant or pig can
never achieve.1 Dolan’s question clearly opens the
'Dolan, Ethics, 121. On p. 119, Dolan also applies this type of argument to
the fetus, concluding that to give infant rights based on potential humanness which is not
yet developed, would mean that we should also extend those rights to the unborn. He
rejects this argument, declaring it invalid, saying it is akin to arguing that contraception
and abstinence are wrong since the egg and sperm have the same potential being denied.
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door for undermining the concept of a unique and intrinsic dignity being ascribed to
humans.
C. S. Lewis details the essence of this demotion of human rights when he asserts
that Darwinian scientists must be naturalistic in their outlook, which, in turn, says Lewis,
brings us up against a very alarming fact. The very same people who most
contemptuously brush aside any consideration of animal suffering if it stands in the
way of “research” will also, on another context, most vehemently deny that there is
any radical difference between man and the other animals. On the naturalistic
view, the beasts are at bottom just the same sort of thing as ourselves. Man is
simply the cleverest of the anthropoids.. . .
. . . Once the old Christian idea of a total difference in kind between man and
beast has been abandoned, then no argument for experiments on animals can be
found which is not also an argument for experiments on inferior men.1
Singer makes this exact point, arguing that if non-speciesist criterion justifies the
suffering of some less sentient for the greater good of the more developed, then we
cannot exclude human infants— he specifically stipulates orphaned infants—or retarded
humans from consideration.2
Frey likewise concurs that unless we include babies and the mentally handicapped
within the class of right holders on the grounds that they potentially possess certain
However, his analogy falls short. The sperm and egg do not have that potential until they
unite and the ensuing embryo is implanted in the uterine wall. Until both conception and
implantation occur, the potential development is limited to a cell mass with no developed
biological systems. Thus he falls short in his criticism.
’Lew is, G o d in the D o c k , 226-227.

2Singer, Animal Liberation, 16-17. See also, Dolan, 119, where he asserts that
Singer’s use of an orphaned infant to make his point is calculated to divest the argument
of extraneous issues such as parental feelings, thus isolating the issue of protecting the
infant solely on grounds of human status. Nevertheless, Singer’s example illustrates the
truth of Lewis’s argument.
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human attributes, there is no reason to grant them rights at all. Significantly, Frey
declares that the arguments for human preference are essentially religious arguments and
that “unless one of these arguments is accepted, we have no basis upon which to
differentiate the cases of babies and the severely mentally-enfeebled from that of
animals.”1 Frey lucidly highlights the distinct possibility when the boundary between
human and animal is blurred, the marginal cases will be further marginalized instead of
further protected. That is, we become more likely to exploit babies and the mentally
handicapped than to protect the sentient animals, because the argument from marginal
cases is grounded in granting rights based on functionality. If the functions on which
rights are granted are too broad, rights lose their significance and no one will take them
seriously.
We saw Rachels go one step further in raising the possibility that there may be
instances where the animal may be entitled to preference over the human.2 Granted,
Rachels seems to try to limit the possibilities to extremely marginal cases, but
nevertheless, we see the potential of a complete reversal of the overall intent of the
argument from marginal cases residing within the argument itself.
What do these practitioners of the marginal-cases argument do with these
criticisms? Virtually nothing. Pluhar suggests that Frey, who defends human preference,
•Frey, 31-32.
2Rachels, CfA, 209.
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is one of the few who actually face up to the possibility of lost rights.1 Pluhar herself
exhibits strong tendencies to dismiss such challenges to the argument from marginal
cases by asserting that the criticism applies only to the bioconditional version.2 But why
should the bioconditional view impact only the human-person criterion of moral
inclusion and not the categorical version as well? Pluhar does not address this issue. The
argument from marginal cases is capable of results opposite to the purpose for which it is
used. Saletan gives us a good illustration of how unintended consequences can cause
severe problems for the argument from marginal cases.

Saletan’s reversal of the marginal-cases argument
Responding to a Peter Singer article on bestiality,3 William Saletan turns the
marginal-cases argument against one of its own champions. Singer appears to argue that
social mores against bestiality are part of a larger program of speciesism (influenced by
Christianity) to differentiate humans from animals. Singer hints that the current world
view of man and animals not being different means we may need to re-think the issue. In
other words, sex between humans and animals may not be evil if it is not cruel to one of
'Pluhar, 121.
2For example, she responds to an attack on the argument from marginal cases by
asserting that the “‘reversibility’ charge [i.e. that marginal cases undermines human
rights instead of increasing animal rights] . . . applies o n ly to the biocon dition al version
of the argument.” Ibid., 72. She never says why it does not apply to the categorical
version.
3Singer, “Heavy Petting.” See also, William Saletan, “Shag the Dog,” Slate, 5
April 2001, http://www.slate.com/id/103801/ (20 May 2002).
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the participants, and is mutually satisfying.1
Saletan responds by raising the issue of consent: Is sex without consent immoral?
What mental capacities are needed to give consent? If Singer believes consent is
necessary, then the marginal-cases argument kills him, for as Saletan points out, “A
philosopher’s duty is to clarify his principles and defend their consistent application.
Those who embrace the principle of consent, and who agree that an animal ‘is no more
capable than a child of giving meaningful consent,’ have done both. They have stated
their principle and applied it to sex with children.”2 Saletan has brilliantly reversed the
direction o f the argument from marginal cases. The crucial implication is that if it is
morally acceptable to have sex with an non-consenting animal, then there must be no
ethical inhibition to having sex with non-consenting humans o f similar capabilities to the
animals. Thus, Saletan has astutely pointed out that if Singer sticks with his argument
from marginal cases in general, and holds to his proposals on bestiality, then defacto he
has to approve o f some types of pedophilia.
This specter diminishes the attractiveness of the argument from marginal cases.
The destructive effects of pedophilia and other sexual abuse of children are widely
recognized. Even apart from speciesism, we have sound reasons to conclude such
practices are morally wrong. Saletan has masterfully exploited this issue, and has
convincingly demonstrated that the marginal-cases argument is not automatically in favor
'Singer, “Heavy Petting.”
2Saletan, “Shag the Dog.”
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of rights for marginal humans, nor does it automatically create equal rights for animals.

Danger o f basing moral duties on extreme cases
It is possible that Singer might respond to this critique by chastising Saletan for
using an overly extreme case for grounding his moral criticism of Singer’s position. But
this is no more extreme than Singer’s own tactics. Neuhaus, reporting on a debate he had
with Singer, depicts Singer’s propensity to begin the argument “with hard cases (the
anencephalic infant being his prime example),” and then develop the general moral rule
(for example, a general moral rule concerning abortion).1 Of more significance to us is
that Rachels is equally prone to the same method. In his fourth edition of his textbook,
he opens the book with three extreme cases to begin establishing the foundations of
moral reasoning.2 Throughout the book several more such cases are used, and major
'John Neuhaus, “A Curious Encounter with a Philosopher from Nowhere,” First
Things: A Journal o f Religion and Public Life 120 (February 2002): 3. For a specific
example see Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem o f
Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 1-3, where Singer and
Kuhse open with a Down’s Syndrome case to begin establishing a case for euthanizing
handicapped infants. Instead of developing the moral norms based on the average
healthy baby, the norm is first set to accommodate the extreme case, then applied to the
normal cases. He uses another Down’s Syndrome example in Unsanctifying, 218, to
debunk the concept o f the sanctity of human life to again argue in favor of euthanasia.
Such tactics appear to be the norm for Singer.
2Rachels, Elements (2002), 1-11. In reference to euthanasia, Rachels’s first chapter
o f the 4th edition o f his textbook uses cases ranging from an anencephalic baby,

co-joined twins who could not be separated without forfeiting the life of one, to a father
who killed his 2 year old daughter with advanced cerebral palsy an act of mercy killing.
Each of these cases is used to stretch traditional ethical views to logical absurdities which
are then said to discredit the traditional views. See also Rachels, Elements (1999), 1-15.
Another example can be found in, CfA, 189, where Rachels contrasts a severely brain
damaged infant, instead o f a normal healthy infant, with an ape to argue for granting
higher rights to the latter.
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moral policies are suggested based on such cases. Therefore, it seems that Saletan’s
turning o f the tables is not inappropriate.
Rachels notes that precedential arguments based on these extreme cases are often
opposed by the “slippery slope” argument. Stated in simple form, the slippery slope
argument would assert that if we accept case A to be legal and moral, it will eventually
lead to radicalized applications, B, C , . . . Z. Rachels rightly notes that “this kind of
argument is easy to abuse.” He then continues, “If you are opposed to something, but you
have no good arguments against it, you can always make up a prediction about what it
might lead to; and no matter how implausible your prediction is, no one can prove you
wrong.”1 There is some truth to this. However, the moral conclusions drawn by Rachels
(and Singer) are extreme enough to authenticate the charges that they are sliding down
the slippery slope. Grounding morality on extreme or marginal cases seems less than
prudent, and seems to make it possible for one to justify the violation of individuals in
less extreme circumstances.

Marginal-cases argument rooted in human preference
A second possible way that Singer might respond to Saletan’s argument is that it
still belies human speciesism. This is indeed possible. But the attractiveness of Pluhar’s
and Singer’s marginal case arguments is no less speciesist. Their efforts to gain support
for animal rights create an emotive tie between the rights of animals and certain classes
of humans. Thus, it seems implied that if we wish to preserve these rights for certain
Rachels, Elements (2002), 11.
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humans (a key assumption of this argument), we must concede that the animals have
rights as well. Such an position, however, appeals to species-based self-interest.
The speciesist taint is not limited to the argument from marginal cases. Singer
seeks to make animal rights more palatable to the unconvinced reader by arguing that
animal rights advocates have a better record of caring for human beings than do
speciesist humans, and that the elimination of human moral preference will create more
compassion for humans. Singer asserts rightly that to care for animals does not mean we
do not and cannot care for humans.1 By appealing to humanocentric interests in
advocating animals’ rights, Singer is making a speciesist appeal, rooted in species selfbenefit.
Ryder argues from the reverse angle. He asserts that if we persist in the total
subordination of nonhumans, we are paving the way for a more callous attitude towards
the weak, the elderly and the handicapped in our own species.2 Here, again, the case is
argued in terms o f human benefit. Thus the very premise being rejected is relied upon to
ground the assertion. The animal rights advocates cannot seem to fully avoid basing
rights on being human, much as they try to avoid doing just that. We must suggest that
this is evidence that humanness has moral meaning, or of a common, inherently speciesist
mind-set. Either way, the animal rights advocates end up with a contradiction that makes
less than full sense. The marginal-cases argument is inadequate because it does not
‘Singer, Animal Liberation, 234-35.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 11.
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clearly define the minimum standard of moral inclusion. At best, it hints at functions like
self-awareness, or at least a minimum level of intelligence, but the standard is not clear.
Trying to ground rights in personal abilities and functions has shown itself to be
problematic. There is one final proposal that attempts to fill this void. Up to this point, I
have focused my evaluation on arguments made by a grouping of scholars allied in the
cause for elevating animal rights. What remains is the task of evaluating the individual
position of Rachels and his ethics of moral individualism.
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CHAPTER SIX

EVALUATION OF RACHELS’S USE OF EVOLUTION
TO INFORM AND SHAPE ETHICS

Moral individualism is Rachels’s attempt to solve some of the challenges
associated with the marginal-cases argument. In moral individualism, Rachels strongly
advocates that all rights are to be determined by the individual’s capacities and abilities.
Species membership has no moral relevance. This radical rejection of species as relevant
to morals, and the ensuing emphasis on the moral significance of the individual, raises
some new challenges.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that reaction to Rachels is virtually non
existent. There appears to be two reasons for this. First, the evolutionary world-view is
so dominant that, even in many Christian circles, it is now beyond question. Thus the
fundamental premises of the arguments rooted in evolutionary development go
unchallenged and the arguments are seen as self-evidently sensible. Second, concerning
Rachels, Peter Singer has published abundantly more than Rachels and thus has been the
central focal point o f Christian reaction. This has left little reaction if any to the work of

Rachels. Therefore, I shall, to a great extent, have to press on alone in my analysis of
these issues.

196
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Implications of Rejecting the Moral Significance
of Species Membership
Charles Pinches argues that the radical anti-speciesists can only deal with the rights
o f individual specimens. This individualistic focus leaves them with little or no ability to
deal with issues pertinent to populations of a species, since species distinctions are
virtually denied.1 Pinches offers the additional criticism that those who oppose
speciesism make a “strong anthropocentric/nonanthropocentric distinction” which he
argues to be a false dichotomy that separates the interests of others entirely from my own,
which is impossible, even with animals.2 In other words, radical moral individualism
leads to an isolationist morality where the interrelationships between individuals can
become morally minimized. This could lead to some interesting results.
Take, for example, Saletan’s reversal of the marginal-cases argument as related to
bestiality, which was examined earlier.3 If Saletan is correct, Rachels’s position would
undermine the concept that bestiality is somehow unnatural, for why should trans-species
sexuality seem odd if species membership is morally irrelevant?
This possibility is further illustrated in a news report about a man in Maine who
came out of the closet as a “zoophile”— one who practices bestiality. The man’s father
responded to this news by attempting to kill him, thus bringing the issue into a court of
'Pinches, 196-197.
2Ibid„ 189.
3Saletan, “Shag the Dog,” 4-5.
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law. The victim petitioned the court to allow his “wife” (i.e., his dog with whom he
commits his acts of bestiality), to be permitted to accompany him into the court room.
The petition was signed “Philip and Lady Buble” with a paw-print near his signature. In
verbal arguments, Mr. Buble told the judge, “I've been informed your personal
permission is needed, given that my wife is not human, being a dog of about 36 pounds
weight and very well behaved.”1
Now if the dog and Mr. Buble are not different in kind, as Rachels claims, but
merely share some characteristics, while not sharing others, why should the concept of a
human being married to a dog (let alone the bestiality involved) strike us as being
bizarre? According to moral individualism, this case should be judged strictly on the
individual characteristics of the dog and Mr. Buble without regard to species
membership. And even if Rachels finds grounds to reject this case as morally valid, it
remains a theoretical possibility that one human and a particular dog could qualify for a
trans-species marriage by having the right cocktail of individual characteristics. For
moral individualism, one cannot automatically say that such an arrangement is bizarre,
for the apparent oddity is rooted in species significance. Rachels might well object that
an overly radical case has been chosen to make this point, yet we have already seen his
penchant for using extreme cases to develop his ethics. Therefore we are not out of
•“Admitted Zoophile Is Beaten by Father with Crowbar Piscataquis County ME
(US),” 7 December 2000, http://www.pet-abuse.eom/cases/854/ME/US/l (7 November
2005). Originally found in May 2002 at a now-defunct site. Emphasis mine. See also,
“Philip Buble,” 31 October 2005, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Buble (7 November
2005).
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bounds to evaluate a real, but unusual case by the methods he advocates. Moral
individualism thus seems capable of supporting ethical conclusions quite contrary to
common sense and moral intuitions. Aside from this, the significance of moral
individualism is found in the underlying criterion for determining, one individual at a
time, who is included in the moral community: being the subject of a life.

Analysis of the Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion
Questionable Use of Regan’s Work
The subjects-of-a-life criterion seems logical and appealing, even self-evidently
true. It would appear that Rachels has offered a unique contribution, as no credit is given
to any other authors during his presentation of the issue. However, eight years earlier,
Tom Regan proposed the “subjects-of-a-life” criterion.1 In fact, Regan’s presentation is
more substantive, yet Rachels neither mentions nor offers any citation to Regan in
connection with the subjects-of-a-life criterion. Rachels lists Regan’s book in the
bibliography of Createdfrom Animals, and discusses the significance of Regan a number
of pages later, so he would appear to be aware of Regan’s work including this proposed
criterion. In addition, Rachels makes periodic use of the argument in The End o f Life,2
sometimes in veiled form, but again never ties it to Regan. Whether purposely or
accidentally, the failure to properly credit Regan as the source of this idea would seem to
'Regan, Case fo r Animal Rights, 243-248.
2See Rachels, The End o f Life, 5,23-28,49-55, 64-66. In all of these Rachels is
arguing favorably towards euthanasia for those who cannot have a biographical life.
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be a grievous omission. Furthermore, such an omission raises questions on the
originality o f other, undocumented arguments given by Rachels. It may be that Rachels’s
unique referencing style— in general, he only give references for direct quotations—may
have contributed to this oversight.1 Be that as it may, Rachels’s argument while very
similar to Regan’s, is communicated in a manner more easy for the common man to
understand. This ability to communicate to the non-scholar is a key strength of Rachels
which is demonstrated throughout much of his work.

Significance of Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion
The significance o f the subject-of-a-life criterion is highlighted by Ryder, when he
notes that Regan was reacting to Utilitarian arguments, mainly by Singer, for the
sentiency-painist criterion o f moral inclusion. Ryder notes that for Regan, Singer’s view
is too limiting, and that “nonhumans as well as humans have a certain ‘inherent value’
which may be independent o f the pleasure and pain which they experience.”2 The key
point is that Regan himself argues that this inherent value is “a categorical value,
admitting of no degrees.. . . One either is a subject of a life . . . or one is not. All those
who are, are so equally.”3 Why it is categorical is not clearly argued by Regan but seems
to be accepted as a given. This definition of an equally inherent value to all subjects-of‘In CfA, Rachels’s referencing style is rather unique. It is very cumbersome to use
and generally only gives references for direct quotations. These are unnumbered, and
listed by the opening line o f the quotation in lists located at the end of the book, and
indexed by each chapter. He has no numbered footnotes or endnotes.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 325.
3Regan, Case fo r Animal Rights, 245. Emphasis in original.
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a-life appears to be the foundational concept for Rachels’s assertion that all subjects-of-alife deserve equal consideration, though not necessarily equal treatment.
Rachels likewise acknowledges the significance of Regan, by describing the
Utilitarian position as protecting animal welfare.
Singer, a utilitarian, would acknowledge that if an experiment [on animals] was
designed so as to minimize suffering, and if it actually did more good than harm, it
could be justified. He only criticized the great mass of research that could not pass
even this minimum test. But Regan would have none of this utilitarian calculating.
Instead, he said, we must acknowledge that, like humans, animals have rights that
should not be violated under any circumstances whatever, not even if we think
there is a great good to be achieved. While Singer was a reformer, Regan was an
abolitionist.1
Thus, Rachels appears to join Regan in the abolitionist position. And the significance is
this: According to online notes posted by Professor Ransom Slack, “Regan’s perspective
is actually very similar to Kant’s.” Both define persons as having inherent moral value
and thus we have a duty to respect their rights. Where they disagree is in how they
define the inherently valuable person. “For Kant, persons are those with rational souls.
For Regan, persons are those who are subjects of a life.”2 Thus Regan differs from
Singer by locating the moral value within the individual instead of in the ability to suffer.
Rachels, CfA, 217-218. Emphasis in original. This argument clearly evidences
connection to the subjects-of-a-life criterion but Rachels never makes the direct
connection.
2Ransom Slack, “Lecture N otes 11,” Undated,
http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/philosophy/15.275_notes_l 1.pdf (17 May 2002).
These appear to be the professor’s notes for a class. See, Ransom Slack, “15.275 L02
Ethics and the Environment,” University o f Manitoba, Winter 2001,
http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/philosophy/15.275%20L02%20MainPage.htm
(17 May 2002). The wording between the two direct quotes is heavily dependent on
Slack’s outline but some editing was needed to smooth out the grammar.
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Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion Based in Functions
At first glance, this seems to exclude the subjects-of-a-life criterion from being a
functional definition of rights because of the appeal to inherent value. But further
information proves otherwise. The individual who is the subject of a life is so because of
a multiplicity of functions. According to Regan, the subjects of a life “have beliefs and
desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfareinterests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a
psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their
experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for
others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests.”1
This is a staggering list of functions and capacities that are deemed necessary to be the
subject of a life. Rachels merely condenses Regan’s explanation into the concept of
having a biographical life as opposed to merely a biological life. Even in simplified
form, this list is, to a great degree, merely asserting a form of self-awareness as the grand
criterion of moral protection. But this means, as Rachels notes, that “having a
biographical life requires some fairly sophisticated mental capacities.”2
This leads to an apparent difference between Rachels and Regan in that Rachels
argues that the richness of one biographical life over another seems to give it more value
'Regan, Case fo r Animal Rights, 243.
2Rachels, CfA, 208.
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than the less rich individual. “Thus, killing an animal that has a rich biographical life
might be more objectionable than killing one with a simpler life.”1 He then notes the
following implication: “The lives of humans and non-humans need not be accorded
exactly the same value.” This, however, would seem to open the way for a new form of
human speciesism, to which Rachels is clearly opposed. It could now be argued that the
richness o f a human’s life is greater than that of a dog or ape, therefore the human gets
automatic preference. Furthermore, Rachels seems to have thus reintroduced the
Utilitarian concept o f the individual being mere receptacles of experiences, which Regan
vehemently opposed.2 But there is a second question embedded in this differentiation of
value based on the richness of the biographical life. How much biographical richness
can the individual lose before disqualification for the moral status of being the subject of
a life? In addressing this last issue, Rachels makes applications not found in Regan.

Subjects of a Life and Marginal Cases
Rachels uses the subjects-of-a-life criterion to argue that loss of biographical life
may be grounds for justifying suicide and euthanasia, citing actual cases to bolster his
point for each.3 But this raises a problem. Why should an otherwise rational person be
'Ibid., 209. On this and the preceding page, Rachels contrasts bugs and shrimp,
who apparently have no biographical lives, with the rhesus monkey and humans, who are
asserted to have biographical lives.
2See, Regan, Case fo r Animal Rights, 243, where he argues, “Those who satisfy the
subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value— inherent
value—and are not to be viewed as mere receptacles.”
3Rachels, CfA, 200-205.
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able to commit suicide or request euthanasia? Has not Regan argued that if the
individual is rational, enough to no longer desire life, has the capacity of carry out
initiative, etc., as being inherently valuable and not to be violated under any
circumstances? Why should the subject of a life be permitted to violate his own inherent
value through being a subject o f a life? It seems that the biographical life criterion has
now become a matter of subjective preference.
For example, Rachels uses “the famous ‘Texas bum case”’ to argue for the
preferential interpretation of biographical life. This case involved one Donald C. who
was horribly burned in an a gas-line explosion. He was left blind, crippled, without
fingers, and other injuries. Donald had been a rodeo performer, pilot, and “ladies man”
among other things. Donald was treated against his will for two years, before changing
his mind. Rachels claims that nine years later, Donald still maintained the doctors should
have let him die and this was rational on Donald’s part, because “what his injury had
done, from his point of view, was to destroy his ability to lead the life that made him the
distinctive individual he was.”1 It would appear, then, that for Rachels, biographical life
is something chosen, a collection of choices and experiences, which makes one the
individual he or she is, and not merely the possession of certain capacities as Regan
argued. Thus, Donald lost his biographical life of choice but not his biological life.
Because Donald’s biographical life was no longer of no value to him, his biological life,
upon which his biographical life depends, would have no further worth.
•Rachels, End o f Life, 54-55.
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Criticisms of the Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion
J. P. Moreland criticizes Rachels’s assertions based on the Donald C. case as being
totally subjective. He proposes a hypothetical counterexample in which a woman
chooses the biographical life of prostitution.
Her life plan is to become the best prostitute she can be. She enjoys bestiality,
group sex, and certain forms of masochism. Her life has value from her point of
view if and only if she can achieve these goals. Now suppose that she is in an
accident that confines her to a wheelchair such that she is in no pain, she can lead a
relatively productive life in various ways, but she can no longer pursue her desire
to be the best prostitute ever. Does it make any sense to say that she would be
rational to desire to die? Does it make sense to say that her biographical life is
what gave her life value? . . . Without objective material grounds that constitute a
morally appropriate life plan, subjectivism would seem to follow.1
Indeed, Rachels’s concept of biograhical life seems to have departed from Regan’s
inherent value model to extreme subjectivity. If one’s biographical life is the primary
ground o f personal identity, as was argued with Donald C., it makes other characteristics
morally insignificant, and seems to raise the possibility of one individual maintaining
multiple biographical lives. Moreland charges Rachels with teaching such. “It is even
possible for a bigamist, says Rachels, to lead two biographical lives.”2 Thus, Rachels has
moved from the inherent-value model to a personal preferential model not far from
personal egoism.
'J. P. Moreland, “James Rachels and the Active Euthanasia Debate,” Journal o f the
Evangelical Theological Society 31 (1988): 88.
2Ibid., 86. Moreland does not reference this source. Whether or not Rachels
actually makes this assertion, it is a logical possibility to occur under Rachels's proposed
criterion.
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A second area o f concern is the loss of rights due to accident or injury. Suppose an
individual becomes comatose. Is that individual no longer the subject of a life? He or
she would currently have no self-awareness or preferences. Who determines that an
individual is no longer the subject of a life? It cannot be made by the individual in
question for if they can make such a judgment, they defacto have the capacity to qualify
as a subject of a life. An external party must decide in behalf of that individual. But if
rights are based on one’s actual condition and not on future possibilities, why should the
comatose person be considered the subject o f a life, even if the prognosis is good that
they will recover in the near to moderate future? If outside relationships are excluded
from reckoning, there is no reason to save the comatose person. Thus those who are
marginal cases could end up in a rather precarious position concerning further biological
life.
J. P. Moreland illustrates this with his argument related to the rule against killing
innocent persons.
According to Rachels, people without biographical lives are no longer morally
significant regarding the rule not to kill
But if the person has lost the right not
be killed—for example, because he was in a persistently vegetative state—it would
seem that he has lost other rights as well. It would seem that one could experiment
on the person or kill him brutally if he so desired. Why? Because we are no longer
dealing with an object that has relevant rights. In these cases there would seem to
be no moral difference between a lethal injection or a more brutal means of killing.
The patient has no life and is not an object of moral consideration and thus
approaches a thing-like status.1

'Ibid., 88.
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This is a devastating critique for it broadens the implications of a loss of rights due to
loss of functions qualifying one to be a subject of a life. Furthermore, it would seem that
many marginal cases and many animals could no longer qualify for being the subject of a
life.
In addition to these challenges, Rachels’s disparaging attitude towards biological
life seems unwarranted. As J. P. Moreland notes of Rachels, “His understanding of
biographical life, far from rendering biological life morally insignificant, presupposes the
importance of biological human life.”1 Thus, Moreland rightly argues the wholistic
indivisibility of biological and biographical life. The subjects-of-a-life criterion thus
seems less than appealing due to its highly relativistic definition based in functional
capacities. It seems probable, then, that to define moral inclusion on the basis of
functional capacities threatens the equivalent of a moral, graveyard spiral, in which as the
individual diminishes in capabilities, rights diminish also. Then, as the diminishments of
rights further hinder one’s abilities and capacities, this further diminishment causes
additional loss of rights.
The inconsistencies of the sentiency (painist) and marginal-cases criteria point to a
larger overall problem. These approaches, as well as Rachels’s “subjects-of-a-life”
criterion, share the common characteristic o f grounding rights in functional capabilities.
Thus, they have argued that there is no uniquely human function that excludes the
•ibid., 86.
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animals while including all humans, including marginally functional humans. Such
difficulties beg the question of how rights are to be grounded.

Some Challenges of Grounding Rights
Difficulty Establishing Moral Claims
A notable challenge for the grounding of rights is that not everyone accepts them
as an objective reality. For example, Ryder argues, “I have come around to the view that
rights are just human inventions.”1 He continues by arguing that “morality serves a
useful psychological function for the individual by making it easier to decide how to
behave.”2 But this raises some key problems. If morality is merely a human invention,
generated, as argued by Ruse and others, by evolution, why should it be universally
binding? At most it should have relevance to the individual making the decisions.
Furthermore, it seems that our moral sense may well complicate decisions, not simplify
them. How often do animals get stuck in deliberating options? It would seem far less
likely than for the average human. And if we invented rights, why should animals have
them? Rights would precisely have entailed protection o f exclusively human interests
since the animals do not have such a concept o f entitlement. So Ryder’s position makes
the concept of rights completely subjective and human centered.
Ryder also distinguishes between rights and duties. “Rights are said to reside in the
victim, whereas duties are in the perpetrator. Moral instruction used to place emphasis
‘Ryder, Painism, 197.
2Ibid.
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upon the doer[;] now it emphasizes the done-to.”1 Thus, for Ryder, those who possess
power have the capability to act and control others, and thus tend to favor focusing on
duties—how they should act. By contrast, those who feel powerless tend to focus on
rights because they do not have the ability to fully act independently and thus worry
about being victimized by the powerful. Thus Victorian morality was seen by Ryder as a
means of protecting the rights of particular classes while “today morality is a concern for
all classes.”2 And this is how Ryder tries to bring the animals into the picture: as one of
the previously excluded classes. But why should a human invention be applied to
animals other than an anthropomorphizing of animals as victims of the powerful? Ryder
does not supply an answer.
Others propose various critera for rights but all tend to focus on some kind of
function. Roslind Godlovitch argues that the fundamental grounding principle of rights
is the right to be free from constraint. “Ultimately, all moral rights rest on a presupposed
right which is not itself grounded on a further principle.” This presupposed principle is
“the equal right to be free from constraint.”3 For Godlovitch, this means that “in granting
that someone has a moral right, one recognizes his liberty to pursue those interests that
are compatible with the like interests of others.” Thus, she believes that “the only
‘Ryder, Animal Revolution, 328.
2Ibid. Emphasis in original.
3Godlovitch, 158.
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condition to be met in order to have a moral right is that one has interests, and this
condition is met by all sentient beings.”1
Two things o f significance stand out in Godlovitch’s argument. First, she admits
that rights are ultimately based on a principle or principles that is presupposed and not
grounded on some other value or premise. This is fundamentally true but many,
including Rachels, seem to feel that presuppositions can be avoided and that all the
foundational principles o f morality and rights can be grounded in reason. But this itself
is an unprovable presupposition, therefore Godlovitch is fundamentally correct.
Second, in grounding rights in interests she presumes a minimum level of function
as the criterion for granting rights.2 But how are interests determined? Sentiency,
usually in the form o f painism, is usually proposed, but this presupposes a minimum level
o f intelligence to be able to give an indication of preference (i.e., such as cries of distress,
fleeing, flinching, etc.). This functionality view, in turn, brings us back to the problems
o f the marginal-cases argument that we have just examined.
The problem of determining the criteria of moral inclusion is highlighted by
Dolan’s claim that “a right is the power to claim what is due.”3 But one must have a
fairly high level of intelligence to make such a claim, and a tribunal in which to voice the

‘Ibid.
2Frey also notes that some appeal to having interests as the ground o f rights.
Addionally, Angus Taylor makes the same argument that those who have interests have
rights. See, Frey, 6; Angus Taylor, Magpies, Monkeys, and Morals: What Philosophers
Say about Animal Liberation (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 1999), 43.
3Dolan, 135.
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claim. This is why Frey argues the inability to maintain moral rights apart from the
concept o f legal rights.1 So the functional model, which is a type of consequentialism,
leaves us in a state of deep confusion in clearly establishing rights.

Rawls’s Analysis of Grounding Rights
Rawls rejects using the consequences of present circumstances as a viable means of
establishing the foundations o f rights, arguing, in part, that the this approach, which he
calls “procedural interpretation,” can justify significant inequalities and thus provides no
real protection for the individual.2 In response to this problem, he proposes that “the
principle o f equal liberty must be secured in advance of a given situation rather than
depending on calculations o f maximal good.”3 To do this, Rawls proposes his doctrine of
the original or initial position—a hypothetical viewpoint in which moral rights and
protections are to be determined from the perspective of being in an original position of
ignorance o f what one’s actual future status and condition will be. Thus, there can be no
self-serving decisions because one might end up in the morally excluded group.4
However, the individual in the original position must be a moral person, which for
Rawls, means that they are capable of having a conception of what is good for themself,
and are capable of having a sense of justice. By moving the functional model to the
‘Frey, 8-9.
2John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999), 444.
3Ibid., 27, 139.
4Ibid., 15-19.
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original position, Rawls believes he protects individuals qualifying as a marginal case,
who through various misfortunes or circumstances end up functionally challenged in real
life.1 Thus, Rawls seems to impute the average human qualities and intelligence to the
original position, which would seem then to exclude animals.2 So, while Rawls has
provided a provocative alternative, it is still functionally based and offers no reason to
stick with the original-position basis of morality other than sheer self-interest. Thus,
Regan classifies Rawls’s ethical theory as a form of “rational egoism.”3 Rawls’s solution
is intriguing, but at bottom, without any real consequences for violating or rejecting the
original-position criterion, there is little reason other than perceived self-interest for
adopting it.
Rawls’s concept o f the original position reveals another problem by grounding the
original-position criterion o f moral inclusion in a minimum level of functionality. The
original- position considers only that the individual cannot consider a particular view of
his or her personal future in determining moral protections. This raises the question
about duties to future generations. Rawls has no way to commend moral duty to future
generations due to his egoistic perspective, because the original-position criterion seems
incapable o f including the perspective of another person in its calculation.
'Ibid., 442-443.
2Regan responds vigorously against this characteristic of Rawls’s moral theory,
noting that the one in the original position must therefore be human, thus excluding
animals from moral consideration. Regan, Animal Rights, 166, 167.
3Ibid., 163. Rational Egoism is clearly viewed by Regan as a form of
Contractualism. See, 156-158.
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A similar dilemma is found in Singer’s work. Singer rejects the fetus as having
actual characteristics entailing rights, and denies that potential characteristics have any
moral bearing. In which case, the fetus is entitled to no rights, including to life.1 It
would seem that Singer’s position would deny moral duties to future generations because
they have no actual functions and capacities on which to base rights. The only
consideration that could be given is to the present generation. So functional criteria do
not give us a clear moral picture, nor do they provide a compelling case for protecting
animals or marginal human cases. This may be why Griffiths chastises those who try to
ground animal rights in evolution, for he sees evolution as under effective attack and
criticism. Thus, “to base an ethics o f animal welfare on what is still widely regarded as
only a hypothesis is to skate on thin ice. It is bad ethics to make one’s morals depend so
heavily on the vagaries o f the results of scientific research.”2

Must Animals Have Rights to Be Given Moral Protection?
The arguments we have examined seem to assume that if animals are not granted
equal rights with humans, then animals are automatically open to exploitation and abuse.
Frey flatly denies this, asserting that denial of moral rights to animals does not leave
them defenseless. He states that even if no moral rights are posited, actions can still be
morally wrong. The issue is sufficient justification, not rights.3 Thus, we see that having
lin g er, Rethinking, 210.
2Griffiths, 17.
3Frey, Interests and Rights, 170.
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rights is no guarantee that sufficient reason to suspend those rights will not be found, and
even when rights are possessed, there is no guarantee they will be respected. This last
point is significant precisely because these animal rights proponents uncritically assume
that right will be respected and that a denial of rights for animals entails their exploitation
and abuse, yet this latter entailment is not necessarily true.
Carruthers likewise argues that regarding the question whether animals have moral
standing, “A negative reply need not entail that there are no moral constraints on our
treatment of animals.”1 Thus, “even if we were to agree that animals lack moral standing,
it would not follow that we can, with impunity, treat animals as we please.”2 Carruthers
notes that “things that lack moral standing may nonetheless have indirect moral
significance, giving rise to moral duties in a round-about way.”3 Furthermore, “it needs
to be emphasized that our question about the moral standing o f animals is not the same as
the question whether animals matter.”4
On what grounds then do they matter? Carruthers argues that castles have no moral
significance for rights, but can have moral significance because many people care about
them. Thus, because people care about castles, we have a duty to preserve and protect
‘Carruthers, 3.
2Ibid., 2.
3Ibid„ 1.
4Ibid.
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them. Likewise, observes Carruthers, we can have indirect duties to animals because of
the people who love them.1

The Indirect Duty Criterion
Regan describes the argument represented by Carruthers as the “indirect duty
view” of rights.2 This is because there must a third party who has an interest in the
subject whose rights are in question. In reference to animals, David DeGrazia describes
this position as asserting that “we have indirect duties to animals based on direct duties to
humans.”3 This view, however, is not without its critics.
Regan argues that if the third party to whom the duty is owed is somehow removed
from the situation (e.g., by death or by change of mind), then the individuals to whom the
indirect duty is due lose their rights.4 DeGrazia attacks the indirect duty criterion from
‘Ibid, 2. See also p. 194, where he gives two contractualist reasons for treating
animals well: (1) Out of respect for animal lovers; (2) on the basis of the good or bad
character qualities o f character that animals may evoke in us. Both are clearly rooted in
human interests and both are based on the ability to have a contractual relationship.
2Regan, Animal Rights, 150.
3David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41. An example of a lack of moral
spillover, given by DeGrazia, is that if there were not other humans in the world to have
an interest in the animals, then acts of cruelty to animals would become morally neutral.
It is important to note also that DeGrazia tends to confuse indirect duty with the
argument that cruelty to animals harms the character of the abusing human. These are
actually separate arguments.
4Regan, Animal Rights, 160. An unwitting illustration of this is found in Singer’s
Utilitarian argument concerning the rights of the fetus or newborn baby. Singer argues
both have no inherent rights as they have no capacities worth basing rights on, but adds
that due to the “others affected” by an abortion or infanticide, that the right to life may be
granted. But he also clearly implies that the unwanted newborn or fetus can be
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the opposite side. Suppose one can act cruelly to animals with no undesirable moral
spillover to others—for example, you are the only human in the world so no one can
claim offense—then acts of cruelty to animals must be morally neutral, and DeGrazia
finds this unacceptable.1 Thus he is forced to argue, “it is prima facie wrong to cause
suffering (regardless o f who the sufferer is).”1 But with all the suffering caused by
predation, we have seen this to be a problematic assumption.
By contrast, Carruthers assigns rights to the context of relationships and
responsibilities. Rights imply responsibility to properly manage those rights in a way
that will not interfere with others’ rights. Animals such as an elephant, dog, or dolphin
cannot assume such responsibilities, for, as Regan notes, they cannot be held morally
accountable for their actions.3 But this raises two questions. First, what responsibilities
can a newborn human baby or comatose adult hold? Carruthers seems to have a good
point but the marginal-cases argument could now be used to exclude some humans from
possessing rights. Second, why should one treat animals nicely because unknown
strangers love those animals? Such reasoning may well provide protection to domestic
animals since their welfare is clearly tied to human interests, but it seems to leave little
protection for wild creatures. Just because someone loves mice, should people be
morally bound from setting traps in their homes to protect their property? Carruthers
terminated. See Singer, Rethinking, 210-212.
'DeGrazia, 41-43.
2Ibid, 43. Emphasis in original.
3Regan, Animal Rights, 152.
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hints at the right idea, but has too narrow a vision. He has come very close to a
significant theological concept which, if taken seriously, would give us basic moral
duties to animals, but without investing them with human-style rights.1

Theological Form of Indirect Duty Criterion
Our duty to animals can be grounded in the biblical belief that “the earth is the
Lord’s and the fullness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein” (Ps 24:1 KJV).
Since God owns the animals and cares for lilies and sparrows (Matt 6:28, 10:29-31), we
are to treat them with care because He cares. It is true that if the indirect duties are to
man alone, this model will fail in protecting the marginal cases or the animal kingdom.
But, for the believer in God, it is a different story. Thus, Dolan notes the propensity of
'Lest we think Carruthers is a Bible-bashing fundamentalist, let the reader be
reminded that Carruthers is seeking a purely secular rationale to ground his ethical
arguments. In fact, on pp. 13-14, in reference to the animal rights issue, he finds theistic
ethics deficient for two reasons: First, Christian values carry little conviction in an
increasingly secular era. They are not salable. Second, he uses Plato’s argument from
Euthyphro (which we saw in the previous chapter) as to whether God chooses the good
because it’s good or whether it’s good because God chooses it. Either way, it is argued,
you end up with a concept of good which is independent from God. Therefore we would
not need God in order to know what is good. Thus, he concludes, when we read the
Bible, our interpretations should be constrained and controlled by our scientific
knowledge, and we should reinterpret those passages which are contradictory to modem
scientific knowledge. Carruthers states that if, in our secular view, we can find no moral
objection to homosexuality, then we must dismiss St. Paul’s condemnation of it as Paul
speaking as a man o f his time, rather than accept it as the word of God.
I cannot digress into lengthy discussion o f these interesting tangents at this

juncture. Rather, the point is that Carruthers’s objections to animal rights are not rooted
in religious argumentation. Thus he comes close to supporting the stewardship motif but
falls short because o f his lack of theistic reference.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

218
those advocating religiously based ethics, particularly Christians, “to deny rights to
animals yet talk of humans having duties toward animals.”1
Recognizing Godlovitch’s claim that the grounding point of ethics is an unprovable
presupposition, the Christian looks to God for moral guidance. In addition to the
statement that “the earth is the Lord’s,”2 further texts reinforce the idea that God also
owns the wild beasts and the “cattle on a thousand hills.”3 The biblical God knows and
sees all,4 and is maker and source of wisdom.5 But these attributes alone are not enough.
As we have seen Frey argue, moral rights need to be connected to legal rights.6
Thus, God’s awareness o f all behavior must be complemented with a judicial dimension,
and hence the necessity o f the doctrine of divine judgment of the world. As Qoheleth
tells us, “Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his
commandments: for this [is] the whole [duty] of man. For God shall bring every work

!Dolan, 136. Regan hardly mentions the use of God in indirect duty models,
reserving the issue to two brief acknowledgments of such a belief, but he never interacts
with it in any substantive way. This may be due to earlier arguments in chapter 1, where
he eliminates religious theories as viable sources of ethics, thus siding with Rachels in
disconnecting God from morality. See Regan, The Case fo r Animal Rights, 150, 193. By
contrast, we have seen Rachels acknowledge the significance of religious ethics and offer
a thoughtful response, and thus commend him for it.
2Exod 9:29; Deut 10:14; Ps 24:1.
3Ps 50:10.
4Isa 46:10; 1 Cor 3:19-20.
5Prov 2:6; 8:22.
6Frey, 8-9.
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into judgment, with every secret thing, whether [it be] good, or whether [it be] evil.”1
Stories like God’s reaction to Balaam beating his donkey, and His threat in Revelation to
“destroy them which destroy the earth,”2 seem to indicate that there will be judicial
reckoning for how men treat God’s earth and animals. And the God who never sleeps or
slumbers, and knows when the sparrow falls, even numbering the hairs of our heads, also
promises that he does not forget things.3 Thus the only weak point in the indirect-dutyto-God view is the human agent. But even then, the forgetful human will be held
accountable. The indirect duty view, as duties to an almighty, governing God, means
theat even if we deny that animals have unique rights and privileges in and of themselves,
there are still universal, morally binding duties towards them. Thus, it is not duties in
reference to man, but in reference to God that will provide the moral foundation for
maintaining moral obligations to the animal kingdom, while still ascribing a higher level
of moral status to humans.
After examining a number o f anti-speciesist attempts to find a functional model for
grounding individual rights that will include some animals with humans in the sphere of
moral protection, I have found that the proposed criteria for moral status seem to create
as many or more problems than they solve. Perhaps this is, in part, because these
arguments are not part of an orderly, unified system of thought. Rachels’s moral
‘Eccl 12:13-14 KJV.
2Num 22:21-34; Rev 11:18. Balaam’s confession of sin is in the context of the
angel’s confrontation over how he had treated his donkey.
3Ps 121:4; Isa 49:15; Matt 10:29-30; Luke 12:6-7.
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individualism was a start towards making an orderly system, but he does little else with
it. Thus in later works he expanded and developed his ideas. What shall we make of his
expanded version of ethics in reference to evolution and its impact on morality?

Analysis of Rachels’s Expanded Ethical Theory
Introduction
Rachels’s use of evolution in The Elements o f Moral Philosophy at first seems trite.
Maybe this is because he treats evolution as an accepted fact instead of as the scientific
theory it is. Furthermore, Rachels does not explain why relative newness on the
evolutionary timetable means humans should not prefer their own species over others. He
just tosses the idea out that being relative newcomers should make us humble. But why
should it? By evolutionary models, the humano-centric mentality must have been a trait
that helped man avoid extinction and become the superior species he now is. So why is
human preference wrong?
Rachels’s only answer is that it seems to open the door for mistreatment of animals.
But in his textbooks, he never really addresses why the animals should be considered for
moral protection, except for a brief reference to their ability to suffer. Rachels could
have strengthened his case against human hubris had he chosen to use an evolutionary
kinship argument similar to Dawkins. Rachels himself admits the theoretical portions are
incomplete but rightly justifies this due to the target audience o f his book—people who
have never studied ethics.1
'Rachels, Elements (2002), ix.
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Consequentialist Tendencies
On the other side of the coin, Rachels’s other deductions from Darwinism make
rational sense. For example, it seems nearly self-evident that consequentialism is a
logical extension of evolutionary principles. This, in turn, leads to a teleological form of
ethics in which the moral good is maximizing good consequences. As Peter Singer notes,
“Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals. They assess the actions by
the extent to which they further these goals.”1Rawls points out the attractiveness of
consequentialism in stating, “Teleological theories have a deep intuitive appeal since
they seem to embody the idea of rationality. It is natural to think that rationality is
maximizing something and that in morals it must be maximizing the good. Indeed, it is
tempting to suppose that it is self-evident that things should be arranged as to lead to the
most good.”2
Rachels certainly takes advantage of the intuitive appeal of teleological ethics,
especially Utilitarianism, but he appears to avoid some of the limits of consequential
ethics. Singer notes that “the consequences of an action vary according to the
circumstances in which it is performed.”3 Pure consequentialism, then, has at least two
crucial limits. First, no matter what one’s motive is, whatever one intended the
consequences to be, they may turn out different from expected and thus the agent can end
’Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
2Rawls, 22.
3Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
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up acting immorally by accident. Consequentialism thus gives little assurance that good
intentions can produce good results. This inability to give moral confidence highlights a
second major limitation of consequentialism.
The second weakness of consequentialism is that it is only as effective as our
capability to forecast results of our actions. In average, simple circumstances, this may
not be much of a problem. If a man takes the radiator cap off his car radiator
immediately after driving, he is likely to get scalded by boiling coolant. But in more
complicated issues, our ability to forecast results accurately diminishes significantly.
The difficulty of some medical prognoses can be good illustrations of the difficulty of
forecasting consequences. Rachels does nothing to address these limitations except to
acknowledge that virtues such as love and loyalty are important, even though they may
not show immediate consequentialist value. For that we must give him credit. On the
other hand, however, it seems that Rachels himself may have fallen victim to the
apparent self-evidential qualities of teleological ethics.
A final aspect of the problem of forecasting consequences is one I have never seen
addressed by consequentialists. We have seen Rachels demand that we include future
generations in our moral reckoning. But how far into the future should we calculate
potential consequences in order to properly consider everyone’s benefits? Suppose there
is an energy executive deciding on policies and procedures for finding more oil, gas,
coal, etc. How far into the future should she calculate projected consequences? A
month? A year? 5 years? 50 years? 150 years? Assumably one should integrate all future
consequences into the reckoning, yet the further forward in time one makes projections,
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the greater the chance of inaccuracy. This, in turn, increases the chance that an action
that seems moral at first can end up becoming immoral over time. The limited ability of
man to forecast consequences points us to the fact that human reason is limited and
fallible. This raises questions about the limits of human reason.

Is Reason Alone Sufficient?
Rachels essentially tries to use reason as the sole ground of morality. His cohort in
animal liberation philosophy, Peter Singer, likewise puts all his moral eggs in the basket
of reason.1 Singer, however, may have unwittingly crippled the reason-alone case.
While arguing for an ethics based solely on reason, he makes a lengthy argument that
rationality is not limited to ethics because one can be rational while still being unethical.
Reason thus does not have to be ethical.2
This observation deals a fatal blow to the belief that morality can be determined
solely by reason. If, as Singer says, the unethical can be equally in accordance with
reason, then reason alone must be incapable of determining what is moral and immoral.
Some other assisting element is now needed. As Gordon Preece states, “Reason is
'Singer, Practical Ethics, 8-9. See also: Peter Singer, Rethinking, 189, 220, where
Singer is apparently attracted to an ethics based on reason alone because he perceives the
“traditional” or “standard view” of ethics, i.e., the Judeo-Christian moral system, as being
“paradoxical” and “incoherent.” His cohort in advocating infanticide, Helga Kuhse says:
“Peter Singer has been accused of being cold-hearted and excessively rational, and it is
true, as Singer explained to a reporter, that for him it is generally reason first and
emotions second.” See Kuhse, “Introduction: The Practical Ethics of Peter Singer,” 11.
2Singer, Practical Ethics, 320-335.
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important, but not all-important.”1 Tony Coady notes that reason must take the facts of
human nature into account including dispositions and emotions. He asserts that such
moral emotions as sympathy, resentment, indignation, and compassion, are important to
rationality and ethics.2 Thus Preece declares that “humankind does not live by head
alone.”3 To do so would make one, in C. S. Lewis’s words, “Men Without Chests.”
Lewis has created a word picture in which, reason, like a king, is to rule man
through an executive officer. Thus, “the head rules the belly through the chest—the seat
. . . of Magnanimity, o f emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The
Chest—Magnanimity, Sentiment—these are the indispensable liaison officers between
the cerebral man and the visceral man. It may even be said that by this middle element
man is man: for by his intellect his is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.” Lewis
then charges that some modem educators, in the name of being intellectual, are out to
create men without chests—without habituated moral sentiments. He then concludes that
'Gordon Preece, “The Unthinkable and Unlivable Singer,” in Rethinking Peter
Singer: A Christian Critique, ed. Gordon Preece (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 2002), 54.
2Tony Coady, “Morality and Species,” Res Publica 8, no. 2 (1999): 12. Coady is
reacting to Singer’s direct rejection of emotional influences in moral thinking. See
Singer, Practical Ethics, 170-171, where Singer asserts that when contemplating
infanticide, “We should put aside feelings based on the small, helpless
and—sometimes— cute appearance of human infants,” and calls such emotions “strictly
irrelevant” to the moral evaluation o f infanticide. Thus, R achels’s MSU is o f
significance in that Rachels has called for morals to be based on the facts of human
nature as explained by Darwinism, including emotions. Significantly, he also has gone
beyond Darwinism to take the facts of our psychological and emotional nature and
include those factors in MSU, as Coady suggests the ethicist should.
3Preece, “The Unthinkable,” 55.
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“in a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function. We make
men without chests and expect of them honor and virtue.. . . We castrate and bid the
geldings be fruitful.”1 In short, both moral intuition and sentiment are needed to assist
our powers of reason and prevent unethical conclusions. Rachels partially acknowledges
this need in recognizing the moral importance of virtues such as love and loyalty which
normally would not fit into a Utilitarian-style ethics, but he does not go far enough in
allowing moral intuitions to aid reason in shaping moral conduct.2

The Norm of Treating People as They Deserve
A final issue o f Rachels’s ethics is his proposed norm of treating people as they
deserve. Certainly, there is a need for some concept of the basic principle of just deserts.
Justice is crippled if there is no foundational concept that freely chosen behaviors can and
should be duly recompensed. But, Rachels has no corresponding concept of grace to
mingle with the concept of deserts. In this regard, it seems that biblical Christianity has a
great advantage, but as that is more a theological concern, I shall instead inquire into the
tie between deserts and exceptions. Rachels uses the principle of deserts as a means to
'C. S. Lewis. The Abolition o f Man: How Education Develops M a n ’s Sense o f
Morality (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1947), 34-35.
2Singer illustrates the divorce o f moral intuitions from reason when he argues for
the moral acceptability o f infanticide. In P ra c tic a l E thics, 170-171, he states: “W e

should put aside feelings based on the small, helpless and— sometimes— cute appearance
of human infants.. . . IF we can put aside these emotionally moving but strictly irrelevant
aspects of killing o f a baby we can see that the grounds for not killing persons do not
apply to newborn infants.” Rachels appears not to be quite so radical in his devotion to
reason. For more discussion o f the need of moral intuitions, see Preece, “The
Unthinkable,” 26-27, 32, esp. 54-59.
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know when to make an exception to the moral obligation to promote everyone’s interests
alike. But how easily can this exception be made? How moral is a morality that can be
relatively easily bypassed with exceptions?
We have arrived at two major but conflicting views of morality. One dictionary of
philosophical terms defines “morality” as “what in fact people believe to be right or
wrong.”1 Such a definition of morality makes it subject to the whims of people’s beliefs.
Rachels’s concept of the optimal list fits into this definition of morality as being what the
individual believes to be right or wrong for his/herself.
But this definition of morality seems tremendously fickle and shallow. Should not
something moral carry more weight than mere “belief’ even if that belief is well
reasoned? Morality should be more universally binding and prescriptive if it is to have
any meaning. Thus Tom Regan declares that a moral principle, “must prescribe that all
moral agents are required to act in certain ways, thereby providing, so we are to assume,
rational guidance in the conduct of life.”2 The American Heritage Dictionary, however,
provides a different definition of morality: “The quality of being in accord with standards
of right or good conduct.”3 In a similar fashion, The Living Webster Dictionary gives the
'Gregory Pence, A Dictionary o f Common Philosophical Terms (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2000), s.v. “morality.”
2Regan, C ase f o r A nim al R ights, 130. Em phasis m ine.

3The American College Dictionary, 2d College ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1985), s.v. “morality.”
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definition, “the quality of conforming to principles of good conduct.”1 Notice that here
morality involves conformity to moral standards, which seem to be cast as universal.
Regan thus correctly catches the prescriptive and universal elements of morality. It
seems that Rachels’s planning for exceptions weakens these two key elements of
morality, leaving us on the edge of ethical subjectivism—right and wrong are what we
believe or decide is right and wrong. On the other hand, we must not confuse situational
flexibility in applying moral principles. Rachels is to be commended for his situational
sensitivity, but it seems he has sacrificed too much in the process, leaving morality as
less than universally prescriptive.
Another key problem comes in Rachels’s argument that we should treat individuals
as they deserve to be treated based on their prior, freely chosen behavior. If just deserts
are based on what the agent has freely chosen, then the whole subjects-of-a-life argument
from Createdfrom Animals gets called into question. The marginal human, including the
infant, and the shrimp have not freely chosen their condition. Why then should their lack
o f self-awareness become a criteria for moral exclusion in some circumstances? By
arguing for treatment based on recompensing responsibility, Rachels introduces a huge
conflict into his system of ethics, particularly in reference to justifying differential
treatment between the interests of marginal human cases and a higher animal, as neither
party has the ability to make the free choices upon which the principle of just deserts
stands. Rachels neither shows recognition of this problem, nor offers any solution to it.
]The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary o f the English Language (Chicago,
IL: The English Language Institute of America, 1975), s.v. “morality.”
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Analysis of Rachels’s Attacks on the Image-of-God Thesis
Introduction
We come now to Rachels’s unique contribution. Rachels appears to be unique in
his effort to use the theory of evolution to dethrone traditional, Christian ethics, and then
to propose a replacement moral system based on the principles of Darwinism. I shall
divide this analysis into two sections. First I shall examine Rachels’s claims that
Darwinism undermines traditional ethics. In particular, I shall especially focus on his
attempts to discredit the image of God thesis, though I shall also briefly survey his efforts
to undermine the rationality thesis. Second, I shall analyze the nature of the ethics that
Rachels proposes for replacing traditional ethics to see key implications for Christian
morality.
It would be easy to merely say that it is self-evident that if man evolved from apes
instead of being specially created by God for a particular purpose, then man cannot be
made in the image of God so therefore cannot claim special significance over the rest of
creation. Though true, if Rachels is right, such an argument seems shallow and trite.
Rachels provides substantive reasons beyond this basic truism for concluding that
evolution indeed undermines man’s special status as the image of God. We saw that
Rachels uses two closely related issues to assert that Darwinism gives good reasons for
rejecting the image-of-God-thesis: Teleology and the problem o f evil. These two pillars
of Rachels’s argument open some key vistas of moral and theological implications, some
of which we have seen Rachels explicate. At the heart of both arguments is the belief
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that the present natural order is, in some way, incompatible with the existence of God as
traditionally depicted in Christianity.

Analysis of the Attack on Teleology
The traditional view of God has been seen to heavily involve the concept of a
divine design that can be found in nature. By contrast, Rachels has flatly asserted that
Darwinism is devoid o f any such design and thus is incompatible with a traditional view
o f God. In identifying teleology as the philosophical nerve of Darwinism, Rachels thus
intersects a long-standing philosophical debate to which he makes little or no reference.
Wiker frames the design issue in terms of a war between two philosophical world-views:
Aristotelian and Epicurean. Teleology was later argued in German philosophical circles,
with Kant and Hegel favoring cosmic design while Nietzsche rejected it.

Aristotle versus Epicurus
Epicurus
Wiker asserts that “Aristotle’s account of nature is teleological. . . because nature
always acts for an end, the completeness of particular form s.. . . Epicurean materialism
is nonteleological.”1 Aristotle's belief that there was a purpose and design in nature can
be seen, for example, in his work, Parts o f Animals (De partibus animalium). Here,
Aristotle discusses which is first in priority: The Final Cause, that for the sake of which
the thing is formed, and the Efficient Cause, to which the beginning of motion (i.e.,
‘Wiker, 103. See also pp. 20-21, where Wiker identifies this point as “the
argument o f this book.”
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development) is due. Aristotle concludes that it is clearly the Final Cause that is first,
since it is the logos or rational ground that determines course of development of each
entity of nature.1 "Logically prior to the seed stands that of which it is the seed, because
the End is an actual thing and the seed is but a formative process."2
Aristotle explicitly rejects the idea that anything in nature originates or develops
through chance. "So Empedocles was wrong when he said that many of the
characteristics which animals have are due to some accident in the process of their
formation."3 By contrast, he asserts, based on his teleological principle of the Final
Cause, that, "because the essence of man is what it is, therefore a man has such and such
parts, since there cannot be man without them .. . . Because man is such and such,
therefore the process o f his formation must of necessity be such and such and take place
in such a m anner.. . . And thus similarly with all the things that are constructed by
nature."4 Thus, Aristotle clearly believes in an internal principle, which inherently
contains design, which makes the man, dog, oak, etc., what they are. There is a design
'Aristotle, Aristotle in Twenty Three Volumes, vol. 12, Parts o f Animals, trans. A.
L. Peck, Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Gould (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1968), 57, 59.
2Ibid., 75.
3Ibid., 61.
4Ibid., 63 (emphases original in the English translation). Aristotle makes similar
arguments when discussing the formation of the embryo. See, Aristotle, Aristotle in
Twenty Three Volumes, vol. 13, Generation o f Animals, trans. A. L. Peck, Loeb Classical
Library, ed. G. P. Gould (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 145-155.
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for each entity. By contrast, we shall see that Epicurus rejected any concept of design in
the cosmos, and did so, in part, through severing the gods from any work of rulership.

Epicurus
Epicurus was an atomist who believed that all matter is eternal, though the atoms
may recombine. Hence he interpreted reality as being fundamentally materialist, without
design in nature, and that true knowledge of that reality is to be gained through our
senses.1 This view, in turn, affects his view of the nature of man and of the gods.
Concerning man, Epicurus taught that the human soul disintegrates at death, and that in
death there is no sense-perception.2 In a letter to Menoeceus, he wrote, "Get used to
believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience,
and death is the privation of sense-experience."3 Here we see a clear connection of
ethical good being connected to sense-experience and thus consequences. This is the
hedonist principle that what brings pleasure is good, while that which causes displeasure
or pain is evil. As Epicurus asserted, "We say that pleasure is the starting-point and goal
of living blessedly."4 It seems significant that Rachels, as a modem materialist, follows

'Epicurus, "Letter to Herodotus," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and
Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1994), 6-7. This also means that for Epicurus, there can be an
infinite number of cosmoi (8).
2Ibid., 14, 18.
3Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and
Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1994), 29.
4Ibid., 30.
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the Epicurean pattern of uniting his materialism with a consequentialist criterion of good
and evil. It seems probable that there is a natural linkage between them. But why?
For Epicurus, the gods cannot be gods, enjoying a blessed and happy existence,
unless they are free from "disturbance in the mind and leisure from all duties."1 Cicero
describes the Epicurean view as believing that a god is not needed to explain the origins
of this earth and its contents when one understands the vast reaches of space, filled with
an infinite number of atoms that combine and recombine to produce "those forms and
shapes which you think cannot be produced without the use of a veritable blacksmith's
shop!"2 Cicero's Epicurus thus rails against the advocates of divine design, saying,
"And so you have burdened us with the yoke of an eternal master whom we are to fear by
day and by night; for who would not fear an inquisitive and busy god who foresees
everything, thinks about and notices everything, and supposes that everything is his own
business?"3 Design is here linked to accountability. If God is busy, designing and
creating, then everything is His business, and we can be held accountable to Him, thus
the fear by day and night. Thus, in his own words, Epicurus concludes, "It was
impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the universe [i.e., his atomistic,
materialist view] but still suspicious about the subjects of the myths [i.e., about gods and
'Cicero, "On the Nature o f the Gods," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings
and Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1994), 53.
2Ibid„ 54.
3Ibid.
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death] to dissolve his feelings of fear about the most important matters."1 Thus, for
Epicurus, natural science was the means to disassociate the gods from our reality and
give us the "just life" which is "most free from disturbance" by the gods and death.2
The contrasting positions on teleology in the natural world held by Aristotle and
Epicurus have been discussed and advocated periodically through the ensuing centuries,
and we cannot pursue all of those views within the scope of this work. However, I shall
briefly move a few centuries forward to two German Idealists—Kant and Hegel—who
advocated teleology, and then Nietzsche, who rejected it. Because Nietzsche is so
significant in this postmodern era, and the fact that he reacted, in part, to Kant, makes it
seem prudent to briefly explore their views of teleology in nature.

Selected Views from German Philosophers
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant seems to hold a teleological view of history and nature. Kant
argues that "whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view,

'Epicurus, "Ancient Collection of Maxims," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected
Writings and Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 33.
2Ibid. Lucretius adopted this Epicurean view and argued against Aristotelian
teleology. We are not to fall into the error that eyes were made so that we can see, etc.
"Nothing is bom is us sim ply in order that w e may use it, but that w h ich is b om creates

the u se .. . . All the members . . . existed long before their use; they could not have grown
up for the sake of the use." Clearly he rejects any design or designer in nature, and
significantly, sounds exceptionally close to Darwin's view nearly two millennia later.
This would imply no design in reality or morality, and Epicurus has already demonstrated
the logical moral outcomes of such a view. See, Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, trans. W.
H. D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1975), 341, 343.
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concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions,
like every other natural event are determined by universal law s.. . . Each, according to
his own inclination, follows his own purpose, often in opposition to others; yet each
individual and people, as if following some guiding thread, go toward a natural but to
each of them unknown goal; all work toward furthering it, even if they would set little
store by it if they did know it."1 Thus Kant believed that some universal inner principle
drove humans and nature towards an overarching, but generally unspecified, goal.
In this regard, he is reminiscent of Aristotle's concept of an inner logos that moves
the things of nature towards particular goals. Kant gives several theses that further
express his belief in a larger, goal-driven process working in human kind and nature at
large. For example, the first two theses are, "All natural capacities of a creature are
destined to evolve completely to their natural end," and, "In man (as the only rational
creature on earth) those natural capacities which are directed to the use o f his reason are
to be fully developed only in the race, not in the individual."2 Nature is regularly spoken
of as determining and regulating things to particular purposes and ends. This would
make sense in light of Kant's epistemology where nature has endowed all human minds
with certain a priori categories with which they experience life and reality.3 All reality
for Kant seems to be imbued with a type of rational structure. It would make sense that if
‘Immanuel Kant, On History, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Aulen, and Emil
L. Fackenheim, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 11.
2Ibid., 12, 13.
3See, Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (New
York: Willey Book Co., 1900), 2-12.
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nature has design and purpose, then morality would be a part of that reality and originate
out of some larger design. Thus, in arguing how self-restrained compliance with duty is
preferable to compliance through external constraint, Kant argues that this shift from
external to internal motivation comes, in part, by the laying down of "ends," not
prescribed by our preferences, but by the designs found within practical reason itself.
Then he concludes, "The highest, unconditional end of pure practical reason (which is
still a duty) consists in this: that virtue be its own end and, despite the benefits it confers
on human beings, also its own reward."1 Kant thus associated prescriptive morality with
a teleological view o f reality. This would make sense, for if there is a master design for
reality, morals must be included in that design.

Georg Hegel
Georg Hegel adopted and refined this Kantian teleology while rejecting some of
Kant's epistemological theory.2 He especially highlighted the role of teleology in the
movements o f history. Reason is "the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life,
and the infinite form which activates this material content.. . . Its end is the absolute and
ultimate end of everything; and on the other, it is itself the agent which implements and
realizes this end, translating it from potentiality into actuality both in the natural universe
‘Immanuel Kant, The M etaph ysics o f M orals, ed. and trans. M ary Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 158.
2For more discussion of the epistemological differences between Hegel and Kant
see Andrew Schouten, "Naturalism Contra Idealism: Metaphysics, Teleology, Ethics," 20
April 2004, 7, andrew_redux.blogs.com/redux/files/naturalism_contra_idealism_
metaphysics_teleology_ethics.doc (6-12-06).
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and in the spiritual world—that is, in world history."1 Even more explicitly, he asserts
"that world history is governed by an ultimate design, that it is a rational process—whose
rationality is not that o f a particular subject, but a divine and absolute reason—this is a
proposition whose truth we must assume; its proof lies in the study of world history itself,
which is the image and enactment of reason."2 Hegel also uses alternate vocabulary to
label the teleological force that drives history, calling it a world spirit (geist) that arose as
a necessary evolution from the rational processes. "This spirit is the substance of
history," and is asserted to be "absolute."3
This rational, directing process or spirit is also described as being "the divine will
which rules supreme and is strong enough to determine the overall content."4 Hegel goes
so far as to label this guided process of history as both "the realization of Spirit," and the
"true Theodiccea," finally asserting that what "is happening every day, is not only not
'without God,' but is essentially His Work."5 It seems self-evident that Hegel is
essentially promoting a form of pantheism, and we shall shortly examine the work of
evolutionary theologians who take a panentheist approach to reality, but without any real
‘Georg Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 27.
2Ibid., 28.
3Ibid., 29.
4Ibid., 30. This spirit operates through the dialectical process described, for
example, on page 33.
5Georg Hegel, Philosophy o f History, trans. J. Sibree ( New York: Dover
Publications, 1956), 457. These quotations are from the final paragraph of the book.
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design or purpose, unlike Hegel. It seems evident, however, that if reason is a divine
force in history that would also be a factor in ethics and morals as well. Thus Hegel and
Kant support an approach to reality that seems to necessitate a prescriptive, rationally
designed morality. But just as Epicurus saw no design when Aristotle did, in a similar
fashion, Friedrich Nietsche denied cosmic design, contradicting the Kantian and Hegelian
support o f teleology.

Friedrich Nietzsche
Nietzsche appears to have developed his nihilistic philosophy, in part, out of his
perception o f the nature of the natural world, and how language relates to objects in that
world. In Uber Wahrheit und Luge im aussermoralischen Sinne, he uses the example of
the leaf (Blatt). Each individual leaf is unique and different, with no two being identical,
yet we eliminate those real, living differences to create language that contains, not the
idea of an actual leaf, but an abstraction of leaves. Thus language is always metaphoric.
Thus all truths are actually lies since each of these truths is an abstraction. Thus he
asserts that, "Die verschiedenen Sprachen, neben einander gestellt zeigen, dass es bei den
Worten nie auf die Wahrheit, nie auf einen adaquaten Ausdruck ankommt: denn sonst
gabe es nicht so viele Sprachen. Das "Ding an sich" (das wurde eben die reine folgenlose
Wahrheit sein) ist auch dem Sprachbildner ganz unfasslich und ganz und gar nicht
erstrebenswert."1 Since the "thing in itself' is inaccessible to human language, all
'Friedrich Nietzsche, "Uber Wahrheit und Luge im aussermoralischen Sinne," n.d.,
http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tlsg.htm (8 August 2006). The site notes
this is from the Nachlass, Fragment 1873. My translation: "The different languages
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attempts to describe it through language are abstractions and thus untruths.
Nietzsche laments the human tendency to gravitate to these abstractions and thus be self
deceived. "Das Uebersehen des Individuellen und Wirklichen giebt uns den Begriff, wie
es uns auch die Form giebt, wohingegen die Natur keine Formen und Begriffe, also auch
keine Gattungen kennt, sondem nur ein fur uns unzugangliches und undefinirbares X.
Denn auch unser Gegensatz von Individuum und Gattung is anthropomorphisch und
entstammt nicht dem Wesen der Dinge, wenn wir auch nicht zu sagen wagen, dass er ihm
nicht entspricht: das ware namlich eine dogmatische Behauptung und als solche ebenso
unerweishlich wie ihr Gegenteil."1 Thus, Nietzsche seems to deny the correspondence
model of truth, for the thing in itself seems viewed as unknowable. Thus, the only
alternative is Nihilism.
For Nietzsche, the truth ultimately "turns against [Christian] morality," exposing its
"teleology," that is, its orientation to purpose and design.2 In another work, he laments
placed beside each other demonstrate that, with words, one never comes to the truth,
never to an adequate expression. The 'thing in itself (which also will be the pure truth
free of consequence [i.e., outside influence]) is to the language creator [literally: sculptor]
totally incomprehensible and not at all worth the effort." This website also has an
English version: Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," n.d.,
http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tls.htm (8 August 2006).
'Nietzsche, "Uber Wahrheit und Luge." My translation: "The failure to notice the
individual and the actual gives us the idea as well as giving us the form, whereas nature
knows no forms and ideas, also no species, but on ly an X [which is] consequently, for us,

inaccessible and undefinable. Because even our contrast of [the] individual and species
is anthropomorphic and does not originate in the nature of the thing, if we do not venture
to say that it [the contrast] does not correspond to it [nature], that [the anthropomorphic
contrast] would be, namely, indemonstrable as the antithesis to it [nature]."
2Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Anthony Ludonici, The Complete
Works of Nietzsche, vol. 14, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), 9.
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this desire to explain things in terms of purpose and design as "the essence of our species
and herd."1 In fact, he defines morality as "herd-instinct in the individual."2 This
teleology is then called a "lie,"3 and Nietzsche goes on to argue that there is no causality
in which something unconditioned (i.e., such as God) is a causal force and the reason for
the conditioned.4 Thus, for the thinking man, traditional forms of morality lead to
nihilism because their lies are discovered. For Nietzsche, Nihilism means "that the
highest values are losing their value.. . . There is no answer to the question: 'to what
purpose?'. . . Life is absurd."5
In Nietzsche's view, "Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know
that there is no accident; for only against a world of purposes does the word 'accident'
have a meaning. Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life."6 This rejection of
design led Nietzsche to deny any other "worlds" (such as heaven) beyond our own, and
any belief in having life after death, to deny the existence of hell,7 and to assert that the
‘Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 27.
2Ibid., 115.
3Nietzsche, Will to Power, 9.
4Ibid., 19.
5Ibid., 8.
6Nietzsche, Gay Science, 110.
7Ibid., 131, 187; Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book fo r All or
None, trans. Thomas Conner, The Complete Works of Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy, vol. 11
(New York: Macmillan, 1911), 7,15.
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notion that God is now dead.1 The result of our rejecting these lies is that "the authority
of conscience" now takes first place over any of the following authorities: personal
authority, reason, history and its immanent spirit (an apparent reference to Hegel), and
happiness, especially the happiness of the greatest number.2 We now create ourselves
anew through the exercise of our own wills.3
Significant to this study is his assertion that, "It is supposed that one can get along
with a morality bereft of religious background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism
is opened."4 A key result of this Nihilism is that "in his own estimation, man has lost an
infinte amount of dignity."5 Nietzsche here affirms a key claim of Rachels, that loss of
teleology leads to a loss of human dignity. Nietzsche clearly develops the formative
concepts of Epicurus to their logical results.

Two opposing world-views
This excursus into philosophical discussion over teleology affirms Rachels’s
assertion about its significance, and it is the tension between two opposing world-views
that Wiker so masterfully develops. Rachels notes that it was Hume who showed the
logical deficiencies of the design argument, but that he was not able to provide an

‘Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 6; idem, Gay Science, 119-120.
2N ietzsche, Will to P ow er, 20.

3Nietzsche, Gay Science, 189.
4Nietzsche, Will to Power, 19.
5Ibid.
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intellectually satisfying alternative for explaining the apparent design found in nature.
Thus, Rachels rightly senses the significance of Darwin in that he “did what Hume could
not do: he provided an alternative, giving people something else they could believe.
Only then was the design hypothesis dead.”1 Hunter concurs on this connection between
Hume and Darwin, stating, “Darwin’s great contribution to this tradition [of distancing
God from creation to avoid natural evil] was the scientific flavor he gave to the solution,
to the point that most readers lost sight of the embedded metaphysical presuppositions.
Whereas the earlier solutions lacked detailed explanations, Darwin provided scientific
laws and biological details.”2 Wiker affirms Rachels’s conclusion with his assertion that
“the war had already been won, so to speak, and the appearance of Darwin’s Origin was
simply the last piece of the machine falling into place with a satisfying ‘snap.’” Again, a
few pages later, Wiker makes his point by quoting Richard Dawkins’s assertion that
“Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.”3 The irony is, however,
that the choice to accept a teleological or materialist world-view seems to be grounded
ultimately in faith, not in empirical evidence. Thus, as Richard Popkin and Avrum Stroll
assert, "Neither of these theories can be proven or disproven, and each can develop
arguments against the other. The philosopher who wants to meditate on philosophical
'Rachels, CfA, 120.
2Comelius Hunter, Darwin’s God: Evolution and the Problem o f Evil (Grand
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001), 126.
3Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Experience o f Evolution
Reveals a Universe without Design (New York: Norton, 1986), 6; quoted in Wiker, 149.
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matters first must decide which outlook he accepts, and then proceed to construct his
theories."1
The incompatibility of the classical view of God with Darwinism has been well
highlighted through the issue of teleology, and Rachels is to be commended for
expressing it so clearly. What Rachels seems to imply beyond the argument is brilliant.
He has argued that the world “when viewed from a non-religious perspective, is a cold,
meaningless place, devoid of value or purpose.”2 Effectively, this means that reality is
cold, meaningless, and devoid of value or purpose. Put another way, if there is a God,
why would He avoid design in reality, while using it in morality?3 Furthermore, if, as
Rachels and others have charged, morality is the product of evolution, which has no
design, how can there be a divine design for morality? Morality at best would have to be
totally relativistic in nature. Rachels’s argument is fundamentally sound, provided he
recognizes the assumption he explicitly included in the argument—namely that the world
is viewed from a non-religious perspective. But why should one view the world this

‘Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll, Philosophy Made Simple, 2d ed. (New York:
Doubleday, 1993), 132.
2Rachels, CfA, 54.
3See also, Jerry D. Korsmeyer, Evolution and Eden: Balancing Original Sin and
Contemporary Science (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 89, where he alludes to this
issue in arguing that “the concept o f a fixed human nature designed by God has been
much used in the natural law approach to moral theology. The laws o f nature reflect the
laws o f God, this system proposes, and violation o f nature’s laws, or purposes, is deemed
to be sinful as a result. This idea that physical processes determine the only proper
human ends (phyicalism) provides the support for such things as the [Catholic] Church’s
position on contraception, because interference with the physical purpose of the sex act is
considered to violate divine law. The nature o f evolution belies this particular version o f
a natural law approach.” Emphasis mine.
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way? Rachels logically turns to the classic form of the argument from the problem of
evil to provide most of his rationale for rejecting a religious perspective of the world.

Does Natural Evil Undermine the Image-of-God Thesis?
Hume on the Problem of Evil
In addition to attacking teleology, Rachels makes use of the larger problem of
natural evil to undermine theism, and thus theistic ethics. The problem of natural evil is
most famously articulated by David Hume in the late eighteenth century. In his
Dialogues, parts 10 and 11, Hume seeks to refute the ability to do Natural Theology, and
in the portion we shall examine, makes specific arguments denying we can make any
analogy from man to God. In Part 10, Hume introduces the argument with a long, almost
redundant, yet pathos laden description of human and animal misery in this world.1
Through the character Philo, Hume challenges another character, Cleanthes:
And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these reflections, and
infinitely more, which might be subjected, you can still preserve your
anthropomorphism [i.e., man and God are analogous], and assert the moral
attributes of the deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the
same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite:
Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal is happy:
Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never
mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to
human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose.. . .
Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil,
but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?2
‘David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Martin Bell (New
York: Penguin Books), 103-108.
2Ibid., 108-109.
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The core of Hume’s argument, then, is that natural evil is inconsistent, yea,
incompatible with the concept of there being an all-wise, all-powerful, all-loving God.
This is seen in his conclusion to Part 10: “But there is no view of human life or of the
condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral
attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite
wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone.”1 A few pages later, in Part
11, Hume, through Philo, answers the rebuttal that the balance between pain and
happiness in the world favors happiness, therefore the pain is explainable in terms of a
good God. He declares that even if there is a balance which favors happiness over pain it
proves nothing: “For this is not, by any means what we expect from infinite power,
infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not
by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the
deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. It is contrary to his intention,? But he is
almighty.”2 Notice the argument is based on human expectation and extrapolation about
God. If God is loving and powerful, then Hume expects there can be no natural evil.
Hume next resorts to the bad engineer argument, in which it is argued that if God is
an all-wise designer, why do all these problems and malfunctions abound? Every animal
lacks a key skill for its survival and things like the weather bring both life-giving rains
'Ibid., 112.
2Ibid.
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and destructive floods.1 Thus, for Hume, God must be a poor designer or malicious in
character. Hume now comes to his crowning point. Says Hume:
The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to
all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above
cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.
There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the
universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness, that they have perfect
malice, that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice, that they have
neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former
unmixed principles. And the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seems to
oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable.2
This completes Hume’s articulation of the basic argument from natural evil.
C. S. Lewis has put the argument in a pithy, succinct form: ‘“ If God were good, He
would wish to make His creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty, He would
be able to do what He wished. But the creatures are not happy. Therefore God lacks
’Ibid., 117-119. Richard Dawkins uses a form of this argument in arguing against
the design hypothesis. He likens the design argument to doing reverse-engineering:
Since X does Y job well, it must have been designed by its maker to do X. He adds to it
the assumption that design is trying to “maximize” something. So he applies these two
principles to create a bad engineer argument against teleological interpretation.
“Cheetahs give every indication of being superbly designed for something, and it should
be easy enough to reverse engineer them and work out their utility function. They appear
to be well designed to kill antelopes.. . . Conversely, if we reverse engineer an antelope
we find equally impressive evidence of design for practically the opposite end: the
survival of antelopes and starvation among cheetahs. It is as though cheetahs had been
designed by one deity and antelopes by another. Alternatively, if there is only one
Creator who made the tiger and the lamb, the cheetah and the gazelle, what is He playing
at? Is He a sadist who enjoys spectator blood sports?” Dawkins’s conclusion is that
evolution makes for sense because “the m axim izing o f D N A survival” is, b y contrast,

“elegant in its simplicity.” Richard Dawkins, River Out o f Eden: A Darwinian View o f
Life (New York: BasicBooks/HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), 105-106.
2Hume, Dialogues, 122.
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either goodness, power, or both.’ This is the problem of pain, in its simplest form.”1 The
fundamental argument asserts that since natural evil exists, whatever or whoever caused
this world to exist can be neither loving, nor hostile, but rather must be indifferent. The
argument from natural evil has been adopted in succeeding generations.

Mill and Others on the Problem of Evil
John Stuart Mill echoed Hume’s bad engineer argument, arguing that religion can
only be useful for those of inferior intellect. Says Mill:
For it is impossible that any one who habitually thinks, and who is unable to blunt
his inquiring intellect by sophistry, should be able without misgiving to go on
ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and
capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of its inhabitants.. . .
The worship must either be greatly overclouded by doubt, and occasionally quite
darkened by it, or the moral sentiments must sink to the low level of the ordinances
of Nature: the worshipper [sfc] must learn to think blind partiality, atrocious
cruelty, and reckless injustice, not blemishes in an object o f worship, since all these
abound to excess in the commonest phenomena o f nature.2
Mill also reiterates Hume’s argument from expectations, in a way, asserting that the
dominant expositions o f the ways of God are “on many occasions totally at variance”
with the precepts said to be prescribed by this morally perfect deity. He cites several
examples o f these teachings including the doctrines of Hell, and the doctrinal duo of
Predestination and Limited Atonement.3
'C. S. Lewis, The Problem o f Pain: How Human Suffering Raises Almost
Intolerable Intellectual Problems (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1962), 26.
2John Stuart Mill, "Utility of Religion," in Three Essays on Religion (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1874), 112.
3Ibid., 113-115. Note that two of the three examples are explicitly Calvinist:
Predestination and Limited Atonement. While Mill does not use these exact terms, he
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What is his response to these doctrines? Mill declares, “Is there any moral
enormity which could not be justified by imitation of such a deity?”1 Mill's argument
seems to be that if God can will such suffering in hell by willfully withholding salvation
from “so many,” then such a God is immoral and would certainly not be concerned with
natural evil. So, like Hume, Mill found the dominant Christian teachings about God’s
perfections to be incompatible with the existence of natural evil. The incompatibility of
natural evil with God as depicted by Christianity has been an oft-repeated refrain since
Hume and Mill articulated their opinions.2
Korsmeyer refines the definition of the problem by noting that the locus of the
problem o f evil is in the natural realm. “Moral evil could always be explained as the
result of human sin. But the problem was natural for physical evil.”3 Ruse is even more
bold in asserting that “the biggest question of all for the Christian believer is the
‘theodicy’ problem. If, as the Christian believes, God is omnipotent (all powerful) and
all-loving, then why evil? . . . How do we explain it?”4 The British theologian, Julian
Casserley, describes the problem of natural evil as “a theological and intellectual
describes these two doctrines in fairly exquisite detail, strongly asserting their
immorality.
'Ibid., 114.
2An excellent source for tracing the incompatibility argument in history is
Cornelius Hunter, D arwin’s God, cited earlier. Hunter traces this view through many
thinkers for the purpose o f deriving the doctrine of God assumed by the argument. We
shall examine this angle a little later in this work.
3Korsmeyer, 96.
4Ruse, Can a Darwinian Be Christian? 129.
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conundrum.. . . It is indeed without doubt the greatest of all the problems with which
Christian thinkers and teachers have to grapple.”1 Alvin Plantinga verifies the
problematic nature o f Hume’s challenge in saying, “The amount and variety of evil in our
world has often baffled and perplexed believers in God.” He continues by noting that
philosophers have argued that the fact of evil in our world “is both obvious and
undeniable; but then belief in G od,. . . is in some way intellectually dubious, or
questionable, or out of order, or worse.”2 Thus many great minds have recognized the
enormity of this problem. Rachels has indeed chosen a potent issue with which to
undermine the image-of-God-thesis. However, attempts by Christian theologians and
philosophers to formulate an answer to this challenge are not lacking. While a full study
of this issue will not fit within the scope of this work, a brief survey of responses and
counter-responses seems in order, due to the significance of the argument.

'Casserley, M an’s Pain, 11. This book is condensed and republished in the first
essay of J[ulian] V. Langmead Casserley, Evil and Evolutionary Eschatology: Two
Essays, ed. and intro, by C. Don Keys, Toronto Studies in Theology, vol. 39 (Lewiston,
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 3. Hereafter cited, respectively, as M an’s Pain and
Evil. In this same reference Casserley articulates the problem: “How can we believe, as
the Bible and Church teach, that God is all-powerful, all-wise, all-loving, and the Creator
and Master o f all things, when the world which He has made and governs contains so
much that is painful and unjust? . . . Is it possible for a man who is intelligent and
realistic to understand and accept a faith which asserts such paradoxes as these?” For
Casserley, how ever, the problem o f pain is not merely theoretical, but practical: “H ow

can I live as a Christian in a world in which pain happens to me, or my acquaintances,
enemies, and friend? . . . That is the practical problem, and it is the most urgent and
challenging problem o f all.” Casserley, M an’s Pain, 11; idem, Evil, 3.
2Alvin Plantinga, “Epistemic Probability and Evil,” in The Evidential Argument
from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996),
69-70.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

249
Survey of Responses to the Problem of
Evil Argument
C. S. Lewis astutely asserts that it is Christianity itself that causes the philosophical
problem of pain or natural evil, though the existence of Christianity in a world of pain is
also problematic: “To ask whether the universe as we see it looks more like the work of
a wise and good Creator or the work of chance, indifference, or malevolence, is to omit
from the outset all the relevant factors in the religious problem.. . . In a sense, it
[Christianity] creates, rather than solves the problem o f pain, fo r pain would be no
problem unless, side by side with our daily experience o f this painful world, we had
received what we think to be good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and
loving”1
While this is a lucid and valid point, many will not consider this to be any real
solution, for explaining the origins of the problem of evil does not solve it. Peter
Bertocci, however, lists four standard Christian responses to the problem of evil. First,
God did not will evil but allowed it in order to give true freedom to man. Second,
suffering is part o f God’s ultimate plan for achieving some overall greater goodness.
Third, natural evil is a tool God uses to achieve the best possible world. Richness with
suffering is better than poorness without it. Finally, in what seems a variant of the third
option, suffering prepares man for a joyous eternity with God. It is a disciplinary tool for
man’s refinement and purification in preparation for eternal life.2
'Lewis, Pain, 24. Emphasis mine.
2Bertocci, 401-408.
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The freedom argument
The freedom argument is rooted in a twofold classification of evil. Ruse observes
that “it is customary and convenient to draw a distinction between two kinds of evil:
moral evil, that is human-caused evil—Auschwitz—and physical evil, that is the pain of
natural processes—the child with sickle-cell anemia.”1 He then restates the argument in
more detail, stating: “The most popular and powerful argument to explain moral
evil—one which goes back to Saint Augustine— is that it is something resulting from
human free will. God is His love gave humans freedom, and that meant freedom to do ill
as well as good.. . . This does not mean that God is indifferent to suffering.” The
adequacy of this particular argument depends crucially on our understanding of the
notion of free will.2
C. S. Lewis pushes the freedom argument further by arguing that while it may be
possible to conceive of a world in which God corrects the consequences of every misuse
of our free will, then free will would be blotted out. For example, he argues that if my
using a wooden beam as weapon was countered by God making it soft like grass, or if the
air would not be permitted to carry the waves o f sound containing abusive and dishonest
words, then “such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible.”3
‘Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 129.
2Ibid.
3Lewis, Pain, 32-34. Most of this book is focused on the problem of moral evil,
though there is some interaction with the issue of natural evil. Only the last chapter
really focuses solely on the problem of natural evil, especially animal pain.
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Thus, he concludes, “Try to exclude the possiblity of suffering which the order of nature
and existence of free wills involve, and you will find that you have excluded life itself.”1
Ruse appears to counter the free-will choice by arguing that “free will cannot
explain away the agony of the child in distress from a genetic ailment.”2 Paul Draper
charges that the freedom argument still does not answer the question o f pain. “Notice
that, so far, we have no explanation of the existence of pain. For there are morally right
actions and morally wrong actions that do not entail the existence of p a in .. . . So God
could have given humans freedom without permitting pain.”3 It should be noted,
however, that Draper seems to ignore the opposite side of his argument. Just because
some forms of free choice do not involve pain, does not necessarily entail that all free
choices can be given without possibility of suffering. Draper, however, is not content at
criticizing the free will answer to the problem o f evil. He also attacks the second
argument, in which supreme wisdom permits pain as part o f a higher plan for producing a
greater good.

‘Ibid.
2Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 130.
3Paul Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” N ous 23
(1989): 341. This article was republished in, The E viden tial A rgum ent fro m E vil, ed.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 12-29. This
dissertation cites the original journal paging.
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Pain as a means to a greater good
A ttack of the argum ent of greater good. Draper summarizes this argument,
“Since God’s knowledge about good and evil is limitless, it is not at all surprising that He
produces or permits evils for reasons that are unknown to humans.” He offers two
rebuttals. First, “antecedently—that is, independent of observations and testimony
Observation] reports—we have no reason to think that God’s additional knowledge
concerning good and evil is such that He would permit any of the facts Observation]
reports to obtain.”
Second, “Indeed, we have no more reason antecedently to believe that such a being
would know some great good unknown to us whose existence entails the existence of
pain.”1 But why? By cutting out observation and testimony from influencing the
conclusion, what is left but mere speculation? It seems, then, that the antecedent is one’s
presuppositions, which are not necessarily provable anyway. Thus, since Draper rejects
theism,2 the argument o f divine wisdom is, de facto, nonsensical.
Bertocci attacks the argument of there being unknown, all-wise purposes, by
asserting that the proponent of such a view “argues not from what he knows about the
world, but from a conception of what might be.” He later calls these arguments
“imaginary conceptions.”3 Eric Kraemer, building on Draper’s work, makes a similar
‘Ibid., 345-346. His use of “antecedently” is not fully clear but seems to be the
equivalent o f a priori.
2Ibid., 334.
3Bertocci, 408.
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argument against the idea of God having higher purposes that allow for natural evil to
occur. He depicts the argument as “chalking up evil to incomprehensible greater goods
that would require it.”1 Kraemer wonders if a species capable of producing the scientific
and technological marvels that we humans have produced “is really beyond God’s ability
to teach us even the rudiments, no matter how sketchy or incomplete, of an adequate
account o f evil.”2 But has Kraemer, like Draper, denied the conditions needed for God to
teach those rudiments?

Responses to the attack on greater good. Alvin Plantinga does not see our
purported ignorance of God’s methods as such a stumbling stone. While admitting that
the Epicurean question o f how a good and powerful God can permit natural evil,
Plantinga nonetheless argues that, “There is no reason to think that if God did have a
reason for permitting the evil in question, we would be the first to know .. . . we don’t
know why God permits evil; but where, so far, is the problem?”3 The only problem
seems to be the assumption that man’s great intellectual and technological progress
implies nothing is beyond his grasp. Plantinga at least is humble enough to acknowledge
the limits o f human ability, great as it is. He further argues that the existence of evil does
not necessarily entail a denial of divine existence. Says Plantinga,
'Eric Russert Kraemer, “D arw in’s Doubts and the Problems of Anim al Pain,”
Undated, http://cal.calpoly.edu/~jlynch/Kraemer_Darwin.htm (6 July 2003). Internal
evidence points to this being published sometime after 1996.

2Ibid.
3Plantinga, 71.
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At present, however, I think it widely conceded that there is nothing like
straightforward contradiction or necessary falsehood in the joint affirmation of God
and evil; the existence o f evil is not incompatible with the existence o f an all
powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good God. Accordingly, those who offer an
antitheistic argument from evil—call them ‘atheologians’—have turned from
deductive to problematic arguments from evil. The typical atheistical claim at
present is not that the existence of God is incompatible with that of evil, but rather
that the latter offers the resources for a strong probabilistic argument against the
former.1
Thus Plantinga asserts that the atheistical argument is not as compelling as it sounds. He
bolsters the conclusion that the problem of evil does not entail atheism by arguing that
the claim that evil implies God’s existence to be improbable “isn’t just clear or obvious
or self evident.. . . Why should we think this is true?”2 Yet,
the suggestion is that there are evils such that it is simply apparent that no
omnipotent and omniscient being, if there were such a person, would have a good
reason for permitting them .. . .
But this to me seems clearly false; that is, it seems that there are evil states of
affairs which, while indeed there could be an omnipotent, omniscient God who had
a good reason for permitting them, are nonetheless such that in fact it is apparent to
us that there isn’t any such reason—no outweighing good he couldn’t achieve
without permitting the evil in question, and no evil he couldn’t avoid without
permitting it. How could such a thing as that be apparent to us? Consider the case
of the child who dies a lingering and painful death from leukemia. True enough:
we can’t see what reason God, if there is such a person, has for permitting this child
to suffer in that way. But (granted that it is indeed possible that he have a reason)
can we just see that he doesn’t have a reason?3

'Ibid.. First emphasis mine; all others in original.
2Ibid., 72.
3Ibid., 73. Last two emphases mine.
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Plantinga has shown that the argument against the possibility of hidden divine
purposes fails to acknowledge the finiteness of human knowledge and reason. He
bolsters this point by use of the biblical character of Job.
This is the lesson of the book of Jo b .. . . He can’t see any reason why God
should allow him to be afflicted as he is; he concludes, unthinkingly, that God
doesn’t have a good reason. As a matter of fact, according to the story, God does
have a good reason, but the reason involves a transaction among beings some of
whom Job has no awareness at all. The point here is that the reason fo r Job’s
suffering is something entirely beyond his ken. . . .
Job complains that God has no good reason for permitting the evil that befalls
him. He believes that God doesn’t have a good reason because he, Job, can’t
imagine what the reason might be. In reply, God does not tell him what the reason
is; instead, he attacks Job’s unthinking assumption that if he can’t imagine what
reason God might have, then God probably doesn’t have a reason at a ll.. . .
. . . Clearly, the crucial problem for this probabilistic argument from evil is
just that nothing much follows from the fact that some evils are inscrutable; if
theism is true we would expect that there would be inscrutable evil. Indeed, a little
reflection shows there is no reason to think we could so much as grasp God’s plans
here, even if he proposed to divulge them to us. But then the fact that there is
inscrutable evil does not make it improbable that God exists.
Plantinga’s argument then is that if theism were true, we should expect inscrutable evil to
exist.
Casserley makes a similar argument and differentiates between absolute proof and
enough knowledge to enable adequate moral function.
If Christianity is true—that is, if the ultimate truth is the God revealed to us in the
Bible—then it necessarily follows that the breadth and splendor o f the truth must
be too great for the finite human mind ever to comprehend it completely and
exhaustively.. . .
I do not mean to say, however, that because the Christian cannot know
everything he knows nothing.. . . Thus Christianity gives us a real knowledge o f
God and a real understanding o f the purposes o f human life but, quite frankly, not
a complete one. The important thing is that the knowledge which it gives us is
sufficient for us in practice. It gives us enough to guide and shape our lives in
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accordance with God’s will and in pursuit of valid purposes.1
C. S. Lewis builds on the inscrutability argument by asserting that,
we must never allow the problem of animal pain to become the centre of the
problem of pain; not because it is unim portant. . . but because it is outside the
range of our knowledge. God has given us data which enable us, in some degree,
to understand our own suffering: He has given us no such data about beasts.2
Then, he takes the biblical teaching that “man was not the first creature to rebel against
his maker” to posit the possibility of satanic activity as the primary cause of natural evil
including animal pain.3

Great Controversy motif
Plantinga and Lewis have introduced the concept of a conflict between God and a
rebel creature as a partial explanation for the problem of natural evil. This is a familiar
concept to the Seventh-day Adventist theologian, for the motif of the Great Controversy
between Christ and Satan is a dominant theological theme in Adventism. But this motif
entails belief in a perfect creation unlike our present one, but corrupted by the influence
of creaturely rebellion against the creator, ergo, by sin. John Baldwin, a professor at the
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, exemplifies this position in his article,
“God, the Sparrow, and the Emerald Boa.” Baldwin argues that the “original creation
was a predation-free habitat,” and that “there were no carnivores in Eden.” He further
•Casserley, M an’s Pain, 14; idem, Evil, 4.
2Lewis, Pain, 129.
3Ibid., 134.
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argues that “sin and its accompanying curses affected life on earth.” He cites the causal
connection of sin to death in Romans 5:12 and notes Romans 8:20, that the creation was
subjected to futility. There was “an immediate change in the original order—from a
death-free habitat to one ruled by the life-death cycle.”1
Ellen White, a founding pioneer of the Seventh-day Adventist denomination,
ascribes the freedom to sin and to effect such changes as part o f a master plan of God to
permit true freedom to created moral agents. One example of her teaching in this regard
is seen in the statement, “For the good of the entire universe through ceaseless ages, he
must more fully develop his [Satan’s] principles, that his charges against the divine
government might be seen in their true light by all created beings, and that the justice and
mercy of God and the immutability of His law might be forever placed beyond all
question.”2 Thus, White would seem to belong to the group who explain natural evil in
terms of being permitted for a greater long-term good.
Kraemer provides a direct challenge to the Great Controversy motif, rejecting the
argument that natural evil helps achieve some greater good as “unconvincing.” He
suggests a hypothetical scenario in which there are some “idiotic giants, modeled perhaps
after the Cyclops, who live on other planets but are obsessed with observing all
nonhuman suffering on Earth through powerful telescopes,” and that “every bit of animal
1John T. Baldwin, “God, the Sparrow, and the Emerald Boa,” in Dialogue: An
International Journal o f Faith, Thought, and Action, 1996,
http://dialogue.adventist.org/articles/08_3_baldwin.htm (6 July 2003).
2E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 42. See also idem, Great Controversy
(Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1950), chapters 29 and 42.
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suffering goes towards improving the moral situation of these pathetic giants, the theist
might claim that earthly animal suffering was counterbalanced by creating greater goods
[s/c] elsewhere in the universe.”1 In almost sarcastic language, Kraemer rejects such a
scenario, asserting,
However unlikely this situation might appear to us, and even if we accept the
crude Utilitarian calculations it presupposes, the Cyclopsian scenario faces the
standard problem confronting most theistic attempts to explain away the existence
of evil. This is the problem of making it plausible to believe that God, an allpowerful and all-knowing being, really had no better method available for the
moral improvement of the Cyclopsian race than to permit the huge amount of
animal suffering we find on the earth. Since we can, with no apparent difficulty,
imagine God making video tapes of animal suffering . . . to think of God’s
ingenuity being defeated by the mental limitations of the Cyclopsian hordes is a
possibility that is hard to take seriously. Clearly a deeper reason is needed to make
the necessity of animal suffering plausible.2
Kraemer here reiterates the old argument that God must have had better options
than this one to accomplish a greater good. Thus he effectually denies that there can be
any truly inscrutable evil within the context of theistic belief. We have already seen an
effective response to this charge by Plantinga. Kraemer is following the well-worn path
o f failing to acknowledge the limits of human understanding. Furthermore, in the Great
Controvery motif, there is more than mere moral improvement for the universe. There is
also a rescue from the power of sin and a restoration of the pre-sin order.
The deliverance dimension presupposes that the current world order is altered from
the way God originally intended and created the world, while the argument based on the
'Kraemer, 7.
2Ibid.
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problem o f evil seems to presuppose that the current state of natural woe is how God
originally created this planet. Thus, in Hume’s Dialogues, Cleanthes counters Philo with
the argument that, for the infinitely wise God, “a less evil may then be chosen, in order
to avoid a greater: Inconveniences are to be submitted to, in order to achieve a desirable
end: benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may have produced a
world such as the p r e s e n t But what if he did not create it so? On the one hand, it
could change the nature of the argument by removing direct divine culpability for the evil
in this world. On the other hand, it merely moves the problem backwards one step to the
issue o f why God permitted natural evil, even if he did not create it. Nevertheless, the
fundamental position of Hume and those of similar persuasion makes a major assumption
about the nature o f creation in order to make the argument from evil efficacious.
We have seen charges, rebuttals, and countercharges on both sides of the debate
over natural evil. Each side has strengths and weaknesses and neither position has been
overly effective in convincing the other. There remain, however, two arguments that
Rachels believes will strengthen the case for the alleged antithesis between God and
natural: The excess evil argument, and the argument on the principle of parsimony.

The problem of excess evil
The basic argument. Rachels has argued that traditional theological responses to
the problem o f evil are both man centered, and more importantly, assume the co
existence o f man with animals during the whole history of natural evil. But if man
‘Hume, 113.
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evolved, there were millions of years of suffering unrelated to man, his will, or his
choices. Rachels thus asserted that “the traditional theistic rejoinders do not even come
close to justifying that ev il.. . . The evolutionary perspective puts the problem in a new
and more difficult form.”1
However, this challenge is not as difficult as it may seem for, as Rachels has
alluded, perspective matters. The problem is that his argument mixes two perspectives.
Because Rachels assumes the correctness of the Darwinist position, he argues for a
presence o f natural evil prior to human existence. But this merely mixes theism with
materialism, without including the supporting theological package that comes with belief
in God. Thus, Rachels ascribes blame to God for something not attributed to Him by
Scripture— creation through an evolutionary process. If one wishes to posit divine
involvement, it seems prudent that such speculation must be done on theistic and not
materialist terms. The excess evil argument is thus rooted in a view of God skewed from
its proper context. There is, however, a second issue buried within the argument of
excess. Is all the excess evil compatible with belief in God? This brings us to the
argument from the principle o f parsimony.

The argument from parsimony. Rachels has appealed to Darwin’s belief that the
“facts” of evolution better accommodated and explained the existence of natural evil than
do the “facts” o f theism. He is thus arguing that Darwinism is more parsimonious than
Christianity when it comes to natural evil. Rachels is not alone in making such claims,
•Rachels, CfA, 105-106. Emphasis in original.
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for Draper observes that “the important question, a question that David Hume asked. . .
but that most contemporary philosophers of religion have ignored, is whether or not any
serious hypothesis that is logically inconsistent with theism explains some significant
facts about evil or about good and evil much better than theism does.”1 Kraemer echoes
the same conclusion: The fact there is widespread natural evil is best explained by a
means o f origins that is indifferent to happiness and suffering, and not by theism.2
An interesting problem is that all three of the above authors use the argument that
theism is less parsimonious than materialism in relating to the problem of natural evil, yet
none take time to justify the efficacy of this method. While Rachels is affirmed in that
his claim is not unique, the question remains as to how effective parsimony is as a tool
for evaluating the problem of natural evil.

Critique of parsimony. John Hubbard notes two key attributes of this
philosophical tool: “Parsimony is a relative characteristic; parsimony can only be used to
describe one theory in comparison with another. Different types of parsimony can

'Draper, 332. Emphasis mine. Draper follows Hume in offering the “Hypothesis
o f Indiference” (HI) as a better alternative to theism, urging that “HI explains the facts
Observation] reports much better than theism d o es.. . . Observation] is much more
probable on the assumption that HI is true than on the assumption theism is true.”
2Kraemer, 5.
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conflict with each other.”1 Thus, he argues that parsimony is a limited tool with
relativistic tendencies.
But such relativity is a problem for Rachels’s argument, for, as Cornelius Hunter
has shown, “the problem of evil presupposes the existence of an objective evil—the very
thing the materialist seems to deny.. . . In other words, the problem of evil is generated
only by the prior claim that evil exists.”2 Furthermore, the relativity of parsimony makes
it unlikely that it can be a capable criterion for determining truth. Not all simple
explanations are true. Hubbard illustrates this by observing that “knowing the fact that
three points on a highway are in a strait line should yield the more parsimonious
conclusion that the highway is a strait line. However, our previous knowledge of the
existence of curves in roads, makes this an improbable conclusion.”3 In addition,
sometimes data are so complex that parsimony becomes a difficult tool to use effectively.
As James Thornton has observed, “Adoption of this principle, though seemingly obvious,
leads to problems about the role of simplicity in science, especially when choosing
between hypotheses that are not (or are not known to be) equivalent. There are often
different and clashing criteria for what is the simplest hypothesis, and it is not clear
'John Hubbard, “Parsimony and the Mind,” 19 May 2003,
http://www.tk421.net/essays/simple.html (3 July 2003). The website indicates this article
was originally written for the Macalester College course PHIL 89: Senior Seminar, in
May 1995. The current web copy has been updated slightly since my research, now
being said to be last modified Februaryl9,2005. Hubbard defines three kinds of
parsimony: Epistemological, Ontological, and Literary, and asserts than any one can be
in contradiction with the other two.
2Hunter, 154.
3Hubbard, 4.
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whether a simpler hypothesis is pro tanto more likely to be true: and if not, what
justification other than laziness there is for adopting it.”1 It would seem that the
complexity of both Christian theology and Darwin’s theory would make parsimony a less
than ideal arbiter for determining the truthfulness or preferability of one over the other.
Could it be that the parsimony argument based on evil could be reversed back on those
trying to eliminate theism?

The problem of good. Casserley creates such a conundrum by countering the
problem of excess evil for the theist with the problem o f excess good for the atheist.
What are we to say, then to the objector who argues that the ‘problem of evil’ only
arises for us because we believe in the good God? For the atheist, apparently, there
is no problem of evil. If only we will abandon our belief that the source and
foundation of the universe is morally good, the presence of evil in the universe will
cease to perplex us.
But there is no way out of our difficulty through any such denial of God and
the basic righteousness of existence. If the fact of evil is an intellectual problem for
the man who believes that the order of the universe is ultimately a moral order, the
fact of good is an equally or even more intractable problem for the man who
believes that the order of the universe is non-moral.. . . There is a problem o f evil
fo r the theist, but there is also a problem ofgood fo r the atheist. The theist must
ask himself, ‘How is it that God’s world so often falls below its own proper level?’
But the atheist must likewise confront himself with the opposite question: ‘How is
it that a basically non-moral universe occasionally rises above itself to such
undeniable moral heights?’ The latter question is of the two the more difficult to
answer plausibly and convincingly.2

'James Thornton, “O ccam ’s Razor,” in Jam es T h orn ton ’s Theory-of-the-W eek, 22

January 2001, http://www.jamesthomton.com/theory/theory?theory_id=8 (18 May 2004).
2Casserley, M an’s Pain, 38-39. Emphasis mine.
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In a similar statement in another work, Casserley appeals, ironically, to explanatory
power to clinch his point. “On balance the problem of evil for the believer is less acute
than the problem of good for the unbeliever. It is easier to understand that the good
God’s world might fall below itself than to imagine how a non-moral world of non-moral
beings could contrive so frequently to rise above itself.”'
Casserley has raised a significant question, for in designless materialism, we would
not expect to find excess good which is not really necessary for survival. Survival could
be achieved with much less good in the world. Therefore, the excess good should be a
waste of resources in an evolutionary scenario. Why all this unnecessary good? Even
altruism cannot account for all of it.
C. S. Lewis complicates the conundrum for the atheist by taking the problem of
good and intensifying it into the problem of religion. Lewis observes that when he was a
professed atheist,
'Casserley, Evil, 11. The full quotation is very similar to the previous one and
reads: “We shall not escape from our difficulties by giving up our faith in God’s
goodness. The objector may say to us, ‘You are wondering how it is that pain and
injustice are found in God’s good world. You have only to stop believing in the good
God and the problem will no longer arise.’ This sounds more reasonable at first sight than
it really is. Certainly the fact of evil constitutes a problem for the man who believes that
this universe is in the last resort a moral universe, created and governed by a morally
perfect being. But there is good as well as evil in the universe, and if we deny that this is
a moral universe, if we deny that there lies behind it an all-powerful moral being who
made it and governs it, then w e should find ourselves up against the problem o f good. I f

the order of the universe is non-moral, how did this goodness get into i t . . . [i.e., good
things like courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice]? On balance the problem o f evil for the
believer is less acute than the problem of good for the unbeliever. It is easier to
understand that the good God’s world might fall below itself than to imagine how a nonmoral world o f non-moral beings could contrive so frequently to rise above itself.”
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there was one question which I never dreamed of raising. I never noticed that the
very strength and facility of the pessimists’ case at once poses us a problem. I f the
universe is so bad, or even half so bad, how on earth did human beings ever come
to attribute it to the activity o f a wise and good Creator? Men are fools, perhaps;
but hardly so foolish as that. The direct inference from black to white, from evil
flower to virtuous root, from senseless work to a workman infinitely wise, staggers
belief. The spectacle o f the universe as revealed by experience can never have
been the ground of religion: it must always have been something in spite of which
religion, acquired from a different source, was held.1
Lewis has raised a question even more difficult for the atheist to escape from than
Casserley’s problem of good. But Lewis compounds the severity o f this point by noting
that
it would be an error to reply that our ancestors were ignorant and therefore
entertained pleasing illusions about nature which the progress of science has since
dispelled.. . . Certainly at all periods the pain and waste of human life was equally
obvious.. . . It is mere nonsense to put pain among the discoveries of science. Lay
down this book and reflect for five minutes on the fact that all the great religions
were first preached, and long practiced, in a world without chloroform.
At all times then, an inference from the course of events in this world to the
goodness and wisdom o f the Creator would have been equally preposterous; and it
was never made.2
This is a most powerful argument that the existence of natural evil is not incompatible
with theistic belief. Indeed, the point is well taken that if excess pain and suffering is
incompatible with belief in God, then why did the great religions develop under such
stringent conditions? The problems of good and of religion are at least as great a
•Lewis, Pain, 15. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 15-16. Lewis adds a footnote at this point which reads: “i.e., never made at
the beginnings o f the religion. After belief in God has been accepted, ‘theodicies’
explaining, or explaining away, the miseries of life, will naturally appear often enough.”
Emphasis in original.
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challenge for the followers of Hume, as the problem of natural evil is to the theist,
possibly greater.
Rachels has made a generally accurate summary of the discussion of the problem of
evil, but while giving a thoughtful look at the issue, he has not given the issue full
treatment. The theistic responses deserve more than just mere summaries. It also seems
odd that Rachels has not mentioned or cited key modem discussions on the issue of pain
and natural evil. On the other hand, Rachels is to be commended for recognizing that the
argument from natural evil does not force the renunciation of theism. Rachels admits that
the atheistic conclusion is hard to resist, though not impossible. Since theism can be
maintained with evolution, this raises the issue of the relationship of theology to
Evolution.

Darwinian Theism
Introduction
Rachels has asserted that if theism is maintained with belief in Darwinism, then
the type o f theism permitted cannot support traditional ethics, especially in the matter of
human preference. But how efficacious is this claim?
There are two issues imbedded in Rachels’s conclusion. First, all the
argumentation concerning God, from Darwin to Rachels, presupposes a particular
doctrine o f God. What kind of god is thus depicted? Second, are there any theologians
who have attempted to build a theological view o f God based on the principles of
Darwinism? If so, does their view of God refute or support Rachels’s claim that
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Darwinian theism cannot support a robust enough view of God to be compatible with
traditional ethics?

Darwin’s God
Plantinga offers us an initial answer to the first question. He notes that the only
arguments for incompatibility between God and evolution “have turned from deductive to
probabilistic arguments from evil.” Thus, “the typical atheological claim at present is not
that the existence of God is incompatible with that of evil, but rather, that the latter offers
the resources for a strong probabilistic argument against the former.”1 This is exactly
what Rachels has argued, and by shifting the argument to probability instead of logical
entailment, Rachels has felt little need to interact deeply with the argument over natural
evil. However, the probablisitic argument (a type of parsimony assertion) itself assumes
a particular doctrine of God. This issue is superbly developed by Cornelius Hunter.
Hunter cites numerous claims by evolutionists, giving various reasons why “God
would not have created [the present natural order] in this way.”2 Such an approach he
calls “negative theology” for it is offering proof by negative instead of positive
evidence.3 But in so doing, argues Hunter, “they are beholden to a specific notion of
God, and notions of God, no matter how carefully considered, are outside the realm of
‘Plantinga, 71.
2In many parts of this book Hunter quotes or cites an evolutionist making such a
claim. For examples see, Hunter, 12-13, 44-49, 63-64, 81-84, 98-99, 109-110.
3Ibid., 47-48. See also 97,103.
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science.”1 Thus, a major assumption of the evolutionary position is not scientific at all!
And this point is foundational to why Hunter calls Darwin’s theory the “evolution
theodicy.”2 But why does Hunter see Darwin as so theological?
Hunter argues that a seminal influence on Darwin was Milton’s Parasise Lost. In
Hunter’s view, Milton was addressing the problem of evil, and solved it by distancing
God from the creation. “Both men were dealing with the problem of evil—Milton with
moral evil and Darwin with natural evil— and both found solutions by distancing God
from evil. And most important, the two held similar conceptions of God.”3 However,
“Darwin’s solution distanced God from creation to the point that God was unnecessary.
One could still believe in God, but not in God’s providence. Separating God from
creation and its evils meant that God could have no direct influence or control over the
world. God may have created the world, but ever since that point it has run according to
impersonal natural laws that may now and then produce natural evil.”4 Therefore,
“Darwin was now increasing this separation to the point that the link between creation

'Ibid., 92.
2Ibid., 13. Hunter frequently calls evolution a theodicy and, on 173-175, closes the
book on this theme.
3Ibid., 12.
“Ibid., 16.
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and God was severed.”1 Thus, Hunter claims to have uncovered “the evolutionist’s
notion of a restricted God.”2
How did Darwin and his contemporaries come to define God with such
restrictions? Hunter notes that modernism spawned a trend towards viewing God in
terms of being a “comprehensible deity.”3 Since the classical Christian view of God
seemed incompatible with the natural world they observed, the concept of a supernatural
deity who intervenes and rules was increasingly rejected, and eventually replaced with, as
Hunter names it, “rational theism.”4 Thus God was seen as acting only according to
natural laws. Hunter credits two key ideas for fueling this trend of invoking “divine
sanction and intellectual necessity. In the former, God is seen as being all the greater for
designing a world that works on its own, rather than requiring divine intervention. In the
latter, the restricting of God to natural laws is urged because only this ensures meaningful
scientific inquiry is possible. If natural laws are subject to violation, then we cannot
Tbid., 17. Mattill makes a similar observation to Hunter, by asserting that when
Darwin proposed natural selection as the creative force, “Darwin rewrote Genesis and
transferred God’s workload to the process of evolution, even as Newton had transferred
another part of the divine workload to gravity. Biology and astronomy were dislodging
Godfrom governing the world." A. J. Mattill, Jr., The Seven Mighty Blows to Traditional
Beliefs (Gordo, AL: Flatwoods Free Press, 1995), 26. Emphasis mine.
2Hunter, 47.
3Ibid., 115.
4Ibid., 115-116,128-132. Ultimately, all of chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to
discussing the issue of how the concept of God became restricted.
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discern the law from the exception.”1 In the divine sanction argument, then, “we should
expect God to use secondary means because this requires all the more wisdom and
foresight.. . . God may be almighty, but his is all the more impressive because he does
not exercise his might.”2
But for Hunter, this raises a serious problem: “In what we might call the problem
o f morality, how can God be so aloof from his creation, allowing even his creatures to be
the result of blind mechanical forces, yet simultaneously be the source of our moral law
and the ultimate judge of our actions? In the former he has become non-existent, or at
least irrelevant; in the latter he is vital.”3 This is precisely the dilemma Rachels seeks to
‘Ibid., 116. Emphasis in original. C. S. Lewis strenuously objects to this last point
that allowing the supernatural into the system makes differentiating between natural and
supernatural impossible. “But there is one thing often said about our ancestors which we
must not say. We must not say ‘They believed in miracles because they did not know the
Laws of Nature.’ This is nonsense. When St Joseph discovered that his bride was
pregnant, he was ‘minded to put her away.’ He knew enough biology for th a t.. . . He
regarded it as a miracle precisely because he knew enough about the Laws o f Nature to
know that this was a suspension of them .. . . If a man had no conception o f an
established order in Nature, then of course he could not notice departures from that
order.. . . Complete ignorance of the laws of Nature would preclude the perception of the
miraculous just as rigidly as complete disbelief in the supernatural precludes it, perhaps
even more so.” Lewis, God in the Dock, 26. Lewis again uses Joseph, in a Socratic style
dialog, to make the same point on pp. 72-73.
2Hunter, 118. On this page, Hunter uses a quotation from Thomas Burnet (16351715) to illustrate the divine sanction argument. Burnet argues that we would esteem a
clock maker who makes clock that strikes the hours automatically to be a superior
clockmaker to one making a clock requiring the maker to push a button each hour to
make it strike. Thus a God who makes a mechanical universe that runs itself without
miracles is deemed superior.
3Ibid., 138. Hunter is here culminating a discussion on the fact that the tension
between natural law and morals had raged for a century or more prior to Darwin, and thus
Darwin did not develop his arguments against, nor his views of, God in a vacuum.
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capitalize on in arguing that theism is either incompatible with morality, or that a
Darwinian divinity is not robust enough to support traditional morality. So Rachels is
certainly not being unreasonable to make such assertions. What kind of God, then, is
there to believe in if the divine sanction and intellectual necessity arguments are
accepted?
According to Hunter, the result is that “God, on the one hand, is seen as all-good
but not necessarily all-powerful, or at least does not exercise all his power. God is
virtuous, not dictatorial.”1 But notice, then, that elimination of God is no longer
necessary. “The end result of Darwin’s theory is not that there is no God, but rather, that
God is disjoint from the material w orld.. . . In evolution theodicy, the Creator must be
disjoint from creation, but no more than this is required.”2 Thus, Hunter disagrees with
Rachels that Darwinism makes atheism difficult to resist, but agrees that the theory of
evolution does entail a view of God not compatible with traditional Christian morality. Is
Hunter right in arguing that Darwinism offers deliverance from the problem of evil
through a reinterpretation of God which saves God’s goodness by limiting his power?

A Theology of Evolution
Introduction
From the late twentieth century until the present, we find movement in the direction
of promoting such a theology. First, there is the denial that Darwinism is incompatible
Tbid., 146.
2Ibid., 165.
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with belief in God. Ruse seems to take this view, noting that “Darwinism does not
dissolve away Christian belief,”1and that “Darwinism is ecumenical. Its processes can
and will accommodate wide range of theological options.”2 Kenneth Miller, a biologist,
makes a similar argument: “The common assumption, widely shared in academic and
intellectual circles, is that Darwinism is a fatal poison to traditional religious belief. One
may, o f course, accept the scientific validity of evolution and profess belief in a supreme
being, but not without diluting traditional religion almost beyond recognition, or so the
thinking goes. Incredibly, all too many traditional believers accept this view, not
realizing that is based on a more humanistic culture of disbelief than on any finding of
evolutionary science.”3 Like Ruse, Miller seems to be arguing that Darwinism does not
defacto eliminate God and religion, and he seems to leave the door open for a variety of
theological options. But how wide is a wide array of options? Ruse recognizes that,
“obviously, if you are a fundamentalist Christian, then the Darwinian reading of Genesis
is going to give you major problems—insoluble problems, I suspect.”4 Thus the portal to
'Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 138.
2Ibid., 216. This is the last sentence of the body of the book. The epilogue asks,
“can a Darwinian be a Christian? Absolutely! Is it always easy for a Darwinian to be a
Christian? No, but whoever said that the worthwhile things in life are easy? Is the
Darwinian obligated to be a Christian? No, but try to be understanding o f those who are.
Is the Christian obligated to be a Darwinian? No, but realize how much you are going to
foreswear i f you do not make the effort” (217).

3Kenneth R. Miller, Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search fo r Common
Ground Between God and Evolution (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), xii.
4Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 217.
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religious Darwinism may not be as wide as is touted. Not all may enter, though some
have.

Putting Darwin into Theology
John F. Haught, possibly the leading scholar in the recently formed movement of
evolutionary theology, laments that not just the discipline of theology has failed to
grapple with the implications of Darwin’s theory, but neither have the philosophers. “If
theology has fallen short o f the reality of evolution, however, so also has the world of
thought in general.. . . Philosophy also has yet to produce an understanding of
reality—an ontology—adequate of evolution.”1 Thus he charges that, “to a great extent,
theologians still think and write almost as if Darwin had never lived.”2
One might be tempted to think that Haught has forgotten the work of Teilhard de
Chardin in combining theology with Darwinian evolution, but Haught assures us
otherwise. “Although Teilhard himself was a profoundly religious thinker, he was not a
professional theologian, and so his own efforts to construe a ‘God for evolution’ stopped
short of the systematic development his intuitions demanded.”3 Thus, Haught believes
the challenge o f properly accounting for evolution in theology still remains.

’John F. Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology o f Evolution (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2000), 1.
2Ibid., 2.
3John F. Haught, Deeper than Darwin: The Prospect fo r Religion in the Age o f
Evolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 162.
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Haught responds to this problem by proposing the possibilities of a theology
informed by evolution.
Scientific skeptics, of course, decided long ago that the only reasonable
option Darwin leaves us is that of a totally Godless universe. That theology
survives at all after Darwin is to some evolutionists a most puzzling anachronism.
We would have to agree, of course, that if atheism is the logical correlate of
evolutionary science, then the day of religions and theologies is over. But as we
shall see, such a judgement is hardly warranted. I shall argue in the pages ahead
that Darwin has gifted us with an account of life whose depth, beauty, and
pathos—when seen in the context of the larger cosmic epic of
evolution—expose[s] us afresh to the raw reality of the sacred and to a
resoundingly meaningful universe.1
Haught expresses high hopes about the prospects of a Darwinian theology: “I cannot here
emphasize enough, therefore, the gift evolution can be to our theology. For us to turn our
backs on it, as so many Christians continue to do, is to lose a great opportunity to deepen
our understanding of the wisdom and self-effacing love of God.”2
But what would such a theology be like? Haught declares: “Evolutionary theology,
unlike natural theology, does not search for definitive footprints of the divine in nature.
It is not terribly concerned with ‘intelligent design,’ since the notion seems entirely too
lifeless to capture the dynamic and even disturbing way in which the God of biblical
religion interacts with the world. Instead of trying to prove God’s existence from nature,
evolutionary theology seeks to show how our new awareness of cosmic and biological
evolution can enhance and enrich traditional teachings about God and God’s way of
‘Haught, God after Darwin, 2.
2John F. Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution (New York:
Paulist Press, 2001), 114.
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acting in the world.”1 Thus evolution is supposed to give us a richer view of God,
presumably superior to the traditional view. Diarmuid O ’Murchu, another contemporary
evolutionary theologian, expands on the idea of evolution enriching our view of God:
“Evolutionary theology wishes to keep open the possibility that all forms of creaturehood
(plant and animal alike) are dimensions of divine disclosure and can enlighten us in our
desire to understand God more deeply and respond in faith more fully. Evolutionary
theology is committed to a radically open-ended understanding of how the divine reveals
itself in and to the world.”2 This means that in evolutionary theology, nature is not used
as evidence to prove classical attributes of God. Rather, both Darwinian evolution and
God’s creatorship are assumed to be true. Thus, evolution shows us how God created,
and this method of creating, in turn, deepens our understanding of who God is and how
He operates. But, cautions Haught, “trying to locate God’s activity within or at the level
of natural biological causation really amounts to a shrinkage of God. This approach is
known as ‘god-of-the-gaps’ theology.. . . A god-of-the-gaps approach is a science
stopper.. . . But, even worse, it is theologically idolatrous. It makes divine action one
link in the world’s chain of finite causes rather than the ultimate ground of all natural
causes.”3
'Haught, God after Darwin, 36.
2Diarmuid O’Murchu, Evolutionary Faith: Rediscovering God in Our Great Story
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 88.
3Haught, 101 Questions, 18-19.
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This, in turn, means that we cannot ascribe specific activity to God. The result, as
O’Murchu notes, is that “evolutionary theology borrows liberally from process thought,
proposing God’s total involvement in the evolutionary process to be a primary conviction
upon which everything is postulated.”1 O ’Murchu further asserts that “the process
position challenges the assumption that our God must always be a ruling, governing
power above and beyond God’s own creation.”2 Why is the tendency to favor process
theology significant? O’Murchu explains, “What conventional believers find
unacceptable about the process position is the notion of a vulnerable God, allegedly at the
mercy o f capricious forces as are all other creatures of the universe.”3 Thus, the first
significant theological impact of Darwin that we shall examine is the limiting of God’s
power in order to save His goodness.

Limiting God’s Power to Save His Goodness
The limiting of divine power is one of the early issues that Haught examines in his
book, God after Darwin. Early in the book, Haught examines David H ull’s argument
that the present order is incompatible with the concept of God. Hull asks, “What kind of
God can one infer from the sort of phenomenon epitomized by the species on Darwin’s
Galapagos Islands?” He eventually answers, “The God of the Galapagos is careless,

'Ibid., 79.

2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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wasteful, indifferent, almost diabolical. This is not the sort of God to whom anyone
would be inclined to pray.” 1
Haught’s answer to Hull’s unworshipable God involves the call to alter our
concept of God to fit the data of modem science. Says Haught,
But what if “God” is not just an originator of order, but also the disturbing
wellspring o f novelty? And, moreover, what if the cosmos is not just an “order”
(which is what “cosmos” means in Greek) but a still unfinished process? Suppose
we look carefully at the undeniable evidence that the universe is still being created.
And suppose also that “God” is less concerned with imposing a plan or design on
this process than with providing it with opportunities to participate in its own
creation. I f we make these conceptual adjustments, as both contemporary science
and a consistent theology actually require that we do, the idea of God not only
becomes compatible with evolution, but also logically anticipates the kind of lifeworld that neo-Darwinian biology sets before us.2
But would this not impeach the goodness of God as Hull has charged?
A number of theologians and philosophers would answer this question, “No.”
Their solution is to argue that natural evil is unavoidable for God because His power is
limited. Bertocci argues that “the evidence indicates God is not omnipotent,” and goes
on to argue that only by having limited power can God’s moral goodness be preserved.3
C. Don Keyes states that through the work of Julian Casserley, he has come to the
conclusion that
‘David L. Hull, “The God of the Galapagos,” Nature 352 (August 8, 1991): 486.
The last lines are quoted in Haught, God after Darwin, 6.
2Haught, God after Darwin, 6. Final emphasis mine. Later, on p. 38, Haught again
appeals to the argument that if God created an unfinished, evolving universe, we should
expect natural evil and contingency.
3Bertocci, 413-414. Emphasis in original. See also 466-467 where he repeats his
argument that limited power is the only way to maintain God’s moral goodness.
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God ought not to be defined primarily in terms of sovereignty and power. The
implications of this statement liberated me from interpreting God’s omnipotence as
the kind o f coercive power capable of always preventing evil. Instead, I now
firmly believe with Plato that the goodness of God is his most essential quality and
that he is the author only of the good things that happen. Ultimately ‘power’ and
‘good’ are different kinds of reality, but of the two, good is more absolutely
attributable to God. The power of the good is almost always indirect.1
Keys gives no good reasons for ascribing goodness as an absolute quality while treating
omnipotence as a symbolic or relative quality, other than the ability to explain evil, and
possibly the support o f Plato. It is also significant, as we shall soon see, that goodness
becomes the supreme, untouchable attribute of God to which all other attributes,
including power, seem to be subjugated.
Korsmeyer echoes the refrain in which God’s power is limited in order to preserve
his goodness.
The painfully slow evolution of life, spreading in great diversity into all available
niches, trying out all possible avenues of advance, the huge role of chance, the

'C. Don Keys, “Julian Casserley’s Hope,” in Evil and Evolutionary Eschatology:
Two Essays, ed. C. Don Keys, Toronto Studies in Theology, vol. 39 (Lewiston, NY:
Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), xxii-xxiii. Casserley actually says little about God’s power,
but what he says seems to agree with Keys’s reaction to his work. In this quote,
Casserley is combating a form of humanism he perceives to focus on developing human
power but not human morality:
“Strangely enough, most of those humanists who seem drawn towards a humanism
of power are precisely the people who are most apt to react against a conception of God
as kind o f a celestial policeman wielding absolute powers over men. For myself, I not
only o b je c t to a conception o f G od that thinks o f hint m erely, o r even p rim a rily in term s

o f sovereignty and power, but I object also to any conception of man that thinks of him
merely or even primarily in terms of sovereignty or power, and I object to both doctrines
for the same reason, that they misapprehend the true value and excellence of personality
[i.e., character]. The person, whether divine or human, finds authentic self-expression in
the range and integrity o f his loving and in the wide variety of his values. A humanism
of power is as objectionable as the Calvinistic-type o f theism and for precisely the same
reasons.” Casserley, Evil, 27. Emphases mine.
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stumbling advances to greater complexity, all these things suggest a divine nature
at odds with the omnipotent God o f classical theism. The universe, as we know it,
was not created in an instant of absolute coercive power. The creeping advance of
matter and life, the spread of probabilities, the diversity of approaches, all suggest
some sharing o f power between Creator and creatures. It is as though divinity
labored to persuade, to lure creatures forward, creatures who sometimes responded
to the invitation, and sometimes did n o t.. . . The universe’s story is suggesting that
divine power is different from what we have imagined. It is like the power of love,
persuasive, patient, and persistent.. . .
. . . The idea o f creation by persuasion, surprisingly, suggests a Creator much
closer to the biblical God of love than that of classical theism.1
All of these authors speak as if their position on limiting God’s power is so self-evident
that there can be no criticism of it.
Kraemer offers three rebuttals to the limited power view of God. First, is God only
limited in power as claimed? If He is limited in power, why not in knowledge and
goodness as well? Why limit God’s power only? Second, he picks up Hume’s argument
that if God were this limited in power, He should have created fewer animals with better
faculties for happiness. Third, Kramer questions if such a limited, imprudent God is
worthy o f respect and worship. He reminds us that “other great but limited beings, saints
and heroes, clearly merit respect, but not worship. Once God is similarly limited, the
problem o f justifying the worship-worthiness of God needs to be addressed.”2

Claiming a More Exalted View of God
Haught directly addresses the issue of God’s worship worthiness and does so in
several places. He states, for example, that “if the idea of God is to arouse our instinct to
'Korsmeyer, 84. Emphases mine.
2Kraemer, 11.
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worship, this idea cannot be smaller than the universe that science has made so
conspicuous to us.”1 By contrast, “the notion of God as an intelligent designer is
inadequate. The God of evolution is an inexhaustible and unsettling source of new modes
of being, forever eluding the encapsulation in orderly schemata.”2
Haught argues that the biblical view of God, which he describes as “the
anthropomorphic one-planet deity,” is too small for the evolutionary view of the cosmos.
Thus, “the idea of a personal God such as we have in the Bible is a stumbling block for
many evolutionary scientists as well.” What we “traditionally called ‘God’ now appears
too small for them.” Thus he charges that they turn to Eastern religions “and other forms
of mysticism to satisfy their very human craving for infinite horizons.” Haught
concludes, “in any case theology must take pains to ensure that our notion of God is not
slighter than the epic o f cosmic and biological evolution itself.”3 Haught further asserts
that “to insist on a special creation, as many Christians do, is to shrink God to the role of
magician. It is also a refusal to acknowledge the creative vocation that all creatures have
in some degree, and which we humans have in a very special way. A robust theology of
'Haught, God after Darwin, ix. Interestingly, while Haught here argues that our
concept of God must be based on a cosmological perspective supplied by science, in his
Responses to 101 Questions, he argues that “this is not a God that theology invented just
to accommodate Darwin. This is the empathetic God revealed in the pages of the Bible”
(124). How can one base his view of God on the scientific discoveries interpreted
through the theoretical perspective o f Darw in, w h ile not making any accomm odation to

Darwinism? These two statements concerning the role of science through Darwin seem to
disagree with each other.
2Haught, God after Darwin, 9.
3Haught, 101 Questions, 36.
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creation finds more to admire in a divine creator who calls this self-creating universe into
being, than a ‘designer’ who directly forces everything into a prefabricated.”1 Such a
God, for Haught, loses some of the traditional concept o f transcendence, for he sees God
as “immediately operative in the depths of all natural processes.. . . The Spirit of God is
hiddenly present in all instances of new creation.”2 Alluding to Teilard de Chardin,
Haught asserts that the reality of God, from an evolutionary perspective, “begins to shift
from the One who abides vertically ‘up above’ to the One who comes into the world from
‘up ahead,’ out of the realm of the future.” This is asserted to match the biblical
eschatology of Isaiah “where God is the One who ‘goes before’ the people.”3
Reversing the analogy, Haught argues for an entering of God into creation.
“Evolution happens, ultimately, because of the ‘coming of God’ toward the entire
universe from out of an always elusive future. And just as the arrival of God does not
enter the human sphere by crude extrinsic forcefulness but by participating in it and
energizing it from within, we may assume that it does no enter coercively into the pre
human levels of cosmic and biological evolution either. The coming o f God into nature,
like the nonintrusive effectiveness of the Tao, is always respectful of the world’s
'Ibid., 53-55.
2Ibid., 53. Emphasis mine.
3Haught, God after Darwin, 39-40. See also 101 Questions, 50-51, where Haught
gives similar argumentation including the connection to Teilhard de Chardin. In 101
Questions, question 94, Haught summarizes the theology o f Teilhard including the
“omega principle” to which the “up ahead” refers. Question 95 expounds on
Whitehead’s process philosophy. These two become the pillars for Haught’s evolving
reality drawn by a God who lures all in development towards him.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

282
presently realized autonomy.”1 Haught here introduces a panentheistic view of a God as
the solution to the problem of evil. But why would God want to choose such an
unobtrusive means of wooing evolution along? For Haught, “the world is in evolution,
then, because God is a God of persuasive rather than coercive power.” Based on the
assumption that evolution is how God created, Haught argues that “it is becoming
increasingly apparent that the Creator does not want a universe that remains content with
the way things are, but one that strives adventurously to become something more.”2

'Haught, God after Darwin, 99.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 136-137. See also, idem, God after Darwin, 42, where he
uses the language o f adventure to opine that God values surprises over order.
“According to process theology, evolution occurs because God is more interested in
adventure than in preserving the status quo. ‘Adventure,’ in Whiteheadian terms, is the
cosmic search for more and more intense versions of ordered novelty, another word for
which is ‘beauty.’ God’s will, apparently, is the maximization of cosmic beauty. And the
epic of evolution is the world’s response to God’s own longing that it strive towards ever
richer ways of realizing aesthetic intensity.” Thus, Haught’s cosmic God of evolution
seems more like an adventure addict who gets his ultimate thrill from creating through a
totally contingent, random processes that surprise even Him.
Haught by his own admission appears to base this proposal on the argument the
from imagination offered by Guy Murchie. See, Haught, God after Darwin, 29-30. Says
Murchie, “Try to imagine that you are God. This might not come naturally to you. To be
God of course you have to be a creator. And a creator, by definition, must create. So you,
the creator, now find yourself creating creatures (a word meaning created beings) who
have to have a world to live in. But what kind of world should they live in? Or more
specifically, what kind o f world will you decide to create for them? . . . As for life and
adventure, Earth is literally teeming with i t . . . . Earth provides the optimum, if not the
maximum, in prolonged stimulation of body and mind and, most particularly, she excels
in educating the spirit.. . . Honestly now, if you were God, could you possibly dream up
any more educational, contrasty, thrilling, beautiful, tantalizing world than Earth to
develop spirit in? . . . Would you, in other words, try to make the world nice and
safe— or would you let it be provocative, dangerous and exciting? In actual fact, if it
ever came to that, I’m sure you would find it impossible to make a better world than God
has already created.” Guy Murchie, The Seven Mysteries o f Life: An Exploration in
Science and Philosophy (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), 621-622.
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Haught thus sees a God with limited power as more worship worthy.
Haught is not the only one to argue that a limited God is more deserving of worship
than the traditional Christian God. Korsmeyer declares, “our God should be worthy of
worship.”1 In the context of advocating panentheism, Korsmeyer asserts, “The whole of
the created universe is within God, although God is other and superior to it. God is both
eternal and temporal, and God both includes and transcends the world. But is such a
God perfect, and so worthy of worship?”2 The context seems to imply an affirmative
answer. Korsmeyer then defines divinity in a manner consistent with limited attributes:
“Indeed, God must be greatest, must be transcendent, in all categories.. . . God is defined
as that perfect, supremely excellent being, than which no other individual being could
conceivably be greater, but which itself, could become greater.”3 Thus, like Haught,
Korsmeyer asserts that God both can and does evolve with the rest of the universe. His
power is limited. But such a view produces an intriguing irony.

The Hidden, Humble God of Evolution
Haught proposes that such a panenthesitic God is actually more deeply involved in
the world than a deity who controls things by external power. His work is “interior to the
'Korsmeyer, 91.
2Ibid.

3Ibid., 92.
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process o f creation.”1 But why should we believe such a God inhabits nature? Is there
any evidence for this conclusion?
Ironically, the answer is, “no.” Three times in as many pages, Haught asserts that
the concept of divine humility better explains the evolutionary data than does traditional
theology or materialism.2 In another work, he argues that “nothing less than a
transcendent force, radically distinct from, but also intimately incarnate in matter could
ultimately explain evolution.”3 Haught describes this immanent presence as God’s “self
withdrawal,” “self-absenting,” and “self-concealment,” so as to not have any external
influence or exercise of “coercive power” over the universe.4 “God is present in the
mode o f ‘hiddenness.’”5 Twice more he asserts that God is present in the form of
“ultimate goodness.”6 Thus Haught associates the limited power of God, represented by
His hiddenness, as being ultimate goodness.
It seems ironic, with Haught’s dedication to modem science, that he claims this
hidden God can only be detected by faith. Says Haught, “The world is embraced
constantly by God’s presence. But this presence does not show up as an object to be
grasped by ordinary awareness or scientific method. It is empirically unavailable, in
'Haught, 101 Questions, 119.
2Haught, God after Darwin, 53-55.
3Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 163
4Haught, God after Darwin, 195, 197, 203.
5Ibid., 195.
6Ibid., 197, 203.
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other w ords.. . . Only those attuned to religious experience will be aware or appreciative
of it.”1 This is amazing! Haught is appealing to subjective experience for a major pillar
of his theology. And he makes the appeal more than once: “The raw ingredients of
evolution flow forth from the depths of divine love, a depth that will show up only to
those whose personal lives have already been grasped by a sense o f G od”2 A few
phrases later he reiterates, “The very fact that nature can lend itself to a literalist reading
is a consequence of the humble, hidden and vulnerable way in which divine love works.
The very possibility o f giving an atheistic interpretation of evolution is that God’s
creative love humbly refuses to make itself available at the level o f scientific
comprehension.”3
Haught claims to base this subjective discovery of God in nature from Tillich’s
concept of God as infinite depth. Thus,
religion is a state o f being grasped by inexhaustible depth that lurks beneath the
surface of our lives and o f nature too. In religious experience we do not so much
grasp this depth as allow the depth to grasp us. Depth takes hold o f us in such a
powerful way that we can neither deny it nor master it, though o f course we may
try to flee from i t . . . . This depth is a “self-authenticating force [which] assumes
an almost revelatory character. To those who have been grasped by it, everything
else pales in significance, including all previous renditions of reality.. . .
. . . When I use the term ‘God’ in this book I intend, nonetheless, to follow
Paul Tillich’s claim that God really means depth.. . . ‘God’ means the
inexhaustible depth that perpetually draws us towards itself, the depth without
which no enduring joy or satisfaction or peace is possible.4
'Haught, 101 Questions, 119.
2Ibid., 60-61. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 61.
“Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 27-29. Emphasis mine.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

286

So Haught appeals to the self-authenticating nature of divine depth as proof of God’s
immanent presence within nature. On the other hand, he does appeal to one vein of
evidence that is discemable to the unbeliever as well: Indian, Taoist, Buddhist, and
Platonic beliefs are all based on the concept of a hidden, deeper reality than the visible
world, and that Christ espoused a similar concept by declaring that God’s Kingdom is
within us.1
O’Murchu argues a similar point to Haught, using the evolutionary process as a
means o f revealing the divine. He concludes, “Consequently, revelation may be defined
as the process o f unveiling in which both the meaning o f the world and the meaning of
God become more apparent at the same time.”2 And again it is awakened and sustained
by faith. “The faithfulness of the Originating and Sustaining Mystery awakens faith not
only in the human heart, but also in the heart o f creation itself. Faith invites faith.”3
The panentheistic hiddenness of God has been argued by Haught to be an
expression o f divine humility to protect the absolute freedom of the universe. This
concept of divine humility is significant, for Haught develops it into a metaphysics for
grounding his theology.

‘Ibid., 29-30.
20 ’Murchu, 88, 90.

Tbid., 34.
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The Metaphysical Foundation of Divine Humility

Haught argues that “the metaphysics of divine humility . . . explains the actual
features of evolution much more intelligibly than either of the main alternatives.”1 But
from where does he get ideas to turn divine humility into a metaphysics? In God after
Darwin we get several clues all pointing to one conclusion: His metaphysics of divine
humility is based in the concept of the kenosis of Phil 2. Haught declares:
At the very center o f the Christian faith lies a trust that in the passion and
crucifixion of Christ we are presented with the mystery o f a God who pours divine
selfhood into the world in an act of unreserved self-abandonment. The utter
lowliness of this image has led some theologians in our century to speak carelessly
of God as “powerless.” . . . The image of God’s humility does not imply weakness
and powerlessness, but rather, a kind of “defenselessness” or “vulnerability.” . . .
The image of the self-emptying God lies at the heart of Christian revelation
and the doctrine of the Trintiy.2
A later statement asserts, “As I have noted, it is in its encounter with the crucified man
Jesus . . . that Christian faith is given this key to G od’s relation to the w orld.. . . The
Creator’s power (by which I mean the capacity to influence the world) is made manifest
paradoxically in the vulnerable defenselessness of a crucified man.”3 For Haught, the
'Haught, God after Darwin, 55.
2Ibid., 48-49. Haught makes use of the theology o f Moltmann to help establish the
conclusions quoted above. A key quotation of Moltmann is found in, Jurgen Moltmann,
G od in Creation, trans. Margaret K ohl (San Francisco, CA: Harper and R ow , 1985), 88,

quoted in Haught, 49, and reads: “This self-restricting love is the beginning of that self
emptying of God which Philippians 2 sees as the divine mystery of the Messiah. Even in
order to create heaven and earth, God emptied himself o f his all-plenishing omnipotence,
and as Creator to ok. . . the form of a servant.”
3Haught, God after Darwin, 112,113. Emphasis mine. See also p. I l l : “At the
center of Christian faith lies the conviction (John 3:16) that ‘God so loved the world that
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kenosis of Philippians 2, especially as seen in the crucifixion, is the primary way in
which God has related to creation, through eternity. “It is to this image that Christian
theology must always repair whenever it thinks about God’s relationship to the world
and its evolution.” 1 This model is one of defenseless, vulnerable love, not supervisory
governance.2
Bertocci offers an alternative foundation for this view of love. “Plato long ago
realized that it was the very essence of love to be in want.. . . Love is beautiful and wise
because it seeks the beauty and wisdom it already enjoys but incompletely; it is good
because it is lured by a good which it incompletely possesses.”3 Thus, in the Platonic
sense as well, love is seen as fundamentally empty and in need. This Platonic definition
seems to exercise great influence regarding how evolutionary theologians define love.
He gave his only Son’ to redeem and renew that world. Theologically translated, this
text and many others like it imply that the very substance o f the divine life is poured out
into creation, and that the world is now and forever open to an infinitely replenishing
future.” Emphases mine.
'Ibid., 111. Emphasis mine.
2In my opinion, Haught has missed the point of Phil 2 which is the voluntary selfsacrifice of God in Christ to provide the perfect obedience necessary to satisfy human
duties to God as the sacrificial substitute for all men. Haught seems instead to turn the
kenosis into the ultimate expression of the modem mentality of victimhood. Christ as
victim arouses our sympathies and gratitude, but the substitutionary atonement dimension
is entirely missing in Haught.
3Bertocci, 457. Bertocci is synthesizing Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 3,
Lysias, Symposium, Gorgias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P.
Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 183-189. Bertocci seems to
summarize Plato with a bit more clarity than is actually found in Plato, but the overall
concept of love being rooted in desire for good and beautiful things seems to be the
foundational concept Bertocci builds on.
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But if love becomes defined in terms of God’s defenseless vulnerability, then love
becomes defined in terms of giving total, unregulated freedom to the universe and its
creatures by his self-emptying.

Love’s Power Is Non-Coercive
A key implication of this empty, needy love is that it must be non-coercive.
Haught makes this fundamental connection by stating:
The doctrine of grace proclaims that God loves the world and all of its various
elements fully and unconditionally. By definition, however, love does not absorb,
annihilate, or force itself upon the beloved. Instead it longs for the beloved to
become more and more ‘other’ or differentiated. Along with its nurturing and
compassionate attributes, love brings with it a longing for the independence of that
which is loved. Without such ‘letting be’ of its beloved, the dialogical intimacy
essential to a loving relationship would be impossible.. . .
. . . Divine love does not compel, but invites. To compel, after all would be
contrary to the very nature of love.1
Miller argues in a similar fashion that the divine love is not a controlling power in
the universe. “The Western God stands back from his creation, not to absent Himself,
not to abandon His creatures, but to allow His people true freedom. A God who hovers,
in all His visible power and majesty, over every step taken by mere mortals never allows
them the independence that true love, true goodness, and true obedience requires.'’’2
'Haught, God after Darwin, 39-41. Emphasis mine. Haught repeats these types of
arguments on pp. 112-114.
2Miller, 253. Emphases mine. Earlier Miller has argued that “our first step would
be to assume that an all-powerful Deity decided to make creatures and to endow them
with free will and the ability to make moral choices.” How? “The genius of the creator’s
plan was that by creating a separate world, a world that ran by its own rules, He would
give His creatures the ‘space ’ they would need to become independent, to make true
moral choices" (emphasis mine). See pp. 249-250.
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Miller reiterates the argument a little later, declaring: “A world without meaning would
be one in which a Deity pulled the string of every human puppet, and every material
particle as well.. . . By being always in control, the Creator would deny His creatures
any real opportunity to know and worship Him. Authentic love requires freedom, not
manipulation. Such freedom is best supplied by the open contingency of evolution, and
not by strings o f divine direction attached to every living creature.”1
Haught uses emotive and almost pejorative language to describe the traditional
view o f God in contrast to his humble, vulnerable God.
The God of Jesus is utterly unlike . . . our traditional images of God
understood as divine potentate or ‘designer.’ Theology is offended by evolution
only when it assumes a rather imperious concept o f divine omnipotence.. . .
Evolutionary science, however, demands that we give up one and for all the
tyrannical images we may have sometimes projected onto God. The real stumbling
block to reconciling faith and evolution, therefore, is not the sufferings in nature
and human history, but our failure to have acquainted ourselves sufficiently with
the startling image of a God who seeks the world’s freedom and who shares in the
world’s pain.2
In another work, Haught declares, “Only a narrowly coercive deity would have collapsed
. . . creation . . . into the dreary confines of a single originating instant.” He further
describes such a process as ‘‘f reezing nature into a state of finished perfection.”3 He calls
such a sovereign God “our divine magician.”4 By contrast, evolution invites us to
“recapture the often obscured portrait of a self-humbling, suffering God who is anything
'Ibid., 289. Emphasis mine.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 127. Emphasis mine.
3Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 80. Emphasis mine.
4Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

291
but a divine controller or designer o f the c o s m o s The evolutionary God “refrains from
wielding the domineering power that both skeptics and believers often project onto their
ideal of the absolute.” Yet God is not “a weak or powerless God incapable of redeeming
this flawed universe, but one whose salvific and creative effectiveness is all the more
prevailing because it is rooted in a divine humility.”2
Kosmeyer makes similar arguments to Haught. “Absolute power is not a trait
consistent with a God who is love; shared power i s . . . . In our neoclassical model, God’s
power is solely persuasive. God persuades creatures into being.”3 Korsmeyer ties this
view of God to the worship issue. “A God who is love is worthy of worship; a God who
is omnipotent, whose power is coercive, is not.”4
Haught welds the concept of non-coercive power to the effectiveness of divine
influence. “God’s compassionate self-restraint allows for the world’s self-creation and
‘Ibid., 81.
2Ibid., 82.
3Korsmeyer, 96. Emphasis in original. In arguing for a power-sharing God,
Korsmeyer sounds not unlike Mill. Mill argues that the problem of evil makes us
worship a contradictory god, for “the ways of this Deity in Nature are on many occasions
totally at variance with the precepts, as he believes, of the same Deity in the Gospel.”
The only non-contradictory view of Deity for Mill is one which posits two competing
principles or powers, one good and one evil. But this seems, for Mill, to diminish the
good god’s power, for, “a virtuous human assumes in this theory the exalted character of
a fellow-laborer with the Highest, a fellow combatant in the great strife; contributing his
little, which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much, towards that
progressive ascendency, and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil,. . . as
planned by the Being to whom we owe all the benevolent contrivance we behold in
nature.” Mill, 113, 116-117.
4Korsmeyer, 94.
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permits God to be much more deeply related to the world than a divine dictatorship
would be. God’s power may be said to be relational rather than unilateral. Relational
power is more vulnerable but ultimately more influential than unilateral power since it
allows for more autonomy, integrity and richness in the world to which God is intimately
related.”1 Thus Haught asserts that, “in the final analysis, persuasive power is more
influential, more ‘powerful’, than coersion.”2 In a different text, Haught expands the
argument, declaring: “Process theology responds that if power means ‘the capacity to
influence’ then a persuasive God is much more powerful than a hypothetical being who
magically forces things to correspond immediately to the divine intentions. A coercive
deity—one that an immature religiosity often wishes for . . . would not allow for the
otherness, autonomy, and self-coherence necessary for the world to be a world unto
itself.”3 Haught also ties the concept of a loving, non-coercive deity to a rejection of
external influence in a way that essentially demands a wholly immanent view of God.
“How effective, after all, is coercive power, even in the human sphere? At best it can
manipulate things or persons only externally. It can never influence from within, but only
•Haught, 101 Questions, 139. Final emphasis mine; all others are original.
2Ibid., 138.
3Haught, God after Darwin, 41. Emphasis mine. See also, Haught, 101 Questions,
where w e find question 97: “Isn’t W hitehead’s notion o f persuasive power a gratuitous
diminishment of God’s omnipotence?” He answers, “Process theology would answer
that it is not. For if ‘power’ means ‘the capacity to influence,’ persuasive power has a
much deeper impact on the world, at least in the final analysis, than would any
hypothetically coercive exercise of force.. . . A world created by divine compulsion
would be nothing more than an appendage o f God’s own being rather than world unto
itself’ (138).
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superficially from without. In the presence of a vulnerable, defenseless love, however,
the world is allowed to experience its own internal power—a power of self-creativity that
eventually takes the form of human freedom. God’s power is manifested most fully in
God’s self-emptying empowerment of the creation.”1 Haught is looking for the best way
that God can exercise non-coercive, freedom-giving power to nature and to man. Thus,
for Haughk, to avoid external coercion and demonstrate his humility, God must become
fully immanent in relation to nature.2

Panentheistic Nature of Evolutionary Theology
We have already seen statements by Haught and others clearly implying a
panentheistic view of God, but now we shall see that this position is clearly advocated
through the concept of a divine incarnation with the material universe. For example,
Haught describes his God of evolution as “a promising God already incarnate in
matter.”3 Commenting on the saying of Jesus, “if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw
all [men] unto me,”4 Haught offers an alternative model of incarnation, declaring, “This

‘Haught, 101 Questions, 115. Emphasis mine.
2C. S. Lewis offers an important critique o f such an overselling of divine love: “It is
for people that we care nothing about that we demand happiness on any terms: with our
friends, our lovers, our children, we are exacting and would rather see them suffer much
than be happy in contemptible and estranging modes. If God is love, He is, by definition,
something more than mere kindness.” L ew is ascribes the em phasis on a non-intervening

view of divine love to the desire to have “a grandfather in heaven—a senile
benevolence,” who merely wishes that “a good time was had by all.” Lewis, Problem o f
Pain, 40-41.
3Haught, 101 Questions, 115.
4John 12:32, KJV.
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image suggests that the most glorious form o f power is that which humbly invites other
beings to enter into organic unity with God of their own accord, and not out of
compulsion.”1 A page later, Haught describes this organic unity o f nature with God in
these terms, “Christ’s human nature, according to the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451),
must not get lost in the divinity to which it is united. God clearly wants to relate to a
world that is ‘other’ than God. In Christ’s human nature, Christians believe, the whole
universe somehow subsists. So in the Christian way of looking at things, God’s presence
in the world does not dissolve the world any more than the divine nature of Christ
nullifies the humanity of Christ.”2
This is a most interesting argument. It argues analogically from the incarnation in
Christ to a broader incarnation of God into the universe. Just as God was in Christ
without destroying His human nature, so God is said to be in the world in a similar
fashion, without obliterating it. This is quite reminiscent of the organic union model of
Dawkins in his ring-species argument. Haught appears to see God as organically united
with the physical cosmos. Yet it is not without some irony, that Haught also sees the
incamational model as a way of avoiding us merging the world with God to the point that
no distinction can be made between the two.3 He asserts a need to maintain the
'Haught, 101 Questions, 117. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 118. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 118-119.
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otherness of God from the world “if we are to avoid pantheism.”1 Nevertheless, Haught
describes Jesus as having an “incamational solidarity with all of nature and history, [by
which] the suffering in these realms is assimilated into the life of God where it takes on
an unfathomable but redemptive meaning.”2 Thus an organic level o f union is strongly
implied.

God Feels the Pain Found within the Cosmos
The panentheistic concept of God incarnating with the universe introduces an
interesting implication to evolutionary theology. Because God is organically united to
the material world, He feels its pain and suffering.3 Says Haught,
Evolutionary thought helps us move beyond the aloof apathetic deity of so much
pre-Darwinian piety. I believe, along with many other theologians today, that the
•Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 79. Haught thus rejects a pure pantheism, but
accepts the panentheism of process theology.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 125.
3For example, see Murchie, where he addresses the problem of finding meaning
and solves it by advocating process theology: “The key philosophical question then boils
down to: why the world? What are we here for? Specifically, why were you and I
conceived such sorry worms upon a troublous mote named Earth? It is a tough one.
Scientists and philosophers have wrestled with it for millenniums to meager avail.. . .
But one of the better [theories] among recent ones is ‘process theology,’ which postulates
that God, along with His universe, is in a perpetual process of development.. . . Although
it limits God, from a human standpoint, by associating Him with a finite time field,
process theology compensates, as I understand it, by permitting his all-knowingness to be
explained by making all life an actual part of His experience. Thus what you and I do and
think, Godfeels and knows eternally through our senses, our lives, our aspirations, our
sacrifices, our creations, along with all such everywhere”(620). Emphasis mine. It is
significant that God’s knowledge is argued to come through the sensory apparatus of
creation. Does this imply that God cannot know independently of the creation? Murchie
does not address this question.
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notion of God as self-emptying love makes sense after Darwin. This is the God
who suffers along with creation and saves the world by taking all o f its
evolutionary travail and triumph into the everlasting divine compassion.. ..
The suffering of living beings, therefore, is not undergone in isolation from
God, but becomes part of God’s own story.. . .
. . . By seeing it all as God’s own suffering, we can hope for an ultimate
victory of love and life over pain and death.1
Haught ties this idea of God sharing in the world’s suffering to the kenosis metaphysics
by invoking Christ’s passion, declaring, “According to the Christian faith, the passion
and resurrection of Jesus present us with the portrait of a God who shares fully in the
suffering o f this world and who rises victoriously over it.”2 This is Haught’s answer to
the theodicy issue in the problem of natural evil. God suffers with us, and our suffering
is eternally recorded in God’s experience.
John Bennet makes a similar argument. “Furthermore, since God’s experience,
unlike ours, is radically and perfectly complete, his actuality is co-extensive with all that
is. In short, God includes within his experience the totality of nature— nature as we
abuse it as well as nature as we care for i t . . . . The God of love is so related to everything
that as things occur and change, the occurrences and changes register (perfectly) with
God.”3 In fact, without this process theology view, says Bennet, “nature has no religious
value if it makes no contribution to the actuality of God.”4
That O’Murchu likewise believes in an incamational model of nature is clear for he
•Haught, 101 Questions, 124, 126. Emphasis mine. See also Murchie, 620.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 124.
3Bennet, 75-76.
4Ibid., 75.
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asserts that, “in the becoming of creation, the God-reality also takes shape and form; in
the suffering of pain and evolution, God also suffers and struggles.”1 But he then goes a
step further in specifically applying this paradigm to human beings. Very early in his
book he declares, “I believe in the incarnation of the divine in the human soul, initially
activated in Africa over four million years ago.”2 Later, he reiterates and expands on this
point. Referring to the appearance of man in evolution as a product of the “divine
energy” 4.4 million years ago, O’Murchu continues, “This is where we encounter
incarnation for the first time. In its basic sense, incarnation means God coming in the
flesh of humanity, fully entering into that embodied condition, blessing and affirming
that all that is happening to it, and using it thenceforth as a means of bearing witness to
the presence o f the divine in the world. Everything Christians claim was happening to
our humanity in and through Christ had started 4.4 million years ago.3 O’Murchu cites a
widespread record o f human history testifying to belief in God as an immanent force
within nature as a major evidence for this incarnation, panentheistic paradigm of God.
He then notes that this same majority of human beings has tended to see this force in
feminine terms, a female deity, which O ’Murchu referrs to as “goddess consciousness.”4
'O ’Murchu, 79.
2Ibid., 3.
3Ibid., 153.
4Ibid., 90.
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God as Mother
Korsmeyer agrees that the feminine view of deity is helpful in understanding the
panentheistic view of God. “Another helpful metaphor is God as Mother of the world.
Imagine the world as present in the womb of God, created and nourished by divine
love.”1 O’Murchu notes that in this approach God is not being viewed historically as a
feminine being, but rather as the possessor of a certain set of qualities. “Such qualities
include fertility, creativity, intensity of engagement, diversity of involvement,
immanence in the cosmic and planetary processes, paradox, and above all, relationality.”2
He then adds, “Comparing creation to a female womb has resonances in a number of
religious traditions.”3
It should be no surprise that a mother-God has been presented by these scholars.
Elizabeth Achtemeier, in her critique o f feminist theology, notes the propensity for
pantheistic views of God found in the concept of goddess.
It is precisely the introduction of female language for God that opens the
door to such identification with the world, however. If God is portrayed in
feminine language, the figures o f carrying in the womb, of giving birth, and of
suckling immediately come into p l a y .. . . But if the creation has issued forth from
the body of the deity, it shares in the deity’s substance; deity is in, through, and
under all things, and therefore everything is divine.. . . If God is identified with his
creation, we finally make ourselves gods and goddesses—the ultimate and
primeval sin (Gen 3).4
'Korsmeyer, 94.
20 ’Murchu, 90. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 91.
4Elizabeth Achtemeier, “Why God Is Not Mother: A Response to Feminist GodTalk in the Church,” Christianity Today, August 16, 1993, 20. As an aside, Achtemeier
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Thus, O’Murchu and Korsmeyer have made a very natural comparison of God a woman
or mother. Such a view meshes well with a pantheistic or panentheistic view of God,
thus strengthening their argument for a highly immanent God.

Salvation as Deification
Achtemeier’s analysis points to a tendency to argue salvation as a type of
apotheosis. We can find this tendency in evolutionary theology. In a Roman Catholic
newsletter of opinions, Jack Keene levels a charge against Teilard de Chardin that may
also apply to our evolutionary theologians. After an undocumented quotation of Teilhard
confessing pantheistic tendencies, Keen asserts, “Teilhard essentially taught that the
world itself was being transubstantiated into Christ.”1 In Haught’s argument that God’s
presence in the evolutionary process is hidden, but real, we can see a concept very similar
to the commonly understood Catholic concept of the sacrament. God is said to work in
nature in the same way that He is said to work in the sacrament. Thus it is not surprising
that Haught, a Roman Catholic,2 uses sacramental language in defining divine revelation
observes that, “The few instances offeminine imagery fo r God in the Bible all take the
form o f simile, not metaphor.. . . That distinction is instructive. A simile compares one
aspect of something to another. For example, in Isaiah 42:14, God will, ‘cry out like a
woman in travail,’ but only his crying out is being referred to; he is not being identified
as a whole with the figure of a woman in childbirth. In metaphors, on the other hand, the
whole of one thing is compared with the whole of another” (19). All em phases in
original.
'Jack Keene, “Teilhard, Darwin, and the Cosmic Christ,” Southern Papist
Perspective: A Catholic Opinion News Letter, Fall 1999, Issue 44,
http://www.trosch.org/for/teilhard-keene991.htm (18 May 2004).
2Haught, God after Darwin, 6-7.
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as “the communication of God’s own selfhood to the world.”1
Korsmeyer also expresses the ultimate destiny of the world in terms of apotheosis.
“The divine life is constantly receiving the lives of everyone in the world, and adding
each moment to the collected moments of their past. All these moments are experienced
by God with no loss of intensity or immediacy. The past o f the world enters the
everlasting present o f the divine immediacy. The world is transformed in God, who
weaves everything that is worthwhile into greater harmony, a greater whole.”2 For
Korsmeyer, “Perhaps we have been called into existence to assist the great divine
evolutionary plan to move the whole universe toward divinity, to be co-workers, co
creators in bringing about the Kingdom of God among us. Perhaps eschatology has to be
rethought.”3
Closely associated with this new direction in eschatology is the issue of what
happens at death. Haught tends to reject the body/soul dualism that means a separation
of the soul from nature, and seems to see death as a further aspect o f God’s incarnating
‘Ibid., 39. In the context, the word “communication” seems to carry the
connotation of sacrament as understood in Roman Catholicism.
2Korsmeyer, 102. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 88. In saying God has an evolutionary plan, Korsmeyer may be treading on
dangerous ground. In the 1980s, one Protestant denomination combined the concepts of
an evolutionary view o f origins, with the biblical doctrine o f human dom inion over

nature to concoct a Christianized form o f Julian Huxley’s Moral Darwinism, where man
takes over the supervision of his own evolution. This included advocacy o f eugenics and
abortion as tools for managing our evolution. For more information see, Stephen Bauer,
“Genesis, Dominion, and Ethics: A Critical Analysis of Ethics Based on the Concept of
Dominion in Genesis 1:26-28,” Journal o f the Adventist Theological Society 6, no. 2
(1995): 77-108.
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Himself into nature. Thus, death “would not be a distancing from, but a movement
toward a deeper intimacy with, and eternally embodied deity.”1 Resurrection seems to be
seen as almost typological, a symbol of the process where God “opens up a new future
for humans and for the whole creation.”2 How would this panentheistic absorption into
the divine, impact our understanding of eschatology?

Evolution, Eschatology, and Human Preference
Korsmeyer asserts that “the idea of God bringing the universe to an end in the near
future through Christ’s second coming is not compatible with the evidence of the divine
efforts in the universe for fifteen billion years.”3 O’Murchu likewise affirms, “I no
longer believe in the anthropocentric myth of the end of the world. There is every
likelihood that we humans will destroy ourselves, but not creation. Creation has an
infinite capacity to cocreate.”4 Haught likewise denies, based on an evolutionary
perspective of our world’s history, that there was an original, perfect world that lost its
perfection and will once again be restored. “Thus, a scientifically informed
understanding of redemption may no longer plausibly make themes of restoration or
'Haught, God after Darwin, 162. Here and on the next page, Haught’s presentation
o f death sounds almost like the Eastern Religions’ hope of Nirvana, the absorption of all
individuals into the cosmic one. Says Haught, “A theology of death sensitive to ecology
and evolution would interpret dying in Christ as a transition from our present relatively
shallow associations with the world to an ever deepening solidiarity with the entire
universe and its future with God.” Emphasis mine.
2Ibid„ 114.
3Korsmeyer, 88.
40 ’Murchu, 4.
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recovery dominant.. . . It would be absurd, therefore, to seek the restoration of a
chronologically primordial state of material dispersal.”1 Not only does evolutionary
theology overturn our concept of God, but it also seems unable to support the hope of a
restored, sinless perfect world. The second coming of Christ disappears from the
theological radar screen.2 And it is in the context of this concept of eschatology that our
evolutionary theologians see fit to raise the issue of human preference.
For Haught, “Evolution, to repeat our theme, means the world is unfinished.” But
on the other hand, “redemption, therefore,. . . must mean . . . the healing of tragedy (and
not just the consequences of human sin) that accompanies the universe in v ia .. . . It
would be callous indeed on the part of theologians to perpetuate the one-sidedly
anthropocentric and retributive notions of pain and redemption that used to fit so
comfortably into pre-evolutionary pictures of the world.”3 Thus, the traditional plan of
salvation is seen as being overly favorable to human status. Korsmeyer holds a similar
position: “Second, any ‘exclusive’ theology, which in effect suggests that God is only
concerned with one group of people on one planet o f one small star, is not credible. It is
the product o f a theology that considers Scripture in a literalist manner, convinced it
provides a comprehensive scientific worldview, and has not considered the scientific
'Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 170.
2Even without doing evolutionary theology, Darwin’s theory has historically shown
a penchant for undermining the biblical doctrine of the second coming. One good
example is, Zachary Hayes, What Are They Saying about the End o f the World? (New
York: Paulist Press, 1983), 40-46. Hayes cites a number of scholars holding to this
denial. O f significance is that Hayes explicitly ties denial of the parousia to evolution.
3Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 169. Last emphasis mine.
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evidence of who we are, where we are, and how we got here.”1 Korsmeyer further posits
the need o f animals for a similar redemption to humans. “What we can be very sure of is
that God loves them and wills their salvation. It is the divine nature to love.”2 So, the
new interpretation o f salvation includes animals with man in such a way that human
preference is diminished so as to include the animals. While not as fully developed as the
non-theistic evolutionists, there is a clear leaning towards rejecting human preference in
moral matters, just as Rachels predicted would happen.

Divine Feeling as the Ground for Animal Rights
How, then, does God redeem man, animals, and all of nature? By feeling,
experiencing, and remembering forever all earthly suffering through being pantheistically
present in the world.3 For Korsmeyer, the fact that God feels all sentient suffering,
including animals, becomes the basis of rights. “The process viewpoint even has
implications for animal rights. Since all individuals, human and otherwise, are felt by
God, and thus have value in themselves, they have rights and we have duties towards
them.”* This means humans cannot be elevated over the animals because the sufferings
o f both are incorporated in the divine being. It further implies that to cause unnecessary
’Korsmeyer, 89.
2Ibid., 129.

3Haught, 101 Questions, 139; idem, Deeper than Darwin, 82; idem, God after
Darwin, 43. See also Korsmeyer, 101-102.
“Korsmeyer, 101-102. Emphasis mine. His position appears to ground moral
duties in the obligation not to cause further pain to God, a kind o f cosmic painism, so to
speak.
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pain to the animals is to cause that pain to God. Korsmeyer then finds another way to
undermine human significance.
Korsmeyer makes a very Rachels-like statement when he argues that “there is no
substance that has been placed into the human body that can be marked, or that is
different from animal souls. That difference is in degree, though still ‘immense.’”1 He
refines his point by asserting
that which we call soul in humans is not a substance that appears at conception or
birth. The potential to become a human being occurs at conception. But the
potential is not actual; therefore the becoming of a human being goes through many
stages in time. Personhood develops in time. The mature human is self-conscious,
has memories, hopes and fears, anticipates the future, and transcends the physical
world in value, creativity, and knowledge of God. The development of human
personhood goes through stages as a human matures, it is not an absolute, and
cannot be used as though it were, to support arguments against abortion or
euthanasia, for example.2
Thus, another reason humans cannot have moral preference is that their human status is
seen as being a relative quality, apparently based on certain individual functions instead
of some inner essence. Again we have discovered that the evolutionary and process
theologians investigated here have all ended up drawing conclusions remarkably similar
to Rachels.

The Validation of Rachels
Evolutionary Theology Verifies Rachels’s Claims
Rachels has used the issues of teleology and the problem of evil to argue that
'Ibid., 101.
2Ibid.
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Darwinism relates to theism in one of two ways. Evolution is either incompatible with
theism or, in the event of maintaining belief in God, cannot support a view of divinity
robust enough to support traditional Christian ethics. I have taken a long detour through
the problem of natural evil and then on into evolutionary theology to look at some serious
evidence in relation to these claims. How have Rachels’s assertions fared?
I believe Rachels is fundamentally correct in this analysis of the relationship
between Darwinism and theism, and thus between evolution and traditional morality.
The God of the evolutionary theolgians is too non-coercive to give any kind of specific
moral guidance. Such direction would likely be seen as an infringement on human
freedom. Furthermore, Benjamin Wiker, publishing a decade later than Rachels but
never citing Rachels in his work, explains why Rachels is right in his conclusions
concerning the relationship of theism to Darwinism.

The Metaphysical Nature of Evolution Verified
Wiker corroborates Rachels’s assertion that Deism is the only form of theism
compatible with Darwinism. In addition, he agrees with Rachels’s assertion that,
ultimately, atheism is not easily resisted within the Darwinist framework.
Deism therefore became the religion of the new [materialist] view of nature;
that is, it was the religion that a closed system of nature would allow. As with
Epicurus, the divine was both distant and impotent to interfere with nature.. . .
[This] was rooted in the Epicurean animosity to an interfering, miracle-performing
deity. Simply put, Deism was the form religion had to take in a Newtonian
cosmos; and one sign that God did not ultimately belong in the system was the all
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too easy slide of Deism in the eighteenth century to materialist atheism in the
nineteenth.1
Wiker further asserts that “it was the materialist prohibition of miracles that provided the
strongest acid in dissolving biblical authority, and thereby helped prepare the West for
the reception o f evolutionary theory as a substitute faith.”2 It is significant that Wiker, a
theist and Christian, has come to similar conclusions as Rachels, apparently
independently of any influence from Rachels. Both Rachels and Wiker thus imply that
Darwinism has a metaphysical dimension hidden within the theory. In fact, Wiker is
quite explicit, saying, “Darwinism in its most fundamental sense is not merely
biological, but truly cosmological in scope.”3 Hunter concurs, charging evolution with
masking its metaphysical tendencies. “Darwin’s great contribution to this tradition [of
distancing God from creation to avoid natural evil] was the scientific flavor he gave to
the solution, to the point that most readers lost sight of the embedded metaphysical
presuppositions. Whereas the earlier solutions lacked detailed explanations, Darwin
provided scientific laws and biological details.”4 For Wiker, the two key consequences
'Wiker, 205. Two pages later,, Wiker proves his point that atheism becomes hard
to resist by relating the story of one theologian, David Friedrich Straus (1808-1874).
“Typical of a whole line of German and English scriptural scholars of the nineteenth
century, he gave up doctrine after doctrine in an frantic effort to save the faith from
irrelevancy, and having given everything away, he himself became a materialist denying
Christianity altogether.. . . The historical lesson is simple, and allows Straus to stand as a
kind of nineteenth-century type: having adopted Epicurean m eans, Straus could not help
but achieve Epicurean ends, not only in his work as an exegete, but in him self’ (207).
2Ibid., 239-240.
3Ibid., 215.
4Hunter, 117.
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of this hidden metaphysics is that Darwinian materialism has “devoured God the creator
and the immortal human soul, leaving behind a completely Godless, soulless universe.”1

The Connection between Cosmology and Morality
Wiker’s mention o f the immortal soul is significant for it is only through this
medium that Wiker sees the possibility of life after death, which, in turn, makes divine
judgement possible.2 Wiker agues that Epicurus saw life under the threat of divine
reward and punishment as undesirable and thus needed a new cosmology that would get
rid of the gods and thus make the good life, a life without fear of future accountability,
possible.3 Wiker observes, of Epicurus, that “he very astutely realized that every way of
'Wiker, 20.
2Ibid., 21-22. For Seventh-day Adventists, Wiker’s assertion that Darwinism does
away with the concept o f divine judgment, and thus human accountability to God, is
significant on two fronts. First, SDA’s deny the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as
being unbiblical. However, they would agree with Wiker that a concept of afterlife is
needed in order to have a viable form of reward and punishment. This is reflected in 1
Cor 15, where Paul argues that if there is no resurrection, then the Christian hope of
afterlife becomes meaningless and we might as well “eat, drink; for tomorrow we die”
(vs. 32). So, then, Wiker is correct in asserting the doctrine of afterlife as essential to the
judgment. However, he either ignores or fails to see the bodily resurrection promised in
1 Cor 15 as an alternate means to the immortal soul for making afterlife a viable
possibility.
3Ibid., 20-22. See also, Wiker, where he makes a similar claim for the
Epicureanism revived in the Renaissance and onward: “Epicureanism became hedonistic
in modernity because its modem proponents believed that if the pleasures of this world
were increased, the worries about, and belief in, the next world dissolve. The pleasures
of the body, so they thought, would dispel the belief in the soul” (156). This is also seen
in Mill, where he explicitly uses Epicureanism to argue against sacrificing present
pleasures for future promises of reward such as is found in Christianity (105). Richard
Dawkins, in reacting to the September 11, 2001 airliner attacks on the Twin Towers in
New York City, also takes a very negative view of belief in an afterlife, and the religions
that teach it. “Religion teaches the dangerous nonsense that death is not the end. If death
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life, every view of morality, is groundless unless it is grounded in the way things actually
are, in nature.”1 This assertion Wiker labels “the great law of uniformity.”
According to the great law of uniformity, “every distinct view of the universe,
every theory about nature, necessarily entails a view of morality; every distinct view of
morality, every theory about human nature, necessarily entails a cosmology to support
it.”2 This means that “materialist-defined science must necessarily lead to materialistdefined morality.”3 Thus, "Epicurus designed a view of nature to fit his desired way of
life, a cosmology to support his morality. Modernity began by embracing his cosmology
and ends by embracing his morality.”4 This is just another way of demonstrating what
we examined earlier: Acceptance or rejection of teleology in nature determines whether
or not one's morals also derive from a master design.5
if final, a rational agent can be expected to value his life highly and be reluctant to risk it.
. . . There is no doubt that the afterlife-obsessed suicidal brain really is a weapon of
immense power and danger.” For Dawkins, “To fill a world with religion, or religions of
the Abrahmic kind, is like littering the streets with loaded guns. Do not be surprised if
they are used.” Richard Dawkins, “Religion’s Guided Missiles,” Guardian Unlimited, 15
September 2001, www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4257777,00.html (22
February 2004).
‘Wiker, 22.
2Ibid. Also, “A materialist cosmos must necessarily yield a materialist morality,
and therefore Darwinism must yield moral Darwinism” (27).
3Ibid., 23.
4Ibid.
5See pp. 229-243 o f this dissertation.
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Two Cosmologies at War
Wiker again mirrors Rachels in arguing that Christianity and Darwinism are
irreconcilable. “Any attempt to reconcile the two— either from the side of theology, as
for example, Kenneth Miller’s Finding Darwin’s God or John Haught’s God after
Darwin, or from the side o f Darwinism, as for example Michael Ruse’s Can a Darwinian
Be a Christian? or Stephen J. Gould’s Rocks o f Ages—can only end in conjuring up a
superfluous deity or cobbling together an incoherent, unstable, ‘two spheres’ approach
(where the universe is tidily divided between science and religion).”1 O f the former
charge, Wiker adds that “the problem with a superfluous deity should be obvious.. . .
Evolutionary theism (or any of its variants), rather than providing anything new, is
merely following in the ruts of Epicurus’ wagon.”2
As to the latter assertion, Wiker argues that Gould’s concept of non-overlapping
magisteria (science and religion—i.e., materialism and theism) “is bound to fail,” and
also that it “is doomed to failure.”3 This is because of the power of the great law of
uniformity: “No amount o f gerrymandering of reality whether it has its roots in Polybius,
or the good intentions o f the materialists, or the desperation of Christians, can override
this most fundamental law: there is only one universe.”4 Thus, “as a house divided
’Ibid., 27. Gould’s book information is, Stephen J. Gould, Rocks o f Ages (New
York: Ballantine, 1999).
2Wiker, 314.
3Ibid.
4Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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against itself cannot stand, so also our society [or church], defined by two ancient and
antagonistic accounts o f nature and human nature, cannot withstand this fundamental
disagreement for long.”1 By “releasing the gods from toil, Epicurus was really releasing
nature, and hence human nature, from any divine interference,” so fulfilling his goal of
“owr freedom from disturbance.”2 Wiker goes so far to allege that,
indeed, no greater and more effective alliance has existed for the eradication of
Christianity, both doctrinally and morally, than that between liberal Christianity
and materialists.
But there are other Christians, those who have made peace with Darwinism,
but who resist the encroachments of moral Darwinism—not realizing, in
conformity to the great law of uniformity, that acceptance of one must bring
acceptance of the other. You cannot accept the theoretical foundations of
Darwinism and reject the moral conclusions.3
To a great degree, this is exactly what Rachels asserted over a decade before Wiker,
though in much less detail. Wiker draws two moral implications of the cosmological
shift to materialism.
•Ibid., 25.
2Ibid., 45. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid., 301. It should be noted that for Wiker, Christianity seems very much tied to
Aquinas and Aristotle. This is especially evident on pp. 103-104 where he speaks with
great approval o f Aquinas’s integration of Christianity with Aristotle, followed by
allegations that “radical Augustinianism,” which appears to be his euphemism for the
Protestant Reformation, as a major aid in reviving Epicureanism. Thus he appears to
charge Protestantism with undermining true Christianity without directly saying so.
Wiker seems to have created a type of Great Controversy motif, but instead of
being framed in terms o f Christ verus Satan, it appears to be structure in terms of
Aristotle (through Aquinas) vs. Epicurus. For the Protestant who claims the principle of
Sola Scriptura, this is a problematic point for it bypasses the supremacy of scriptural
authority, while implicating the Reformation as aiding that which is destructive to
Christianity. Wiker’s argument that cosmology is the grounding issue is significant and
correct. This is why the Bible starts with a cosmology in Gen 1, and why the Sola
Scriptura Christian should reframe Wiker’s motif into Scripture vs. Epicurus.
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Two Implications for Morality
For Wiker, the first implication of the new cosmology is that in the evolutionary
view, humans lose their preferential place in the moral universe. Wiker specifically
asserts that Darwin’s “Descent o f Man, destroyed the distinct feature, reason, which
nonmaterialist philosophy understood as the sign of the existence of an immortal and
immaterial soul in man.”1 Here Wiker verifies the veracity of Rachels’s argument that
the rationality thesis was a key pillar of establishing human preference and is undermined
by evolution.2
Wiker then highlights a second implication of Darwinism for ethics which parallels
with Rachels: The supreme importance of the individual. After explicating that Thomas
Hobbes’s explanation of nature is not friendly to the concept of family, due to the
inherently antagonistic stance between individuals asserting self-interest, Wiker adds:
“The atomistic individualism that Hobbes’s account promoted must continually view the
natural family as a side effect of sexual desire. As the consequence of this myth, modem
Epicurean hedonism will continually strive to liberate sexual desire from its unintended
side effect, procreation. Another important hallmark of Epicurean hedonism will follow
upon this: as opposed to the natural law argument that the family is the foundation of

'Ibid., 239. Emphasis in original.
2Ibid. Wiker likewise precedes this conclusion with a similar tactic to
Rachels—citing Darwinian statements that there is no substantive difference between the
mental capabilities of man and animals. It is a matter of varying degrees, not o f kind. So
Wiker again, without citation of Rachels, has made a very similar moral argument and
conclusion concerning Darwin’s theory and ethics.
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society, modem Epicureanism will make the individual—the presocial unit, as it
were—the foundation of society.”1 If the individual is the foundation o f society, then it
would seem that morality becomes the protection of the individual’s rights, as in Hobbes.
Rachels has merely taken this concept beyond the human to any individual, and Wiker
has shown us why—the inherent individualism of materialist metaphysics forces such a
conclusion unless vigorously resisted.

Rachels’s Unfinished Work
I believe Rachels is fundamentally correct in this analysis of the relationship
between Darwinism and theism. The data from the evolutionary theologians, as well as
from Hunter and Wiker, have repeatedly validated Rachels’s position. But Rachels, it
seems, has not gone far enough in his effort to undermine Christianity and its moral
veracity. While mentioning the doctrines of creation, divine revelation (including the
moral law), the plan of salvation, and the eschatological end of the world, he focuses only
on creation and the cosmological dimension reiterated by Wiker. In the other three areas
he is strangely silent, not developing any of those issues to any degree o f significance. I
propose Rachels could easily have gone further than he did.

Extending Rachels’s Attack
Rachels alluded to the ten commandments as part of the biblical picture of God’s
regard for man. But if Darwinism is accepted as factual, then the lack o f teleology means
'Wiker, 164.
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there can be no divine design for morality, just as there was none for creation. Why
would God avoid design in creation only to have design in morals? The designless
theism that Rachels rightly demands of Darwinism would have to eliminate the ten
commandments, and all other direct moral guidance by God as shown in the Bible. In
such a scenario sin is eliminated since there can be no divine law or design to violate.1
Thus Darwinism clearly undermines the foundations of biblical morality and theism.
The elimination of the ability to sin (because there is no divine design such as the
10 commandments) means one would eliminate the need of salvation from sin and its
penalty. There would be no need for an incarnation and sacrificial death by Christ for
incarnation is a designed, planned, unnatural act incompatible with Darwinism or a
deistic god who uses no design. Removing teleology thus undermines yet another pillar
of Christian faith which points to human dignity and preference.
Additionally, if there is no divine design, how can such a theism have any
meaningful eschatology? If suffering and death are tools of evolutionary progress, then
death and suffering are natural. Death is no longer an enemy as the Scriptures declare
(for example, 1 Cor 15:26). If Darwin is right, then why should we hope for the world to
come in which death and suffering will be no more (Rev 21-22)? Man’s importance in
the plan o f salvation and divine future is replaced by an uncertain future of natural
selection, personal insignificance and death. There can be no special destiny since there
is no divine design which calls for it.
'Rom 4:15; 5:13; 7:7. Paul here argues that sin is not reckoned where there is no
law and that he would not know what sin is except for the law.
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Furthermore, the destruction of eschatology destroys human accountability to God,
a crucial element of morality for it is impossible to have accountability without design. If
there is no design, how can there be a judgement?1 I would propose that without
accountability one can not have a genuine morality. If the moral capacity in humans
evolved through traits of altruism, as Rachels and others have suggested, then morality
merely becomes being helpful to others. But morality is bigger than mere unselfishness.
It involves justice and injustice. Thus morality is bigger than the evolutionists tend to
depict it. Why argue over moral obligations if there is no accountability? This question
begs a question Rachels never addresses: Why be moral?2 What difference does it make
whether one is moral or immoral if there is no accountability to a being with universal
moral authority?
Rachels seeks to answer the accountability question by declaring his adherence to
the Kantian doctrine that moral precepts are self-imposed upon by the morally and
rationally autonomous agent. The penalty for violating these self-imposed moral
precepts is, “in Kant’s words, ‘self-contempt and inner abhorrence.”’3 But there are
'For Seventh-day Adventist theology this is especially devastating due to the great
emphasis on the “investigative judgment.” Such a judgment is incompatible with
Darwinism or deism, leaving man with no real accountability to God. Deism and
Darwinism cannot sustain such a doctrine.
2W hile R achels does not address the question, “W hy be moral?” Peter Singer does.

Helga Kuhse reports that he wrote his MA thesis on this question, and Singer devotes the
final chapter of Practical Ethics, “Why Act Morally?” to the issue as well. See Kuhse, 9;
Singer, Practical Ethics, 314-79. In a simplistic nutshell, Singer argues we should be
moral because it gives our lives meaning and direction in a meaningless world, and
brings greater personal happiness than purely self-centered living.
3Rachels, “God and Moral Autonomy,” 118.
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plenty of people who have no sense of any duty, let alone self-imposed duty, and who
feel no “self-contempt,” regardless of their actions. Thus Rachels seems to assert that
there is no external accountability in morality. But on what grounds can one argue with
the “immoral” person to convince them of their immorality? Rachels has offered his
doctrine o f treating people as they deserve to be treated. But who decides this issue? If
individuals decides just deserts, ethics will degenerate to egoism and vigilanteism. The
alternative for Rachels is to argue for a type of contractual morality as a means of
protecting one’s own interests.

Is the Concept o f God Antithetical to Ethics?
As to the charge that the concept of the existence of God is antithetical to ethics, it
seems that the rationale is more driven by emotion than logic. This can be seen, in part,
by the fact that before Rachels starts his essay on this matter, he has a header quoting
Kant: “Kneeling down or grovelling [sic] on the ground, even to express your reverence
for heavenly things, is contrary to human dignity.”1 Such a quip clearly is designed, by
its setting, to arouse strong emotions against the idea of submission to a supreme being.
It is seen as being contrary to human dignity. Ironically, it has been this very dignity that
Rachels has sought to undermine by attacking the image of God thesis.
Second, the concept o f God’s sovereignty presented by Rachels is nothing more
than a caricature o f divine sovereignty as found in Scripture. For Rachels, divine
sovereignty seems to be construed as only being a mindless, moronic submission to God.
'Ibid., 109.
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Rachels may have a point if one’s understanding of God is akin to Calvin’s doctrine of
divine sovereignty. This may be because Rachels generally appeals only to Augustine
and Aquinas as representative o f Christianity.1 Scholars holding a heavily Augustinian
view of divine sovereignty, such as Charles Hodge and Millard J. Erickson, have
animated discussions in their writings trying to explain how God wills everything that
happens before it happens, and yet somehow we can still be said to freely choose to do
what God willed we would do, and therefore must do.2 Such interpretations of divine
sovereignty have greater vulnerability to Rachels’s charge that divine sovereignty and
human moral accountability are incompatible. But other Christian versions of the
doctrine o f God are less susceptible to Rachels’s complaint.
To say that God deserves unconditional submission is not necessarily contradictory
with human moral freedom. The God o f Scripture invites us to “reason” with Him (Isa
1:18). Additionally, man must have moral freedom before this almighty God or else
there could be no moral accountability to Him, including a judgment.3 Just because we
'Rachels never makes direct reference to Protestant sources of Christian theology.
This seems to be a significant omission by Rachels. To never mention Calvin or Luther,
for example, seems to be a glaring omission. Possibly due to the strong theological
connections o f Calvin and Luther to Augustine, Rachels felt them to be secondary
sources in reference to Augustine. Still, the equation of Christianity with solely Roman
Catholic sources seems to be a critical weakness of Rachels.
2See, for exam ple, Charles H odge, S ystem atic Theology (N ew York: Charles

Scribner and Company, 1872), 541-546; Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1985), chapter 16, esp. 357-362.
3Would it be fair to hold a severely mentally handicapped human accountable for
an action they are unable to comprehend is wrong? Suppose a 45 year old with a mental
capacity of a three-year-old played with matches, thus starting a fire that destroyed
several homes, killing one person. Would we charge such a person with arson? In like
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ought to submit to God does not mean that we have to submit. The Scriptures reveal a
God who gave freedom to Adam and Eve to disobey, albeit they were held accountable
for their free choices. Accountability to divine judgment is precisely the tool that allows
God to be fully sovereign and humans to be truly free moral agents who can be held
accountable. Rachels, instead, sees accountability to anyone except oneself alone as
antithetical to morality, yet we have seen that such a position makes it all too easy to be
immoral without consequence. Morality, without accountability to a higher authority,
collapses. And indeed, this collapse is what Rachels argues Darwinism does to
traditional ethics. Thus, Rachels’s argument that the existence of God is incompatible
with the human moral freedom does not account for the necessary conditions for having
free moral agents. It seems rooted in a psychological aversion to a God who grants
freedoms but holds us accountable.
Rachels has offered one last trump card to oust God from morality: Plato’s
Euthyphro argument. We have seen that Rachels clearly believes that he has proffered an
unanswerable argument to the traditional theist. Either God is arbitrary, or there is an
independent standard of good. One could easily get seduced into responding point by
point to the subtleties o f Plato’s argument. But I believe this misses the point. The real
answer lies outside the parameters framed by Plato, and further developed by Rachels.
Both fail to take into account one key attribute of God found in Scripture. For Plato this
manner, God cannot hold dogs to the same standards as humans. Morality presupposes
the capacity to be both moral and responsible. If not, moral demands lose their authority
and power. This does not mean that this mentally handicapped person has no rights. But
it means they cannot be held to the same moral standard as the average human.
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is excusable as he was likely ignorant of the Hebrew Scriptures and historically prior to
the Christian era. But for Rachels there is less excuse. And what is this attribute of God?
Divine foreknowledge.
The Bible teaches that God knows the end from the beginning. This includes a
knowledge of the future which separates Him from the other gods o f antiquity.1
Furthermore, it is clear that God not only knows what will occur, but also what might
happen. This is most easily seen in the blessings and curses of the covenant with Israel.
God lists out two possible scenarios and Israel’s choices will determine which avenue is
actualized.2 Thus God is the only being who is qualified to determine good and evil
consequentially. He is not subject to the limitations of consequentialism due to His
foreknowledge and perfect wisdom. Neither Plato nor Rachels accounts for this
possibility.3 It is not without significance that those influenced by process theology deny
God’s ability to foresee future, freewill choices.4 In so interpreting God’s abilities, they
'Isa 45:21; 46:10. In these two chapters God contrasts Him self with the idol-gods.
The idol-gods are made while God is maker (thus the significance o f the doctrine of
Creation) and God is Lord of the future, and the idol-gods have no ability to control or
foretell the future. The uniqueness of God as Lord of the future is again highlighted in
Dan 2:27-28,47, and all of chapter 4.
2See Deut 27-29.
3In Gen 3, prior to the fall of man, God is said to have known evil. Presumably He
also knew the workings of evil prior to the fall of Lucifer and the angels as well. How
then, could God have known evil if it did not yet exist, and that it was evil?
Foreknowledge of what might happen allows Him to see what is destructive and useful to
the welfare of His creatures.
4See, for example, Bertocci, 448-449, where he argues from a process perspective
that in order for us to be truly free, God cannot foreknow future freewill choices. Thus
God’s foreknowledge is limited to that which is believed to be knowable, which does not
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undermine the very means by which God knows what is good and evil, and thus able to
show us what is good.1
James Rachels has taken great care to systematically undermine any possibility of
combining theism with ethics. Like Sampson’s attack on the two pillars of the Philistine
temple, Rachels is attacking two pillars he believes upholds the temple of traditional
Christian morality—the image-of-God thesis and the rationality thesis. For the believer
in Darwinism, the religious pillars for traditional ethics, especially human preference,
have been removed.
Rachels has made a significant effort to produce an alternative ethical theory that is
rooted in Darwinian principles. He has been especially insightful in showing how an
ethics based on Darwinism might look. While I disagree with his choice of supporting
the Darwinist position contrary to Christianity, Rachels has made a fundamentally lucid
and accurate assessment of the fatal implications of Darwinism for Christian ethics. But
an important question remains: Has Rachels accurately portrayed biblical theology in
relation to nature?

include future free choices. See also, Charles Hartshome, Omnipotence and Other
Theological Mistakes (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), 3-4, 3739. Freewill Theism, also called the Openness of God, holds a view of divine
foreknowledge similar to the process theologians, though for different reasons. For more
on Freewill Theism, see David Basinger, The Case fo r Freewill Theism: A Philosophical
A ssessm ent (D ow ners Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996), esp. chapters 1-2; Clark

Pinnock and others, The Openness o f God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional
Understanding o f God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994). For an overview
of the current foreknowledge debate, see Gregory A. Boyd and others, Divine
Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2001).
‘See Mic 6:8, “He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good.”
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Rachels and Scripture
Introduction
When James Rachels published Createdfrom Animals in 1991, theological works
focusing animal and environmental issues were virtually nonexistent. In the decade
following Rachels’s volume, there has been an eruption of published works seeking to
develop theological justifications for protecting the environment and animals.1 These
efforts have generally represented an approach to Scripture which treats the Bible and
non-biblical sources as equal in authority. One example of this perspective is illustrated
in the work o f Stephen Webb. He asserts, “I need to substantiate my point that the Bible
alone is for Christians a necessary but not sufficient basis for developing an ethics of
animal compassion.”2 Thus he proposes a method based on Tillich’s concept of
“correlational theology” in which biblical and non-biblical sources dialogue as equal
partners in a give-and-take arrangement not “governed and controlled by a single
'A major pioneer in the theological realm has been Andrew Linzey, several of
whose works we have cited several times previously. Additional works include, Stephen
Webb, On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology o f Compassion fo r Animals (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998); idem, “Ecology vs. the Peaceable Kingdom: Toward a
Better Theology of Nature,” Soundings 79 (1996): 239-252; John Passmore, “The
Treatment of Animals,” Journal o f the History o f Ideas 36 (1975): 195-218; Lewis G.
Regenstein, Replenish the Earth: A History o f Organized Religion’s Treatment o f
Animals and Nature— Including the Bible’s Message o f Conservation and Kindness
Tow ards A nim als (N ew York: Crossroad Publishing, 1991); Steven Boum a-Prediger, F or

the Beauty o f the Earth: A Christian Vision fo r Creation Care (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Books, 2001). Thirteen different authors have contributed chapters to Good News fo r
Animals? Christan Approaches to Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B.
McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993).
2Webb, God and Dogs, 20.
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philosophical method,” and having “no essential form or structure.”1
Most o f the studies done in the last decade are closely allied to Webb’s
methodology. Furthermore, most of these efforts appear to be forms of systematic rather
than biblical theology. Nevertheless, these authors do make some significant
observations about what Scripture says about the relationship of humans to nature, and
particularly to animals. I shall briefly survey how these authors use Scripture to
establish the moral value of animals as biblical. Then I shall turn to two aspects of
biblical theology that may shed further insight. First, I shall examine what Gen 1 means
by the term “dominion,” and second, I will survey how divine limitations on human
usage of animals and nature demonstrate a clear limitation of that dominion.

Does Scripture Value Non-Humans?
Theological Attempts to Establish the Worth
of Nature and Animals
Stephen Webb observes that, in Scripture, the animals were pronounced “good”
prior to and independently of the creation of man, suggesting they have some inherent
value in themselves. Additionally, Webb appeals to the biblical record of the inclusion
of animals in the Sabbath commandment, the saving of animals in Noah’s ark, and
Mosaic laws protecting both wild and domestic animals to assert that the Bible depicts
animals as having inherent value in themselves, which entitles them to compassionate
treatment. He likewise argues that the angel’s chastisement of Balaam, in part, for how
'Ibid., 18.
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he abused his donkey, shows God’s displeasure with animal abuse.1 Thus he lays an
effective foundation of biblical data to support his claims. It may be argued, however,
that Webb has a tendency to do minimal exegesis and thus tends to use the biblical
references more like “proof texts.”
Lewis Regenstein makes essentially the same arguments as Webb, based on the
same passages. In addition, he cites such texts as Exod 23:5, where one is to help their
enemy’s beast get up when unable to rise due to its heavy burden.2 Unfortunately,
Regenstein often does little more than cite texts, leaving it to the reader to figure out why
the text is relevant to the discussion. By contrast, Ellen White explicitly argues a direct
duty to animals based on this same text. Commenting on the story of the good
Samaritan, she says,
The merciful provisions o f the law extended even to the lower animals, which
cannot express in words their want and suffering. Directions had been given to
Moses for the children o f Israel to this effect: “If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his
ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of
him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him, thou
shalt surely help with him.” Ex. 23:4, 5. But in the man wounded by robbers, Jesus
presented the case of a brother in suffering. How much more should their hearts
have been moved with pity for him than for a beast of burden!3

•ibid., 20-23.
2Regenstein, 19-21.
3Ellen G. White, The Desire o f Ages (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1940,
500.
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Ellen White insightfully argues that Mosaic law contains regulations with implications
for animal welfare. It also seems clear that helping the enemy’s beast is precisely for the
sake of the beast itself, in spite of its master’s reputation. Thus, Ellen White shows the
Bible appears to depict duties to animals independently of benefitting people.
Regenstein, however, does nothing of significance to unpack this text. By contrast,
Regenstein does do more explication in exploring the implications of the Sabbath (with
its inclusion of the animals in the prescribed rest), Jesus’ comments on rescuing animals
in distress on the Sabbath, the role of animals in justifying God’s concern for Nineveh,
and Balaam’s incident with his talking donkey.1
Regenstein’s weakness is that he tends to treat texts with high exegetical potential
too superficially, while simultaneously over-focusing on weaker texts, sometimes using
them completely contrary to their context. For example, he cites Num 35:33-34 as
talking about environmental pollution, when the context is the moral pollution of the
“land” by blood-feuds.2 Such questionable exegesis undermines the credibility o f the
points just cited.
These scholarly attempts to grapple with the relationship of mankind to nature are
commendable. It is lamentable that Rachels apparently never responded to works such as

•Ibid., 19-21,24, 36,38.
2Ibid., 20. This example is followed by using Isa. 5:8 to condemn real estate
developers who don’t leave enough green zones in their subdivisions. The context,
however, seems to be condemning their greed, and not to address environmental issues.
In the ensuing pages there are more examples o f such severing of the text from its
context. See pp. 22, 34-35, and 41.
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these in the years between publishing Created from Animals and his death a little over a
decade later. Likewise, Evangelicals have been slow to address the issue of the Bible and
our attitudes towards animals and the environment. Thus we must ask: Can a sola
Scriptura theology produce an ethics of respect for nature and compassion to animals? I
suggest that there is evidence that the Bible does not support a despotic view of human
dominion as suggested by Rachels and others. While I cannot do a full biblical theology
of nature here, I shall use an introductory exegesis of portions from Gen 1 as a case study
to demonstrate the despotic viewpoint does not appear to be supportable by Scripture.

Dominion in Genesis 1:26,28
Some implications of “image" and "likeness"
Genesis 1:26 states that man was made in God’s image (selem; aba) and likeness
(cTmuf, ni&n). Elsewhere in Scripture, selem (aba) is used to depict idols and statues (see
1 Sam 6:5, 11; Ezek 7:20; 16:17).1 Thus it connotes the idea o f something copying or
representing a unique, original entity. In Gen 1:26, “image” is immediately
communicated in terms of human dominion over the earth (vs. 26), suggesting, it would
seem, that man’s dominion over the earth is to mimic or image God’s rulership over the
universe. Nahum Sama takes such a position by observing, "The continuation of verse
‘See also, John E. Hartley, "aba," Theological Wordbook o f the Old Testament, ed.
R. Laird Harris (Chicago, IL: Moody, 1980), 2:767, where he notes that selem (aba) is
used only o f images depicting things related to deity. For an extended discussion of the
nuances of aba, with many listed sources, see F. J. Stendebach, "aba selem, "
Theological Dictionary o f the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer
Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 12:391-396.
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26 establishes the evident connection between resemblance to God and sovereignty over
earth's resources."1
These same ideas are reinforced by the parallelism of "image" (selem; nbx) with
"likeness" (cTmut; niQl). While "likeness" seems to be less discussed, and there is some
disagreement on the relationship "likeness" with "image" among those who discuss it,
there seems to be some consensus that "likeness" is either interchangeable with, or a
modifier that limits the meaning of "image." This limitation is usually asserted in terms
of making it clear that man as the image of God is not to be seen as identical with God,
but rather being similar to God.2 Hamilton asserts that the "concrete term, 'image' is
toned down by the more abstract term, 'likeness."'3 There seems to be some significance
to this last observation. "Image" tends towards a conceptual model that is frozen and

'Nahum M. Sama, Genesis: The Traditional Hebrew Text with New JPS
Translation, The JPS Torah Commentary, ed. Nahum M. Sama (New York: Jewish
Publication Society, 1989), 12. Sama goes on to make the classic argument to which
Rachels objects: "In other words, the resemblance of man to God bespeaks the infinite
worth of a human being and affirms the inviolability of the human person."
2Bruce Waltke, with Cathi J. Fredericks, Genesis: A Commentary (Grand Rapids,
MI: Zondervan, 2001), 66; Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, trans. John H.
Marks (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1961), 56; Victor P. Hamilton, The Book o f
Genesis: Chapters 1-17, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament, ed.
R. K. Harrison (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 135; Victor P. Hamilton, "nDT."
Theological Wordbook o f the Old Testament, ed. R. Laird Harris (Chicago, IL: Moody
Press, 1980), 438; H. D. Preuss, "rtEn damah\ r w i cTmut," Theological Dictionary o f the
O ld Testam ent, ed. G. Johannes Botterw eck and H elm er Ringgren (Grand R apids, MI:

Eerdmans, 1978), 257.
3Hamilton, Genesis, 135. See also Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, Word
Biblical Commentary, vol. 1, ed. David A. Hubbard, Glenn W. Barker, and John D. W.
Watts (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 29, where he notes that cTmut ( rnD'n) has the
ending of an abstract noun.
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rigid, like a statue. "Likeness," being more abstract, brings in a more flexible, dynamic
dimension akin to the concept of similarity. I suggest that (fmut ( m m ) helps clarify
selem (pbs) by adding a more dynamic dimension and nuance.
The close relationship between (fmut ( m m ) and selem ( a ^ ) is underscored in
Gen 5:1-3 where the two words are used in an extremely similar fashion to Gen 1:26, yet
reversing the use of the Hebrew prepositions, 3 and 3. Again this implies an essentially
synonymous use of the two terms in Genesis.1 Sailhamer captures this synonymity when
he observes that each animal was made according to its kind but man and woman were
made in the image of God, not merely according to their own kind. Thus, "man's image
is not simply of himself; he also shares a likeness to his creator."2 What is the
significance o f this emphasis, the image and likeness of man to God being a dynamic
similarity?
The Bible presents God’s fundamental relationship to the earth and universe as one
o f nurture and sustenance (Heb 1:3; Ps 104). Since man was made to be the image of
God, it seems evident that his dominion was meant to mimic God’s sustaining rule. Jesus
notes that God not only cares for sparrows (Matt 10:29; Luke 12:6) but He even cares for
“the grass o f the field, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven” (Matt
6:30). Frear notes that the underlying assumption of Christ’s argument assumes a basic
'See Sama (12) and Wenham (30) where both assert the interchangeability of these
terms in the Genesis text. Hamilton also notes that some argue this view (TWOT, 438).
2John H. Sailhamer, "Genesis," The Expositor's Bible Commentary, ed. Franke E.
Gabelein (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), 2:37.
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value for animals.1 It would seem, then, that since God cares for and values plants and
sparrows, so should His image. Therefore, we can infer a moral duty to animals and
nature, framed in terms of humans having the obligation, as God’s image, to mimic and
copy His nurturing and sustaining stance towards the natural world. This means that
human dominion was to be exercised within the limits of the divine example. What,
then, is the meaning of “dominion?”

The meaning o f “dominion”
William White observes that the verb for dominion, rnn (rada), is used twenty-two
times in the Old Testament, with the first uses occurring in Gen l.2 Victor Hamilton
further asserts that whereas in the majority of the uses of r m (rada), the word usually
describes one person or nation ruling over another, it is sometimes used to describe a
“shepherd’s supervision over his flock (Ezek 34:4).”3 He further notes that
the last passage—Ezek. 34:4— shows that rada could be connected with force and
harshness. Such is not the normal nuance o f the verb, however. Thus the three
passages from Lev 25 expressly say the master is not to rule over his servants with
harshness.. . . The reigning king of Ps 72 is also the champion of the poor and
disadvantaged. What is expected of the king is responsible care over that which he
rules... . Man is created to rule. But this rule is to be compassionate and not
’George L. Frear, Jr., “Caring for Animals: Biblical Stimulus for Ethical
Reflection,” in Good News fo r Animals? Christian Approaches fo r Animal Well-Being,
ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 6-7.
2William White, “2121 iTTi (rada),” Theological Wordbook o f the Old Testament,
ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke (Chicago, IL: Moody
Press, 1980), 2:833.
3Hamilton, Genesis, 137.
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exploitative. Even in the garden of Eden, he who would be lord of all must be
servant of all.1
Gerhard von Rad also notes the royal theme in Gen 1:26-28. According to von
Rad, the concept of man as the image of God is derived from the practice of a king
placing an image o f himself in a province he does not visit, as a symbol of his claim of
authority over the region. Thus, “man is placed upon earth in God’s image as God’s
sovereign emblem. He is really only God’s representative, summoned to maintain and
enforce God’s claim to dominion over the earth.”2 Accordingly, humans would not be
entitled to do as they please. Rather, they were expected to operate within God’s policies
which sustain and nurture, but do not exploit, von Rad notes that if we wish to discover
what it means to be made in the image of Elohim, we find in ancient Israel that Elohim
was characterized by descriptors, “wise” and “good” (2 Sam 14:17,20; 1 Sam 29:9).3
Claus Westermann also asserts that Gen 1 contains “echoes o f the Ancient Near
Eastern royal ideology,” but with a key difference. In other cultures, man was said to
have been created “to relieve the gods of the burden of everyday work.” By contrast, “in
Gen 1:26 the goal of humans is within this world—dominion over the animals.. . . The
goal of the creation o f humans is detached from the life of the gods and directed to the
life of this world.”4 Thus, he asserts that “people would forfeit their kingly role among
‘Ibid., 137-138. Emphasis mine.
Von Rad, 58.
3Ibid., 57.
4Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1984), 159.
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the living . . . were the animals made subject to their whim.”1 Westermann thus sees
human dominion as conditioned on properly representing God’s methods of nurturing
rulership.
Gordon Wenham echoes the arguments o f Westermann and von Rad. He further
develops, however, the idea of a philosophy of kingship when he asserts:
Because man is created in God’s image, he is king over nature. He rules the world
on God’s behalf. This is o f course no license for the unbridled exploitation and
subjugation o f nature. Ancient oriental kings were expected to be devoted to the
welfare of their subjects, especially the poorest and weakest members of society
(Ps 72:12-14).... Similarly, mankind is here commissioned to rule nature as a
benevolent king, acting as God’s representative over them and therefore treating
them in the same way as God who created them. Thus, animals, though subject to
man, are viewed as his companions in 2:18-20.2
Nahum Sama further develops a similar concept of kingship to that asserted by Wenham:
The verbs used here and in verse 28 express the coercive power of the monarch,
consonant with the explanation just given for “the image of God.” This power,
however, cannot include the licence to exploit nature banefully, for the following
reasons: the human race is not inherently sovereign, but enjoys its dominion solely
by the grace o f God. Furthermore, the model of kingship here presupposed is
Israelite, according to which, the monarch does not possess unrestrained power and
authority; the limits of his rule are carefully defined and circumscribed by divine
law so that kingship is to be exercised with responsibility and is subject to
accountability.3
Bishop echoes this same sentiment when he asserts,
The earth is not humanity’s to do with as it seems fit. It is God’s creation, and as
God’s delegates, we are to take care of it on his behalf; humanity is accountable to
God for its treatment of the earth (cf. Pss 115:6; 8:4-6).
‘Ibid.
2Wenham, 33.
3Sama, 12-13.
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It is not rulership without limits. God follows on from the cultural mandate to
place immediate constraints on dominion: men are not to kill for food (w . 2930 ) . . . .
. . . Dominion is not a dictatorial rulership, we are not to lord it over creation:
it is a delegated rulership, a rulership that is accountable. As God’s stewards of
creation, we will be called to account for how we have treated his earth.1
It seems abundantly clear that Gen 1 contains a limited-dominion motif, including
accountability to God for how that dominion is exercised. The readers of Genesis should
understand human dominion as a divinely granted gift to be managed according to God’s
sovereign will. There is doubtless more that can be done to mine the theological content
of Gen 1 concerning the relationship of mankind to nature. However, we have seen
enough biblical evidence to demonstrate a clear pattern of limited, nurturing dominion
and to exclude the viability of exploitative interpretations.

Argument from Divine Restrictions
Bishop appeals to a second body of evidence to assert that human dominion was
always regulated. He asserts that “Gen 2:15 contains an amplification of what it means
to subdue and rule, and here the context is that of the garden.”2 He further adds that the
garden context of the command to dress and keep the habitat implies a servant motif
restricting the concept of dominion.3 Bishop could have strengthened this assertion by
‘Ibid., 8-9. The “cultural mandate” is described in comments on Gen 1:26-28, as a
call to develop and unfold creation as image bearers of God. See p. 8.
2Bishop, 9. See also, Callicot, 2.
3Bishop, 9.
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noting that in Gen 2:15, man was appointed to “cultivate” (“QI? - ‘abadf and to “protect”
("lOT - shamar),2 and that neither word implies a despotic dominion. Webb aptly
observes, “Traditionally, Christian theology portrays heaven as a garden, not a wild
jungle, a place like the original garden of Eden where God allows life to grow without
the countless sacrifices and violent death.” Thus, “exploitation is not a form of
gardening.”3
Bishop interprets this conditional, limited dominion of man over nature in terms of
a stewardship model where there can be no exercise of absolute power by man.4 In a
similar vein, Regenstein argues that human dominion is simply a stewardship over the
natural realm, exercised as a subsidiary governor to extend God’s nurturing dominion

‘According to the Theological Dictionary o f the Old Testament,
used with an
inanimate objects means, “to work on, develop, cultivate.” With personal objects, it
“means ‘serve’ and expresses the relationship between an ‘ebed and his or h e r . . . lord,
master.” This latter use would suggest that cultivation is to be viewed from a service
perspective and not one of exploitation. Helmer Ringgren,
Theological Dictionary
o f the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, Heinz-Josef Fabry
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 10:382. In addition, ‘ebed (a servant) is the noun
form of the verb, thus reinforcing the service orientation of the verbal form.
2In Gen 3:24, this word describes the activity of the cherubim in guarding the
entrance o f the garden to prevent human entrance. Thus we see its connotation is of
protection, not exploitation.
3Webb, “Ecology,” 245,246.
4See also Morris, 2, where he argues for an accountable stewardship of man over
nature. See also Pinches, 195-201, where he asserts the concept of man being the image
o f God to mean mimicking God’s sustaining care over nature.
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into the world.1 Stewardship implies some restrictions and accountability to the owner or
sovereign.
Prior to the fall of man, clear limits were imposed on the use of natural resources
by divine command. First, a particular fruit tree is declared off limits, apparently as a
means of demonstrating God’s ownership and man’s stewardship (Gen 2:15-17).
Second, Keil and Delitsch note that both man and animals were given a diet “exclusively
from the vegetable kingdom.” They further conclude, “From this it follows, that,
according to the creative will of God, men were not to slaughter animals for food, nor
were animals to prey upon one another.”2 As Webb states, “The Genesis account
provocatively portrays a vegetarian world . . . in which the humans exercise authority
over the animals but do not use or kill them.”3 Thus even prior to the fall, we see limits
on man’s use of nature. He is given no opportunity to act at whim.
After the fall, Bishop notes that we find further limitations on human dominion.
People were not to eat the blood of animals; fields are not to be reaped to the borders;
fruit trees could not be harvested during their first five years, nor could their wood be
used to build siege works; a kid could not be boiled in its mother’s milk; the ox was not
'Regenstein, 27.
2C. F. Keil, and F. Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, Biblical Commentary on the Old
Testament, vol. 1, trans. James Marti (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1949), 65. See

also, Gary L. Comstock, “Pigs and Piety: A Theocentric Perspective on Food Animals,”
in Good News fo r Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles
Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 112, where he makes
a similar argument.
3Webb, God and Dogs, 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

333
to be muzzled while threshing grain; they were to obey the law of the bird nest in which a
mother bird was not to be taken with the young; and they were to implement sabbatical
years for resting the land.1
Jo Ann Davidson highlights the divine limitation on human dominion by citing
Mosaic laws that protect both the environment and animals. For example, in war, fruit
trees were not to be cut for military usage. While this could be interpreted as primarily
for the benefit o f humans—not destroying the food supply—the protection of trees shows
a limit on human sovereignty. Humans thus were not allowed to use nature any way they
wished. In addition, Davidson cites the protection of animals employed in labor for
human masters— the ox is not muzzled while threshing grain (Deut 25:4); one should
help his enemy’s animal rise with a heavy load (Exod 23:4-5; Deut 22:1-4); and the
sabbatical years for the land (Lev 25:6-7).2 Such divinely given regulations reinforce the
idea that human dominion over nature was never absolute, nor does it justify exploitative
use of the natural world. Clearly such restrictions imply that it is not God’s plan that man
have unrestricted dominion over nature.
Both Davidson and Henry Morris appeal to the implications of the weekly Sabbath
rest prescribed even for animals (Exod 20:8-11; 23:12). Morris asserts that this
•ibid. Biblical citations, in order, are: Lev 17:10-14,19:9,23; Deut 20:19,25:4,
22:6; Lev 25:1-12.
2Jo Ann Davidson, “Seventh-day Adventists and Ecology,” in The Word o f God fo r
the People o f God: A Tribute to the Ministry o f Jack J. Blanco, ed. Ron du Preez, Philip
G. Samaan, and Ron E. M. Clouzet (Collegedale, TN: School of Religion, Southern
Adventist University, 2004), 360-361. A similar argument can be found in Frear, 6-7.
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addresses the issue o f human dominion, for God “ordained a weekly rest for animals as
well as people.”1 This point is significant, in that the extension of the Sabbath restriction
on work to draft animals suggests that humans were not seen as having unrestricted
dominion over the animals. Thus, the Sabbath commandment protects animals from
undue exploitation by humans. While it is true that Jesus declared the Sabbath was made
for man, this does not have to mean it was made exclusively for man. Rather, the
Sabbath protection o f work animals seems better understood as part o f God’s overall care
for the animals, including the wild animals.2 Morris ties the weekly Sabbath protection
for animals to the resting of the land during sabbatical years to further show that God
restricted man’s use of nature. “Although His greatest provisions are for men and
women, He also provides for animals, and even for the land itself.. . . If God is so
careful to provide for His creatures, we as His stewards thereof should also care for
them.”3 Morris’s comments evoke yet again a stewardship model of man’s relationship
to nature. Thus the biblical model appears to fit well with the theistic version of the
indirect duty model for determining moral obligations to nature and animals.

Duties to Animals Based in Creation Kinship
In addition to restrictions on the use of nature by humans, we also find a form of
'Davidson, 361; Morris, 3.
2Both in the Psalms and in the sayings of Christ we find depictions of God’s care
for the wild animals. For example see, Pss 104:14, 21, 27, 28; 136:25; 147:9; Matt 6:2730; 10:29-31; Luke 12:6-7, 27.
3Ibid.
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kinship argument depicted in Scripture. George Frear argues cogently that “the Bible
recognizes human kinship with animals. The terms ‘flesh’ and ‘all flesh,’ for instance,
often join human and animal together.” He observes that “the Hebrew word, nephesh
denotes the ‘life’ or ‘will’ or ‘soul’ of human and animal.” He also notes that
animals share the same “breath of life” and man.1 Frear argues that the Bible does
differentiate between man and animal as well, but insightfully concludes, “This aspect of
the biblical outlook only qualifies, it does not remove, the sense of kinship.”2 This
commonality highlights the stewardship and indirect duty models proposed earlier,
pointing to the common creator of all and His loving, sustaining rulership over all.
Creation kinship, however, does not undermine human preference.
Steve Bishop argues that “the opening chapters of Genesis show that humanity’s
relationship with the rest of creation is ambiguous: we are part of it and we are above
it.”3 While highlighting God’s care for the sparrow, Christ reminds us that “you are of
more value than many sparrows” (Matt 10:29). The elevated status of man over the rest
of nature is no more incompatible with moral duties to animals than God’s exalted status
is with His nurturing care of us and of the non-human realm. One can believe both in
special human moral status and in moral duties to animals.
Since I have argued for basing animal treatment on an indirect duty to God as part
'Frear, 5. He appears to be alluding to Gen 2:7; 6:17; Eccl 3:19, though he does
not cite specific texts.
2Ibid.
3Bishop, 9. Emphasis in original.
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of a theology of stewardship, this means that I have essentially argued that animals have
a type of moral status, even rights. I have argued that God grants special status to
humans as the image of God, while Rachels has argued contrarily to both points. Since
God owns humans too (1 Cor 6:19-20, is it not possible that God grants rights to animals
too, and may those rights not differ in their content and level o f protection from humans?
To grant rights to animals does not entail equal rights with humans. Thus, while the
Bible never classifies killing an animal as murder, it does exhort us that the righteous
man regards the life of his beast (Pro 12:10). Furthermore, a functional model is
theologically akin to legalism where salvation—in this case rights—are meritoriously
earned. By contrast, God's kingdom is based in grace, where free moral agents are called
to deny self and protect the poor and weak (Rom 6:14; 15:1-2; Matt 16:24; 25:40-45;
Jas 2:1-7). Therefore, humans rights are graciously extended to marginal humans while
basic protections against abuse and exploitation are graciously given to animals. Hence,
to grant rights to humans based on species membership is neither speciesist not
exploitative, but rather a gracious act o f God. These grant-based rights protecting human
welfare do confer on us a right to abuse and exploit those of lesser rights and status,
including the animals.
There is much more that could be done, but it seems safe to make the following
conclusion. There is sufficient biblical data to seriously undermine the charge that the
doctrine of man’s being made in the image of God gives him unbridled sovereignty over
nature. Furthermore, the curses in Gen 3 strongly suggest that a significant portion of
that dominion was lost through the curse on Adam and Eve. Thus our dominion is even
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less absolute than prior to the fall. But the evidence appears to favor the interpretation
that the pre-fall form of dominion was still based in a stewardship model of nurturing
care, with due accountability to God. As Geisler has shown, “It is not the Christian view
that encourages the abuse of nature, but the materialist view.”1 Thus, evolutionary
materialism seems more likely to produce despotism in man, than the biblical view.
James Rachels may not have given as balanced a view of Christianity and Scripture
as he might have. However, the sad truth is that Christendom has often given credence to
Rachels’s charges. Ultimately, it is not the charges and countercharges that matter.
Rachels is one of a very few to catch the significance of protology for ethics, and even if
his presentations of theological issues are incomplete, his work with the foundational
issues seems well done. We have seen his predictions fulfilled in regard to theism and
the moral significance of human beings. It is time, now, to review what we have learned
and assess its significance.
‘Geisler, 308. For Geisler’s full discussion on these two views see, 294-298, and
302-309.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary
Ever since Charles Darwin published his ideas on the theory of evolution,
individuals have been passionately pursuing questions regarding the relationship of
Darwinian theory to ethics and morality. Churchmen, philosophers, and scientists alike
have made claims for and against the viability of such an endeavor. Attempts to use
Darwin’s theory to guide ethics can be divided into three historical stages. The first stage
covers the period from the time of Darwin to about World War One. Stage two covers
the era from the first world war into the 1960s. The third stage extends from the 1970s to
the present.
The third stage carries special significance for Christian ethics, for three key
reasons. First, it is in this stage that proponents of Darwinism declare it to be more than
science. Some now admit that evolution is a world-view, and thus ascribe a metaphysical
dimension to Darwin’s theory. Second, the new Darwinian influence on morality has
becom e som ewhat ubiquitous, spreading from the ivory towers of academia into

everyday life and society.
Third, this stage of evolutionary morality makes a focused attack on human

338
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preference over animals in ethics. In particular, the idea that humanity holds a special,
superior position over the rest of nature is frequently challenged in this new view.
Darwin’s evolution means that man is no longer viewed as a special creation—the image
of God, but rather, man is now viewed as merely another animal among many. This
paradigm shift is seen by its proponents as undermining the long moral tradition of
Christian ethics, which views man as inherently more valuable than the rest of nature.
A foundational element in the attack against Christian ethics is Lynn White’s
charge that the Judeo-Christian view of human dominion over nature is responsible for
much of our current ecological problems. Historically, there is a strong history of
Christian thinkers declaring the superior moral value of humans over animals and the rest
of nature, extending from the early church fathers through the medieval period, and into
the twentieth century. This history includes statements by key Christian theologians and
thinkers seemingly justifying the exploitation of nature as a fundamental right of man,
regardless o f the consequences to non-human creatures and the inanimate world.
In addition, the more secular influence of Francis Bacon’s imperative to use the
powers o f science to regain human dominion over nature helped fuel both secular and
theological thought from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Bacon’s
influence is evident in some works by Boyle, Hale, Derham, Mather, and even the
Puritans, who had a strong theology of divine imperative to subdue the wilderness and
harness its resources for human benefit. By the nineteenth century, there was increasing
reaction and opposition to this dominionist theology which was expressed by thinkers
such as Francis Wayland, John Muir, and Henry Thoreau. The twentieth century brought
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an even stronger reaction in Lynn White’s criticism of Christianity’s tradition of
emphasis on the dominion of man over nature. A number of Christian thinkers reacted
to White’s charges, proposing a more balanced view of human dominion, casting it in
terms of stewardship instead of exploitative power. For the issue of evolution and
ethics, however, it was not until the early 1970s that a major breakthrough came in the
form of a movement to discredit Christian morality on the basis of an evolutionary view
o f man’s relationship with nature.
It was around 1970 that the Oxford Group brought the moral status of animals into
mainstream philosophical discussion. One fruit of this development was the invention of
the term “speciesism” to describe the arbitrary favoring of one species’s interests over
another. Speciesism was presented as being in the same moral genre as racism and
sexism, with particular emphasis being focused against placing human interests over the
interests o f non-humans. The new, anti-speciesist movement called for a major moral
revolution which would abolish the old, traditional morality and replace it with a new one
that was not inherently speciesist. Darwin’s evolution plays a key role in the antispeciesist argumentation, on the basis of the evolutionary belief that man is merely
another, albeit highly developed animal in this world and is thus not entitled to any
special privileges based solely on the fact of being human. Thus, the animal rights issues
serves as a convenient foil for exploring the relationship between evolution and ethics.
A core argument in the animal rights movement is the idea that the animals and
man are evolutionary kin, with a leading proponent of this model being Richard Dawkins.
Dawkins argues that traditional morality is based on what he calls “discontinuous
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thinking.” Discontinuous thinking is a form of thinking in which an individual needs to
categorize everything into separate, unrelated categories. Thus, in traditional morality,
humans are a discontinuous species, having no relation to other species. The chasm
perceived to exist between humans and animals is the foundation of promoting a
sacrosanct protection of anything classified as human, including embryos. For Dawkins,
then, we must carry out a moral revolution by replacing the discontinuous view of man
and nature, with a continuous one based on the data of Darwin’s theory.
The new perspective is illustrated in Dawkins’s concept of the “ring species.” The
concept is illustrated by following the geographic change in a particular species of sea
gull around the world, thus creating a geographic circle, or ring. In Dawkins’s example,
the two ends of the ring meet in England with two species of gulls that cannot interbreed,
yet constitute two ends of one continuous line of interrelated species. At any point in the
ring, one species can interbreed with the neighboring species segment, but no further.
This is used to argue that humans are in ring-species relationship with the animals,
especially certain apes. Thus, while the incremental relationship between man and ape is
too wide for interbreeding, the apes are in our ring-species group and should not be
discriminated against on the basis of speciesist rationale. The new attitude is mandated
by the new “continuous” view of man and ape. Physical kinship is thought to imply
moral kinship as well. Thus, the call is made to go beyond animal welfare to animal
rights.
This kinship-based morality has some key moral implications of significance to
Christian ethics. First, rights are viewed as possessed on the basis of quantitative

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

342
criteria—functional abilities—instead of on qualitative grounds—possession of abstract
qualities (such as membership in a species group such as human beings). Second, this
means that there is no absolute ground of ethical principles, mores, or norms. All
morality becomes relativist in order to be able to continue to adapt and evolve with man
and nature. Third, not only is morality relative, but, if Ruse is right, our moral sense
might be a totally arbitrary invention of our genes. Thus it has been asserted that there
can be no absolute foundation for ethics.
To further establish their point, the issue of potential transgenic breeding of human
with non-human creatures is used to bolster the argument that rights cannot be based on
species membership (i.e., being human). Transgenic breeding begs the question, “How
many human genes must a creature have to be considered human?” Thus, the possibility
of this practice is used as evidence to blur the boundaries between human and animal,
thus making a speciesist basis for grounding moral protection impossible.
To replace the species criterion, many thinkers have proposed some form of
functional criterion to mark the boundaries of moral protection. A favorite proposal,
based on Bentham’s principle of Hedonism, is the sentiency criterion—the ability to feel
pain. In this model, pain is essentially equated with suffering, so any organism capable
of suffering deserves moral protection. Thus, the painist approach to grounding rights
exhibits a strong affinity to utilitarian ethics.
The utilitarian tendencies of the animal rights movement may help fuel an alternate
argument for grounding rights, known as the marginal cases argument. In its simplest
form, proponents of the argument, including Rachels, assert that since “marginal”
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humans—humans exhibiting less than typical development (for example, a person with
Down’s Syndrome)— are recognized to have moral status, then animals demonstrating a
similar level of developmental function should logically be included in the circle of
moral protection. Thus, many animals should have similar rights to those granted to
humans. The intended purpose of this argument is to elevate the rights of animals.
However, the argument can be equally effective in reverse: Since animals do not have
rights, marginal humans, whose functional level is no higher than the animals, would lose
their moral protection. Thus, the marginal-cases criterion does not guarantee that the
moral status of animals will be elevated, but rather leaves a door open to devalue human
rights.
The animal rights movement provides a convenient foil for bringing out some key
implications of Darwin’s evolution for ethics, but it offers no prescriptive, organized
system of ethics based on Darwinism. Thus the significance o f James Rachels. Rachels
offers the foundations of a proposed moral system based on Darwin’s theory, and he does
so by explicitly comparing and contrasting his proposed ethics with Christian ethics. His
central premise is that Christian ethics restricts morality to the protection of human
interests. This anthropological focus is said to be supported by two conceptual pillars.
The first pillar, which Rachels calls the “image of God thesis,” is that humans are entitled
to moral protection because they are fundamentally different from, and superior to,
animals because they are the image of God. For Rachels, this sense o f human specialness
is further bolstered by theological concepts such as God giving man special guidance in
prescribing a moral code, God giving periodic prophetic guidance to humans, and by the
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plan of salvation which seems to save only man while excluding animals.
The second pillar is the “rationality thesis,” which argues that humans possess the
capacity to reason while animals do not. Therefore, humans are entitled to a greater level
of moral privilege than animals.
For Rachels, if man evolved, then he cannot be an image of God. Furthermore, he
appeals to “Humes guillotine” to argue that even if man is the image of God, it does not
mean that humans ought to get moral preference over the animals. Additionally, Rachels
appeals to the problem o f evil, used by Darwin and others, to argue that the prevalence of
natural evil is incompatible with the existence of the God of traditional biblical and
Christian theology. This brings Rachels to the “philosophical nerve” of Christian
ethics—teleology, that is, divine design. Rachels argues that evolution is incompatible
with Christian thinking because the former rejects teleology while the latter ties morality
to a divine design and prescription. He bolsters his argument against teleology by
invoking the problem of evil: There is too much natural evil in the world to be
compatible with the Christian idea of God. If there is a God, at best He can be like the
God of the deists, and such a God is not robust enough to support traditional biblical and
Christian morality. Both the denial of design and the argument from evil are seen as
undermining the image-of-God-thesis. Rachels also argues that the existence of God is
antithetical to morality, as he believes that submission to God violates our moral sense
and freedom. Thus true morality cannot be connected to religion. Instead it can only be
founded on the principles o f teleology, with right and wrong being solely determined by
consequences.
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Rachels also argues that evolution undermines the rationality thesis. This is
because, from an evolutionary perspective, reason developed incrementally, and thus, the
issue is not one of quality—we have reason and animals do not—but rather, one of
quantity— both animals and man have reason, but man has a higher quantity. Since the
animals have some levels of reason (or intelligence), this blurs the boundary between
animals and humans, making it impossible to make a moral distinction based on
possession o f reason. Having satisfied himself that evolution effectively topples the two
pillars supporting Christian ethics, Rachels turns to developing a new morality without
human specialness.
Rachels proposes to replace traditional ethics with a system he calls “Moral
Individualism.” In this approach to ethics, rights are granted solely on the capacities and
abilities found in the individual. Species membership is of no moral significance. Each
individual stands alone, receiving no benefit or detriment in moral protection from others.
Central to this new approach is the dictum that every individual deserves equal
consideration o f interests, which Rachels calls “the principle of equality.” Differences in
treatment between individuals are appropriate when justified by good reasons. Thus, a
blind man cannot be an aircraft controller, but a hypothetical ape who can read, write,
and has good test scores, plus a solid academic track record, could not be rejected from
law school because it is an ape, not a human.
In addition to the principle of equality, Rachels proposes a second pillar for
supporting his new ethics—the concept of being the biographical “subject-of-a-life.”
Biological life is only o f value to one who is alive if they can prefer life over death.
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Thus, a certain level of self-awareness is needed to be the subject-of-a-life. Being the
subject-of-a-life is the primary criterion Rachels offers for determining the boundary for
moral protection. Thus a shrimp is not a subject-of-a-life while dogs, apes, and other
more developed animals are subjects-of-a-life and entitled to moral protection alongside
humans. Rachels illustrates the implication of such an ethics with the assertion that a
healthy ape could be entitled to more rights than a comatose human. It is also on the
grounds of the subjects-of-a-life criterion that he advocates abortion and some cases of
euthanasia.
In ensuing publications, Rachels expands moral individualism into a form of
utilitarian ethics. Again, he stays committed to “morality without human hubris.” Rights
are still merited by the individual, not granted by a moral authority, and provisions are
made for making exceptions to the general moral prescriptions provided by his proposed
system. Rachels tries to avoid the cold, sometimes counter-intuitive claims of pure
Utilitarianism by arguing for “Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism,” in which certain
intuitive attractions to forms o f love and loyalty that might violate a purely Utilitarian
ethics are viewed as indirectly contributing to the greater good. Thus the mother caring
for her child while another suffers, helps produce a good society, so the short-term utility
seems compromised but the long-term utility is enhanced.
Rachels proposes an overall concept o f a satisfactory moral system. First, a
satisfactory moral system must take into account the “facts” of human nature as revealed
by Darwinian evolution. Thus, since humans are relative newcomers on the evolutionary
scene, they are not entitled to claim special privileges over other creatures. This means a
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satisfactory moral system will take into account the evolutionary development of our
powers of reason, which are defined in terms of piecing together the chain of causes and
effects. Thus, evolution means that ethics must be based on consequential reasoning. An
action is good if it produces good consequences. This is what produces the utilitarian
tendencies in his ethics.
The second major characteristic derives from the denial of human specialness. It
asserts that everyone’s interests must receive equal consideration, though equal treatment
is not guaranteed. Rachels couches this equal consideration of interests in a heavily
Utilitarian context, which opens the possibility of injustice being perpetrated in the name
of the greater good.
To solve the potential justice problem, Rachels offers a third characteristic of a
satisfactory moral system. It is the principle of just deserts: each individual deserves to
be treated according to his previously and freely chosen behaviors. This is the principle
used to govern and justify exceptions to the second premise that we need to treat
everyone’s interests alike. These three premises or principles are the governing
principles of his alternative to Christian ethics, and were chosen on the basis of his
explicit attempt to make ethics compatible with Darwin’s theory of evolution.
I then turned to the task of analyzing the implications for ethics that were claimed
for evolution. I suggested that evolutionary kinship was an arbitrary criterion that may
commit the naturalistic fallacy. I then turned to analyze painism and discovered several
problems with this proposed criterion. These challenges include the fact that some pain
is good and necessary, manifold problems with objectively assessing pain, and the
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assumption that pain is the equivalent o f suffering. Another conundrum for the painist is
predation. Why is it immoral for a man to kill and eat a zebra while it is moral for the
lion to do so? The zebra experiences pain and suffering either way. I suggested that
painism may be grounded largely in emotivism.
Next, I examined the marginal cases-argument. We saw that the marginal-cases
argument is grounded in the intent to elevate the moral status of animals. However, there
is nothing to prevent the unintended effect of devaluing the rights of marginal humans
instead o f strengthening the moral protection of animals. Furthermore, Saletan used the
marginal-cases argument to refute Singer’s apparent justification of bestiality by saying
that this defense of the practice implies approval of sexual relations with marginal
humans since neither animals nor marginal humans are capable of giving informed
consent. Thus the marginal-cases argument can be a two-edged sword that slices deeper
than expected or intended. It further seems that basing rights on marginal cases bases
moral duties on extreme cases. Normal life becomes regulated by morals grounded in
highly abnormal scenarios, and thus seems less than prudent. Finally, the marginal-cases
argument seems to assume human preference in ethics, thus the belief that it will elevate
animals instead of devalue humans. But this assumption is anomalous with the antispeciesist context in which the argument is offered.
My next task was directly analyzing Rachels’s challenge to Christian ethics. I first
examined some challenges to his ethics of moral individualism. One criticism is that
such an individualist focus makes it virtually impossible to recognize or deal with moral
issues related to groups or populations. Thus, moral individualism leads to an
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isolationist morality where the interrelationships between individuals can become
morally minimized.
For example, why should bestiality be viewed as aberrant if species membership
carries no moral significance? This point was also illustrated by news story concerning a
man who claimed to be married to a dog. If species membership does not matter, then
the man and the dog, viewed purely individually, could theoretically be suited for a
transgenic marriage. We would have no grounds to argue that such a practice would
violate any design or order, for the bizarreness of the case is precisely rooted in species
significance. Furthermore, such an argument mimics Rachels’s tendencies to establish
ethical principles based on highly unusual and extreme cases.
Being the subject-of-a-life was the next item considered. First, we noted that
Rachels seems to have used a concept invented by Tom Regan, yet he never credits
Regan as the source of his idea, even though Regan is cited regularly by Rachels. This
seems to be a grievous omission on the part of Rachels. It calls into question the veracity
of his other, seemingly original contributions.
We then observed that the subjects-of-a-life criterion seemed quite Kantian,
expanding the concept of “persons” who are not to be used as means to an end. We
further noted that the criterion of being the subject-of-a-life at first seems to avoid the
pitfalls of an ethics based in the individual’s functionality, but instead, turns out be
ground rights in present functions and capacities after all. Most notably, to be a subjectof-a-life requires minimum levels of intelligence, self-awareness, memory, reason, and
more. Thus this criterion becomes subject to the criticisms leveled against grounding
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rights in personal functions and development. Furthermore, we saw criticisms leveled
against this view, charging that it is inherently subjective, for the subjects-of-a-life
standard is grounded in the concept of biographical life which is self-chosen, instead of
biological life which is mere existence. Thus, one can lose his chosen biographical life
and wish to no longer live even though the biological organism is in fine condition. This
would make other characteristics and relationships insignificant in that loss of one’s
chosen “life” could be used to justify suicide, thus impacting others in the individual’s
matrix o f relationships. Finally, such a view seems to quickly digress into rank
subjectivism.
We also saw it argued that the subjects-of-a-life criterion is inherently unstable.
What happens if one becomes comatose so that they are no longer the conscious subjectof-a-life? At this point, the individual is no longer able to express a preference to remain
alive or not. The decision must be made by an external party. But if rights are based on
being the subject-of-a-life, then how can the comatose qualify as having rights? Based
on the current capacities, there is no reason to recognize rights and maintain life. Thus it
might even be possible to justify killing or to conduct experimentation on the persistently
comatose.
Finally, the subject-of-a-life criterion seems to discredit the obvious
interrelationship between biological life and biographical life. You cannot have the
second without the first and thus there is a holistic dimension to these two aspects of life.
Because of this holism, any decline in functionality would mean a decline in moral value
and protection.
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The issue of grounding rights was thus raised and examined. The current
proponents of animal rights give a conflicting picture of the grounding of rights. Ryder
sees rights as a merely psychological, though useful, function. But if rights are merely a
figment o f our imaginations, a fictitious invention, why should we take them seriously or
impute them to animals? Another problem was the admission by Godlivitch that rights
are ultimately grounded on unprovable presuppositions. This is complicated by the fact
that appeals to functions, such as feeling pain, presuppose a minimum level of
intelligence to be able to understand and interpret pain.
We examined Rawls attempt to counter the functional model with his “original
position” model. Here, we are to imagine we are in an “original position” not knowing
how we shall fare in life, and thus we should determine moral actions apart from
perceived self-interest based on one’s personal station in life. Rawls’s purpose is to
bypass the marginal-cases argument by determining right and wrong apart from direct,
personal circumstance. However, Rawls provides no good reason to accept his original
position approach to morality, and he merely pushes functionality back into a
hypothetical original position in which ignorance of the future is supposed to check
selfishness.
All this wrangling over the grounding of rights seems to miss one key point:
Animals can have moral protection without having to possess rights. Having rights is no
guarantee that the free exercise of them will be permitted, nor is there any assurance they
will be respected. Further, even if we argue that animals do not have rights, this is no
license to treat them however we please. I argued that we can have moral obligations to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

352
animals through an indirect duty to someone else, such as an owner, or even God. The
claims o f God to own all things in this world would imply some duty to God in reference
to how we treat His world and its creatures.
Having looked at some of the positions related to Rachels, we turned our attention
to analyzing Rachels’s proposals. We noted that in The Elements o f Moral Philosophy,
Rachels’s use o f evolution in shaping ethical theory seemed almost trite. Evolution is
treated as a fact and not a theory, and the resulting claim that humans have no right to
claim moral priority is based on a seniority argument—as relative latecomers, humans
have no right to make high claims of privilege. The same volume affirms the
consequentialist tendencies of Rachels, thus placing his ethics in traditional teleological
theories such as Utilitarian ethics. We noted that these theories have deep intuitive
appeal but that Rachels fails to address two key limits of teleological ethics. First, there
is no assurance that the good intended in an action will actually come to fruition. An
action can be immoral due to its consequences in spite of motive. Second, there are
multiple problems with trying to forecast consequences. The further into the future we
forecast, the lower the accuracy. Furthermore, it is debatable as to how far into the future
one must try to forecast consequences in order to assure a moral outcome.
Another issue claimed by Rachels in The Elements o f Moral Philosophy is that
ethics should be based on reason alone. However, we saw that Singer observed that
reason alone does not have to be ethical. One can be simultaneously rational and
unethical. Thus reason alone is an insufficient guide to determining what is moral and
immoral. Reason is important, but it is not all-important.
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A final element from The Elements o f Moral Philosophy which I analyzed was the
norm of treating people as they deserve. For Rachels, justice means giving people their
just deserts based on their freely chosen behaviors. But this means Rachels can have no
corresponding concept of grace or forgiveness as found in Christianity. Rachels intends
this criterion to be used to govern exceptions to the rule that we must equally consider
everyone’s interests. However, it seems that exceptions can be easily made, thus
bypassing his foundational criteria in authority. Second, his proposal of developing a
personal “optimal list” of moral standards for oneself raises problems because of the
inherent subjectivity in the concept. Personal lists can vary widely and thus no universal
norm can be established. Yet morality assumes a universally binding obligation. How
can there be any moral authority without moral obligation being universal?

Rachels’s

proposal weakens morality by making it relative only to the individual. Why should one
person accept another’s moral opinion as authoritative? Rachels is situationally sensitive
but in the process subverts the ability to have any universally binding moral standards.
Third, this view would seem to contradict his subjects-of-a-life criterion in Created from
Animals, for the shrimp and infant have not freely chosen their conditions, yet are
essentially punished by exclusion from the morally protected.
The core o f Rachels’s work, however, centered in its relationship to Christian
ethics, and this is Rachels special contribution to the debate on how evolution impacts
ethics. I argued that Rachels identification o f teleology as the philosophical nerve of
evolution is especially important, and saw several other authors who concurred. The
genius of Rachels argument is that it asks why, assuming the truth of evolution, God
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would avoid design in the natural world while employing it in the moral sphere.
Furthermore, if morality is the product of evolution which has no design, then there can
be no design in morality either. Ultimately, this argument is based on the problem of
evil, first raised by Hume in the eighteenth century. The argument, that the presence of
natural evil implies either that God is good, but not all-powerful, or that God is allpowerful, but not good, has been oft repeated between Hume and Rachels with the
apparent assumption that it is irrefutable.
We saw several attempts to answer this objection including the arguments that
natural evil is a necessary by-product of granting moral freedom to humans, that
suffering can be a means to accomplishing a greater good, the Great Controversy motif
(which introduces multiple wills into the equasion), and the problem o f excess good in
the world. This led to an examination o f Darwinian theism and how it handles the
problem of evil.
The evolutionary theologians, such as John F. Haught, and other theologians
influenced by evolution, such as Julian Casserley, solve the problem o f evil by restricting
God’s power in order to save His goodness. Haught acknowledges the influence of
process theology in his work. A number of problems for traditional Christian theology
are generated by evolutionary theology. Beyond the basic claim o f God being limited in
power to preserve His goodness, evolutionary theology claims God is hidden,
panentheistically in nature, and that this presence in nature is what lures evolution along.
Furthermore, the master paradigm for how God relates to the universe is seen in the
kenosis—Christ’s emptying of Himself. Thus, God’s love is so non-coercive he had to
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create by a totally random process in order to preserve the absolute freedom of creation,
and God incarnates Himself into all of nature. God’s hidden presence in nature means
He feels all the tragedy and evil that happens since the material universe is His body.
God is also depicted as a mother instead of a father, salvation becomes something of a
deification and absorption into the divine, and biblical eschatology is openly denied.
Interestingly, human preference is rejected and God’s feeling of all that happens in the
cosmos is used as a reason to give animals rights.
The significance o f evolutionary theology is that it validates Rachels’s claim that a
theism which embraces evolution cannot depict a God robust enough to support
traditional Christian morality. Furthermore, the work o f Wiker and Hunter shows us that
evolution is a metaphysical system of thought, based on an Epicurean cosmology which
needs no God. Wiker asserts that cosmologies always affect morality, and that if
Christianity is mixed with Darwinism, the evolutionary cosmology will eventually
overturn theology and ethics. This is a cosmological war. I finally suggested that Rachels
pinpointed several areas of potential conflict between Christianity and evolution, but that
he focused only on the cosmological implications related to origins. I suggested that he
could have gone further, tracing the effect of no teleology on the veracity of the ten
commandments, the plan of salvation, and on eschatology.
As an extension of the theological issues, I returned to Rachels’s assertion that the
existence of God is antithetical to morality. First, I suggested that Rachels’s argument
against the compatibility is based in a view of human dignity which he has tried to
undermine elsewhere. Second, his understanding of divine sovereignty is a caricature of
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the biblical view, though may be valid in criticizing a Calvinist concept of God’s control
over all. This is more than likely as Rachels only references to Christian theology are
rooted in Augustine and Aquinas. Rachels most significant effort to oust God from
morality is in his use of Euthyphro’s argument found in the works of Plato. The question
is raised as to whether good is good because God declared it good, or did God choose it
because it is already good. This would seem to leave only two options for a solution:
Either God is arbitrary and hence His goodness is undermined, or there is an independent
standard o f good higher than God, thus H is not supreme. Neither solution is useful to
the Christian’s faith.
I proposed that divine foreknowledge is the solution to this dilemma. In the
biblical model of divine foreknowledge, God knows all the possibilities that may happen,
not just those things that will actually happen. Thus, God, through foreknowledge, can
determine good and evil consequentially from an eternal perspective. He is thus not
arbitrary, yet can speak authoritatively to man on what is good and evil. I proposed that
divine foreknowledge is the foundation of God’s moral authority. But a God compatible
with evolution can have no such foreknowledge, nor can such a deity exercise the level of
governance needed to grant rights to creatures. Thus, evolution essentially demands a
teleological approach to ethics.
Finally, I briefly examined Rachels’s use of Scripture and found it wanting. In
arguing that the Bible teaches that man has despotic dominion over the earth without
need to consider the needs and sufferings of animals, Rachels has missed the biblical
notion of stewardship, which lies at the heart of the indirect duty model mentioned
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earlier. There is much biblical evidence that human dominion was not absolute, but was
restrained within a number of parameters, all of which offered some protection to nature.
Restrictions such as the law of the birdnest, helping your enemy’s beast to stand up under
its burden, and other laws benefitting animals, all point to a limited, not absolute
dominion o f man in the context of being stewards accountable to God.

In short, it

seems Rachels may have nearly created a straw man that he could then tear down.
Nonetheless, the fact that he seeks to build an ethics based on evolution, while
simultaneously showing how evolution undermines Christian ethics, remains a significant
and noteworthy contribution to the discussion.

Conclusions
There are several key conclusions that can be made based on the evidence
examined in this study. First, and foremost, James Rachels is essentially correct in his
analysis o f the impact o f Darwinian evolution on Christian ethics. While he appears to
create a partial straw-man description of Christianity based solely on Augustinian and
Thomist foundations, but also reflecting the dominionist theology of the industrial
revolution, his argument ultimately depends less on those assertions than on concepts
found in the next three conclusions.
Second, possibly Rachels’s greatest contribution is his identification of the
rejection of teleology as the philosophical center of Darwinism. While Rachels used this
rejection of teleology primarily to refute divinely prescribed ethics (including ethics
based on a design in nature), we saw that he could have extended the anti-design
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argument to undermine the ten commandments, the plan of salvation, and biblical
eschatology. If there is no divine design, then there can be no morality based in divine
revelation. Thus, as Rachels, Dawkins, Singer, and others have suggested, evolution
cannot co-exist with an absolutist ethics. Morality must be relative and capable of
evolving with man. Relativism in ethics is a major consequence of Darwin’s theory.
Third, Rachels’s attack on the two key pillars of traditional morality was closely
connected with the lack o f design in evolution. The argument that evolution undermines
the image-of-God thesis by altering our view of man into a highly evolved animal was
especially effective in undermining Christian ethics. This is reflected less precisely in
both the ethics of evolutionary kinship promoted by several, including Richard Dawkins,
and in the ethics o f Peter Singer, particularly his explanation of the traditional rejection
of bestiality as immoral. In short, Rachels has made a strong and effective effort to
eliminate Christian morality and has offered a rational alternative, based in Darwin’s
evolution, which eliminates human preference in ethics.
Fourth, Rachels was also correct in asserting that the kind of theism supportable by
evolution cannot have a God robust enough to support the traditional, Christian system of
morality. While Rachels did not give adequate or substantive evidence to support this
assertion, my study on Evolutionary Theology, as championed by Haught and O’Murchu,
demonstrated the accuracy of Rachels’s assertion. The God of evolutionary theology
cannot be a ruling, sovereign deity for He is depicted as being too non-coercive to act in
that manner. The theory o f divine action espoused by Haught, O'Murchu, and others
means God cannot have a kingdom, conduct a judgment, or intervene in natural events.
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As in Process Theology, God Himself is an evolving being and not absolute. Why, then,
should morality be absolute? Thus Rachels leaves us with a strong tendency to moral
relativism, which was demonstrated both in Dawkins’s kinship ethics, and in Ruse’s
assertion that morality is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes. The Christian
moralist should recognize catastrophic implications for Christian morality in such
relativism.
Fifth, the grounding of Process Theology on evolution is also significant, not only
because God is no longer viewed as an absolute being, but also because of its
implications on divine foreknowledge. I have argued that divine foreknowledge is the
key to refuting the Euthyphro argument. In this sense, I agree with Rachels that good and
evil are determined consequentially. However, man can never have the knowledge
needed to accurately determine good and evil because, in part, he cannot accurately
foretell the future. This would mean, therefore, that foreknowledge of all possible events
and choices is the foundational quality that makes God a moral authority possessing both
the ability and the right to prescribe to finite creatures what is good and what is evil, for
He alone has the consequential knowledge needed to determine moral standards. Neither
Plato nor Rachels accounts for this possibility. It is especially significant that
professedly Bible-believing Christians are generating interpretations of Scripture that
question at least some o f God’s capacity to foreknow—especially in the matter of future
free-will choices by created beings. The similarity of such a view to that o f evolutionary
theology is astounding. Both have a limited God in the name o f love—love being
defined in terms of giving absolute freedom to creatures to the point that God is either
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limited by nature or by His choice. But to limit God’s foreknowledge is to limit His
moral authority and makes Christian morality vulnerable to the Euthyphro challenge. If
God cannot know future, free-will decisions, then it seems that He would only be an
authority in matters of natural evil. He could no longer be an authority in moral good and
evil because He, Himself, cannot know the consequences of our choices, and thus, the
outcome of human choices could surprise even God.
Sixth, it thus seems that Wiker is correct in his assertion that cosmology affects
morality. Since it seems clear that a God compatible with designless evolution is not
robust enough to support biblical or traditional Christian morality, that a final moral
consequence confronts us. If the body of Christ abandons biblical protology—its belief
in biblical creation as recorded in Genesis—and adopts an evolution view of our origins,
then an eventual shift o f morality is inevitable. The first generation or two involved in
such a switch will retain a strong enough sense of tradition that it will keep them from
developing the implications of the conversion to their fullness. With each ensuing
generation, however, the staying power of tradition wanes and the moral implications of
evolution will eventually become more manifest in the Church. A God compatible with
evolution cannot be the source of the prescriptive, absolutist, revelational ethics of
Scripture. Thus, sooner or later, traditional ethics will be undermined.
A seventh conclusion arises. We have seen much vexation over the ground of
rights and moral protections. Various criteria have been suggested by those favoring an
evolutionary world-view. What all these have in common is that rights are based on
some kind of personal capacity or function. This is what fuels the marginal-cases
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argument with its challenges. The variety of criteria seems less to establish rights than to
undermine human preference. Even Rawls’s attempt at grounding rights in the “original
position” is ultimately a functional criterion. The main problem with basing rights on
functionality or capacity is that the moral protection provided is not stable. One can lose
rights quickly through an accident. By contrast, the God of Scripture grants rights to
man, based on His foreknowledge of consequential good and evil, rights granted by a
supreme being are not conditioned on the capacities and functions of the recipient.
Likewise, God can prescribe duties to animals without conferring rights on them, because
ultimately, those duties are to God Himself. When our view of God is weakened as it is
in the evolutionary scenario, however, such a God is not capable of granting rights, and
Christian ethics is, again, undermined. Furthermore, the concept of all men being granted
certain inalienable rights is destroyed.
In addition to these moral implications of Darwin’s theory, I would note two
theological implications of evolution of significance for Christian theology. First, the
view of God promoted by Haught and O’Murchu, in the name o f evolution, seems highly
compatible with Abelard’s Moral Influence theory of atonement. The non-coercive, non
intervening God who feels all our pain, but cannot do anything since action is coercive,
seems a natural match to a God who needs no satisfaction but merely demonstrates His
love to us through the cross in an effort to morally influence us. The point, then, is that
variants of the moral influence theory will have a greater affinity to an evolutionary view
of God than to the biblical understanding of who He is. It thus seems that a theology
based on the moral influence theory would be highly susceptible to being united with the
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panentheism inherent in evolutionary theology.
Second, the strong propensity of evolution to produce panentheist doctrine should
concern biblical Christians. The evolutionary theologians claim that the incarnation of
Christ is not confined merely to humanity, but is an incarnation of God to all of nature.
A similar claim is made by Andrew Linzey. Linzey rejects any interpretation of the
incarnation which would give particular significance to one group such as humans, or one
gender within humanity—that of being male. Linzey asserts concerning the incarnation
that, “far from being God’s Yes to male humanity alone, or male and female humanity,
the incarnation can be viewed as God’s Yes to creation: specifically to fleshly and
sentient life. By becoming flesh, the Logos identifies, according to this paradigm, not
only with humanity but with all creatures of flesh and blood.”1
The idea of an incarnation by Christ to all of nature, however, is an idea which we
have seen to be closely allied with the panentheism proposed in evolutionary theology.
The compatibility o f Evolutionary Theology can adapt both panentheism in general, and
a moral influence soteriology into its system of thought with minimal modifications. It
appears, therefore, that Darwin’s theory has both ethical and theological implications at
great variance to the views held by traditional Christian theologies.
This study has highlighted several key consequences of the theory of Evolution for
biblically based Christian theology and morality. Thus, I have achieved my purpose of
uncovering some o f the implications of protology for ethics. We have seen that,
‘Linzey, “Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?” xvi.
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concerning ethics, it favors ethical relativism and Utilitarianism. Furthermore, Rachels
has rightly shown that evolution undermines the foundational pillars of traditional
Christian ethics rooted in the specialness of humans over the rest of nature. Human
dignity is undermined and rights become grounded in individual capacities and functions,
instead o f being a divine bequest. Theologically Rachels argued that evolution begs an
atheistic orientation, but also argued that any God compatible with evolution is
incompatible with Scripture, this latter point being demonstrated in the works of
evolutionary theologians who limit God’s power in an attempt to preserve His goodness.
Thus, whether by atheism, or by a redefined theism, the only viable moral philosophy
compatible with evolution is one that is teleological. Both in the ethical and theological
realms, Rachels has rightly revealed that evolution eviscerates biblical and orthodox
Christian beliefs and values. We must still recognize, however, that having observed
some of the key implications of evolution for Christian morality and theology, we must
note that there remains much more to do in unpacking the theological and moral
challenges o f Darwin’s theory for Christianity.

Areas for Further Study
It seems, then, that there are several areas of further study that are called for based
on the results o f this endeavor. First, the relationship between divine foreknowledge and
God’s moral authority must be pursued in greater depth. In light of theological
movements such as the Openness of God theology, which clothes itself in the garments of
evangelical Christianity, this is a most urgent need.
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Second, in light of the current emphasis on animal rights, Bible-believing
Christians need to develop a clear theology of animals, based on the principles and
methods o f sola Scriptura faith. Some work has been done, but mostly from a more
liberal Christian orientation. Thus, the task remains for Bible-believing scholars to
address this issue more comprehensively.
Third, there needs to be an effort made to produce an approach to ethics based on
the biblical doctrine of Creation. It would appear that the Wisdom literature contains
some moral counsels rooted in creation.1 Likewise, Jesus made an ethical application to
marriage and divorce based on the creation design. In the ten commandments, the fourth
commandment makes a strong appeal to creation, and may have implications concerning
the other nine. Such data need to be gathered and developed in a systematic fashion.
Fourth, the potential relationship between the moral influence view of atonement
and evolutionary theology needs further exploration. Does the apparent fact that the
moral influence view can blend so easily into evolutionary theology have significant
implications for biblically based Christian theology? Is it possible that the probable
ability of the moral influence theory to so easily integrate with an unbiblical theology
have any implications for the biblical veracity with the theory?
•See Craig G. Bartholomew, “A Time for War, and a Time for Peace: Old
Testament Wisdom, Creation and O’Donovan’s Theological Ethics,” in A Royal
Priesthood? The Use o f the Bible Ethically and Politically: A Dialogue with Oliver
O ’Donovan (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), 91-94, where he develops the position
that the biblical Wisdom Literature is an ethics based in creation, based on a survey of
well-known Old Testament scholars.
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Finally, at the more practical level, greater effort must be made to ground professed
Bible-believing Christians in biblical morality. The influence of evolution is such that
relativism is creeping into Christian morality from the grass-roots level, partly because
the Church assumes a depth o f spirituality that may be lacking. The moral implications
of evolution can slip into the church through non-scholarly means and alter the courses of
both theology and morality. Darwin’s theory appears to have much deeper implications
than many recognize.
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